Lost before it started – Part 5

Having looked at the effects of policy on the conduct of the campaign in Iraq, in this fifth part, we look at the Army's response to criticisms, and its broader response to its own failures, reflecting on the nature of the problems which affect the Army high command.

Armchair critics

Faced with criticisms of the Iraqi operation, Gen Dannatt has been quick to round on "armchair critics". He is not the only one. At the height of the Iranian hostages affair in April 2007, there had been much speculation about the apparent willingness of the boarding team to surrender without a shot being fired. Des Browne had sprung to the team's defence, castigating the "armchair pundits". "We ought to be very careful about commenting from the comparative comfort of wherever we are, when we are not out there on operations, about decisions that operational commanders and other people make," he said.

It is perhaps a little unkind to point out that, when it came to armchairs, the MoD was better equipped than most. To complement the £2.3 billion refurbishment of its headquarters in Whitehall, it had purchased over three thousand Herman Miller Aeron chairs, described as "the most comfortable office chairs in the world" - at a list price of over £1,000 each.

An Army incapable of learning

Despite its rejection of "armchair critics", we have an Army which seems incapable of learning for itself. For instance, with troops deployed in Afghanistan, albeit in small numbers before 2006, as had happened in Iraq, routine patrols in the capital Kabul had been carried out in Wolf Land Rovers.

Sure enough, on 28 January 2004, a patrol was attacked by a suicide bomber, killing Pte Jonathan Kitulagoda and destroying the Land Rover. As in Iraq, the Army replaced these vehicles with Snatches. Sure enough, on 4 September 2006, a patrol was attacked by a suicide bomber, killing Pte Craig O'Donnell. Four Afghani civilians were also killed and another soldier was very seriously injured.

Just over a month later, on 19 October, Marine Gary Wright, 45 Commando Royal Marines, was killed in a Snatch as it left the police station in Lashkar Gah, the regional capital of Helmand Province. A suicide bomber had been waiting for his convoy. The Snatch was destroyed, one other Royal Marine was seriously injured and two children bystanders were killed.

In all, up to the end of 2008, at least ten soldiers died in Snatches in Afghanistan, culminating in an infamous incident on 16 June 2008. Then, four soldiers were killed in a Snatch, three from the SAS and one female soldier, Sarah Bryant. Another soldier was badly injured.

The use of the Snatch was roundly condemned as "cavalier at best, criminal at worst," by Major Sebastian Morley, the soldiers' CO. Having tendered his resignation, he claimed that Whitehall officials and military commanders had repeatedly ignored his warnings. Troops would be killed if they continued to allow them to be transported in this vulnerable vehicle, he had protested. He had not been alone. "We highlighted this issue saying people are going to die and now they have died," said a soldier who served with Major Morley, referring to a vehicle which the troops were calling "mobile coffins".

Defence of the Snatch

Far from being contrite, the MoD robustly defended the Snatch. In the immediate aftermath of the June incident, Defence Minister Bob Ainsworth had in the Commons insisted that "commanders on the ground" were telling him they still needed Land Rover-based platforms "... and they will do for the foreseeable future." Weathering aggressive oral questions on 3 November and even a question to the Prime Minister two days later, the MoD maintained its fightback.

This culminated in briefings to MPs and media on 16 December from none other than Lt Gen Nick Houghton, now Chief of Joint Operations. Patronising in tone and simplistic in content, Houghton's dissertation amounted to an admission that, as long as there was a tactical need for a light protected vehicle, the Snatch would have to remain in service. There was no other option. "You may have heard of alternatives," he said, "but at present no acceptable alternative vehicle exists though they are being actively sought."

The Vector – a "coffin on wheels"

What he admitted to journalists after his formal presentation, though, was that there had been an alternative. But it had "proved inadequate, unable to cope with the threat from roadside bombs." This was the Pinzgauer Vector, about which the Army had been so enthusiastic in July 2006. Then, it had prevailed upon Des Browne to buy more - its price for accepting the Mastiff which it had not wanted. A clear record of the Army's intent had been delivered in March 2007 – by Houghton himself. He then told the House of Commons Defence Committee that once the Vector had been deployed fully, "the more vulnerable Snatch would be withdrawn from service in Afghanistan".

There were hints of a problem in June 2008, in a published list of "expected out-of-service dates" for a range of vehicles. The Vector was given a date of 2015. In an Army that routinely kept vehicles for 30 years or more, a mere seven-year service life was unprecedented. Therein lay a tale which raises serious questions about the competence and good faith of those involved in the procurement of Army vehicles.

In June 2006, when the Army had first announced its intention to buy Vectors, this "armchair general" expressed alarm at these "coffins of wheels". This was based on the manufacturer's specifications, which claimed a protection rating against "two NATO L2A2 hand grenades detonating simultaneously only 150mm below the floor pan" – 350g of high explosive. This vehicle was to be deployed into one of the heaviest mined countries in the world, up against Russian anti-tank mines housing 7.5 Kg of high explosive.

More alarmingly, the Vector had a "cab forward" layout, with the driver and the front seat passenger sat over the wheel arches. If a mine detonated under a wheel, either the driver or the passenger would be directly in the so-called "cone of destruction", exposed to the full force of the blast. At least with the Snatch and its "engine forward" layout, there was some distance between the front wheels and the occupants of the cab, allowing, as some did, soldiers to escape the full force of a mine and survive.

Had it deliberately sought out a design to maximise deaths and injuries, the Army, in selecting the Vector, could not have made a better choice. Furthermore, the vehicle was not cheap. Including the support package, each cost £437,000. They were not only "coffins on wheels", they were very expensive coffins. The £258,000 price of a Force Protection Cougar – on which the Mastiff was based – was better value.

Predictably – totally and completely predictably – within months of the Vector being deployed, a fatality was reported. This was on 25 July 2007 when L/Cpl Alex Hawkins and others, "had been taking part in a routine patrol and were returning to their patrol base when the explosion struck their Vector." Two other soldiers were injured. The Vector had to be destroyed to avoid it falling into enemy hands. Channel 4 News noted:

Vector, which is more suitable for rugged terrain than the army’s existing Snatch patrol vehicle, was recently introduced as part of a package of measures designed to increase troops' safety in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first Vectors began arriving in the country in April of this year and are being phased in, set to replace most of the Snatch vehicles by late October.

How many non-fatal incidents occurred we have no means of knowing but reports from serving troops recorded that the "ambulance" section of their flights home were frequently occupied by soldiers who had lost their legs from mine blasts. There is no means of knowing either how many soldiers were killed in Vectors. Conscious of the potential for damaging publicity, the MoD stopped reporting the types of vehicle involved in fatal incidents.

But we do know that, from October 2007 when Snatches were supposed to have been replaced, there had been only one fatal incident involving a Snatch – killing Sarah Bryant and her colleagues – as against three known fatal Vector incidents. There has since been one more, bringing the known total to four.

But there was a final twist to this debacle. There had been yet another Snatch replacement. In April 2008, months before Sarah Bryant and her colleagues had died, the MoD had ordered 24 mine-protected Bushmasters, exclusively for the Special Forces. Had the British emulated the Dutch and called off vehicles directly from Australian Army stock of 400, they could have been on a freight aircraft within weeks and been issued to units in Afghanistan by May. This vehicle could readily have resisted the attack which had killed four people and injured another.

Defence of a failed strategy

While the Snatch was getting the lion's share of attention – greater than in 2005, when so many more soldiers were being killed – and the Bushmaster order having been ignored, troops were being killed and injured in a far more dangerous vehicle, one which had been slated as a replacement for the Snatch. No wonder the Snatch Vixen was rushed in to plug the gap. No wonder Lt Gen Houghton and the MoD had been defensive.

There was though, more to Houghton's defensiveness. The Snatch was more than just a vehicle. It was the embodiment of a mindset. The vehicle filled an operational requirement, reflecting the Army's approach to counter-insurgency. As Houghton explained in his briefing:

In counter insurgency environments, other factors play into the desired capability mix. Most obvious amongst such factors are first the physical accessibility of vehicles in built up areas and narrow streets … Second the physical profile of the vehicle and its affect (sic) on the local people.

Third the ability of a vehicle to allow its occupants to interact with the local population and to allow observation of local atmospherics. And finally I would say the physical effect that a vehicle has in respect of the likelihood of it damaging local infrastructure such as mud walls and weakly constructed roads and culverts and thereby alienating the local population.

The Snatch, therefore, was essential to the Army's "hearts and minds" strategy. But what Houghton did not explain was there were two parts, essentially summed up as "go light – go heavy". The essence was outlined in a joint US/UK study of the British approach to "low intensity operations" in Iraq. This grouped armour into two packages. The Challengers and the Warriors were the "heavies", the Snatch, obviously, the "light". Thus:

Warriors and ultimately Challengers were found to send a very strong statement whereas the use of Snatch vehicles … sent an entirely different message. During difficult periods, having such impressive physical capabilities greatly enhanced the ability to ramp up and down between stances, maintaining British credibility as a serious fighting force.

The strategy, therefore, amounted to sending messages, essentially paternalistic in nature. If the citizens were good, daddy would use Snatches. If they were naughty, daddy would send out the Warriors. If they were very naughty, daddy would get really cross and inflict Challengers on them. If they then behaved themselves, it was back to Snatches as a reward … go light, go heavy – go light, exactly the rhythm to which the Staffords had been exposed in al Amarah in 2005 with such tragic consequences.

The problem, of course, was that the insurgents did not quite see like that. Going "light" meant offering them targets. When the British upped the ante and escorted the Snatches with Warriors, the insurgents learnt how to take out Warriors. When the Challengers appeared, they learnt how to take them out as well. After that, the British had nowhere to go, other than their bases – where they became … targets.

One thing the study also noted was the "instinctive reluctance of junior officers to rely heavily on technology to assist in their tactical decision-making". Was it "based on ill-founded conservatism or on a justified concern with how it may adversely influence their instincts?" it asked. It failed to note that technophobia was not confined to junior officers. However, the point was made – that technology was not always part of the British force mix. More worryingly, it was not part of the intellectual make-up of the Army.

COMMENT THREAD

Let loose the dogs of chores

So far, reported only by one obscure (to me, anyway) online business site, the MoD has at last given some more details of its new £700 million armoured vehicle package announced by John Hutton last month.

This is the Tactical Support Vehicle (TSV) range – all given names from the canine genus, as has become customary in British Army armoured vehicle nomenclature. These, though, are to be the workhorses, doing the fetching and carrying and other chores, rather than fighting.

At the heavy end – very much as expected – we see the Force Protection Inc nominated at the preferred bidder with the Cougar flatbed. The MoD offers a photograph (above), which includes the vehicle being dressed up with the characteristic Barracuda Mobile Camouflage System (MCS) which we see adorning the Snatch Land Rovers and Vectors, so one might think that this is the final form, without bar or additional side armour.

However, once the wonks back home get at it, we could see it come out in a very different form. The MoD is, in fact, saying that it will be "up-armoured and integrated with UK specific equipment such as communications systems and protection measures in a similar way to Mastiff."

Less impressive is the nomination for the Husky – the "medium" vehicle. The preferred bidder is Navistar Defence with a vehicle based on the International MXT-MVA (pictured). As a cargo truck, it will have a four-man cab and a cargo capacity in excess of 1.5 tons. It will, however, come as three variants: utility, ambulance and command post.

This vehicle does not come with rave reviews. It is not a proper MRAP, with the classic v-shaped hull, but is a conversion built on an International MXT 4x4 pick-up chassis, with appliqué armour.

The last thing the Army needs is yet another truck type on its inventory. An alternative is the cargo version of the Bushmaster called the Copperhead. With the Bushmaster about to enter service with the special forces, there would be some commonality but, it appears, this is not to be.

The third and least satisfactory of them all is the Coyote TSV (Light) which is to be a 6x6 derivative of the Jackal designed by Supacat Ltd. We are told that it will also have a cargo capacity in excess of 1.5 tons and a four-man crew.

The MoD does not offer a photograph of this, but it may well be similar to the Supacat "Extenda" seen in Paris earlier this year (pictured). There are no indications, as yet, as to whether this will be armoured in the same way as the Jackal but, if it is not, soldiers would be better protected going to war on bicycles.

The best thing that can be said of this vehicle is that it will share the same degree of vulnerability as its smaller cousin. Frankly, if the extreme mobility for which this vehicle is famed is really needed in the supply role, then the best option would not be a ground vehicle at all, but a helicopter or even – as was adopted by the LRDG in World War II - light aircraft (spool down to fifth picture).

Of this new package, John Hutton tells us the vehicles "will give the troops in Afghanistan the additional bite they need in the fight against the enemy. They do a formidable job and deserve nothing but the best." Despite these fine words, it is by no means clear that they (the troops) are about to get what they deserve.

COMMENT THREAD

Bogged down in the mire

What started as a straightforward story of simple negligence is now getting hopelessly bogged down in a mire of recriminations, accusations and counter-accusations, with the point being missed completely.

According to Thomas Harding's latest report, Special Forces soldiers "tore their hair out" at being allocated "Snatch" Land Rovers, described as "flimsy vehicles", after Cpl Sarah Bryant and three of her male colleagues had been killed last June.

The source is hardly impartial, coming as it does Adam Holloway, albeit a former regular soldier but also a Conservative MP. Nevertheless, it is probably true, especially in the light of a report in The News of the World which does not seem to have been picked up by The Telegraph or the diligent Tory MPs.

This records that Major Sebastian Morley, at the centre of the current storm, was moved to resign not just by the Sarah Bryant incident but by a second attack on a "Snatch" Land Rover. This took place in September in Nadi-ali, west of Lashkar Gah. No troops were killed so the incident was not revealed by the MoD.

However, according to the NOTW account, as the four men inside struggled to get out, two with injuries, they came under fire from the Taliban. Coalition forces rushed to their rescue and another massacre was prevented. A senior military source said: "Morale was badly hit by the death of Sarah Bryant and her colleagues. But after this second incident people were asking why nothing was done."

The paper cites an "insider" saying: "The first one was tough but the second knocked everyone for six. We could have been sending home another four coffins. "Frankly, it's a miracle lives weren't lost again. It has forced Maj Morley — a good bloke well-liked by his men — to resign. He could see more lives being lost and felt he had to take a stand."

This source continues: "Time and again we've asked for better vehicles and the excuse is they aren't available. It has clearly cost lives."

Despite the current focus being on defence minister Quentin Davies, under fire from the Tories, the broader implications of this second incident, and the new timeline, adds a whole new dimension to the issue.

As we reported earlier, suitable protected vehicles had already been ordered and, had urgent steps been taken, they could have been in theatre well before June, in time to prevent Sarah Bryant and her colleagues being killed.

These were the Australian Bushmasters, the order placed in April and confirmed in May by the British High Commission in Canberra.

There is no question of these vehicles not being suitable as they are currently used by Australian Special Forces, who work in a very similar manner to their British counterparts, on whom they are modelled. The vehicles are currently in Afghanistan, with the Australian forces (pictured).

We further pointed out that, when the Dutch in Afghanistan ordered Bushmasters – which were delivered in October 2006, they negotiated to draw them from existing Australian Army stocks rather than wait for a new-build, the Australian inventory then being topped-up when the manufacturers had built what amounted to replacement vehicles.

Given that authorisation to purchase by the British government had been given in April, and the fact that the Australian Army holds large stocks of these vehicles, it seems inconceivable that, had a formal request been made, immediate supplies could not have been made available.

Even with transport (a few days by air freighter) and the fitting of radios and electronic counter-measures, there still seems no reason why these vehicles could not have been in service with British Special Forces well before the end of May, in time to protect Sarah Bryant and her escorts.

With the second incident occurring in September, it would now appear that these vehicles were not even in place on this extended timescale, which begs the question, where were they? And, for that matter, where are they now?

As to Mr Holloway's "evidence", given yesterday during questions from the Commons' Defence Committee on the state of the Armed Force to the chief MoD civil servant Sir Bill Jeffrey, we learn not only that an SAS commander was "pulling his hair out making urgent requests that they should not have to have 'Snatch' before they deployed to Afghanistan this summer," but the unit "despaired" after numerous requests were ignored with bosses telling them the Snatch was suitable for their task.

The substantive point here seems to be the identity of those "bosses", and the actions and inactions of those further up the chain of command. It is great sport, in which shadow defence minister Gerald Howarth is indulging, to pontificate that: "This is the second example in two days of commanders being denied equipment which they had requested."

However, his complaint that: "Quentin Davies has been extraordinarily cavalier about the requests that commanders have made from the field," is slightly wide of the mark - as indeed is his assertion that, "If he cannot fulfil the role of equipping them (the troops) properly then he should consider his position."

That is not in any way to defend Davies, but he was not in post when the Sarah Bryant or the second incident occurred. Furthermore, ministers may not even have been directly involved in the decisions which led to the "Snatch" Land Rovers being used. But they may have been involved in the decision to allow what seems to be a fairly relaxed timescale for the delivery of the Bushmasters, in which case we need to look elsewhere than Quentin Davies for where the fault lies.

The Tories, though, seem more concerned with gaining a ministerial "scalp" than they do with getting to the bottom of this murky affair, finding out what went wrong and why, and how best – and most expeditiously – the system should be fixed.

We did suggest earlier that defence was too important to be treated in the conventional party political manner yet it seems, once again, that Tory tribalism is taking precedence over securing a safer environment for our troops.

Ironically, if only the Tories could be more focused, the failures they identify could well be greater that those to which they have alluded. In that case, the prize could be an even bigger "scalp" than the very junior minister they are targeting.

COMMENT THREAD

The ugly face of politics

UPDATED (with adds): Today, at defence questions, on the basis of "information received", I had expected to see the unedifying sight of Mr Gerard Howarth leaping to his feet in the House of Commons, attempting (Speaker permitting) to wax indignant about the fate of the four British soldiers killed in a "Snatch" Land Rover last June.

Now that the media are again paying attention to the fact that these dangerously vulnerable vehicles are still in service, and there was a prospect of a favourable mention in the press, Mr Howarth, I suggested, would be milking the issue for every last drop of political advantage he could gain from it.

In the event, he was upstaged by his boss, the shadow secretary of state for defence, Liam Fox, who with sundry other members of the Tory tribe - including Patrick Mercer - sought to extract what they could from the perceived embarrassment of the government over this affair.

But, when it comes to doing anything about SAS soldiers having to deploy in these vehicles, Mr Fox and his Conservative friends are too late – far too late. In April and then again in May we picked up the news that the MoD was to buy 24 Australian-made Bushmaster Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles (pictured below).

The fact that this was not formally announced – in the context that the MoD usually extracts as much publicity from equipment purchases as it can – indicated only one thing. The Bushmasters were intended for the Special Forces. The government never announces equipment procured for them. The obvious and wholly sound inference is that these, in due course, are intended to replace the "Snatch" Land Rovers which had to be used with such disastrous consequences last June.

If there is a complaint – and there are in fact many – it is that the MoD, having recognised the need for protected vehicles, did not make arrangements to get some to theatre immediately, leaving troops to continue to using vehicles which they knew to be dangerously vulnerable.

That, if anything, is the substantive point to emerge from this affair - where the government could and should rightly be held to account - rather than over some imagined slight to an Army officer - but it is one which the Conservatives did not attempt to address. Nor, in truth, are they probably capable of so doing.

On this, one has to state that, when purchasing military vehicles, the time between the order and delivery can be fairly prolonged, especially if – as is so often the case - the buyers insist on "customising" the vehicles to their own specific requirements, adding all the "bells and whistles". But this was exactly the situation that the Dutch confronted in Afghanistan in 2006 when they realised that protected vehicles were needed for their troops.

It was then that they ordered 25 Bushmasters from Australia but, in view of the urgency of the situation, they did two things. Firstly, in the interim, they borrowed five Nyala (RG-31) protected vehicles from the Canadians, to cover them for their more hazardous patrols. Secondly, they negotiated to draw Bushmasters from existing Australian Army stocks rather than wait for a new-build, the Australian inventory then being topped-up when the manufacturers had built what amounted to replacement vehicles.

By this means the Dutch had Bushmasters in place by October 2006. By similar means, the British Army could have had protected vehicles in place by June, to cover the expedition that ended in tragedy. That these vehicles were not in place is a genuine cause for concern, the reasons for which should be established.

This is especially the case as, from the report of the incident - where it appears the Land Rover was hit by two stacked mines - the attack would have been eminently survivable, that weight of explosive being well within the capacity of protected vehicles to withstand. By any account that we know, these deaths were needless - good lives of good men and one woman horribly wasted.

As it stands, had someone at high level in the chain of command had the balls - and the initiative - and sought the political support, the moment that order for the Bushmasters had been signed, actions could have been taken which could have culminated, within days, of those vehicles being put on a freight aircraft to Afghanistan.

And, I bet, there are any number of people prepared to tell me that there were a hundred reasons why this could not have been done. But there was one reason - which trumps them all - why it could have been done: those vehicles were needed in theatre, without which people were going to die - as indeed they did.

But - as one has come to expect from this dire crew which calls itself the Conservative Party - instead of there being calls for the substantive issues to be investigated, the affair has degenerated into an unseemly squabble over who precisely was responsible for the deployment of "Snatch" Land Rovers that June, with the bickering devolving over whether it was a field officer or the result of equipment inadequacies.

Thus we are told, newly-appointed defence equipment minister, Quentin Davies, has "angrily rejected" claims that his department was responsible for the lack of equipment, suggesting that the deaths could have been the result of commanders on the ground sending out their troops in the wrong vehicles with the wrong equipment. He declares:

Obviously there may be occasions when in retrospect a commander chose the wrong piece of equipment, the wrong vehicle, for the particular threat that the patrol or whatever it was encountered and we had some casualties as a result.

Needless to say, the tail-end Charlies like Cdr John Muxworthy, of the UK National Defence Association (UKNDA), are piling in to attack Davies, Muxworthy declaring that, "The replacement to Snatch vehicles should have been procured years ago but they were not and as a result British lives were lost."

This, I actually find offensive. When the UKNDA was set up, I communicated with Muxworthy about the toll of deaths arising from Land Rovers, inviting him on behalf of his association to take an active part in the campaign to secure their replacement. The Association, however – as a matter of policy – decided to avoid dealing with such contentious "political" matters, choosing instead to focus on non-partisan "welfare" issues such as the treatment of injured soldiers (a "line" that was also followed by the Conservatives).

My cry that we should give at least some attention to preventing soldiers getting injured (and killed) in the first place went unheeded. But now we see Muxworthy and his pals crawling out of the woodwork, ready with their sound bites and their easy condemnation, in exchange for cheap publicity in whatever media source that will give them a hearing.

Even then Muxworthy, in proclaiming that the "Snatch" replacement "should have been procured years ago" is missing the point. It should never have been deployed in the first place, not in Iraq where it arrived in October 2003 and certainly not in Afghanistan where it was deployed in combat operations in mid-2006. General Jackson has a lot to answer for.

The real point is made (partly) by Nicholas Carter of Blaina, Gwent, in the letter column of today's Daily Telegraph, who observes that:

When I was a soldier serving in Oman in the 1950s, most of our casualties were caused by Land Rovers being blown up by mines. That was 50 years ago and still the Government neither learns nor cares.

By 1966, however, the Army was buying factory-modified Bedford trucks, specially fitted with mine protection plates (right), which we specifically discussed in a post in December 2006 (and again in March 2008) with the broader theme of mine protection broached in June 2006 (and here). Even water tankers and fire engines (the latter pictured below in Cyprus, where the mine threat was considerable) were protected.

Where Nicholas Carter goes slightly wrong, therefore, is in complaining that it is "the Government" that "neither learns nor cares". The fact is that the Army and successive governments – Conservative and Labour - took their eyes off the ball. But, in particular, the Army is at fault, having never taken the mine threat in warfare seriously, leaving huge gaps in capacity.


Thus, despite the experience of the Second World War – where mines were the cause of significant vehicle losses in Northern Europe – the reaction in Oman and then Aden was tardy.

Furthermore, each time lessons have been learned, they have been forgotten as quickly. Even more recently, in Bosnia – where British mine protection procedures and equipment were so much admired that they were copied by US forces and the Canadian – the Army disposed of its equipment, dispensed with its hard-earned expertise and went into Iraq almost completely shorn of protection.

Gradually, over the bodies of its dead, it is re-learning the same lessons. Thus, more than forty years after it first bought armoured, mine protected trucks, the Army is again buying armoured, mine protected trucks (pictured) - having, incidentally, recently invested in a massive new fleet of unarmoured trucks.

The tragedy of all this is that, while the storm of protest is centred around the now "fashionable" cause of the "Snatch" Land Rover, there are other equally deadly vehicles still in service, supported by Mr Gerald Howarth.

Thus, we have one vehicle that has become a "political football", to be used by the opposition for scoring cheap points against the government, while the real lessons are not learned and the broader issues are ignored. That is the scourge of modern politics, and what an ugly picture it paints.

COMMENT THREAD

Plus ça change …

Good news this week was the delivery of the first of the batch of 157 Ridgeback MRAPs to Brize Norton, a month ahead of schedule. They will be fitted here with weapons, additional armour, plus radios, ECM and other theatre equipment before being despatched to Afghanistan.

That five were airfreighted to the UK by a chartered Antonov signals that a small battle has been won – the argument as to whether the whole batch of vehicles should be assembled before deployment, or whether they should be fed into theatre piecemeal, as and when they come off the production lines and have been kitted out.

So far, it looks as if the latter "school" has prevailed, and the vehicles will be rushed out as soon as they are available.

It is just as well that a sense of urgency is at last being impressed on the MoD for, last week saw another fatal attack on a British convoy, causing the death of Signaller Wayne Bland, from 16 Signal Regiment. Two other soldiers were also injured as their vehicle was targeted by a car-borne suicide bomber (pictured) while the troops were carrying out a route familiarisation patrol in Kabul.

According to The Sun - the only newspaper to have identified the vehicle type – Signaller Bland was riding top cover in a Saxon, one of three in the convoy when the bomber hit. Although the Saxon is probably less vulnerable than the "Snatch" Land Rover (in certain respects), this additional death underscores the vital need for better protection.

There is no "hearts and minds" issue here, as the unit to which Bland was attached was the Motor Transport Troop, responsible for force protection and movement of personnel and vital stores around Kabul. As the vehicles are largely confined to the main supply routes, neither is size an issue – as indicated by the use of the Saxon which has similar dimensions to the Ridgeback.

Another dimension to this is that, while Kabul has been relatively quite until recently, it seems as if the Taliban are escalating their campaign in the area, specifically targeting supply convoys – a tactic which includes picking off vehicles all the way along the route into Pakistan.

However, it is not only supply convoys which are at risk. Ranger David Pepper of the Royal Irish Regiment was among six soldiers wounded when an IED hit their "Snatch" Land Rover last month, when they were on patrol in Sangin. His mother, Jacqueline Pepper, said their lives had been saved by an "act of God" after the vehicle had "split in two". Pepper was driving the vehicle and, reportedly, the gearbox below him took the blast.

In a separate incident, also last month, a Territorial Army sergeant with the 3rd battalion of the Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment suffered multiple injuries when his WIMIK was hit by a mine "on the way out of enemy territory" in southern Helmand Province three weeks ago.

July also saw the death of Australian soldier Sean McCarthy killed in a six-wheel Long Range Patrol Vehicle (LRPV), based on the Land Rover Defender Series – not dissimilar to the WIMIK. McCarthy was the second Australian soldier to die in a LRPV. In February 2002, SAS Sgt Andrew Russell was riding in his LRPV when it hit an old Russian anti-tank mine.

Now, perversely, with 24 Australian Bushmasters being supplied to the British SAS - and the Dutch Army having ordered another 13, with another European Army (believed to be Spain) expressing interest in acquiring some - their Australian equivalents are buying 30 six-wheel versions of the Jackal, to be named the "Nary". It is said to be unarmoured, a move that has not met with universal approval. One ex-SAS officer complained, "Wherever you go in Afghanistan you are seen and people can blow you up. How can so little have changed in six years?"

What clearly has not changed – or not enough – is the military attitude to MRAPs. Although the US is in the throes of complete conversion to protected vehicles, the number being bought by the UK is still insufficient – and late. On the other hand, some in both the British and Australian forces, in their advocacy of the Jackal, still believe that protection comes from mobility, speed, greater off-road capability, lower profile and an ability to fight.

No one, though, seems to have told the Taleban this.

COMMENT THREAD

Another Vector

Although initial media reports, based on MoD information, made no reference to the vehicle type, we must commend the MoD website report on the untimely death of Corporal Jason Stuart Barnes from the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME), which does name the vehicle involved.

The incident happened on the late evening of 22 July when, according to the official account, Kajaki Company of 2 Para had deployed forward from their base to counter the Taleban's attempts to influence the local population in nearby villages, and prevent them from firing mortars and rockets at the base and the Kajaki Dam.

Cpl Barnes was an armourer and part of 2 PARA's REME Light Aid Detachment. His job was to maintain the company's weapons in the base, but often took a turn driving the Vector ambulance vehicle in support of the company's operations.

When another member of the company was seriously injured in an explosion the ambulance was needed, and after a successful evacuation of the seriously injured soldier by helicopter Cpl Barnes was driving the ambulance back towards the base when it was struck by an explosive device.

Given the lack of detail of the strength and positioning of the IED, one cannot positively affirm that another, better protected vehicle such as the Mastiff, would necessarily have protected Cpl Barnes. But, given the known vulnerability of the Vector, and the success of the Mastiff in saving troops from mine and IED explosions, the presumption must be that the outcome might have been very different had a Mastiff been used.

Of course, that also presumes that the heavier Mastiff could have reached the area accessed by the lighter Vector, which might not have been the case. That leaves the question open as to whether things could have been done any differently.

However, as we know, there are lighter MRAPs than the Mastiff, and it was the MOD's choice in the first instance to go for one of the heavier types, when alternatives were available.

Even the Ridgeback, currently on order and due in theatre soon, is still a heavy vehicle and there is no assurance that it could be a complete replacement for the Vector, nor even the Bushmaster, which is on order for the Special Forces.

We do accept deaths as a tragic consequence of the deployment of troops in Afghanistan and we are profoundly grateful to the young men and women who so bravely risk their lives on our behalf. Nevertheless, the continued toll of casualties and the complete absence of reports of deaths amongst those fortunate enough to be tasked with riding in Mastiffs, does raise serious questions as to the continued deployment of the Vector.

This is the fifth death that we know of in Vectors, and there have been other deaths in unarmoured Pinzgauers.

We do not accept that there should be these unnecessary deaths – those which, with a modicum of care and the right equipment, could have been avoided. Subject to the caveats we have expressed, the death of Cpl Barnes seems to come into that category. Should it be the case that a better-protected vehicle would have saved his life, his death will indeed have been unnecessary, making this incident all the more tragic.

The MoD, and particularly the Army, must think seriously as to whether this vehicle remains in theatre.

COMMENT THREAD

No celebrations yet

The Sunday Telegraph headline "Snatch Land Rover to be scrapped by the British Army" should be a moment of triumph. But, even at a time when a coroner has at last questioned the safety of the "Snatch", over the death of Marine Gary Wright (picture below right), one is left curiously flat.

Perhaps it is the self-regarding tone of the article which, in a style typical of the newspaper, reports: "Defence chiefs have ordered an emergency review of the Army's controversial "Snatch" Land Rover after the deaths of four soldiers in Afghanistan, The Sunday Telegraph can disclose."

Another irritant is that the writer, Sean Rayment puffs the paper's favourite military renta-a-quote, telling us that "The pressure on the military to scrap the Snatch Land Rover was further raised by, Patrick Mercer the Tory MP and former infantry commander, who described the vehicle as a 'death trap', during a debate in the House of Commons."

This was the debate on 19 June, to which we referred, when for the very first time – as far as we are aware – Mercer raised the issue in the House, having been silent for the many years that this scandal has continued. There is something particularly loathesome about bandwagon jumpers, and something unsavoury about newspapers which give them space.

If any one politician should be given credit for putting pressure on the MoD, it is Lord Astor of Hever, who first raised the vulnerability of the vehicle on 12 June 2006, telling Lord Drayson, the then procurement minister, that the Snatch Land Rover was "not remotely adequate for patrolling areas where insurgents use landmines."

He asked Drayson for an assurance that the government would "provide our soldiers with equipment that is fit for this role", getting a brush off which we recorded shortly thereafter when we launched our campaign for its replacement. It was then that Drayson told the House:

I do not accept that Snatch Land Rovers are not appropriate for the role. We must recognise the difference between protection and survivability. It is important that we have the trade-offs that we need for mobility. The Snatch Land Rover provides us with the mobility and level of protection that we need.

We were joined in our campaign by Christopher Booker and, a week later by The Sunday Times which ran two pieces (on on the front page and the other as a Focus piece), which had a powerful effect.

Lord Astor persevered and was joined, in the "other place" by the Conservative front bench defence team – which for once got its act together. With the insistent pressure from backbencher Ann Winterton – who persists to this day – and Owen Paterson (who asked a number of pointed written Parliamentary Questions), plus sundry others, it all came together.

Aside from a torrent of written questions, there was one debate, then another and then another. With continual posts on this blog and a further piece from Christopher Booker, the pressure became too great. By 26 July 2006, the then relatively new Secretary of State, Des Browne, was announcing the procurement of a new armoured vehicle which came to be known as the Mastiff – which was to save lives again and again.

Damningly, some of the greatest opposition to the new vehicles came from Mercer's pals in the Army and we were later able to disclose, their preference was for the lightly protected Pinzgauer Vector, which was to be instrumental in killing many more men.

What perhaps also rankles is that it has taken the death of a woman, Cpl Sarah Bryant finally to put the nail in the coffin of this dangerously vulnerable machine. The fact that at least 30 men (this is all the Army will admit to) have been killed riding in Snatches – and many more injured – does not seem to have been so important.

Certainly, there were no signs otherwise that the MoD was considering removing the Snatch from theatre – witness this photograph (right). With 45 Commando rumoured for deployment in the winter rotation, we have been watching a steady build-up of these vehicles as they pass through Arbroath on their way to the local barracks, together with a large number of Vectors on low loaders. Our sources tell us that they are (or were) destined for Afghanistan.

The decision taken – if indeed it has been – must have been very sudden. We are told by The Sunday Telegraph that "Commanders have been told to establish whether the vehicle, which was designed for operations in Northern Ireland almost 20 years ago, is critical to the Afghan mission."

The review, we are also told, was ordered by Des Browne, the Defence Secretary. At a meeting of senior Army officers in London last Wednesday. Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Lt Gen Andrew Figgures, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (equipment capability), and Lt Gen Nick Houghton, the Chief of Joint Operations, all agreed that the vehicle's suitability should be reassessed.

Once again, it seems, the pressure is coming from the politicians rather than the Army, with commanders in Afghanistan to be asked if there is a requirement for a light patrol vehicle and, if so, whether the "Snatch" is of the standard required. If not, the military will search for something more suitable, "which could take several months".

Already, Brig Mark Carleton-Smith, forces commander in Helmand, has admitted that Snatches are "not safe for use in high-risk areas." Asked if he would rather not have to use the Snatch Land Rover in Helmand, the brigadier said: "It's not a vehicle of last resort but it's clearly not a vehicle of first choice."

The brigadier also says that the "mine" which destroyed the Snatch and killed four of his soldiers had contained more than 220lb of explosives and would have defeated the armour of any but the heaviest vehicle. However, given that this Cougar took 300lb of explosive – and the crew walked away – a more heavily armoured Mastiff may well have kept Sarah Bryant and her team alive.

It seems that the Army will in future be relying on the Mastiff and the Ridgebacks, which are shortly to come into service, although – as always – the MoD is being somewhat disingenuous in claiming, "Through investment in Mastiff and Ridgeback we are already reducing the number of patrolling roles in which we use the Snatch" – when the Ridgeback is not yet in service.

However, both are far heavier than the Snatch and it may well be that there is a need for a lighter vehicle. There have been hints of something else, apart from the 24 Bushmasters, which we now know to have been procured for the Special Forces. Ironically, had they come earlier, Sarah Bryant – apparently on a secret mission could well have been in one of these vehicles.

For others to come though, there are still the Vectors, the Land Rover WIMIKs, the Jackals – of which the MoD has decided to buy 72 more - and it is still committed to FRES.

That is what is perhaps removing the gloss from what should have been that moment of triumph. The Army is not really doing anything other than moving slowly, and reluctantly towards safer vehicles, in response to public and political pressure. There is no "sea change". When that happens, then we will be able to celebrate.

COMMENT THREAD

It's the balance, stoopid!

Yesterday morning, without fanfare, Lady Winterton brought "Next-War-itis" to the House of Commons.

This was the theme of the recent speech by US defence secretary Robert Gates in which he called for the US military to focus "more on winning in Iraq and preparing to fight other insurgencies and less on possible big wars with other countries".

And, if much of the US defence establishment was obsessed with future conflicts, neglecting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so too was the British establishment – or so it was charged.

Of course, the MoD claims it has had the vaccination against this dreaded disease, telling us recently that, "We are determined to do more to support our people here and on the front line…", pledging then to "better prioritise our spending plans".

But Anne Winterton was not convinced. We do not know in which direction the military is looking, she said. But we get some clue from this month's Soldier magazine. There, Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt purrs about his new toys, telling us that the Piranha V heralds the "start of a new era" for the Army.

This said Dannatt, "maintains the progress of the FRES programme, which is my highest priority after support to operations." It will, he adds, form the backbone of the Army’s future armoured vehicle requirements. Mastiffs are all very well, but this beast will allow the Army "to conduct a wider range of operations in an uncertain and changing world."

To Ann, this was the proverbial red rag to the bull. Let us have it spelled out exactly what sort of operations we are expecting in the future, she demanded - or is this a case of next-war-itis?

There lies the problem. FRES is not designed for counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan – the subject of this debate in Westminster Hall. But the brass are saying that the FRES vehicle, for which Piranha V has been provisionally chosen, has a dual role. It can be used for high-intensity warfare and counter-insurgency.

Ladies of Ann Winterton's breeding do not say "b*****ks!" But, well she might.

As to supporting our people in the front line, in Afghanistan – the insurgents as she predicted – have resorted to "various explosive devices". To counter them, the MoD has 282 Mastiffs in use or ordered. Some 157 Ridgebacks and 24 Bushmasters are also on order. Thus, we have 463 mine/IED proofed vehicles, specifically designed for counter-insurgency warfare.

Against that, we have 169 Pinzgauer Vectors - not designed to protect soldiers from mines or IEDs. There are 180 M-WMIKs (otherwise known as Jackals) and the Army wants 2,000 Piranha Vs – as yet still a paper vehicle, not off the drawing board – another vehicle which is not well protected against mines and IEDs.

"With the best will in the world," she says, "one could hardly say that that is a very balanced mixture, bearing it in mind that the whole future Army structure is geared to the latter type." This was not, she added pointedly, "making present operations the top priority".

As we are likely to be in Afghanistan for the long term, that could realistically be at least 20 years down the road. How many more conflicts of that nature will the UK be engaged in or have been engaged in by then, with 2,349 vehicles that are not particularly suited to purpose, compared with 463 vehicles that have a proven track record in counter-insurgency operations?

At this point, Conservative MP, Philip Hollobone, intervened to remind us that the "percentage of fatalities of UK service personnel resulting from IEDs or mines is 27 percent in Afghanistan and 28 percent in Iraq." Kevan Jones from the dark side (Labour) then also intervened to say that, the last time he had been in Basra, he had seen a Mastiff vehicle that had driven over an IED. The crew had survived. The Mastiff, he said, was good news and had clearly led to a reduction in casualties from IEDs.

This is where it started getting messy. The minister for the Armed Forces (Bob Ainsworth) then got stuck in, saying that Anne had put only three vehicles "on the right side of the line" and all the rest on the wrong side. "We cannot conduct effective operations in Afghanistan with only those three vehicles. No commander can do that," he protested.

It was a question of balance, Ann countered: 463 vehicles designed specifically for blast protection, with their V-shaped hulls, against 2,349 which were not. And, when it came to the Piranha V, there were all sorts of problems with this machine, not least that it was "incredibly expensive". Being designed to fulfil the original concept of FRES – a network-enabled system of vehicles that would engage the enemy at a distance – it is not best suited for the kind of warfare that our troops are encountering now. The enemy is not at a distance and is often indistinguishable from the local population. The danger is all around them.

Thus, she contend that UK troops need considerably more of the type of vehicles of which we have 463, and perhaps considerably fewer of the others, if they are to be successful in future with minimum loss of life. Why are the vehicles of which we are to have 2,349 are so numerous, when others are more suited to present day warfare?

Intervention from Kevan Jones there came again, with a charge that commanders needed "a range of vehicles, including lightly armoured vehicles". Yes, I know that said Winterton – or words to that effect – it's the balance stoopid … 463 against 2,349. The insurgents aim to send as many troops home in body bags as possible – we need more vehicles designed to keep them alive.

Thus batted down – although Jones was to rise again, the stake not yet driven through his heart – Ann switched tack.

In order to defeat any insurgency, she said, it is necessary to train the host country's own military forces so that they can deal with the problem and protect their own people. That is happening successfully in Iraq and Afghanistan; their armies are doing a great job and allowing our forces gradually to be withdrawn.

However, it was also important to have a certain amount of parity between our equipment and that of the host country – seen in Iraq where the Army has the same or better vehicles than ours. But, when we come to the Royal Air Force, the contrast is extreme. The situation is nothing less than an unmitigated disaster.

For Afghanistan to succeed after the withdrawal of UK and other troops (in fact, in order to allow us to withdraw), it must have sufficient air power. Yet could the Afghan air force ever use the Eurofighter? We need turbo-prop aircraft, which the host country's pilots can be trained to use alongside our own pilots, the famous Tucano option – with all the added advantage that we get from that type of machine.

Equally, she said, reconnaissance operations should have their own aircraft, such as the Pilatus Porter PC-6, which can operate with the patrol being able to land and take off within very short distances indeed, acting as an evacuation carrier and a general supply vehicle. These aircraft should be operated by other ranks within the Army, and we should learn the lessons from other successful counter-insurgency forces such as the Rhodesians.

Then Anne turned to the economics. There is a constant shortage of helicopters, yet the Merlin is a very good, if extremely expensive, helicopter. The RAF's Mk 3 Merlins cost £19 million each. The six Danish ones cost £29.3 million each and £34,000 an hour to run. She had to repeat that figure to Patrick Mercer, who seemed stunned by the figure,

The attitude in the UK seems to be that the we need the best to cover every eventuality, Ann continued, and therefore the nation will cough up the funds for that. But the military are not living in the real world if they believe that they can have anything at any price. That is one of the reasons why the UK is short of what it actually needs. Rather, we need simple, robust platforms that will last in the long term. They must also carry the latest technology, but at the same time they must be as simple as possible to maintain.

So it came to finish off the speech. Her closing themes were "finance and the benefit to the nation of a sound defence policy."

Whichever party wins the next general election, she warned, some very large financial commitments have been made by this Government that will come into effect during the period from 2010 to 2015. If the military believe that they will get more money out of a Conservative government, I think that they are deluding themselves. That extra money is not likely to be forthcoming, bearing it in mind that the country will probably be broke by then.

Thus she said: "The mantra that our armed forces are underfunded is often repeated—indeed, there is some truth in it - but how the money for our forces is spent also needs to be challenged and I believe that it is a pertinent issue. I have pointed out in previous debates that the wastage in the defence budget has been enormous, mainly due to unclear or ulterior motives and objectives."

If we are funding "next war-itis", present operations will either be starved of cash or denied the most suitable platforms in sufficient quantities at the time when they are most needed. The MOD, she added, is doing its best to learn from recent hard lessons, but it has not been much helped by certain factions within the military.

We rely on our armed services for the defence of the nation but it is highly unlikely that any force will directly attack our shores. Instead, the threat to us now is far more subtle and difficult to counter. The enemy is within and around us, and we cannot always differentiate between friend and foe. Terrorism is the greatest evil and we have to be better prepared to defeat it, not least because the United Kingdom needs a stable world for trade, which is the lifeblood of our economic survival.

So, said Ann, I share the belief of Robert Gates that the top military and political priority should be the success of COIN operations, to ensure that the breeding grounds of instability in the world, which are the greatest danger to our people, are neutralised. It is within that sector that British forces could excel and, indeed, are excelling against the odds. It is up to the military to explain where their priorities will lie in future, from a basis of the Government of the day giving clear directional leadership.

The United Kingdom is no longer a global power and, unlike the Americans, we cannot afford two armies — one for counter-insurgency and the other for conventional warfare involving large-scale manoeuvres. I believe that we should concentrate on undertaking counter-insurgency and similar operations exceptionally well, rather than diluting our efforts and resources. We should face facts and recognise that the United Kingdom can no longer fulfil all its aspirations as far as defence is concerned. Stretched resources and manpower will limit what we can achieve in the future.

In Part II of this post, I will deal with the response to this speech.

COMMENT THREAD

Bushmasters for the Army

Picked up from a French defence website via a reader, we learned of a rumour last month that the British Army was poised to buy 24 Australian-made Bushmaster MRAPs.

As far as we can be certain now – in the complete absence of any statement from a British minister or the MoD - this is no longer a rumour. According to The Australian, the British High Commission in Canberra has confirmed that the vehicles have been bought, the paper's headline declaring that they are "for use in Iraq and Afghanistan".

A spokesman adds, "As I understand, the vehicles have been loaded and are on their way for use straight away," with the paper adding that it is understood most of the British Bushmasters have been earmarked for operations in Iraq – leaving the possibility open that some are headed for Afghanistan (or held back for training?).

This is extremely good news, providing a lighter, more manoeuvrable alternative to the 25 ton Mastiff. Weighing in at 12 tons, this nevertheless shares the blast-resistant v-shape hull design with the larger vehicle and, as kitted out by the Australian Army – which has ordered 600 - it is capable of carrying nine fully equipped soldiers. Its deployment in theatre should keep David Axe happy and reduce the whingeing about the size of the Mastiff.

The vehicles can be fitted with a variety of weapons ranging from light machine guns, a 40mm grenade launcher or a remotely operated 12.7mm heavy machine gun, and have a good reputation with the Australian and Dutch troops who are using them.

So far, no soldier has been killed in this type, or even seriously injured, although a number of Australian troops (mainly drivers) have been killed in their version of the Piranha, the ASLAV, the type chosen for the British FRES utility vehicle. A Dutch operated Bushmaster recently survived a potentially lethal IED attack in Afghanistan (pictured), the crew escaping without injury.

Without wishing to look a gift horse in the mouth, there are certain reservations about the plethora of vehicle types now being procured, and the apparent similarity with the Ridgeback recently ordered. With the logistics and maintenance efforts already stretched, it seems rather odd that yet another type is being purchased - especially as the precise role has not been specified.

One must also express some concern that we should learn of this deal from an Australian newspaper, rather than from the MoD. But then, this is rather typical of the contempt with which this ministry occasionally treats those who actually pay its bills, so it should not be too surprised if we reciprocate – occasionally.

COMMENT THREAD

"It definitely saved my life"

By coincidence, Defence Questions yesterday had Richard Benyon, Conservative MP for Newbury (pictured), ask a pointed question of the defence secretary, Des Browne, in relation to the growing toll from IEDs in Afghanistan.

"Given that a large proportion of the injuries suffered by members of our armed forces in Afghanistan are from roadside bombs and similar improvised explosive devices," said Benyon, "why are we still deploying troops in some of the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan in so-called snatch Land Rovers, when we know that such vehicles offer little or no protection against such devices?"

Browne's response is worth recording in full:

The hon. Gentleman and the House will know, because I have gone to some lengths to keep the House up to date, that we have been increasingly providing our troops with vehicles that offer the highest level of protection. Indeed, through Mastiff and Ridgback (sic), on which we hope to make significant progress over the coming months, we will be providing a total of 400 new vehicles that will offer that level of protection. The hon. Gentleman will know also, because it is reported back here regularly, that Mastiff has proved enormously popular with the troops in saving lives.

My obligation as the Secretary of State is to provide commanders on the ground with a range of vehicles. Our experience in Afghanistan shows us that the issue is not just a need for protected vehicles, in the sense of protected against such explosions; rather, we also need vehicles that give our troops both the necessary flexibility and movement, and a presence on the ground that is specific to the communities in which they are working. I fulfil that obligation. We provide a range of vehicles to the commanders. I do not intend to dictate to our commanders, with a long screwdriver from London, which of those vehicles they should use, but I am conscious of the need continually to develop and to deploy more protected vehicles, subject to that requirement.

The coincidence, as it happens, was a BBC report on the children's news programme Newsbeat, accessible through the website, that report headed: "I survived a bomb attack". It offers an interview with Lance Corporal Jamie Dougal who was on a routine patrol in Helmand Province when the vehicle he was in set off an IED. Dougal was in the top cover position and sustained minor injuries and is now back on duty.

That, as Dougal makes clear, is entirely due to the fact that he was riding in a Mastiff. He tells the BBC: "Considering how bad the explosion was and considering the small amount of injuries I got, I'd definitely say that if it wasn't for the Mastiff I wouldn't be here today. "It definitely saved my life."

The BBC report tells us:

The Mastiff is the vehicle of choice in Afghanistan. The main threat from the Taleban are IEDs, but even they are struggling to get to grips with this incredibly tough piece of kit. At a cost of around £1m it's not cheap, but it's saving lives on a daily basis.

They test it out by driving it over mines. It has six wheels so it can keep going if some of them get blown off. The armour is designed to take the force of an explosion away from the vehicle, and it's covered in cameras so the troops inside can see 360 degrees around them.

That report also tells us that, "Amazingly no-one inside Jamie's Mastiff was hurt …", something of no surprise to this blog. It adds to the growing body of anecdotal evidence which attests to the value of these vehicles.

However, Browne's comments about not intending "to dictate to our commanders, with a long screwdriver from London …" perhaps hints at the underlying and continuing tension between the politicians and the military over the value of protected vehicles, with the MoD still pushing its Jackal "weapons platform", with an inordinate number of "puffs" on the MoD website, the latest here.

The extent of the mountain that has to be climbed to get it through to the military that their existing equipment is dangerously (and unnecessarily) vulnerable comes in the 2008 90th Anniversary edition of the RAF Yearbook. Page 8 and 9 – about the RAF Regiment - make sombre reading. Page eight reads:

The Regiment has recently received the latest Pinzgauer Vector armoured vehicles, and updated Wolf, WMIK Landrovers to bolster its daily patrols covering the AOR of over 480sq kms.

On page nine, it then states:

The RAF Regiment squadron provides a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and also undertakes regular long-range patrols over the area, for extended periods making themselves known to the local village elders and population … Equipped with the latest Wolf Land Rover, armed WMIK Land Rover and recently arrived Pingzgauer Vector armoured vehicle, the squadron has a broad remit and flexibility to conduct a range of patrols in order to achieve their missions…

The article, according to one of our correspondents, gives the impression that the Regiment beleives it has been issued the "Mutts Nuts" of armoured vehicles. Given recent casualties in mobile patrols (here and here), their enthusiasm is somewhat misplaced.

The dangers of conducting "regular" patrols" and "making themselves known to local village elders" (and Taliban) while using Vectors and WIMIKs does not seem to have dawned on these particular military geniuses, who seem to need more protection from themselves than the Taleban. As our correspondent writes: "Words fail me".

In the protection stakes, an unconfirmed report in a French defence journal - apparently based on a report in DefenseNews - has it that the UK intends to order upwards of 24 Australian-made Bushmaster MRAPs (pictured above) – each equipped with a Kongsberg 12.7 mm remote weapon station. They are, it appears, to be used for "electronic warfare".

This, if confirmed, would be an interesting development and perhaps indicates that the Browne message that we need "continually to develop and to deploy more protected vehicles…" is slowly getting through.

COMMENT THREAD

More toys!

Announced by Gordon Brown in a Commons statement today, and clothed in more detail by an MoD press release, the MOD plans to order 150 additional specialist, protected vehicles, specifically for Afghanistan.

The new vehicles will be called Ridgeback and, says the statement, will represent a further spend of over £150M on protection for our forces, fully funded from the Treasury Reserve.

We are told that work is currently ongoing to identify the vehicle type. "A number of solutions have been looked at, including off-the-shelf products," is all the MoD will say. However, this seems to be the smaller (than the Mastiff) MRAP vehicle, something in the range of the 4x4 Cougar (pictured), Bushmaster and Golan category. The 4x4 Cougar, in particular, has already been deployed in Afghanistan by US forces (pictured).

We are also told that the UK will be sending additional Sea King helicopters to Afghanistan, expected to deploy in the spring. However, these are not standard versions. They have been fitted with new, advanced composite rotor blades (the so-called "Carson" blades - pictured left) which substantially improve "hot and high" performance, also giving additional payload, speed and range on the same fuel capacity. The machines, therefore, will bring much needed and welcome additional capacity.

Also, Gordon Brown revealed that, through Nato, moves are being made to acquire helicopters from private contractors, to give back-up logistic support, and negotiations are continuing on this. One hopes it they will not get bogged down in the endless bureaucracy for which Nato is notorious.

Altogether though, this is good news for the Armed Forces and, in that the inventory of protected vehicles is being enlarged, a sign that the Army has finally realised that mine and ambush protection are a vital part of the armoury of any modern counter-insurgency force.

COMMENT THREAD