Why we are losing

Anthony Loyd in Sangin reports for The Times on the latest fatal attack, which killed three soldiers and injured many more. He writes as follows:

As the dust cleared around them, revealing the terribly injured body of one of their comrades, the fusiliers knew that the horror might have only just begun.

Three of their number had died on Thursday in the same green zone south of Sangin — killed by a secondary device that exploded among soldiers trying to rescue the wounded from the first blast.

Shortly after first light on Sunday, the same was about to happen again, killing three more British soldiers and taking the death toll to 204.

As the troops of 3 Platoon, A Company, 2 Rifles battlegroup carried their casualty through reeds on the bank of the Helmand River towards ground that was clear enough for a medical helicopter to land upon, another blast ripped through them.

"I was blown on to my backside," said Sergeant-Major Pete Burney. "I thought, 'That's me then' but as I picked myself up I saw I hadn't a scratch. Then I realised we were among a belt of IEDs [improvised explosive devices]."

To his right he could see a medic, a woman who seconds earlier had been attempting to resuscitate the first casualty, but who had been blown past him and lay wounded on the ground. Another fusilier and a Royal Military Police corporal were injured. A fusilier lay dead among more IEDs.

The other incident to which Loyd refers happened on 13 August. But then there was the incident on 10 July when five died, again through a combination of a primary bomb and a secondary set to kill members of the rescue party.

To paraphrase Lady Bracknell, once may be regarded as a misfortune; twice looks like carelessness. Three times?

But we had exactly the same dynamic with Snatch Land Rovers. On 29 May 2005, L/Cpl Brackenbury is killed in a Snatch by a type of bomb then new to the British sector – the explosively formed penetrator (EFP) – against which the vehicle was defenceless. Three others are injured.

Then, on 6 June, an EFP "daisy chain" is discovered intact and successfully defused. It is taken away for forensic analysis, from which the Army confirms with no room for doubt that Snatch Land Rovers offer no protection at all to this type of device.

So what does the Army do? On 15 July it sends another Snatch patrol out into the same general area where the device is known to be used. Three soldiers are killed and two more injured. And then the Army does it again and again and again.

We are led to believe that the Army is manned by professionals – soldiers who know what they are doing. We can criticise the politicians freely, but not our "Brave Boys" who put their lives on the line.

So which politician was it that decided to send a foot patrol out into an environment where twice previously soldiers had encountered complex, multiple IED ambushes and experienced multiple casualties?

Or could we possibly surmise that this was an "operational" decision, just like the decisions to deploy Snatches into a territory where weapons were being deployed which rendered them defenceless?

And just how many times do soldiers have to walk into such traps before it dawns on someone that this is not a terribly good idea?

Incidentally, it was on 10 March 2007 that Anthony Loyd, soldier turned photographer and war correspondent, argued: "for once" an Afghan war is winnable, declaring that, "the tide is turning against the Taleban".

Some tide ... some Taleban.

COMMENT THREAD

The mincer of Sangin

Anthony Loyd describes the scene at Camp Bastion's hospital when the dead and wounded are brought in by a Chinook Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT).

After watching the proceedings and then watching young Afghan girl die (from suspected meningitis), "for an awful second," he writes, "I thought I might choke - an unforgivable act of weakness in front of the calm resolve of the young medics."

"Don't think we are immune from all this," says a medic as he walks away, as humbled as he can recall.

The MERT was back in action yesterday morning, with yet another three soldiers reported killed, bringing to the number of British soldiers who have died in Afghanistan since 2001 to 199 – one short of that "sad milestone" – the "magic" number which will trigger the media torrent.

Once again, with dreadful familiarity, these three were killed by an "explosion" while on foot patrol. Another dreadfully familiar word also crops up: "Sangin". With 168 killed in action (KIA), Sangin and its environs have accounted for at least 47 dead, more than a quarter of the total, making this district by far the most dangerous for British troops.

This was the town which from mid-2006 onwards was one of the famous four "platoon houses", occupied by 3 Para who mounted a spirited defence against sustained attacks from the Taleban. Then, in Aril 2007, with the help of the US 82nd Airborne – who carved out their reputation in Normandy and Arnhem (to say nothing of Bastogne and the Rhine crossing) – Operation Achilles was mounted, led by 42 Commando Royal Marines Battlegroup, the Estonian Armoured Infantry Company, and the Danish Recce Squadron.

At the time, Brigadier Jerry Thomas, Commander of the UK Task Force in Helmand, stated the aim of the operation was: "to clear the Taliban from the Sangin area and to re-establish the authority of the Government of Afghanistan in Sangin to create a secure, stable and prosperous environment in which reconstruction and development can take place."

On 30 May, Operation Achilles ended, with Operation Lastay Kulang (pickaxe handle) starting the same day, aimed at clearing out the upper Sangin valley. It was during this operation, which ended on 14 June, that a Chinook was apparently hit by an RPG round and crashed, killing five Americans, a Briton and a Canadian on board.

By early June though, the MoD was in a buoyant mood, claiming that the operation had "succeeded in squeezing the Taliban in the north and south of the Upper Sangin Valley into isolated pockets."

Lt-Col Charlie Mayo, spokesman for Task Force Helmand, declared: "By extending the authority of the Afghan Government and removing Taliban forces this operation will provide the security conditions for the redevelopment of the Upper Sangin Valley and further enhance Government influence across Northern Helmand."

This operation led to Operation Ghartse Gar, which commenced in July 2007, its objective: "to track down Taleban positions, taking the fight to the Taleban and clearing them out of Sangin," building on "the momentum and strategic success of Operation Lastay Kula."

In "pacified" Sangin, however, the Taleban simply moved back in, adopting their now standard techniques of mounting ambushes, using direct fire and IEDs. Fighting remained intense so that, by February 2008, six British soldiers had been killed in and around Sangin in just over a month. Yet another operation was mounted, this one called Ghartse Dagger, aimed at flushing out Taliban from a stronghold in the upper Sangin valley.

Supply convoys were being attacked and in July 2008 heavy fighting was reported with "at least 40 militants" killed in two days.

Nevertheless, the security situation remained tense, with the Army having to apologise in August 2008 for killing four Afghan civilians after troops had rocketed a building in which Taleban had been seen.

Despite this Ministers were citing the "relative stability" of the Sangin area as evidence that British troops were "winning the battle against the Taleban," only to have four Marines killed by a suicide bomb in December when they were approached by a 13-year-old boy pushing a wheelbarrow, which exploded.

This year so far has seen 17 British soldiers killed in the "relative stability" of the Sangin area, with attacks even being mounted close to the district centre (pictured). Then, on 10 July came the horrendous multiple IED attack which killed five soldiers.

So precarious had the situation become that troops holed up in Forward Operating Base Jackson had become entirely reliant on helicopter supply, with the giant Mi-26 helicopter being shot down less than a week later. A dispatch from Michael Yon made it very clear just how tenuous the hold on Sangin has become, in an area The Daily Telegraph reports as "one of the most heavily mined" in Afghanistan.

So it is that yesterday another three soldiers paid the price for "relative stability", the questioning of which defence secretary Ainsworth regards as "defeatist".

No doubt we can rejoice that the government objective remains "to clear the Taleban from the Sangin area and to re-establish the authority of the Government of Afghanistan in Sangin to create a secure, stable and prosperous environment in which reconstruction and development can take place."

But in the mincer that has become Sangin, three more soldiers will never see that happy event arrive.

COMMENT THREAD

Ahead of the game?

It would be entertaining to take a sarcastic view of the much-trailed speech to be given by General Sir Richard Dannatt this evening on the importance of reconstruction in the armoury of the modern soldier.

We could so easily offer the jibe, "nice of you to catch up", remarking that we have been banging this drum for some little time, the work based on the gradual realisation that the war in Afghanistan will be won or lost not by the force of arms but by the success of the reconstruction effort.

However, to do so would not only be unfair, but facile. As one of the pieces which trails the speech – this one in The Daily Telegraph - points out, there has already been some "friction" between the military and civilian reconstruction teams, and there is and has been a genuine concern in the corridors of power about the lack of progress in this department – an issue we highlighted yesterday.

Thus, Dannatt intends to propose "a shake-up of the way the Army trains its personnel and runs its operations, to put more focus on reconstruction and development work." And The Telegraph tells us that his suggestion "comes amid concern in Whitehall about the way the British military mission in Afghanistan is fitting into the wider Western effort to develop that country's government and economy."

British generals, the paper says, insist they are making progress in the military battle against the Taleban, but doubts remain about how effective Western development work is. Only a fraction of the billions of pounds spent on development in Afghanistan ever reaches local projects.

Far from "catching up", therefore, Dannatt is articulating the growing concern which has been troubling for some time the many thinkers within the military, political and civil service establishments, as they struggle to work out a vade mecum which will deliver the real progress that is so desperately needed and has yet to be apparent.

Interestingly, what Dannatt is doing is building on the tradition of the "soldier administrator" which formed the bedrock of Empire, where young men – often our best and brightest – were sent to the far-flung corners of Empire to take up enormous powers and responsibilities as "district commissioners" and the like, exercising military and civil control over vast regions, bringing peace, stability and, very often, prosperity.

Thus, Dannatt is calling for the armed forces to consider creating a permanent body of "stabilisation specialists" who spend their careers working to rebuild countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Increasingly, he is due to say this evening, soldiers are finding that they have to add civilian skills - from town hall administration to banking - to their traditional combat capabilities.

So important are these skills that the forces should now look at the feasibility of developing "permanent cadres of stabilisation specialists" who would specialise in training and mentoring the local military in former conflict zones.

Officers in such a body could typically spend "a tour with indigenous forces, followed perhaps by an attachment to DfID (Department for International Development) overseas, or a local council at home, or a police force in Africa or elsewhere."

This is good stuff and, if translated into policy, represents an important shift in thinking. Much of the Army training still concentrates on training for "grand manoeuvre" attuned to the needs of protecting Europe from a Russian invasion in the event that the Cold War turned "hot".

Recently, Ann Winterton asked a Parliamentary Question on how much training time for future officers at Sandhurst comprises counter-insurgency tactics and operations, to be given the answer that, "Approximately 17 percent. of the 44 weeks of instruction an officer cadet receives at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst is devoted to counter-insurgency tactics and operations."

These, we are told, "are known as stabilisation operations at Sandhurst. The teaching is conducted in a variety of ways including theory, demonstrations, practice periods and two field exercises."

Thus, although many officers coming though the system will spend one hundred percent of their active careers on "stabilisation operations", a mere 17 percent of their training is devoted to this activity.

However, while we can thus applaud Dannatt (rare enough for this blog), without wishing to damn him with faint praise, we would also aver that he is either not going far enough or missing the point. In our own analysis, we have stressed the need for hard-edged infrastructure works, in particular roads, as the fundamental core of nation-building.

Interestingly, as part of our general background research, we happened on a piece published in the New York Times dated 4 December 2005 – a feature on the building in India of the major new highway from New Delhi to Agra. Apart from the intrinsic value of the work, the piece tells us: "Nationalists also hope the highway will further unite a country that is home to 22 official languages, the world's major religions, a host of separatist movements, and 35 union territories and states, many more populous than European nations." It continues:

On the highway from New Delhi to Agra, where the Taj Mahal floats over a grimy city, homelier but no less enduring relics line the route. Kos minars - massive pillars that once served as markers - invoke India's last great road-building effort. It was five centuries ago.

The Moguls, whose empire stretched into central Asia, understood the importance of transport links for solidifying empire. Most famously, Sher Shah Suri, who ruled in the 16th century, commissioned the Grand Trunk Road along ancient trade routes.

The British who began colonizing India a century later also understood that imperial rule required physical connection, not least for moving the raw materials, like cotton, that made empire profitable. But they cemented their rule in the age of the steam engine, laying railways rather than roads across the subcontinent.

Elsewhere, however, my co-editor stresses the need for "soft" development projects such as schools, and I would not disagree. But it is a matter of priorities.

There is no point, in my view, in building schools in villages where there is no electricity to light the rooms or power the equipment, where the communities cannot afford the books and equipment, cannot afford to hire the teachers on living salaries, and then cannot finance the maintenance of the buildings that have been so generously provided.

Something of that dynamic came across in The Times yesterday, where Anthony Lloyd reported of Musa Qala. The electricity supply, he wrote, though improved over the past month, is still worse than it was under the Taleban. Locals say that it now generates between three and five hours of power every four days, as opposed to the one day off, one day on supply they had during Taleban rule. He then adds:

The health clinic, yet another British project (£115,000), provokes similar comment among locals. The Afghan head of the Health Department has not been able to approve the clinic for use, despite three visits, as there is no running water and no electricity, few doors are in place and the plasterwork crumbles. The contractor, who was due to be dismissed two days ago unless he had rectified the problem, had allegedly multiplied material prices threefold between what he actually paid and what he charged.

This is not "redevelopment". It is madness, a collective madness born of wishful thinking, good intentions and poor execution. And it does more harm than good.

That said, although we have emphasised the role of roads, there are three major infrastructure priorities: roads, electricity and telecommunications – the three pillars on which any modern society is based and upon which it entirely depends.

And there, in Musa Qala, eight months down the line, the development agencies are as yet unable to guarantee an uninterrupted electricity supply, making a mockery of any pretensions of bringing long-term benefits to the town. Are we really saying that, over eight months, installing a reliable electricity supply is beyond our capabilities? That is certainly the message we are giving to the residents.

Thus, on top of Dannatt's "soldier administrators", we need engineers, more engineers and even more engineers – road engineers, power engineers and telecommunications engineers.

That they need to be in uniform is a compliment to our Armed Forces. Of all our government institutions, they are perhaps the most capable, the most task-orientated and the least corrupt. It is fruitless relying on the fabric and infrastructure of a failed nation like Afghanistan to provide the wherewithal to kick-start its own reconstruction, relying on corrupt and inefficient contractors. Instead, we need the likes of Lieutenant John Chard, of No. 5 Field Company, Royal Engineers, who arrived at the soon to become famous location of Rorke's Drift to repair the pontoons across the river and stayed to lead the epic defence of the station.

The Army, therefore, needs to take a direct hand. It can employ local labour, of course – as it did in days of Empire – but it must plan, execute and defend the primary phase of reconstruction. Then you can build your schools, your clinics, your outreach centres and all the rest, confident that the occupants can reach their new buildings and that, when they turn on their newly fitted switches, the lights go on.

That, surely must be Dannatt's priority and, if all he has in mind is his "stabilisation specialists", then we still have a long, long way to go.

COMMENT THREAD

We cannot afford this

Anything published in the MSM has to be treated with a great deal of caution but, health warnings aside, the latest piece in The Times on Musa Qala makes an interesting contrast with an earlier report on the MoD website.

The MoD report, published three months after the successful military operation to re-take the town from the Taleban paints an unashamedly optimistic picture of the reconstruction process. It tells us that, "the process of returning the town to a bustling centre of commerce is well underway". Musa Qala, it says:

…is gradually beginning to return to some sense of normality, the reconstruction and development works a testament to the comprehensive joint efforts of the local government headed by Governor Mullah Salam and supported by elements of the UK Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and other elements of the British military.

Eight months down the line, however, The Times offers a very different "take". Its piece is headed, "Bungs and bungling in Musa Qala: British dreams of building utopia crumble", written by Anthony Loyd from the town, the title very much conveying the tenor of the report.

Loyd reminds us that, following its recapture, the British were "keen to capitalise on their first tangible victory in 18 months," and announced "a series of projects to rebuild the town, while the Afghan Government vowed to reverse years of neglect."

Framing the piece, Loyd quotes David Slinn, the Foreign Office chief in Helmand shortly after British troops entered the town, stating: "If we can't get it right in Musa Qala then we can't get it right anywhere."

From there, it is all downhill. In the baking July heat, with temperatures soaring to 52C (125F) in the shade, the sun burns down on a rather diminished reality, writes Lloyd: "Stalled development projects, misappropriated funds, corruption, intimidation: the British stabilisation strategy has encountered a sobering set of obstacles in Musa Qala that have left it well short of the utopian state imagined in winter."

Adding colour to that assertion, we learn of a challenge from one elder during last week's shurah meeting between the town leaders and British officers. The man says, "It is the eighth month of government here. ISAF, the Afghan Army, the Afghan police - can they show the work they have done in this district? … You must show your work here. Civilians need to understand that you are working for them."

Thus the theme develops as we find that:

From the start, the British Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) - the joint civilian and military organisation based in the capital of Helmand, Lashkar Gah - was powerless to prevent Afghan subcontractors from carving up British-funded projects among themselves.

The ensuing bungs, bribes and embezzlement ensured that much of the money disappeared long before it could be spent on reconstruction projects, some of which are now falling apart as a result of inferior materials and shoddy construction.

It falls to the hapless Justin Holt - the Royal Marine colonel sent to Musa Qala last month as stabilisation adviser – to explain to the shurah: "I am very aware that when a contractor is given a contract, he subcontracts it many, many times before the building starts … I agree with members of the shurah that in eight months there hasn't been much visible progress. But we've learnt some valuable lessons."

Much featured by the earlier MoD report was the main bazaar road in Musa Qala, 500 yards long and funded by the British to a tune of £100,000 – and this "is one such lesson"? Though only three months old, it is already the target of Afghan ire:

"The contractors made it out of poor-quality cement and gravel and now it is ruined," Mullah Abdul Salaam, the Governor of Musa Qala, said. "No one in the bazaar is happy with the project. The contractors didn't spend all the money they were given by the PRT."

The health clinic, we are told - yet another British project (£115,000) - provokes similar comment among locals. The Afghan head of the Health Department has not been able to approve the clinic for use, despite three visits, as there is no running water and no electricity, few doors are in place and the plasterwork crumbles. The contractor, who was due to be dismissed two days ago unless he had rectified the problem, had allegedly multiplied material prices threefold between what he actually paid and what he charged.

To add to these woes, we then learn that the town mosque, central to local concerns since it was destroyed by the British during fighting two years ago - listed as the prime Afghan-funded reconstruction project - is still in ruins. Residents have demanded a bigger mosque than the one offered, while the donor Afghan Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development is accused of short-changing the contractor, who cannot move materials overland anyway, as the Taleban prevent road access.

It gets worse:

The Governor of Helmand attempted to lay a foundation stone at the site in May but aborted the plan when his helicopter was hit by a rocket as it was about to land. Nothing has happened since.

The electricity supply, though improved over the past month, is still worse than it was under the Taleban. Locals say that it now generates between three and five hours of power every four days, as opposed to the one day off, one day on supply they had during Taleban rule.

Only one Afghan ministry has an office in the town despite assurances in January of full government presence in Musa Qala. Meanwhile, the British-funded cash-for-work scheme, under which locals were paid $8 (£4) a day for casual labour, had its labour force cut by 75 per cent at the weekend after a deadline had expired for the Afghan managing the scheme to present his accounts - adding about 200 men to the list of unemployed.

"There was a lot of destruction here during the fighting with the British," Mullah Salaam said. "There has not been the same amount of reconstruction."

The picture thus painted is unremittingly black, although Loyd does offer a counterpoint, conveying "some notable successes". Local commerce is thriving in a hugely improved security environment. A six-strong military stabilisation team has made progress in establishing local governance and an Afghan civil secretariat, an executive and judicial shurah have been formed to work in conjunction with Mullah Salaam (the current Governor and a former Taleban commander, was appointed after British forces retook the town last year), a crucial step in empowering Afghans to take control of their affairs.

In the security domain, British troops have done their best to mould local militias into a police force that, while far from exemplary, is an improvement on what it was before despite the dubious past of the individuals concerned. In its defence, the PRT insists that the creation of local governance is a more vital strand in the "Helmand Road Map" than reconstruction.

Nevertheless, given the totemic role of Musa Qala in British efforts to stabilise Helmand, adds Loyd, it is surprising that it has taken seven months for the PRT to send a permanent stabilisation adviser to join British soldiers in the town. Further PRT advisers are due to arrive later this summer, part of an enhanced deployment throughout Helmand.

He concludes that, If their entry allays the concerns expressed by the Musa Qala shurah, it may yet have some way to go in recapturing confidence in the British troops - and the soldiers' confidence in the administrators. "They wouldn't know how to pour p*** from a boot if the instructions were on the heel," one soldier remarked. "That's the PRT."

On the back of this report, we also get a narrative from Times columnist Magnus Linklater, who remarks that Musa Qala "is where the battle for the Afghan soul will be won or lost." Linklater too speaks to Justin Holt, who "has a clear view of his role":

He aims to introduce workable systems, such as a structure for wages, a proper legal process, adult literacy courses, accountability through the local shurah or council, respect for the Afghan national police - all within a society which he describes as "like 13th-century England with mobile phones."

This means working with men such as the governor, Mullah Salaam, who is widely distrusted, both by British officers and local people. It means accepting - for the time being - the opium money that funds the local economy. It means dispensing a primitive form of justice that would be incomprehensible in Britain. It means, in effect, going native while crawling towards democracy - the beard that Holt has grown to gain respect in the shura is the visible symbol of his determination to work with the grain of local tradition, not against it.

No one could claim that Musa Qala is safe or stable enough yet to count as a positive gain for the coalition forces. If that is ever achieved, it will be done not by force of arms but by the dull, unsexy but vital symbols of a civil society at work - accounts, spreadsheets and the competent use of public money. If that sounds familiar, well it is the way that we once built an empire.

All of this is what is called in official jargon, "The Comprehensive Approach". The MoD report we have cited enlists the PRT's Stabilisation Advisor, Richard Jones to tell us that it:

… is really all about ensuring that all the elements of government necessary to rebuild and stabilise an area like Musa Qala fall into place … It is really a reflection of the complexity of conflict nowadays that you have to have the involvement of not just the military but also the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development.

About this, though, we wonder. Linklater, in his report, talks to Louise Perrotta, the "stabilisation adviser" in Garmsir. She thinks it important to get "inside the heads" of villagers, and to try to understand things from their point of view. Their thought processes do not always conform to Western concepts, she says. They are more "elliptical".

One has to admire the optimism of Mz Perrotta, if at the same time we also suggest that she is somewhat misguided. While she and, undoubtedly, her colleagues in Musa Qala are indulging themselves in getting "inside the heads" of villagers, the town of Musa Qala is a troubled island, surrounded by hostile elements where a local contractor cannot move materials overland as the Taleban prevent road access.

Linklater suggests that what is needed "is a proper civilian structure, manned by trained experts, not soldiers," adding that, "So far, however, it has proved too dangerous for non-military staff," then failing to see the inherent contradiction in his own statement, sharing the lack of clarity which seems to afflict the "stabilisation" advisors.

Essentially, with the current security situation, the civilian staff cannot deliver – something which we have seen from another worker in Helmand. But, without reconstruction, there will be no lasting security. Thus, if the civilians cannot deliver, the only logical conclusion is that reconstruction – at least in the early stages - must be a military function.

Time and again we see Afghanis, not unreasonably, asking for results and, time and again, as in Musa Qala, we see the coalition forces and their supporting agencies promise much and deliver little.

In the very nature of human relationships, this is a recipe for failure. He who delivers more than he promised very often gets more kudos than someone who delivers even more but promised the moon and fell short. Once again, we have to refer to Petreus and his injunction about managing expectations.

Holt may warble about having "learnt some valuable lessons" but he and his employers need perhaps to come to terms with the idea that Afghani reconstruction is not an exercise in on-the-job training for British officials. Rather than "learning valuable lessons", a more rigorous approach guided by a different ethos, under the title "right first time", might be more productive.

Getting it right is not rocket science – and building 500 yards of substandard road through the town centre is not it. Spending a little less time getting "inside the heads" of villagers and building a road to reconnect Musa Qala with the rest of the world might be a good start.

COMMENT THREAD

Of donkeys in uniform

If the news coming from defence correspondent Thomas Harding in Lashkah Gah, via The Daily Telegraph, is at all accurate – and there is no reason to believe it is not – then we may have turned the corner in Afghanistan.

That much was hinted at by Anthony Loyd in The Times last March, about which we were duly sceptical. But what Harding is telling us is that the Taliban's much-vaunted spring offensive has stalled. This is apparently due to lack of organisation after dozens of middle-ranking commanders were killed by British troops in the past year.

After suffering more than 1,000 dead in battles with the Parachute Regiment and Royal Marines in the last year, the Taliban retired to regroup and re-equip last winter. A spring offensive was ordered by the Taliban leadership based in Quetta, Pakistan, and was meant to be launched in late March – but since has not materialised.

Says a "military source", a lack of mid-level commanders has meant that there has been little co-ordination to bring about the offensive: "They are getting strategic guidance from Quetta but this is not translating on the ground." Says the same source, "It's a bit premature to discuss the Taliban as a spent force. I believe that they are struggling but still maintain a capability to carry out attacks on a daily basis. But I would suggest in the long term the Taliban may just peter out."

But if British Forces are experiencing a welcome success, then it seems it is in the main due to the much derided "platoon house", policy of placing small detachments of troops in remote locations, acting as a magnet for insurgents, who subjected them to continuous attacks.

At the time, there were complaints that the policy was driven by political imperatives rather than military strategy. The platoon houses had been occupied only as a result of requests from President Karzai and Governor Daoud, who wanted British forces to hold north Helmand," endorsed by the British government. Yet, as Brig Ed Butler was later to admit, going into the platoon houses had the "unintended consequence" of defeating the Taliban, tactically, in north Helmand.

However, contemporary reports indicate - it was a close run thing and, for a time, it looked like we might be losing.

It was at that time that stories of equipment shortages in Afghanistan had been dominating concerns, with tales of the enormous difficulties in resupplying the isolated platoon houses, primarily because of the shortage of helicopters.

It was largely this that led to the "platoon house" policy being brought precipitately to a halt at the end of last September, when British commanders sought a truce in Musa Qala and a withdrawal of our troops, only to have the area reoccupied by the Taliban.

On this blog, we have tended to focus our criticism on the equipment front, although, here, we ventured into a critique of tactics, and were highly dubious about this retreat, seeing it as another example of the lack of aggression on the part of the Army.

Amongst those who applauded this move, though, was Times defence correspondent Mick Smith who wrote at the time, in September 2006 that "the whole policy of putting troops into remote outposts in the north … have provided graphic evidence as to why politicians should not interfere in the business of soldiering."

But, by February of this year, then Nato commander, British Army General David Richards, was forced to admit that, "In many respects I think we've been more successful than I anticipated … Not only has Nato unequivocally proved it can fight but actually, militarily, it has defeated the Taliban."

What is now emerging is that this defeat was achieved largely in spite of, not because of, the efforts of senior Army commanders who had opposed the "platoon house" policy from the start. Thus, rather than enthusiastically committing their forces and – crucially – calling for more back-up, they were refusing to transmit requests for more troops and equipment up the chain of command and, moreover, refusing offers of external assistance.

Ed Butler, for instance, had been offered the services of experienced ex-military pilots flying giant Russian-built Mi-26 "Halo" helicopters (pictured above) which could have completely resolved his supply problems, releasing military helicopters for operations. But so lacking in enthusiasm was he about the idea that he did not endorse it. When the news of the offer was then broken by the Telegraph and other media, it was presented in such a negative way that, without the endorsement of key senior military officers, it was never progressed.

Fortunately, by the time Butler and Richards got their way and the retreat from Musa Qala had been brokered, the damage to the Taliban had already been done – the extent of which was then unknown. Yet, while Nato forces have subsequently been able to exploit this situation, the herd memory of the period is one of stumbling and incompetence on the part of a government that was not in control of events and letting down our troops.

The full story on this has yet to emerge but we were getting hints of obstruction and inertia by factions within the military by last February when we wrote a piece indicating that things were not entirely as they seemed. As that time, we wrote that, if we are going to be locked into that oft quoted paradigm of "lions led by donkeys", it is as well to remember that, when that phrasing emerged, many of the "donkeys" were in uniform.

And, as more details come available, this seems more true now than when we wrote it.

COMMENT THREAD

An unhealthy lack of information

Our struggle to keep abreast of the progress in the Iraqi and the Afghani campaigns is not done for entertainment or out of idle interest. We take our responsibilities as citizen/subjects in a democracy seriously, and could hardly do otherwise, having so often declared that democracy is not a spectator sport.

Thus it is that we need to know what is going on because, if the campaigns are being badly mismanaged, and the government does not respond adequately or at all, we will be part of that band of people who raise a clamour and demand action. That is what living in a democracy is about.

The trouble is, so many miles removed from the action, we rely on others for information, on the media, on official sources and on the occasional discussions with people who have been there – all assessed through the filter of our own experience, background knowledge and powers of understanding.

That said, the essential problem with Afghanistan is that the flow of information is sparse and very often second-hand. Media reports, for instance, are often datelined Kabul, written by journalists hundreds of miles away from the action in the context where it matters not whether it is hundreds or – like us – thousands. The information is still second hand.

That much which is based on official information can be totally unreliable, representing spin from organisations which are determined to present the best, and thus leave out bad news.


A classic example is a recent media report of Nato activities at Garmsir. Offering details of a military "success", a month later the troops are still having "successes", but seem no further forward than when they had their earlier successes.

We saw this especially with the accounts of the Kajaki dam clearance, where we are now being told of a third operation in as many months, having been led to believe that the first two had been successful.

On the other hand, looking at the totality of information available to us, we believe there is a possibility that Nato (and especially British) forces are not doing too well. We could even be at risk of losing.

However, unlike many, we do not take the view that the Afghani war is inherently unwinnable – the white man's graveyard of yore – and took some comfort from a piece earlier last month in the American Spectator by Hal Colebatch.

He argued that the myth of inevitable defeat for British forces is precisely that – a myth. The previous campaigns in Afghanistan, he writes, don't tell us much about the present one, except that it is a very tough country inhabited by very tough people. Any army there had better be well-equipped and supplied, well-motivated and with clear-minded military and political leadership.

Then, today, in The Times, we get soldier turned photographer and war correspondent, Anthony Loyd, who argues that, "for once" an Afghan war is winnable, declaring that "the tide is turning against the Taliban".

However, if as Loyd believes, the Taliban is spent force, his information comes not from direct communication with them, but from Nato sources – the same sources that arranged a truce in Musa Qala, only to have the Taliban move in and take over.

The Australian Herald, however – with a reporter Kandahar – reports that 40 miles to the south of Musa Qala, "Sangin is boiling", the town that straddles the British communication line to the Kajaki dam region.

The fierce and unexpected activity of the Taliban here tends to confirm the fears of some analysts who, according to the Herald, argue that the insurgency has spent the winter regrouping and is showing signs of more sophisticated communications, tactics and command-and-control structures. And it has Pakistan as a sanctuary from which to operate. And, as we saw recently, they can still reach out in unexpected places, to ambush unsuspecting convoys.

It is as well to remember that only a fraction of the manpower and aid deployed to Iraq is being allocated for Afghanistan yet, while the country and its population are bigger than Iraq, the foreign force is only a fifth of that in Iraq. Even with everything going for it, the Nato force is going to find it much harder to prevail.

But there are worrying sign the Karzai government – never firmly in control – is losing its grip in the southern provinces, while the population is becoming more alienated by foreign troops, and their perceived indiscriminate killing of Afghani civilians.

This harps back to a perspicacious report published in February 2004 on the dangers of collateral damage, a report which seem to have been largely ignored as Nato forces rely more and more on airpower rather than more precise and controllable land equipment.

All we have to go on, though, is slender scraps of information – and a sense that very little effort is going into reporting what is going on. Instead, we get acres of coverage on the career of Patrick Mercer, a minor Tory politician, unknown to most people before a few days ago, all from a media that is obsessed with trivia.

If the war is winnable, though, we need to make sure we put the necessary resources into winning it but, so far, it is more than a little difficult to find out what is going on. That is not healthy.

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