Sodden and limp

In the aftermath of the British withdrawal from Sangin, we have considerable media comment, and a huge contrast of styles. Up front is the ponderous – some might say pompous - Max Hasting, in The Daily Mail. He says: "Blame the generals and politicians for this mess. But our soldiers can hold their heads up high."

Then we have the gung-ho Sun which blares: "Sangin: Our Boy's blood, their efforts, their victory." And just to make sure we get the message, it has that great strategist Andy McNab, who is now the "Sun Security Adviser". Continuing the joke, he tells us:

I AM fed up with armchair generals who say the handover of Sangin to US Forces is a British retreat. That is 100 per cent crap. We have moved out because at long last the 20,000 US 'boots on the ground' finally arrived.

The Scotsman has Clive Fairweather telling us that the handover is a sensible redeployment of our troops ... not a retreat. He then retreats behind a "premium" paywall, so we never get to see what he really thinks. And we care less.

In The Daily Telegraph we get some sensible pieces from Thomas Harding, but it is more reportage than analysis. And that is what is missing – decent analysis.

You couldn't call Hasting's piece "decent" analysis. His is lightweight extruded verbal material. You unroll it, tear it off by the yard and paste it in to fill the space. I'm getting rather bored with his pontificating.

I was mightily cheered, however, by an extract from Michael Foot's biography of Aneurin Bevan, who commented on the wartime coverage of military affairs – the Second World War, that is. "Immediately on the outbreak of war," he wrote, "England was given over to the mental level of the Boys' Own Paper and the Magnet". He continues:

The Childrens Hour has been extended to cover the whole of British broadcasting, and the editors of the national dailies use treacle instead of ink. If one can speak of a general mind in Britain at all just now, it is sodden and limp with the ceaseless drip of adolescent propaganda.

At least we can take some comfort in having been there before. I devoted a considerable amount of effort into evaluating the situation at Sangin in Defence of the Realm and was particularly proud of this and this.

But with a nation given over to a second childhood, still "sodden and limp with the ceaseless drip of adolescent propaganda," such grown-up analysis is a complete waste of time and energy. How much easier it is to cheer "Our Boys" to the rafters, and celebrate yet another victory.

COMMENT THREAD

Another great victory

Most of the papers carry the "news " today, that British forces have scored yet another great victory in the global war on terrorism, handing over the now pacified town of Sangin to the grateful forces of his excellency president Karzai, who will now extend his kindly rule over the friendly and prosperous inhabitants of this bustling market town.

This victory follows in the great tradition of recent campaigning in Afghanistan, where British forces can now add Sangin to the growing list of towns and settlements pacified, which include Now Zad, Musa Qala and Kajaki, and where the US forces can only stand back and admire the sheer skill, dedication and fortitude of the UK military and its leaders.

The template for this success, however, was undoubtedly forged in recent times by the experience in Iraq, where the British military brought us the stunning success of the al Amarah campaign, followed by its storming success in Basra, which has earned the undying gratitude of the Iraqi people – those that survived the experience.

But for those who think such successes are recent, we need to look back 70 years where, this weekend we were able to celebrate another great victory where the RAF so successfully beat off the German air force that the citizens of London and elsewhere in the UK only had to endure another eight months of bombing and a few tens of thousands dead and injured – plus hundreds of thousands of homes and properties destroyed - as the Luftwaffe roamed almost without challenge in the barely-defended night-time skies.

And so the lessons of the past transfer to the future. Says Sir Stephen Dalton, the current Chief of Air Staff, "winning the Battle of Britain was vital to the overall outcome of the war ... Unless we had control of the skies over Britain we could not build up the forces ready to liberate Europe later on."

"That is entirely relevant today," he adds. "Without the freedom of the skies in Afghanistan there would need to be 10 times the number of soldiers and marines on the ground to achieve the same effect." And as with the Luftwaffe of the past, we only have to count the wrecks of the Taliban air force to know how true this is.

We are so lucky that we have such wise and foresighted leaders who will guide us on the path to yet more and better glorious victories in the mould of Sangin. And the Afghanis simply don't realise how lucky they are that we happened along at just the right time to save them and their beautiful country.

COMMENT THREAD

Cannon fodder

Another two Brits have been killed in Helmand. One was a Royal Marine and the other was a trooper from the Royal Dragoon Guards.

The Marine was on foot patrol in the Sangin district, while the Trooper was a member of the Brigade Reconnaissance Force, part of a dismounted patrol that was providing security to enable new roads and security bases to be constructed to the north-east of Gereshk. Both succumbed to IEDs.

This brings total British military deaths in Afghanistan to 320, less than a month after the three-century milestone had been reached. That puts the current annual death rate at close to 280 and makes it highly probable that the figure of 400 will be reached before the end of the year – unless there in a dramatic change in operational tempo.

In due course, there will be another street exhibition in Wooton Basset, and we are not alone in wondering whether the displays here are getting out of hand. What happened, for instance, to quiet dignity and the famous British "stiff upper lip"?

Moreover, while it is always tragic to see lives cut short, the campaign in Afghanistan has been going on long enough for soldiers to know what they are letting themselves in for. They either joined the armed forces in that knowledge or have not sought to remove themselves from harm's way.

Either way, the Army and the top brass do not seem to be mightily concerned about the losses, otherwise they might be doing something to prevent them, instead of indulging in back-covering propaganda. One does wish, therefore, that the Army spokesman would learn some new lines to go on the press releases when fatalities are announced.

Of the latest casualty, "... tragically he was struck by an explosion," says Lt-Col James Carr-Smith. "His courage, sacrifice and selfless commitment will never be forgotten." But of course it will. If he has any next of kin in Army quarters, the papers for eviction are already being prepared. The pay termination notice applied before even the body was cool.

We need to be a little bit more honest here, and call these men what they are – cannon fodder. Whatever their own personal delusions, they are only dying to cover the backs of Mr Cameron and Mr Fox, while they work out a suitable face-saving formula to cover their political embarrassment at announcing a defeat. That honesty might focus a few minds and get us out a little faster.

The pic shows soldiers en route to Afghanistan on the last roulement, in the belly of a C-17. More than three times the number visible will have returned in coffins by the end of the year. At least they get a little more space on the way back, and a car to meet them at the airport.

COMMENT THREAD

Even stupid people deserve better

"We have this old adage," says Captain Anthony Harris of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (pictured): "70% skills and drills, 20% equipment, 10% luck". He goes on to say, "Unfortunately that's quite a large percentage for luck. You can overplay blame. We just happened to take the patrol on that path on that day."

This is after the man has been blown up in Helmand while riding in the commander's seat in a Jackal – as recorded by The Guardian. But the point is that it isn't an "old adage" – it is the sort of crap they are taught in soldier school by people who should know better.

What is more, some officers seem to believe what they are told, without complaint – this one still believing it after the trauma of amputation. That's why they get blown up in the first place, and keep getting blown up - yet they keep repeating the mantras ... skills 'n' drills, skills 'n' drills, skills 'n' drills ... BAMMMMMMMMM!

Compare and contrast with this - Lt-Col Roly Walker's experience of getting blown up. He is riding in a Mastiff and survives uninjured. "I always thought it was a case of 'when' not 'if' we drove over an IED," he says afterwards.

No doubt, Col Walker has his own "old adage": "100% equipment", as long as it's called a Mastiff. If you want to live, fly Mastiff. The problem is that, after the event, even after they have been blown up, some of our less intellectual people are still not putting two and two together: "I am sat over the wheel," Harris says. "The blast goes off underneath the wheel, the shockwave goes through the metal ...". Doh!

You do wonder what it takes to get the message through when, as here in September 2007, we have the Jackal being paraded, alongside Gen Dannatt telling us: "the mounting death toll in the country should not overshadow the success forces were having on the ground." The troops, he then said, "are winning the tactical battle".

Well, three years later, they're still winning the tactical battle, the ones that are still alive and in one piece - and Dannatt is collecting his pension. But his troops, after winning that tactical battle (again and again and again ...), are also pulling out of Sangin with more than 100 dead, mostly to IEDs, with three times that number very badly injured.

And that's why the MoD under the new Cleggeron adminstration are spending £45 million on another 140 Jackals. That's so we can have another batch of young men (and the occasional women) to sit over the wheels of these insane vehicles - and they too can lose their legs, or even their lives. But hey! Skills 'n' drills, skills 'n' drills ... keep taking the mantras. These prosthetics are really good when you get used to them.

But you do also wonder why newspapers, instead of doing soft-focus, human interest stories, don't point out that so many of these deaths and injuries are entirely unnecessary, brought about by enhanced stupidity, bolstered by bad tactics, misleading training, blind faith - and duff equipment.

Even stupid people and Army officers (where there is a difference) deserve better than that.

COMMENT THREAD

You can't say it's a victory

The British withdrawal from Sangin was formally announced yesterday by defence secretary Liam Fox to parliament. The date set for their departure is October. In the meantime, the theatre reserve battalion from Cyprus is to be deployed in the district, responsibility for which is to be handed to US forces.

This is the first major contribution by the Cleggeron administration to the conflict in Afghanistan, and one which is being interpreted as a major turning point which Kim Sengupta, writing in The Indpendent thinks makes it now America's war.

In some quarters, this move is being regarded as a defeat. The view of Col Richard Kemp, writing for Channel 4 News is that the Taliban would certainly attempt to present it as a defeat. Parallels are being drawn with our humiliating withdrawal from Basra, although the Americans reject the comparison.

Perhaps it has more in common with the retreat from al Aamarah, where an ill-equipped Army abandoned a city torn by tribal strife, not fully understanding the dynamics in which they had become involved. Certainly, Richard Norton-Taylor, in The Guardian, remarks that British intelligence had been unable to get a grip on the tribal structure in the area, making it hard to cut deals with the key players and therefore protect UK forces.

This is unsurprising as the tribal mix is unusually complex even for Afghanistan, and further complicated by the presence of the Alakozai tribe and the long-standing feud with Ishaqzai, plus the ever-present Kuchi, who remain a poorly recognised but important component of the insurgency.

Predictably, Richard Dannatt, in his new role as all-purpose media renta-mouth, is also on the case. And it says something of the media that they should continue to lionise a retired commander who has probably contributed more to our tactical if not strategic defeat in Afghanistan than any other man.

By his wilful failure to recognise and deal with the IED threat in a timely fashion, by his sloth in ensuring that sufficient of the right type of UAVs and other surveillance assets were made available in theatre - to say nothing of the helicopters - and particularly by his early misreading of the tactical situation and his espousal of FRES as a suitable weapons system, he ensured that our troops were ill-prepared to counter the threats to which they were exposed.

Nevertheless, the former CGS argues in The Daily Telegraph that since the USMC, now in considerable strength, has assumed operational responsibility for northern Helmand, it makes no sense to have a lone British battlegroup in the middle of the US area. Redeployment is an entirely logical move.

Despite this, he says, some will present the change as the Americans bailing out the Brits and some will choose to see it as the start of a wider British withdrawal.

He too sees the Taliban attempting to claim the move as a tactical victory. And, rather forgetting that he is no longer in the Army, where he can order people around, he states: "Those views cannot be suppressed in a liberal democracy such as ours, but they should not be allowed to gain credibility or traction. It is more important that the move be seen for the sensible development of the campaign that it is."

Whatever Dannatt might declare, there is a sense of defeat. With a multi-national force where contingents from different countries are used to operating side-by-side, there is no overwhelming reason why the British Army cannot work within a US zone. But it has clearly reached a limit to how many men it can feed into the mincer of Sangin, which it has long failed to understand and has had no idea how to deal with it.

Of course, there are those in addition to Dannatt who will seek to defend British performance, especially those who have had the dubious benefit of "being there". But – as we have pointed out here, such campaigns are not won or lost on the ground, but in the offices and minds of strategic commanders and their advisors. And it has long been evident that they have lost the plot.

Patrick Cockburn, in The Independent, argues that British troops were never geared up to make a lasting difference. There were never quite enough British troops to gain permanent control of Sangin, and the Taliban obviously sensed the vulnerability of British troops spread too thinly. Roadside bombs, he writes, could inflict a toll which was difficult to justify in terms of bringing an end to the war.

He is not the only one to argue that we never had enough troops, but we disagree. In just one one example (and there were many more), we showed that the lack of imagination and ponderous tactics led to excessive demands for manpower. Much could have been done, more effectively, with far less.

And nor can anyone assert that we are being wise after the event. We have been nothing if not consistent in our criticism of the lacklustre tactics, the inadequate equipment and the limited strategic vision. You cannot defeat an insurgency in a land of a thousand walls.

Nevertheless, this is not a strategic defeat in the mould of Iraq, where British forces scuttled out of the field of fire, leaving unprepared and ill-equipped indigenous security forces to face the insurgency. This time, the US forces have learnt their lesson.

While even now the British are still talking up their expertise in counterinsurgency, based on their Northern Ireland experience, they are regarded as unreliable, their experience irrelevant (not that they are actually implementing the lessons). They have thus insisted on an orderly hand-over rather than allow a moonlight flit and are now - as always - to do the heavy lifting.

Nor is the military getting any support from the population. Ben Farmer in The Daily Telegraph interviews Haji Akhatar Mohammad, from Bostan Zoi village near Sangin.

He says: "The British had been there for a long time. They were not helpful and there was no good result from them. They didn't understand the people and there was too much fighting." Now, adds the 45-year-old elder, "People are happy the British are moving."

Neither does The Guardian offer any comfort. Sangin's residents, it says, have criticised the planned withdrawal, complaining that four years of fighting have failed to bring peace or development. "The British have failed," says Haji Fazlul Haq, a former town governor. "They could not bring security to the town and that is why they are handing it to the Americans."

This " blunt assessment" says the paper, was shared by other residents who expressed greater confidence in US forces due to take control in November. "The Americans fight harder. I think the Taliban will be afraid of this change of command," said Haji Abdul Wahab, acting director of the peace commission of Helmand, a government body that promotes reconciliation.

Despite this, our military have learned something from Iraq: minor embarrassments like failure can easily be dealt with by removing the word "defeat" from the military vocabulary. They simply substitute words like "redeployment", "reorganisation", "force realignment" or "a sensible redistribution of manpower". This latter phrasing was how 13th Century Fox justified it, having learnt well the art of spin from the Labour government that previously he was so quick to deride

The establishment line, being touted by the BBC is that "the changes being unveiled will improve the effectiveness of the overall military effort." They won't, of course – not without a significant change in strategy and tactics. The US tactics are probably marginally better, but still not good enough and their strategic appreciation is probably as lamentable as that of their British counterparts.

The only significant difference, therefore, is that the US forces are better able to weather the running attrition. With more men in theatre, the number of body bags is not (yet) quite so critical.

That aside, however much British politicians and the military care to dress it up, even Con Coughlin admits it still doesn't look good. The mockery has already started and, if they do manage to avoid the taint of defeat, the military sure as hell cannot claim that this has been a victory.

COMMENT THREAD

It's happened

The 300th soldier has died in Afghanistan.

It is a totally meaningless figure, which includes non-combat deaths – and bears no historical comparison: medevac and surgical procedures are so much better that many who in previous campaigns would have died now survive. Did you know, for instance, that 371 British soldiers died in the "official" Cyprus emergency in 1956?

However, being a "round" number, 300 has a certain magic which means it becomes a media event. I bet the Sundays are seriously pissed off, as they were all waiting – bit like vultures, really, but that's the name of the game – for the single soldier to die and make their day.

Actually, the poor sod was hit by an explosion while on patrol in the Sangin district (Sangin again - the mincer) on 12 June and only died yesterday at the New Queen Elizabeth hospital in Birmingham. One should not be too cynical about this but ...

Anyhow, stand by for a certain amount of media comment on the Afghan war, some of it ill-informed, much of it drivel, with some nuggets buried deep in the mass – but very little of interest from the political blogs. Because it's what I do, I'm going to pull together a number of pieces and offer an analysis later today.

In the meantime, The Independent publishes a leading article about Dave's attempt to wrap himself in glory as a war leader. Flags are not the answer, says the paper.

I agree. There is something tawdry and unwholesome about these artificial displays of emotion and ... whatever. They don't ring true. But then, what does these days. More comment to follow.

COMMENT THREAD

Another one down

NATO says a helicopter has been shot down in the Sangin district. Four troops have been killed. The Taliban claims responsibility.

The Times is reporting that the aircraft was a US Blackhawk, attempting to pick up a British casualty. It came under fire around midday over Forward Operating Base Jackson, near the British-held town of Sangin.

With others, the BBC is reporting that the aircraft was brought down with an RPG and that it crashed in the Sangin district bazaar.

This seems almost an exact re-run of the Mi-26 downing in Sangin last July. It too was brought down by an RPG as it was approaching FOB Jackson - in apparently much the same area.

The current incident follows the recent downing of a Sea King as it came in to land at a checkpoint in Nad-e Ali, also struck by an RPG. The hit was described at the time as a freak "lucky shot." Five soldiers were injured.

However, since the soldiers in this incident are American and it was a US helicopter that was lost - albeit in a British area of operation, coming to the aid of the British - the notoriously parochial British media is barely reporting it.

It would have been a different matter entirely if a British helicopter had been shot down, and four Brits killed - but there you go. Who are we to question the news values of the British media?

COMMENT THREAD

Cameron's War

Although much hailed before the event, getting information on yesterday's meeting of Cameron's national security committee is proving extraordinarily difficult. All we have so far is a very limited statement from a Downing Street spokesman, telling us that: "There were wide-ranging, intensive and productive discussions during the extended session on this, the Government's top foreign policy priority."

"The Prime Minister and the NSC," we are also told, "expressed their great admiration and support for our troops serving in Afghanistan and paid tribute to the essential contribution that they and their civilian colleagues make. The NSC will now continue its work to ensure that the UK does all it can to support the agreed Nato strategy in Afghanistan to succeed."

Separately, we have a report in The Guardian which makes the claim – attributed to officials - that Britain is putting pressure on Afghanistan to assume full responsibility for its own security as soon as possible.

If that is true – and there is no reason why it should not be – it quite possibly represents the ultimate example of hope triumphing over experience, there being any number of accounts which attest to the incompetence of Afghan security forces.

The latest of these comes in the New York Times which describes the Interior Ministry's most promising force, which has been "undercut by drug use, petty corruption and, at times, a lack of commitment in the face of the ordinary hardships and duties of uniformed life."

This piece deserves to be read in full but particularly relevant is the observation that many of the police from the force profiled were Tajik, and did not speak Pashto, southern Afghanistan's dominant language. Unsurprisingly, one of them complained: "Nobody can find a lot of information about the Taliban."

What, of course, this destroys is the facile idea that the southern, predominantly Pashtun population is ever going to accept the rule of Kabul, bolstered as it is – and has always been historically – by the northern tribes of an entirely different ethnicity.

Thus Simon Jenkins is telling us in The Guardian that Cameron should take the opportunity of the switch in Helmand from British to US control to admit the obvious and start to plan how best to leave. It is idle to pretend, he writes, that Britain's 2006 expedition to bring Helmand under the control of the Kabul regime has anything but failed.

Yet, rather than take that opportunity, the Cameron stance has been to support the last administration's policy and, as he did during the session allocated to PMQs in parliament today, commit to providing the military with "whatever they need", thereby effectively taking ownership of the conflict. It may have started off as Blair's war, then to become Brown's war, but it has now undergone a glacially smooth transition, on its way to becoming Cameron's war.

There is no obvious political reason why the Cleggeron leader should so recklessly assume responsibility for this conflict – other than, perhaps, he has been unduly influenced by today's leader in The Daily Telegraph, which intones that "tangible results" are "desperately needed" to reassure an increasingly sceptical public that the war is winnable - an outcome which only that newspaper can believe is possible.

"Providing clear and unequivocal support for the military effort would be a good start," the paper says, advice which Cameron seems to have taken, unwittingly falling into a trap from which he will find it difficult to extract himself.

As a harbinger, the significance of which it is unlikely he would understand, yesterday we learned of the death of another Danish soldier, since identified as 22-year-old Private Sophia Bruun. She was killed close to Bridzar military base in Helmand, after a Piranha armoured personnel carrier was hit by an IED.

The point that will escape Cameron is that this vehicle type was intended to be the base for the FRES utility vehicle which, given a choice, the Army would have preferred to the Mastiff and other protected vehicles. Affording the Army "unequivocal support" may prove to be unwise, given that it most often has no real idea what it really wants and, in any event, should be given what it needs rather than what it wants.

In return, however, the one thing Cameron need not expect is "tangible results", other than seeing the number of deaths climb from today's figure of 290 – with yet another Royal Marine killed by a bomb in Sangin – to 300 in the very near future. For his first performance in the PMQ slot today, he had to read out three names. Already, he has another for next week's list and soon enough he will be dealing with the torrent of media "celebrating" that macabre third century.

By then it will truly be Cameron's war. And if he makes 400, it will be the only thing he "achieves" from it.

COMMENT THREAD

Thirteenth Century Fox

Politically, for the period that British troops remain in Afghanistan, it is going to be an interesting time. We are going to see a Conservative defence team, which in opposition specialised in low-grade sniping, now exposed to its own medicine, as unhappy events unfold.

What would have been a classic example of this is the resignation today of Colonel Bob Seddon, the principal ammunition technical officer of the Royal Logistics Corps. He has decided to call it a day over his concerns that cuts have left his team - which deals with the threat of IEDs in Afghanistan – "overstretched and undermanned".

Pre-election, then shadow defence secretary Liam Fox would have had a field day, condemning the inadequacies of the government. Now he represents the government, however, Fox is having to promise to remedy the inadequacies of his predecessors. He is now, effectively, on notice, and further problems with ATO shortages will, in due course, be laid at his door.

This, of course, is a game Fox cannot win. There will always be deficiencies emerging somewhere in the order of battle as our forces continue to engage with a relentless enemy. Of those deficiencies, Fox will have little direct knowledge – until they are brought to his attention – but, having been so keen to hold his predecessor responsible for every defect, will now find himself similarly in the hot seat.

So far, Fox has not made a good start of it, having incurred the wrath of the Afghan government during a weekend visit, after describing Afghanistan as a "broken 13th-century country". A senior Afghan government source said: "His view appears to be that Afghanistan has not changed since the 13th century and it implies that Afghanistan is a tribal and medieval society."

If that is indeed Fox's view, it says little for his broader understanding of the politics of the region, but this should come as no surprise. On this and many other things, he shows every indication of having learned absolutely nothing during his period in waiting.

From his privileged position as defence shadow, Fox has had every opportunity to explore the Afghan crisis at length and, had his understanding developed at all, he would undoubtedly be thinking along the lines of Denis MacShane, one of the few to understand the malign role of India in the conflict.

"We cannot keep on sending British soldiers to die in the will-'o-the-wisp search for an ultimate military victory," says MacShane. "Instead of warcraft we need statecraft and that must involve a stronger relationship with Pakistan. There has been much talk about Pakistan and the solution to Afghanistan. But there will be no solution in Pakistan until India changes its strategic approach in the area."

Alongside foreign secretary William Hague, however, the Conservative leadership – MacShane asserts – is totally India-obsessed, which leaves Fox's thinking undeveloped and superficial.

And, if his strategic thinking is lacking, so too is his response to local issues such as perceived shortages. Tonight's Panorama documentary may be a case in point, where Christina Schmid, widow of Staff Sergeant Olaf Schmid, complains that her husband, who was killed by an IED in Sangin, was "flaking" with exhaustion on the day he died because of demands being made on him and his elite team due to staff shortages.

Taking them at face value, Fox has no choice but to respond to such complaints by promising to make good the shortages. But, had he been more conscientious in his research, he might have learned that there were alternative and less labour-intensive way of doing things, than currently undertaken by the military, which could square the circle – providing better military effect at less cost and loss of life.

Crucially though, where over the weekend there emerged what appeared to be a split between Fox and development secretary Andrew Mitchell, a more rational approach by Fox could have had the two ministers singing from the same hymn sheet.

The essential issue here is that, for many of the intractable military problems in the British area of operations, there are no pure military solutions. With such solutions are being sought, in vain, this gave Fox the opening to offer alternatives, such as the tried and tested engineering solutions which have served others so well.

Such an approach would have put Fox on the same wavelength as Mitchell, but instead has him creating his own hostages to fortune, with his current promise that the new government will "do everything we can to ensure that, whatever you are asked to do, you are properly, fully equipped to do so, to maximise your chance of success and minimise the risk to you."

That is a promise which Fox cannot keep – it will always be the case that there could have been something more which could have been done while, on the other hand, nothing Fox has in mind by way of strategy would offer any chance of success. He has already squandered multiple opportunities, to the extent that history has perhaps already marked Thirteenth Century Fox down for failure, before he has even got properly into gear.

COMMENT THREAD

"Bloody criminally sad"

Asking a journalist to write an account of a series of actions in which his soldier brother was seriously injured does not seem the best way to ensure objective writing.

But such is the task of Miles Amoore, working for The Sunday Times, whose younger brother Jim, 24, a second lieutenant with 2 Rifles, was blown up as he walked through a compound door in Wishtan, near Sangin, to reach fellow soldiers hit by another explosion.

In a piece entitled "Carnage in Wishtan, 'the devil's playground'", Amoore claims to be the first reporter to reach Forward Operating Base (FOB) Wishtan and speak to those fortunate enough to have survived a series of bomb incidents which he describes, the drive from Sangin to the base taking him along "a dirt track known as Pharmacy Road".

Pharmacy Road is, of course, familiar to us, the subject of the famous report from Michael Yon, who dealt with the operation to clear the road, an operation which the MoD also described.

Amoore adds to these accounts, confirming something that we had worked out for ourselves – although never admitted by the MoD. "Until bomb disposal experts cleared this road," he writes, "the soldiers in FOB Wishtan had lived under virtual siege, supplied only by helicopter. The Taleban had placed a cordon of mines 50 yards from the perimeter walls of the base."

Previous accounts, however, refer to near misses, as helicopters delivering supplies were attacked. This, with Amoore's additional detail, further supports the contention that the base was effectively cut-off and that "Operation Flint", deploying 200 soldiers from 2nd Battalion The Rifles, was an emergency measure to break the siege and allow a supply convoy through.

These details are important as they illustrate the increased power of the Taleban, the perilous situation of British troops and, all importantly, the failure of the MoD – and indeed the media – in any way to convey how serious the situation really was.

Also supplied by Amoore is more detail of the Taleban tactic of laying multiple IED ambushes, with primary devices and secondaries emplaced to kill or injure personnel coming to the rescue of those caught by the initial blasts – about which we have written, in some detail as the tactic became apparent.

But what is lacking from Amoore's account is any sense of complaint or criticism, as he records soldiers – including his own brother – being sent out time and time again to patrol an area known to be seeded with IEDs. He simply records that, of the 120 soldiers who served at Wishtan in the past six months, one in three has been killed or injured, the vast majority - eight killed and 30 wounded, including Amoore's brother - caused by IEDs.

There are many reasons why one should be critical of the Army for allowing this to happen. The positioning of an isolated base, without the manpower or the equipment to keep the supply route or the patrol area safe, was asking for trouble. The failure of the Army to adapt its patrol pattern – or suspend patrolling altogether – once the new threat had been experienced, is unpardonable.

What is now also clear – from Amoore – is that there was plenty of warning. In April soldiers could patrol more than a mile from the base, carrying full kit and weapons. But as the poppy harvest came to an end in May, he writes, "the warning signs began to appear."

The Taleban blocked alleys with lumps of concrete, channelling the soldiers onto paths booby-trapped with IEDs. They mined doorways, forcing troops to enter compounds by blowing "mouse holes" in the thick mud walls. Then they mined those, too. "Everything started to tighten up. We knew it was coming," said 9 Platoon's Sergeant Jamie Moncho, a softly spoken soldier of Italian descent.

One prominent casualty, on 20 August, was Sgt Paul McAleese, killed as he tried to recover the body of Private Johnathon Young, the circumstances of whose death Amoore describes in detail.

With the benefit of the overview gained from piecing together the many disparate pieces written about Sangin and Wishtan, we have been highly critical of the failures, and had already argued for better solutions to combat the threats.

Despite what have been very obvious military failures, however, The Sun chose to exploit the death of Sgt McAleese as a tool to attack the government, illustrating perfectly the thesis enunciated by Paul Robinson.

In this case though there is criticism but it does not come from us. In a comment on Amoore's piece, James Duffield, who describes himself as "ex Sapper to Capt 1967-1988", asks: "Where were their Sappers in 'intimate' support? Where are the Explosive Detection Dog teams? Where are the officers demanding this support? Where is the UK in providing it?"

He may not be covering all the bases, but his final point does sum it up. "Bloody criminally sad," he writes.

COMMENT THREAD

Institutional inertia

Things are improving in Sagnin. From the desperate picture painted by Anthony Loyd earlier this month – referring to his experiences in August – we get a completely different "take" from Miles Amoore.

The district, Amoore writes, which has seen the vast majority of British casualties during the bloodiest summer of the eight-year war, is now the focus of operations to counter the IED threat. Helicopters, UAVs and aircraft, which were sucked into Operation Panther’s Claw around the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah during the summer, have been made available to Sangin.

The helicopters, in particular, have allowed commanders to launch Operation Storm: over the past two months troops have air-assaulted into areas that lie beyond the belt of IEDs ringing the army's main bases, moving behind the Taleban's frontline in an onslaught against known IED teams aimed at preventing them from setting their lethal traps.

"We have shifted our operational mentality," said Capt Tom Beasley, who manages operations for the 2 Rifles battle group in Sangin. "Patrolling and looking for a fight meant that we were hitting IEDs. It was not going to be practical unless we changed things. Operation Storm was a response to the IED belt getting so close it was foolish to keep pushing out, finding an IED and then the entire patrol revolving around that incident."

That is how it should be, of course, with different tactics evolving to counter specific threats – and from all accounts they are being relatively successful. Certainly, we have not recently been appraised of any casualties from the area so, mercifully, they seem to have worked.

However, although the new tactics were evidently resource-led, it has long been known that, as Capt Beasley admits: "Patrolling and looking for a fight meant that we were hitting IEDs." Pending the availability of resources, there had been nothing to prevent the Army adopting a more passive stance, to avoid the inevitable casualties.

Nevertheless, even if the Taleban have been thwarted in Sagnin, that does not mean the battle is over – far from it. The focus of attacks has merely shifted to a different location, the previously "safe" main base at Camp Bastion. First of all it was an attack on an RAF Regiment Vector, patrolling the perimeter.

Now, we learn that Guardsman James Hill, of the Coldstream Guards (pictured), who killed last week, had fallen foul of an IED emplaced near the entrance to the base's firing range. The attack, described as "an unprecedented breach of security", also injured ten others.

Hill was in a group of soldiers walking to the range, which is outside the main camp. A soldier is believed to have stepped on the pressure plate of a bomb, detonating it. Amid the confusion, it is claimed, a second bomb planted close by had also gone off, killing Hill.

If the location is different, the tactic of using primary and secondary bombs to maximise casualties, is precisely that which has been used to such devastating effect at Sangin. And if a technique works well in one location – from the enemy point of view – then it will be used elsewhere.

Nor, frankly, should the attacks have come as a surprise. We pointed out earlier the well-worn truism that guerrillas operate to a well-defined pattern, part of which is that they will probe for the weakest spots and exploit them.

The inevitable consequence of this is that, no sooner does the Army manage to suppress activity in one area, the enemy will re-appear elsewhere, its aim as always to kill and injure coalition soldiers with a view to weakening the resolve of the home front.

Here, then, we have a direct conflict between the McChrystal "strategy" of protecting the people – even if it means putting troops at risk to do so – and Taleban strategy of maximising troop casualties. If the coalition intends to pursue the McChrystal strategy, it will become a race against time as to whether it can prevail before the weight of casualties turn public opinion irrevocably against the campaign.

In this, the Taleban's advantages are the Army's slowness of response and its seeming inability to think ahead and pre-empt their next moves. This "institutional inertia" is an almost unavoidable feature of a lumbering, bureaucratic entity – and that is primarily what any modern army really is. A nimble enemy can invariably outwit and outmanoeuvre such a machine which, for all its size and sophistication, is surprisingly vulnerable.

Thus, while the Army sees "boots on the ground" as its greatest asset, the Taleban see not soldiers but targets. Still, though, the British high command is wedded to the idea of sending more troops to theatre and is complaining that the 500 uplift proposed – which is to be formally announced on Wednesday – is not enough.

Some of those troops, it is rumoured, are destined for Sangin, to deal with a threat that was rampant in the earlier months of this year. Others, no doubt, will have to be assigned to base protection at Bastion, to meet the newly emerging threat there. In time the Army will deal with that threat and contain it. But, by that time, the Taleban will have moved on to exploit another vulnerability.

This is a battle the British Army cannot win – as long as there is no tolerance on the home front for continued losses. Gen Sir David Richards, the newly-appointed CGS, recently spoke of the drumbeat of casualties, claiming that that "the Army was ready to bear the sacrifice".

It is interesting how the people who do not have to bear the direct personal brunt of the consequences of that "sacrifice" are so sanguine about bearing it but, that notwithstanding, the evidence is that the population at large is less inclined to allow it.

Unfortunately, "institutional inertia" may well ensure that it has no option in the short-term. But public opinion has an inertia of its own and, once set, it is very difficult to change. Then, the "drumbeat" will have to assume a different tempo.

COMMENT THREAD

They lie and deceive

These "killer machines" were supposed to have been withdrawn. We all thought they had been. In fact, we had an announcement in May that the Vector was to be withdrawn from operations in Afghanistan.

Then, on 2 October we learnt that an RAF Regiment gunner had been "killed as a result of an explosion that happened whilst on a force protection patrol near to Camp Bastion."

He was named the next day as Senior Aircraftman Marcin Wojtak, and we were told he had been "killed as a result of an explosion whilst commanding his vehicle." There was, however, no mention of the vehicle type – and nowhere in the contemporary media accounts was the vehicle type mentioned. By keeping quiet, the MoD hoped to get away with it.

We should have known. Despite MoD assurances, we did pick up that the Army was still using Vectors when we got a fleeting glimpse (pictured) of one on an MoD video showing the re-supply convoy to Sangin in late July.

I should have made more of it then, but it could have been a one-off, and the convoy was led by mine-clearance vehicles. Furthermore, it was a "maximum effort", when everything seemed to be in use.

But little did I think that the military could have been so criminally stupid as to issue the vehicles to the RAF Regiment for routine patrols, in view of their extreme vulnerability. But, when it comes to stupidity, this is something in which the military has always excelled.

One can only suppose that they thought that Bastion – which has rarely been attacked – was a "safe" area, neglecting the fundamental principle of asymmetric warfare. There are no "safe" areas – the enemy will always be probing for the weak points and, once again, they found one.

As commander of the vehicle, SAC Wojtak, acting up as a Corporal, would have been in the front passenger seat, and would not have stood a chance. This is only the sixth death in this machine, as a direct result of IEDs or mines, but many more have been seriously injured.

Anyhow, The Daily Telegraph and some others have picked up the identity of the vehicle, reporting that the death of Wojtak raised "new concerns" over the safety of armoured patrol vehicles in Afghanistan.

The greater concern is what the hell is the RAF Regiment playing at? They were supposed to be delivering Panthers to theatre and, although we have no love of that vehicle, it is substantially better than the Vector.

Needless to say, the hapless Ainsworth is in the frame, having to cover up for this particular example of military stupidity – one of the less enviable tasks of a secretary of state – when, privately he is seething, having effectively been deceived about their use.

"Vectors will be on people's minds here," he says, "but what you have got to try to do is give commanders the length and breadth of the Helmand valley the choice so they are never having to use the wrong vehicle for the wrong operation."

The "commanders", the Army and the MoD between them did have the "choice" and once again they have cocked it up. As a result, another good man has died. They are fortunate to have a fall-guy of an unprepossessing secretary of state who is taking the rap this time. But the guilty ones know who they are. They should be ashamed.

COMMENT THREAD

The values of the harlot

One wonders quite what the media are seeking to achieve with the prominence they have given today to a letter from aggrieved relatives directly blaming the prime minister for the death of Sergeant Paul McAleese. He was killed by an IED on 20 August in Sangin, while coming to the rescue of his stricken colleague, Private Johnathon Young (both pictured).

Leading the fray is The Sun, which runs the story on its front page (below right), with the headline "Dear PM, You killed our boy."

This, by its presentation and prominence, goes far beyond straightforward reportage, implying the paper's endorsement of the accusation, an endorsement made more explicit in the body of its story. The Sun, effectively, is accusing the prime minister of being directly responsible for the death of a soldier.

In general terms, of course – in the context of any war – the charge of being responsible for the deaths of our soldiers can be made against any prime minister, the office holder being the notional head of government and thus responsible for the prosecution of the war and its conduct.

This accusation, however, is different in tenor. It makes specific charges as to shortages of "manpower, surveillance kit, vehicles and helicopters", directed specifically at Gordon Brown. "As the Prime Minister, you must accept responsibility for the deployment of our troops," the letter goes. "You have a duty to ensure they are provided with the best equipment available and the operational tactics that are used are sound and sensible," it then declares.

Herein rests one of the crucial issues in the conduct of the war in Afghanistan – and generally – as to where the responsibilities lie between the politicians (at all levels) and the military. But this newspaper is not prepared to address this issue, preferring instead to direct its ire at the prime minister.

In so doing, it fails to recognise that there is, and always has been, a distinction between policy (and the direction of overall strategy), which rightly comes within the political ambit, and strictly operational matters, which are the responsibility of military commanders.

Inevitably, there is often a blurring of the line but, in general, operational matters are left to military commanders. This is territory into which the politicians will not venture and, if they attempted to do so, there would rightly be a media furore, with the politicians condemned for meddling.

The particular issues surrounding Sgt McAleese's death, however, are problematical. McAleese was operating from the Wishtan patrol base on the outskirts of Sangin, about which we know something, not least from Michael Yon's descriptions of operations in the vicinity.

We know, for instance, that Wishtan is a small base, out on a limb, and for some time was cut off from its support at FOB Jackson, to the extent that a major operation had to be mounted to restore access and re-supply the base.

The first question to confront, therefore, is whether the base should have been maintained at Wishtan. And, for such a small base – amounting to a company deployment – this is not something in which politicians would be involved. This has to be considered a military decision.

Then, through the good offices of Michael Yon, but also from other sources, particularly this moving account, we are aware that Army tactics are heavily reliant on establishing remote bases, from which routine foot patrols are mounted – for diverse reasons, not least in pursuit of the "hearts and minds" policy adopted as a core part of the strategy.

Given that McAleese was killed while on foot patrol, the next issue to confront is whether such patrols should have been mounted from Wishtan. Dismounted soldiers are extremely vulnerable and dozens of soldiers have been killed whilst on foot, mainly by IEDs. It must, therefore, at least be questionable as to whether the tactic was appropriate for this base, in the particular circumstances.

On the face of it, this again is an operational matter, which puts it firmly in the military sphere - something for military commanders to decide, based on their appreciation of local conditions. It could not be, and should not have been, a decision made by politicians, especially from their desks in London.

Given that two hurdles were passed – that the military had decided that the base was essential, and that the patrols were equally so – only then comes the question of resources.

In this instance, the question is focused on manpower, surveillance equipment and armoured vehicles. There is also an issue of detection capabilities, as it is alleged that the Taleban had access to the same type of mine detector used by the British and were thus able to devise IEDs which were undetectable with this equipment. Helicopters, although mentioned, are not strictly relevant.

However, before addressing the relevant issues, it has to be noted that a decision to maintain a base in the heartland of Taleban activity, and then to mount foot patrol from it, must be taken having regard to the resources available. If there were insufficient resources to secure the safety of the troops, then it would seem logical that operations should have been curtailed.

This is actually a key element of the whole debate on the conduct of the war. It boils down to the question of whether the military, given overall policy/strategic directions, should plan and execute their operations in vitro - i.e., without regard to the resources available – and then demand those resources. Failing their provision, the question devolves as to whether the Army should undertake those operations anyway, the politicians (or resource providers) being held accountable for any failures or calamities arising from their lack.

Here again, the matter is not completely clear-cut. If, on the one hand, the Army is bound specifically to carrying out a strategy which has been devised and imposed by the politicians, the implementation of which necessarily and unavoidably required mounting foot patrols from isolated bases in hostile territory, and which required certain resources which were asked for and denied by those politicians, then there could be no doubt as to where responsibility lay.

On the other hand, if the patrol tactic was entirely discretionary, under the control of the Army, which could decide whether to maintain a specific base and mount particular patrols, then this perhaps puts a different perspective on where the responsibility lies for any failure or calamity. Lack of resources would not be a political issue, as the command decisions would be taken having regard to resource availability.

Even then, there are complications. We see in this instance, the complaint about the lack of armoured vehicles. But, in the context of foot patrols, this hardly seems relevant. However, should they have been judged necessary, we know that a number of Ridgebacks were available, but the Army had decided to hold them back for issue en masse to the new roulement. This was despite the wishes of the politicians that they should be have been used immediately. Where then, does the responsibility lie?

More relevant perhaps, is the matter of mine clearance vehicles – something not brought up in the relatives' letter. We had our own suggestions for this, and have written on the need for vehicles such as the Buffalo, the Husky and even a variant of the Pookie for more restricted areas.

If we accept that there was an operational imperative which demanded routine foot patrols, such equipment would on the face of it seem appropriate and necessary. But, before attributing responsibility for any failure to supply such kit, we have to return to the questions of whether it was asked-for, by whom, when, under what conditions, and whether any such requests had been refused. If that equipment was available – but was not requested at the appropriate level of command – then responsibility lies where it falls.

Another issue raised was surveillance, the lack of which allowed the Taleban to emplace IEDs without being observed. This is very relevant, and there are several technical means by which it could be provided. The most obvious is the UAV but, for a fixed base from which troops mounted routine patrols, area surveillance might best be achieved by using fixed sensor masts.

Here, there has been some controversy. But before any blame can be attached for the failure to make suitable arrangements, the questions yet again have to be asked – and answered – as to whether such equipment was requested and whether any request was refused.

That then brings us to the vexed question of manpower. Whether more troops, in the short-term, deployed to Sangin would or could have led to a reduction in casualties is moot. One of the issues confronted by the US planners of the surge in Iraq was that more troops, initially, would yield more, not less casualties. More troops in Sangin, likewise, could have led to more casualties.

But again, the relevant issue here must surely have been whether, given the current manpower levels, it was safe and militarily appropriate to maintain the base at Wishtan.

All of these issues, collectively, point to the responsibility for the death of Sgt McAleese – and Pte Young – resting on complex issues and many unanswered questions. Notwithstanding that the soldiers were actually murdered by the Taleban, it is far too simplistic to point a finger of blame at the prime minister.

That then returns us to the question posed at the beginning of this piece – as to what media is seeking to achieve by giving such prominence to a letter from grieving relatives.

One can quite understand their grief and their very natural – and entirely commendable - desire to seek explanations. And it is forgivable that they should lash out at those who they think might be responsible. On the other hand, the writers are neither expert nor informed critics, nor necessarily balanced in their views.

Arguably, a responsible media would take this into account. Furthermore, while there is no restraint on grieving relatives making what accusations they think fit, the media should bear the responsibility for levelling informed accusations, directed at those who could reasonably be found wanting. Promulgating or supporting wild or unsubstantiated accusations – made for whatever reason – should be no part of the media brief.

Yet, no sooner had The Sun published its charges, the story was picked up by diverse other media outlets, including The Daily Mail, The Daily Telegraph and The Times. But the process of publication is not value-free. Without explanation, caveats or commentary, it implies endorsement. The media is, in effect, exploiting the grief of relatives to pursue an attack on the prime minister, adding to a narrative already in place.

Against that is the marked reluctance of the media to address any of the issues raised in this piece, or even to question the tactics of the Army, or its responsibilities for keeping its soldiers safe. To that extent also, the media seems to be exploiting the deaths of these soldiers, all in the guise of concern for their welfare, when not one of the papers involved is prepared to expend the time or energy needed to understand the issues.

What is so very depressing is that a properly focused and informed media could be a very powerful force in ensuring that our troops are properly equipped and that tactics and strategy are properly scrutinised and improved. Instead, the media have chosen the role of the harlot – power without responsibility – milking the grief and misery of relatives, and exploiting the dead, for their own sterile agendas.

They are always the last to accept any responsibility for their actions but, as with politicians and the military, we should let the responsibility lie where it falls.

COMMENT THREAD

Tootal on Afghanistan

Yesterday, Stuart Tootal offered his insights into the campaign in Afghanistan at the Frontline Club. Unfortunately, he chose not give a presentation but instead took the easy way out and opted for an interview format, answering questions from Patrick Bishop and then from the audience. This made for a disjointed and somewhat incoherent dialogue, with no unifying structure.

He opened by stating his belief that the conflict was "winnable", citing the "Briggs plan" for Malaya, arguing for a greater sense of mission and purpose. You need to build up the Afghan forces and while you do that, you need more Nato troops.

If we lose in Afghanistan, it will not be in the arid plains of Helmand or in the foothills of the Hindu Kush, but in capitals like London and Washington. It is vitally important that the domestic public area in countries like the US and this country understand and support the mission in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, says Tootal, we don't have a publicised, joined-up strategy that makes sense.

The fault that the message is not getting across lies ultimately with the politicians. But to get the message over requires courage, which Tootal implies is missing. Soldiers don't want sympathy – they don't want pity. They just want support. But the last thing they need now is for the public to "wobble" on them, to suddenly start questioning their mission.

Asked how he measures success, Tootal focused on Helmand, and then Musa Qala, stating that, if you secure an area properly, people would turn against the Taleban. "There are a number of metrics where you can build a data argument," he says, you can draw out "certain parameters" as long as you focus on areas. As you "focus on one area and then another, they begin to join up."

Asked whether we were winning, Tootal answered by telling us that, "The British Army is doing a fantastic job." He then went on: "Whether its got enough equipment or not is a big question mark and I personally believe there isn't enough equipment and there are not enough troops there. But they're doing a remarkable job with what they've got."

What people need to be clear, he said, is that the Taleban are taking a beating. They've been pushed back from the district centres. We hold five centres. They have been stabilised to an extent and they are no longer under conventional attack. That is an effect and a mark of success. The Taleban are under pressure which is why they have moved to a more asymmetric form of attack - the roadside bomb. That is an indication that operations out there are having an impact.

Tootal was then asked, given the lack of security, how he could achieve reconstruction and development. Difid, said Tootal, was incredibly poor. If they could not do it, then give it to the Army. The whole development bit needed to be "substantially thought through". A special representative in the audience, however, disputed the idea that we could win hearts and minds by "building things" was misplaced. It was all about "security and governance" and "sustainability".

Instead of turning up and making promises, Tootal countered, you need to do small things which make the difference – the "grass roots" approach.

We're now playing catch-up. We took our eye off the ball with Iraq and we did not put enough resources into Afghanistan. He then diverted into helicopters, dismissing the statistics game, complaining that many of the airframes were "old, knackered Sea Kings", with limited lift.

No one took him further on this, but sure enough, that is what has made the headlines. No mention was made of the Carson blade upgrades which did not appear until long after Tootal had left.

To what extent, therefore, Tootal is living off past glories is moot. He certainly was not able to offer an overall strategic view, instead offering narrow, "fixes" which did not seen to take into account current developments. When he claimed that we held the district centres, for instance, did he really have Sangin in mind when he argued that they had been "stabilised to an extent"?

We got an hour into the "discussion" and there was another half-hour to run, but attention waned. Tootal seems to reflect the general malaise in Afghanistan – a lack of coherence and confusion. "We need the right resources" says Tootal. Right. Is it winnable? A matter of resources, is the message.

COMMENT THREAD

Job security

The situation in Afghanistan took a decided turn for the worse with the kidnap of Stephen Farrell. That, at least, is the view of James Robinson, Observer media editor, writing on the Guardian website.

He conveys the message that reporting is now affected by the growing risks, with Harriet Sherwood, head of international news at the Guardian comparing Afghanistan with Iraq at the height of its insurgency.

Sherwood's concern is echoed by Richard Beeston, foreign editor of The Times who thinks that Kabul is better than it was in Baghdad in 2006 and 2007, but he fears it could deteriorate. His staff now had to be far more cautious which, he says, "obviously inhibits the reporting". Beeston's immediate fear is that it is possible that the Taleban will seek to avenge Farrell's rescue by deliberately targeting reporters.

Whatever one thinks of journalists as a breed, and the media in general – and we have made our views clear enough – this is an unhappy development. Our complaint is always that there is not enough hard new and so much of what is reported is low-grade and disjointed. But even what we get is better than nothing at all.

Anything therefore, which makes reporting more difficult, and reduces the flow of material, is not welcome. This is more so as Afghanistan is reaching a critical juncture. While many tend to think of events in that country as remote from their immediate concerns, British performance there and the outcome of the counter-insurgency campaign will have a profound impact on us as a nation.

The implications can be inferred from one of the more credible parts of Gordon Brown's recent speech on Afghanistan, where he noted that al Qaeda continued to view Afghanistan as fundamental in the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate. A peaceful and stable Afghanistan, therefore, would be a severe propaganda blow and strategic failure for al Qaeda, said Brown.

By contrast, of course, the collapse of our venture in Afghanistan would be a severe propaganda blow and strategic failure for us, awarding a moral as well as a physical victory to our enemies and weakening still further our credibility as a significant power.

And, although this ostensibly lies in the realm of the abstract, our success as a trading nation – on which we rely for our waning prosperity – relies intimately on that nebulous quality of "prestige", which would be sadly and dangerously diminished by our failure.

The problem with Afghanistan, of course, is that we are losing. On the other hand, the government is never going to admit to that, and nor is it going to concede that is strategy is dangerously flawed, to the point of being counter-productive.

In an open society – of a type of which we still have some pretentions of being – the correctives can only come through robust and searching debate, challenging the assumptions and performance of government, mobilising public opinion to demand change.

Perhaps it illustrates just how dire is our predicament that for this we are entirely reliant on the traditional media – the blogosphere and the rest of the "new media" clearly is not up to the job. And while relying on our media to provoke this debate may be a forlorn hope, it is the only real hope that we have.

It is for this very reason that we are so critical of the media. We mean it no harm – quite the reverse. We want a more powerful, more robust, independent media that does its job properly, a job that is vitally necessary in a functioning democracy. That job just got harder, and more dangerous.

A particularly worrisome side-effect of this may be a greater reliance on the so-called "embedded" reporters, where media organisations turn to the relative security of the military, and reduce their independent coverage.

The dangers of this are apparent from the experience in Iraq where so many of the areas of the country became too dangerous for unattached reporters. The only way reporters could cover the news was to rely on military protection. The result, as we saw, was that the military controlled the news agenda, placing huge tranches of the country "off-limits" and concealing (or distorting) major events which had considerable strategic significance.

We cannot afford this to happen in Afghanistan – although in many areas of the country, it is already too late. There are already many towns in Helmand, not least Sangin, where no western reporter would venture without military protection.

Where that leaves us is difficult to say, but if the recent experience of Michael Yon is any guide – where his "embed" was cancelled without notice – then we are in for a difficult time.

It is my theory that the MoD moved in not because of what he had written but because, in his most recent reports, he had demonstrated that he was beginning to understand what was going on. The MoD prefer ignorant reporters – of which there are many – and short embeds, thus preventing knowledgeable and informed comment driving the debate. Yon had become too well-informed and, therefore, he had to go.

Now though, for journalists in Afghanistan, job security" takes on a different meaning – whether you live if you do your job properly. That should give us all cause for concern.

COMMENT THREAD

Why we're getting it wrong

Following on from Stephen Grey's critique of the campaign in Afghanistan, sociology professor Anthony King offers his own observations about the capabilities of the British Army, in a piece entitled "Why we're getting it wrong in Afghanistan".

King is an interesting observer, having carried out several studies of the British military, and he is thus better qualified than most to contribute to the ongoing – albeit limited – debate about the performance of the Army.

In framing his own critique, he picks up on Grey's identification of the role of the institutional culture of Britain's armed forces: "cracking on" - the unshakeable determination of Britain's troops. Says King, the British army's determination to "crack on" in Helmand may be brave, but foolish.

Grey is right, according to King, in asserting that the ethos of "cracking on" is the army's greatest quality; effective armies require fortitude and morale in order to endure the losses that they will inevitably suffer. Yet, as he notes, it may be the army's greatest weakness too.

King tells us that he has worked with the British armed forces for the last five years, watching them on operations in Kabul and Basra. From that experience, he says, it has become clear to me that the culture of "cracking on" may not mean merely that British troops from the Somme to Sangin have dutifully enacted orders which they know to be poor but, more seriously, it affects operational command itself.

Rather, he observes - as Grey notes - British commanders have blithely conducted missions in Helmand despite a woeful lack of intelligence about the theatre and knowingly inadequate military resources for any realistic chance of success.

Now follows King's analysis, which is more than a little illuminating. During their initial training at Sandhurst, he notes, army officers are taught to retain the initiative: when they are confronted by the immediate presence of an enemy, it is better to do the wrong thing decisively than to do nothing at all. Passivity almost always leads to defeat, while determined, concerted action - even if initially implausible - can often unhinge opponents.

Thus, on recurrent exercises primarily based on conventional warfare, the centrality of activity, of tempo and offensive action - of cracking on - is repeatedly emphasised to trainee officers. At the tactical level, this prioritisiation of action and initiative is surely correct, imbuing a robust work ethic in Britain's armed forces which is appreciated and valued by their allies, like the US. From the Balkans to Afghanistan, multinational commanders have looked to British troops to carry out tasks that other nations have been reluctant to perform.

The trouble is though that the same ethos of action is evident at staff college where officers are trained for operational command. Although the concept behind Britain's Joint Service Command and Staff College (created in 1997) was innovative, the institution was imbued with traditional British military culture. It was and remains a testament to "cracking on."

Giving students little time for thought and independent reading and research, the college seems to replicate a conventional military exercise in which the speed and quantity of output is prioritised over quality - and potentially incorrect action over cautious contemplation. The result is that Britain's operational commanders feel the need to act and impose themselves on any situation.

More worrying still, says King, British commanders often have a narrow concept of the ideal form of military action. Despite well-worn claims to expertise in counter-insurgency, the British army actually regards conventional military combat as the ideal - and indeed ultimate - test of their professionalism. Like Clausewitz's military genius, British officers today want to test themselves under "the most murderous fire."

This encourages the premature and excessive use of violence despite wider the political situation. In June 2008, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith judged the Taleban insurgency to have been defeated (at least temporarily) as a result of a series of decapitation missions by special forces he had commanded. But by the end of the tour in October, he took a rather different line, arguing that this was a campaign which could not be won by the very military methods which he had advocated only months earlier. British commanders are prone to confusing local tactical superiority with operational success.

Even now there are inadequate numbers of troops in Helmand. However, rather than tailor the campaign to their resources, commanders have consistently "cracked on"; seeking to dominate the whole of Helmand, a hostile province the size of Wales, with just a few thousand troops, and dispersing their forces across the province into small, isolated platoon and operating bases.

Even in the Sangin Valley, King observes, where there are several significant positions, the British bases cannot mutually support each other; they are too far apart, while Musa Qaleh is some twenty miles away to the north. As British commanders in Sangin have themselves noted, troops in these locations "sit in a bubble," and this inevitably means they are engaging in numerous firefights.

Institutional factors within the military establishment seem to have further encouraged this preference for "cracking on." Never easy, tensions between the services have become increasingly strained over the last decade as a result of declining defence budgets and, as they approach the future defence review in 2010, these frictions have reached a crisis point. Each service is desperately seeking to protect itself from cuts; furious and bitter arguments have been reported, with each service trying to undercut the other.

And intense tactical activity in Helmand has become a potent tool in this competition: it is very difficult to cut regiments that have fought hard and suffered numerous casualties in Helmand. Budgetary pressures, then, have actually precipitated a preference for high-intensity war-fighting in Helmand - a pathological institutional reaction to chronic under-funding, ministerial mismanagement and poor governmental guidance.

So, King asserts, a new Afghan strategy is essential - and the announcements from US General McChrystal and Gordon Brown at the end of August recognise this. However, their new strategy in Helmand also requires a reformation of Britain’s armed forces themselves.

The success of General Petraeus in Iraq rested finally on a common recognition by the US Army and Marine Corps that the way in which they trained, planned and conducted military operations required profound revision. In short, operational success demands institutional reform at home.

While valuable at the tactical level, the culture of "cracking on" needs to be expunged from operational command. The armed forces, the ministry of defence and government need to develop more mature criteria on which to assess the performance of commanders - judging them by their political contribution to the campaign, not by the number of air assault operations they have conducted.

There is some evidence that the British armed forces may be capable of this change, says King. In previous campaigns in Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British recognised, after false starts, that the key to success in counter-insurgency campaigns was the slow suppression of insurgency through intelligence, negotiation, the presence of adequate security forces and cross-governmental coordination.

The British now need to relearn these lessons very quickly. The alternative is that their commanders in Helmand will continue to disperse their forces in futile and blunt demonstrations - ensuring that they crack on to defeat not only in Helmand but at home, in the arena of public support, as well.

And that is the view of an academic, but one with a profound knowledge of the military. Rarely do I find myself reviewing a paper and ending up repeating it almost word for word. But with such a taut analysis, there is little "fat" and much to think about.

King's analysis, added to Grey's, and much more – including the recent observations in the British Army Review - all add up to the singular fact that the British Army is failing to perform.

While some less perspicacious observers prefer to direct their attention to the political management of recent campaigns, even the military seems to concede the need to rethink its operations, while the evidence mounts as to the scale of the failings.

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