On our way out?

With yet another three soldiers reported killed in Sangin, bringing the total up to 204, the Scottish Daily Herald is reporting on a UK opinion poll on our involvement in Afghanistan.

From this we learn that some 57 percent believe British forces should not be in Afghanistan at all, only 13 percent think it is "very clear" why the UK military is there and 82 percent say the UK Government is not doing enough to support our troops. Undoubtedly, sentiment has been heavily influenced by the rush of casualties over the last two months and, as public opinion hardens, the opposition to our continued presence is only likely to increase.

But, if The Daily Telegraph is any guide, the growing public wish for withdrawal might come sooner than expected. Defence secretary Bob Ainsworth, it appears, is telling us that the mission in Afghanistan could largely be concluded as soon as 2010.

That the mission was to undergo fundamental changes was in fact signalled by Gordon Brown in his announcement on the AF/PAK strategy at the end of April, where he intimated that, from the autumn, greater effort would be devoted to training and mentoring Afghan security forces, with a view to an accelerated hand-over of responsibilities to them.

Whether this is realistic in view of the known inadequacies of the Afghan forces is moot, but it provides a political figleaf to cover our progressive disengagement, much as we did in Iraq, enabling us to declare a "victory" and leave with the flags flying.

In fact, according to Mick Smith in The Sunday Times, there are other pressures in theatre which may lead us to disengage even faster. These are coming from the Americans who are expressing their concern about the inability of the British to hold and stabilise Musa Qala district, in addition to their current commitments in the so-called green zone.

Following Operation Panther's Claw, which had British troops "clearing" the Taleban from 150 square miles of the green zone north and northwest of Lashkar Gah, troops have been left exhausted and there are barely enough men to mount "framework patrols" to secure the area.

Thus, the US forces are taking a more and more active part in operations, even to the extent of sidelining the British command structures, centred on the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood, west London. In theory PJHQ controls all British military operations abroad, but is increasingly toothless. With the Americans taking control of most of Helmand, it has lost much of its role.

That much is evident to the west of Musa Qala where, this weekend US Marines and Afghan officials completed yet another operation in Now Zad, this time hoisting the Afghan flag over the deserted town (pictured). Through the week, 400 Marines, with 100 Afghan troops had been taking part in operation Eastern Resolve II and are mow claiming to have regained control of the district.

Until recently, the US Marines have had only a tenuous grip over the district, taking considerable casualties, with a lone company responsible for policing the area.

Now Zad was, of course, one of the four original British "platoon houses", which included Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qala. Now the US has taken total responsibility for Now Zad, if Musa Qala is also taken over, then half of the "outstations" held by the British will have gone.

But, if the casualty rate at Sangin - with over 50 dead - continues, it will only be a matter of time before there are serious questions as to whether holding this district is tenable by British forces. Certainly, it cannot be long before the media focuses on this area and the toll it is extracting, creating a situation where US forces might feel impelled to move in and then, eventually, take over.

By slow progressive moves, therefore, British involvement – at least in terms of the areas occupied – could gradually be scaled down, leaving a situation where one can imagine that the force is concentrated on Lashkar Gah and then Bastion, before retreating entirely to barracks and thence onto the ramps for the final airlift which will take them back home - and military oblivion.

The likelihood is that Gordon Brown's administration is unlikely to see this end game but Brown's successor will almost certainly see it to fruition. There is no longer any appetite for this war, either in the British public or even in the military – and the current casualty rate is politically unsustainable. Despite the analysis from Michael Evans in The Times, given a figleaf by the Americans, we will be gone.

COMMENT THREAD

A lack of focus

Today, the domestic political focus will be on the election of the Speaker in the House of Commons, an event that will absorb much time and energy both of the media and the political classes.

That this election should be necessary and that so much attention is being devoted to it, however, demonstrates how inwards-looking our politicians have become – all at a time when great events should be demanding theirs and the nation's attention.

Not least is the violence in Iran following the rigged election but, of direct and immediate importance is the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan where there is a sense that events are coming to a head. And with so little reporting in the British MSM of actual events, there is also a sense that we are sleepwalking into another disaster, the effects of which are incalculable.

What is particularly remarkable though is that after the flurry of publicity over the weekend and the urgent and important issue of inadequate vehicles supplied to our troops, but politicians and the media had slipped back into their normal torpor, ignoring what seems set to become a major crisis.

That is not the case with the US media, where the Washington Post devoted a lengthy article to the situation in Now Zad, which we recorded in one of our Sunday pieces.

Today we also see Associated Press reporting on the same area, with an account of some of the ongoing fighting, all under the headline, "Afghan firefight shows challenge for US troops".



Written by Chris Brummitt, he offers an eyewitness account of an operation where, "Missiles, machine guns and strafing runs from fighter jets destroyed much of a Taliban compound," but he then records that "the insurgents had a final surprise for a pair of US Marines who pushed into the smouldering building just before nightfall."

As the two men walked up an alley, we are told, the Taleban opened fire from less than 15 yards, sending bullets and tracer fire crackling inches past them. They fled under covering fire from their comrades, who hurled grenades at the enemy position before sprinting to their armoured vehicles.

We then learn that the assault capped a day of fighting Saturday in the poppy fields, orchards and walled compounds of southern Afghanistan between newly arrived US Marines and well dug-in Taleban fighters. It was a foretaste, writes Brummitt, of what will likely be a bloody summer as Washington tries to turn around a bogged-down, eight-year-old war with a surge of 21,000 troops.

Significantly, though, Brummitt also agues that the fighting was on the outskirts of Now Zad, "a town that in many ways symbolises what went wrong in Afghanistan and the enormous challenges facing the United States. It is in Helmand province, a centre of the insurgency and the opium poppy trade that helps fund it."

The point, of course is that, in 2006, the town of Now Zad was a British responsibility yet, as Brummitt records, British and Estonian troops, then garrisoned there, were unable to defeat the insurgents. They were replaced last year by a company of about 300 US Marines, who lived in a base in the centre of the deserted town and on two hills overlooking it.

Even now, a year later, the Taleban hold much of the northern outskirts and the orchards beyond, where they have entrenched defensive positions, tunnels and bunkers. The Marines outnumber the Taleban in the area by at least 3-to-1 and have vastly superior weapons but avoid offensive operations because they lack the manpower to hold territory once they take it. There are no Afghan police or troops here to help.

"We don't have the people to backfill us. Why clear something that we cannot hold?" said Lt-Col Patrick Cashman, commanding the battalion occupying Now Zad and other districts in Helmand and Farah provinces, where some 10,000 Marines are slowly spreading out in the first wave of the troop surge.

Cashman says the Marines did not intend to allow the Taleban free rein in parts of Now Zad, but was unable to give any specific plans or time frame for addressing what he acknowledged is "a bad situation."

For all their better equipment ands resources, therefore, the US Marines – who have now been in-place for over a year – do not seem to be making much more headway than the British before them, with the same limitations on "Clear, Hold, Build" that the British Army is experiencing – the subject of some criticism.

The trouble is that, in a country the size of France, with Helmand roughly the size of Wales, there are never going to be enough troops to hold the territory. That suggests that the basic approach being adopted by both the US and British is flawed. Although it might be fine in theory, on practice it is never going to happen, in which case we really should be looking at an alternative strategy – or admitting defeat and getting out altogether.

This makes Afghanistan a highly political issue yet, where there is any attention being given to foreign adventures, our politicos are looking at pre-war Iraq. But, as Peter Hitchens in the Daily Mail remarks, "Who needs an inquiry into the Iraq War? It's over. Nobody will be brought to justice. Isn't it time Parliament debated our dubious involvement in Afghanistan, and sought to end it?"

Despite this, we all know this is not going to happen. The Speaker's election will get a hundred-fold more time and attention, and the Iraq inquiry has already had far more attention than current operation in Helmand. This lack of focus is dangerous – to the troops on the ground and to us as a nation. For our neglect, there will be a price to pay.

COMMENT THREAD

On another planet?

In Helmand province, readers will recall, we are told by the Operations Officer for 3 Commando Brigade (Major):

Currently we have secured the five major population centres in Helmand and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams have exploited this security to deliver tangible, effective and sustainable reconstruction and development. During our tour, you could count the number of security incidents in these areas on the fingers of your hands.

The record shows that 3 Commando Brigade took over in Helmand from 16 Air Assault Brigade on 8 October 2008 and completed its 6-month tour on Friday, 10 April 2009, when it handed over to 19 Light Brigade.

Having already dealt with the Major's assertions in relation to Now Zad, we return to his extraordinary claim about the number of "security incidents", with a look at one of the five major population centres in Helmand, Lashkah Gah. This just happens to be the provincial capital and the location of the headquarters of British forces in Helmand.

With 3 Commando Brigade having taken up residence on 8 October, we find from the official record that, on 11 October 2008, at approximately 7:30 pm, "International Security Assistance Force forces took action to interdict a combined attack planned by enemy forces against an Afghan national security force compound in Lashkar Gah."

We are informed that insurgents were seen gathering on the outskirts of the town, prior to launching a mortar attack. Afghani and ISAF forces sought to counter this attack, supported by an air strike in which multiple enemy forces were killed.

Brig-Gen Richard Blanchette, ISAF spokesman, then stated: "If the insurgents planned a spectacular attack prior to the winter, this was a spectacular failure."

Task Force Helmand spokesman Royal Marine Lt-Col. Woody Page said, "This was a deliberate and planned operation that continues, conducted by ISAF and ANSF forces to defeat terrorist activities in the region of Lashkar Gah. We remain fully committed to supporting the government and people of Afghanistan in their aim to defeat these terrorists."

The Times was then to observe on 13 October that the attack on Lashkar Gah had been the first time that the Taleban had attempted to push inside the well-defended provincial capital. The operation had indeed been an attempted "spectacular", a Taleban tactic culled from the insurgents in Iraq and aimed as much at psychological impact as military success.

We then get limited information on air activity, such as on 11 October when F/A-18Cs performed shows of force to deter enemy activities in the vicinity of the capital, on 12 October when coalition aircraft are in the air conducting shows of force, also to deter enemy activities, and again on 13 October

On 14 October, we then hear from the New York Times that ISAF and Afghani forces had repulsed a fresh Taleban attack the day before, killing at least 18 insurgents.

A Nato spokesmen said the attack, "the second in four days on that city, underscored the growing abilities of the Taliban, who have increased the tempo of their attacks as the seventh anniversary of their ouster from power in Kabul approaches."

Interestingly, Nato officials also say that the two attacks at Lashkar Gah showed how the Taliban had grown into a far more formidable force than in the early years of the conflict. "They now have an ability," we are told, "to mass fighters in large groups, sometimes in the hundreds, with an array of small and heavy weapons, and they can co-ordinate attacks more effectively, often involving simultaneous thrusts from different directions."

That day, there is also more air activity, again with coalition aircraft performing shows of force and, the next day we hear from the Boston Globe that a US National Guard soldier has been killed by an IED after his military convoy was attacked near Lashkar Gah.

By 16 October , there is still air activity, with a coalition aircraft dropping a GBU-12 onto enemy fighters firing upon friendly forces with small arms fire, "in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah" and, on 17 October, The Guardian reports: "Insurgents kept up their assault Thursday on Lashkar Gah. They fired a rocket that landed on a street lined with shops, killing a civilian and wounding five others."

The attack, says the paper, followed two other assaults this week on the security checkpoints that ring the city. More than 80 militants were killed and three police were wounded. The attacks on the city, the capital of the world's largest opium producing region, appears to signal the Taliban's intention to disrupt a major government centre.

On 18 October 18, we get indirect news from the Pakistani Daily Times that fighting is continuing and on 20 October we are told that a US Air Force MQ-9A Reaper dropped a GBU-12 onto insurgents who were using small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades against coalition forces. A US Air Force B-1B Lancer dropped GBU-38s in the same area.

It is then only on 21 October, after what has effectively been ten days of continuous fighting, that the Afghan National Army declares victory in defending Lashkar Gah from "an attempted Taliban takeover".

Not until 4 November, however, do we learn from the Canadian press of the scale of the fighting and how close the battle had been.

Viewed from the Canadian perspective, from this source, we learn that a small group of Canadian soldiers had "finally returned to their base in Afghanistan after playing key roles in some of the heaviest fighting this fall."

Details, the narrative went, are now starting to emerge about the part about 30 Canadians played in the battle for Lashkar Gah. "(The fighting) was quite intense," said Maj. Steve Nolan, who commanded one of the mentorship teams working with a kandak, or battalion, of Afghan National Army soldiers.

Hundreds of Taleban fighters were involved, attacking the city on three sides. Nolan's team and their kandak, normally based in Kandahar province, were mobilised and arrived in the embattled city on 13 October as insurgents were attacking police outposts around the city. "We pulled into Lashkar Gah in the dark and it turned into a combat mission right away," said Nolan. "As we were moving in, there was tracer fire moving over our convoy."

On 17 October, the Canadian-mentored kandak was ordered to clear a swath of territory five kilometres wide and 10 kilometres long into the nearby village of Aynak - a maze of eight-metre deep canals, three-metre high cornfields, vineyards and narrow lanes lined by tall mud walls. "There is no more complex terrain anywhere in the world," Nolan said.

Backed up by attack helicopters, the Canadian and Afghan soldiers advanced into repeated ambushes, coming under machine-gun and rocket-propelled grenade fire. Shots would be exchanged, then the Taliban would fall back to their next position. "It's an all-day affair. There was always fire, or you always knew (every) 50 metres, that's where the next little contact would be."

After sweeping the corridor into Aynak free of Taliban, the kandak and the Canadians took part in a massive assault involving more than 1,400 Afghans, as well as mentor teams from Britain and the US. That assault, on 21 October, cleared a similar corridor into another nearby village called Nawa. On 22 October, Gen Zazai declared the Taleban had been successfully driven back from Lashkar Gah.

Although barely reported in the British media at the time, The Daily Telegraph later observed that, "British commanders were surprised that the Taliban had managed to gather such a large force for a single attack."

On 26 October, though, The Times had been on the case, reporting that US military chiefs are to send up to 9,000 troops to Helmand next year, potentially sidelining the UK’s 5,000-strong force in the southern Afghanistan province.

The move, wrote defence correspondent Mick Smith, "comes amid US frustration that the British have insufficient soldiers and helicopters to maintain security and reconstruct Helmand, with the Taliban acting freely in large tracts of the province." British sources said the revelation that the bulk of the troops were to be sent to Helmand made it doubtful the British could stay in charge.

The failure of the British effort in Helmand, Smith added, "was highlighted two weeks ago when Taliban fighters marched on the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah and attacked the governor's house just yards from the UK base." The base is actually over a mile away, but the point was made. Even in a supposedly secure area, the British had failed to keep out the Taleban.

All this notwithstanding, given that, only two weeks into its deployment, 3 Commando Brigade had spent ten days fighting continuously in its own headquarters town, one can only assume that our Operations Officer for 3 Commando Brigade (Major) took this to be just one security incident. Either that or, as we suspect, he was on a different planet – or in a different country.

That could indeed be the case because, even after 22 October, with over five month to run, there were many, many more incidents. We will have a look at some of these in another post.

COMMENT THREAD

Peace in our time

In response to Booker's piece on Afghanistan yesterday, a number of commentators disagreed with his "take" on the situation. One, who called himself "Praetorian" even went so far as to argue that the situation in Helmand was largely under control.

According to this anonymous source, the US did not retake Now Zad. It was handed over peacefully by the Estonians to the US so that the Estonians could be redeployed to the Nad-e Ali district (this actually happened in Nov 08). Thus, does he claim that, while the situation that Christopher Booker describes was true two years ago:

Currently we have secured the five major population centres in Helmand and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams have exploited this security to deliver tangible, effective and sustainable reconstruction and development. During our tour you could count the number of security incidents in these areas on the fingers of your hands. During Dec 08 we mounted a major operation (Op Sond Chara) that secured 270 km square of fertile land and 100,000 people. We established patrol bases and have delivered sufficient security to enable Voter Registration, Focused District Development for the Afghan National Police and Governor-led Poppy Eradication, all without major incident. In short, the columnist is out-of-date and ill-informed.

Going back to look as those two years of peace so admirably described, there are just one or two incidents which might cast a little doubt on the glowing picture painted. Actually, there are slightly more than one or two.

Focusing exclusively on Now Zad, on 14 March 2007 RAF GR-7 Harriers were dropping Enhanced Paveway II laser-guided bombs on an enemy firing position and a building used as an additional firing position near Now Zad.

The next day, on 15 March 2007, one of two separate F-15Es of the US Air Force dropped a GBU-12 on enemies on a hilltop near Now Zad. The enemies were using the hilltop to direct mortar fire at coalition forces. One of the F-15Es then dropped a GBU-12 on the hilltop mortar position.

Then, on 16 March 2007, the F-15E Eagles were back, assigned to support coalition forces taking fire from and returning artillery fire to an enemy location near Now Zad. The F-15s made three passes over the target area, expending multiple GBU-12s, GBU-38s and 20 mm cannon rounds on enemy firing positions.

Only days later, on 19 March 2007, F/A-18s conducted aerial reconnaissance for a suspected mortar position near Now Zad. The F/A-18 pilots reported spotting multiple individuals on a ridge.

On 27 March 2007, it was the RAF's turn, as Harriers dropped Advance Paveway II munitions on a building and compound where insurgents were firing upon coalition forces near Now Zad.

The following month, on 12 April 2007, F-15Es provided overwatch of a village being used as a meeting location for local elders. And, at the coalition ground force commander's direction, the pilots also provided overwatch for a coalition convoy vehicle disabled by a mine in the same area.

The next day, on 13 April 2007, US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles received notice that coalition forces were taking mortar and small arms fire while trying to make their way to the district center of Now Zad. A Joint Terminal Attack Controller passed coordinates for a building used as an enemy fighting position and the F-15Es dropped a GBU-38 on the target. The JTAC confirmed the building was destroyed. Another GBU-38 was dropped successfully on a second target at the request of the coalition ground commander.

The F-15Es were then assigned to make strafing passes into a wooded area that was a known enemy firing position and where enemy forces were attempting to manoeuvre around coalition forces. After the jets strafed the wooded area, anti-aircraft artillery was heard. By then, coalition forces had made their way safely to the district centre.

On 4 May 2007, US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs provided reconnaissance of enemy firing positions and suspicious activity near Now Zad. A week later, on 13 May 2007, US Navy F-18F Super Hornets dropped multiple GBU-12s on enemies in the area including a sniper and an insurgent cave. The JTAC confirmed the bombs hit their targets. F-18s also dropped a GBU-12 on insurgents moving toward a disabled vehicle. Then, a US Air Force MQ-1 Predator fired a Hellfire missile at enemy targets fleeing from the attack by the F-18.

Things seem to have quietened down a little for it was not until 6 July 2007 that A-10s were in action, performing shows of force with flares over Now Zad. Then, on 15 July 2007, RAF Harrier GR-7s searched compounds and monitored suspicious vehicles.

The 17 July 2007 saw F-15Es provide successful shows of force to deter enemy activity and the 23 July 2007 had a RAF Harrier GR-9A also provide a show of force in what was termed "the Now Zad battle".

The big stuff came in on 24 July 2007, when a B-1 Lancer (pictured above) dropped GBU-38s on an enemy mortar team in Now Zad. Two days later, on 26 July 2007, another RAF Harrier GR-7 conducted a successful show of force with flares.

Three days later, on 29 July 2007, F-15Es were back in action dropping GBU-38s on a mortar firing position in Now Zad. The weapons hit their intended target. The aircrews also provided a show of force to deter any more enemy activity in the area.

Two days later, on 31 July 2007, the big stuff was back in town when a US Air Force B-1B Lancer destroyed a mortar position and hit enemies on along a ridgeline with GBU-31s in Now Zad. An Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle also provided a show of force with flares over an enemy mortar position for friendly forces in the area.

It was A10s which delivered the goods on 5 August 2007 when thet destroyed an enemy mortar position with a general purpose 500-pound bomb. Four days later, on 9 August 2007, F-15E Strike Eagles were in the sky, dropping GBU-38s on a compound and a tree line.

The 11 August 2007 had an F-15E providing a show of force with flares to deter a potential second attack by the enemy while the 23 August 2007 saw a B-1 provide shows of presence and air effects over coalition routes near Now Zad.

On 25 August 2007, A-10 Thunderbolt IIs destroyed a mortar firing position and a building in Now Zad with a general-purpose 500 pound bomb and a GBU-12. The pilots also fired cannon rounds at the mortar position.

All we got on 6 September 2007 though were F-15Es performing a successful show of force with flares over Now Zad, a display that was repeated on 9 September 2007 when another F-15E performed a show of force with flares, this time to deter mortar fire on ground forces. An Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs also performed shows of force over vehicles to deter movement toward friendly forces.

An elapse of two days brought us to 11 September 2007 when defending coalition forces under enemy fire near Now Zad had the assistance of a US Air Force B-1B Lancer, which destroyed an enemy mortar position, a compound and caves with GBU-31s. The aircrew also successfully targeted another enemy position with a GBU-38.

On 14 September 2007, all it took was a show of force from F-15E Strike Eagles to deter anti-coalition activity but, 18 September 2007, slightly more aggressive action be A-10s was required, when they targeted enemies with cannon rounds. The JTAC confirmed the weapons hit the target. One of the pilots also conducted a show of force with flares to deter further enemy activity.

The A10s were back on 21 September 2007 when they performed a show of force to deter enemy activity but, 29 September 2007 an RAF Harrier GR-7 did the honours with its own show of force.

On 8 November 2007, Navy F/A-18C Hornets were in action, strafing enemy positions with cannon rounds and adding GBU-12s to the mayhem. During the same mission, F/A-18Cs aided in the engagement by dropping GBU-12s and firing cannon rounds against enemy combatants who were engaging coalition convoys moving through Now Zad.

An RAF Harrier showed up the next day, on 9 November 2007 and engaged an enemy position with Enhanced. Paveway II munitions. Coalition forces were taking fire from the enemy held position. During the same mission, GR-7 performed shows of force to deter enemy activities in the vicinity of Now Zad.

Five days passed when, on 14 November 2007, a show of force with flares was performed by an F/A-18C to deter enemy actions. The following week, on 22 November 2007 had a B-1B performing a show of force. That must have been impressive to watch. At an air show, you pay for that sort of thing and the Taleban were getting it free.

The 5 December 2007 saw a major intervention in support of the action in Musa Qala, when Afghan and coalition soldiers pushed back Taliban insurgents from Now Zad.

The combined force was conducting a reconnaissance patrol in Now Zad when Taliban insurgents attempted to ambush the patrol from established fighting positions. The enemy fired on the Afghan forces using small arms, rockets and mortars. The forces immediately returned small-arms and machine-gun fire, putting the enemy on the defensive.

The enemy moved to secondary positions in an attempt to flank friendly forces as the battle escalated. Afghan forces identified the new enemy fighting positions and engaged with small arms, machine guns and precision air strikes. The insurgents attempted to hide among the civilian population by moving into homes.

The Afghan civilians prevented the enemy fighters from using the compounds and their inhabitants as human shields. The enemy fighters retreated and the Afghan forces continued to clear the village to ensure no insurgents remained.

Air power was back in action on 31 December 2007 when an Air Force B-1B Lancer targeted an enemy bunker with a GBU-31 and GBU-38s. And, to celebrate the New Year, on 1 January 2008, a French Mirage-2000 engaged an enemy target with a GBU-12. The next day, 2 January 2008, had a show of force performed by a another Mirage-2000 and the 9 January 2008 had US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles engaged enemy personnel by dropping a GBU-38 in Now Zad. The F-15s also fired cannon rounds against the targets.

All we got from a Harrier GR-7 on 21 January 2008 was a show of force but on 30 January 2008 a US Air Force B-1B Lancer made up for it by dropping a GBU-38 in order to destroy an enemy mortar position in Now Zad. Just over a week later, on 8 February 2008, a B-1B Lancer was back, dropping GBU-38s and GBU-31s in order to eliminate multiple enemy combatants.

Ten days later, on 18 February 2008, a French Mirage-2000 performed a show of force and 27 February 2008 another Mirage 2000 conducted a show of force.

To ring the changes, on 3 March 2008 a US Air Force B-1B Lancer and an A-10 Thunderbolt IIs dropped GBU-12s, 31s, and 38s in order to destroy enemy combatants and enemy firing positions. Two days later, on 5 March 2008 a Lancer then dropped a GBU-38s in order to destroy enemy combatants in a bunker.

The 19 March 2008 had another Lancer in action, this time dropping a GBU-31 in order to destroy enemy combatants in a compound engaging friendly forces with mortar fire. That held the line until 5 April 2008 when shows of force were needed from French Air Force Mirage-2000s over enemy positions.

The French were back on 13 April 2008 with their Mirage-2000s again performing shows of force. But, on 16 April 2008, F-15s dropped GBU-38s in order to destroy an enemy structure housing enemy combatants and a sniper engaging friendly forces.

On 18 April 2008, a French Mirage-2000 gave another free air show, repeated on 21 April 2008 for those that missed it. To pick up the latecomers, the Mirage was back on 22 April 2008 and the 23 April 2008, again with shows of force.

To give the Taleban a change of scene, on 27 April 2008 F-15Es conducted the shows of force but, on 12 May 2008, the Mirage was back yet again, followed on 29 May 2008 by RAF GR-7 Harriers. No one could say that the Taleban were not getting value for money.

The 6 June 2008 saw F-15Es dropping GBU-12s to destroy enemy combatants and 7 June 2008 had an Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle drop a GB-38 onto enemy combatants. Then, on 15 June 2008 a B-1B Lancer dropped a GBU-31 to destroy an enemy compound.

An Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle did the honours on 17 June 2008, dropping a GBU-12 onto enemy combatants, leaving A–10s to follow up on 28 June 2008 with shows of force.

The 3 July 2008 brought a bit of novelty when a US Air Force MQ-9A Reaper dropped a GBU-12 onto a building containing enemy combatants. The US Navy then joined in on 8 July 2008 with its F/A18E Super Hornet and F/A18C Hornets, dropping GBU-38s onto enemy combatants and an enemy compound.

They were only the warm-up act. The next day, 9 July 2008, a Navy F/A18C Hornet fired cannon rounds onto enemy combatants. The 14 July 2008 saw the return of a B-1B which dropped GBU-31 and 38s onto an enemy compound and enemy forces. This was followed on 21 July 2008 by a Predator MQ-1B which fired a Hellfire missile and dropped GBU-12s onto an enemy compound. Additionally, a US Air Force B-1B Lancer dropped GBU-38s and 31s onto an enemy compound and enemy combatants.

The 28 July 2008 had an RAF GR-7 Harrier doing some serious stuff, dropping EPII munitions onto enemy forces engaging friendly forces in the vicinity of Now Zad, followed by US Air Force B-1B Lancers on 4 August 2008, which dropped a GBU-31 and 38s onto the enemy.

Three days were allowed to elapse before, on 7 August 2008, a Royal Air Force GR-7 Harrier dropped Enhance Paveway II munitions onto enemy forces preparing to ambush coalition forces. That seemed to have kept the Taleban at bay for a while for it was not until 18 September 2008 in this peaceful environment that a coalition aircraft dropped Enhanced Paveway II munitions and a 540-pound free falling bomb onto anti-Afghan forces engaging friendly forces.

The 25 September 2008 then had an F-16A dropping GBU-12s onto insurgents in a compound using rocket propelled grenade and small arms fire. A Navy F/A 18C Hornet backed up, dropping a GBU-31 onto insurgents outside the compound trying to place an improvised explosive device in the same are. The next day, on 26 September 2008, only needed coalition aircraft performing a show of force to deter enemy activities.

It was only three days later, however, on 29 September 2008, that F/A-18Cs were needed to drop a GBU-12 and GBU-38 onto improvised explosive device emplacers in the vicinity of Now Zad. This seems to have given a month's respite for it was not until 26 October 2008 that a US Air Force B-1B Lancer was called to drop GBU-31s and GBU-38s onto a building where enemy fighters were firing RPGs against coalition force.

The next day though, on 27 October 2008, coalition aircraft had to drop GBU-12s onto a tree line where enemy fighters were firing mortars and rockets against coalition forces.

About this time, British and Estonian forces were preparing to leave the base at Now Zad, allowing the US Marines to occupy this peaceful area. Thus, on 1 November 2008, to entertain the about-to-depart troops, a Hornet conducted a show of force to deter enemy activities and provide armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy.

Another air show was provided on 11 November 2008, when coalition aircraft conducted shows of force to deter enemy activities and yet another on 20 November 2008 when a Navy F/A-18A performed shows of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy conducting counter-improvised explosive device operations.

With the Brits and the Estionian forces "redeployed", on 3 December 2008 the 8th US Marine Regiment and the ground combat element of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force could get down to some serious gardening and other useful activities, entertained that day by a Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet conducting a spirited show of force to deter the enemy from walking on the newly-sown grass.

So peaceful had the "handover" been, however, that the Brits had left all their kit behind – as one does. But so balmy and soothing was the desert air that the US forces, with nothing else to do with their time, decided to greet the British convoy which came out to reclaim the luggage.

Clearly, so enjoyable was the experience that the Marines and sailors with I Company, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, the ground combat element of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force decided to make the affair a grand event, turning out in force between 7-12 December 2007, even in grand military style giving their excursions the name "Operation Backstop".

With the British and Estonian combined forces having "retrograded from the Now Zad area in order to redistribute forces in a realignment of battle spaces", kindly allowing the Marines of 3/8 the honour of to "filling the battle space in Now Zad", the British despatched a convoy of more than 30 large vehicles to collect their kit. The US Marine security Company I allowed the British free, uninterrupted passage, supporting the British with "force protection through its lethal firepower and manoeuverability".

Along the route from Camp Barber to Now Zad lie a number of choke points and well-known enemy positions. The Marines' objective was aggressively to confront insurgents along the route before the British convoy passed through. Fully equipped with sniper teams, explosive ordnance disposal teams and engineers, the Marines pushed their way through.

"In order to let the [British] convoy pass through safely, we [Marines] decided to take a route where we would most likely meet enemy activity and neutralize it," said Capt. Mike Hoffman, the commanding officer of Co. I. It is hard to believe this was at all necessary in the context of such a peaceful handover having taken place earlier.

Nevertheless, once the British had reclaimed their kit, it was back to the free air shows, with a US Navy F/A-18A Hornet on 20 December 2008 performing shows of force to deter enemy activities. With a break for Christmas, on 27 December 2008, coalition aircraft entertained bored troops with shows of force to deter anti-Afghan activities and to provide armed aerial overwatch for coalition convoys traveling along a known enemy route.

We were reminded that this was not only a Navy and Air Force show, as US Marine Cobra attack helicopters were also in daily action. In late November, after eight intense months of daily combat operations, 2/7 was replaced by 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (Reinforced).

Still, though, US Air Force B-1B Lancers were helping with the gardening, one on 3 February 2009 destroying an anti-Afghan bunker near Now Zad with a GBU-31. Enemy personnel in the bunker, rather unsportingly, were firing on coalition ground forces.

Another Lancer was reported doing an encore on 22 February 2009, although the similarity of the narrative suggests double-reporting. You simply cannot get the staff these days. But, on 27 February 2009, coalition aircraft carried out shows of force "to provide an additional level of presence to enhance security for coalition operations".

Enhancing security even more, on 4 March 2009, F/A-18Cs hit anti-Afghan forces hiding behind the walls of a residential compound with several 20mm cannon strafing passes. Enemy personnel had been using the compound to fire mortars, RPGs and automatic weapons at coalition troops until the jets engaged, neutralizing the enemy firing positions.

On 6 March 2009, after completing an important logistics mission, a group of Marines braved insurgent attacks while transiting through what was described as "one of the most challenging regions of southern Afghanistan".

The second platoon of Motor Transportation Company, Combat Logistics Battalion 3, overcame insurgent attacks while returning to Camp Barber from FOB Now Zad. While returning from a three-day combat logistics patrol, the platoon received multiple rounds of insurgent mortar fire and located two improvised explosive devices.

Having arrived in November 2008, Combat Logistics Battalion 3 were celebrating their work in Now Zad forward operating base, They had been carrying out work, ranging from constructing buildings to building bunkers, at a pace described as "fast and furious." The biggest thanks they received, though, was after installing shower units and providing the Marines there with the opportunity to take a hot shower.

By 13 March 2009, Air Force and coalition aircraft were thus reduced to flying overwatch performed shows of force during several convoy operations, only breaking the monotony of perpetual hot showers by launching a precision air strike on 16 March 2009 to take out the sought-after insurgent, Jamaluddin Hanifi, together with Maulawi Mohammed Saddiq and two associates.

On 19 March 2009, it was back to boring old shows of force, with Navy Super Hornets doing the honours, which seem to have succeeded in deterring enemy forces from taking action "while coalition ground troops achieved their objectives".

However, on 22 March 2009, a Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet provided slightly more entertaining fare, striking a compound with a makeshift enemy bunker inside, knocking in the roof of the bunker and destroying the fighting position. Enemy personnel in the bunker had been pouring automatic fire towards coalition soldiers from that location. They obviously had not been told how peaceful it had become.

Then came 3 April 2009 when the Marines did not re-take Now Zad. Thus, using a US Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber to destroy an anti-Afghan forces staging area and several enemy positions in the area around Now Zad using GBU-31s and 38s must have been a complete waste of time. And, despite reports to the contrary, enemy forces clearly had not targeted coalition units using heavy machine guns and automatic weapons prior to the bomber's arrival.

Nor can it have been the case that the US Marines enjoyed US Navy F/A-18C Hornet fighter-attack aircraft, an Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber, Marine AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, the Army's tactical missile system and the Marines' high mobility artillery rocket system setting conditions for the operation by employing precision munitions on key insurgent targets.

Despite these non-events, however, we note that to finish off two years of "tangible, effective and sustainable reconstruction and development", on 8 April 2009 a US Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber used GBU-31s to destroy several buildings near Now Zad which were being used as enemy fighting positions, with enemy gunmen firing from inside the structures at coalition soldiers.

It is such a comfort to know that this was completed "without major incident".

COMMENT THREAD

A question of prestige

Anybody who thinks that the dearth of hard news on British activity in Afghanistan is an accident knows nothing of the ways of the MoD. As we have already indicated, there is a quite deliberate policy emanating from Whitehall aimed at obscuring the strategic position.

The clamp-down on information very much mirrors that which was imposed in Iraq, and for many of the same reasons. Not least, we have the euro-elections coming up and, after those, the general election. Mr Brown's Labour Party does not want the Afghani War to be an election issue – it is a certain vote-loser. Thus, the less said about the way the war is being prosecuted the better.

The deafening silence, however, has at least been picked up by Booker in his column today, building on the work of this blog.

Thus Booker is able to bring to a wider audience a reminder that one of the best kept secrets of our recent politics, thanks to the news management of the Ministry of Defence, was how our occupation of southern Iraq turned into one of the greatest humiliations in the history of the British Army. But, bringing us up to date, Booker tells us, history is being repeated as the MoD is managing to hide the fact that something remarkably similar is happening in Afghanistan.

The essence of the case is that while, in March 2006, our forces were deployed to take responsibility for the southern province of Helmand, again and again they have taken some town from the Taleban and then been forced to abandon it. Each time, American troops have then had to be called in to retake it, with or without British assistance.

So far, there are three examples. Firstly, in December 2007, the US provided the bulk of the troops and assets needed to retake Musa Qala. Then, in April 2008, the US Marines retook Garmsir, after UK forces had spectacularly failed in their attempt. Finally, this month the Marines retook the town of Now Zad.

Now, although nominally, UK forces still retain the military lead in Helmand, without any formal announcement, it seems that the US forces under General David Petraeus, architect of the famous Iraq "surge", have taken over responsibility for much of the province. Clearly, from the amount of activity, the US is calling the shots and the UK is taking a secondary role.

At one level, it could be argued that this did not matter – and even that it was to be welcomed. With both the costs of the war and the scale of the fighting clearly escalating, US forces taking on a greater burden relieve the Treasury of some of the costs and also reduces our casualties.

The problem, however, is that a reduced presence carries its own costs, in terms of reduced prestige, authority and influence, demoting the UK to the status of an increasingly junior partner in the task of rebuilding Afghanistan, forced to follow the strategic direction set by the Americans, with very little say in the conduct and timing of operations.

In some ways, though, ceding the lead to the US is also to be welcomed, as the British have shown neither strategic competence nor any flair for addressing the complex problem of countering the Afghani insurgency, and neither is the government – with the complicity of the media – prepared to entertain an open debate about the tactics required or even the broad strategy.

In contrast with the steady drone of MoD-inspired "feel good" pieces in the British media, however, we are beginning to see the beginnings of a debate in the US media, one particularly interesting report appearing in Washington Times this week.

This report makes all the right points, specifically the role of road-building, maintenance and security, with the appalling state of one road illustrated in the piece (shown above).

These are issues we know that Gen Petraeus has taken to heart, while the British seem only reluctantly to be following in his wake, too little as always and too late. Thus, if there is any chance of the coalition ever breaking free of Afghanistan, leaving a stable nation behind them, it rests more with the Americans, to which extent the less "leadership" we get from the British the better.

That said, the penalty arising from our reduced prestige – while not immediately measurable – is bound to have an effect. Despite attempts to pretend otherwise, the reputation of the British military took a severe drubbing over Iraq, and a similar failure in Afghanistan reinforces the reality that Britain is drifting inexorably to the status of a third-rate power of very little consequence.

Yet, it is our reputation for being able to "punch above our weight" that has given us our status in the world, with which has come diplomatic and trading opportunities which have undoubtedly translated into real wealth. Britain the third-rate power is likely to have a much harder time of it.

Even though the British public and the media may be entirely indifferent to this prospect, there is also another element. The underlying understanding behind our deployment in Afghanistan is that British forces would, to a very great extent, be autonomous – not merely auxiliaries to the US military.

If, as appears to be the case, that is the current status of our forces, they are in Afghanistan under false pretences. That, incidentally, is also likely to be one of the reasons why the government is so reluctant to tell us the truth. One suspects though that the most important and profound reason for the silence is the reason that governments are always silent – to conceal their own incompetence.

That this current government is incompetent in Afghanistan, as elsewhere, should hardly come as a shock but, as elsewhere, it should not be allowed to conceal that incompetence under a veil of silence. If the government is selling us out, yet still having to bear the burden of the enormous cost of the war, the only reward being dead and injured soldiers and a progressive loss of prestige, this is something about which we should be told.

COMMENT THREAD

While the children play

For a nation at war, with blood and treasure draining into the sands of Helmand, our ignorance of the current military situation in Afghanistan is matched only by the scale of public indifference - and the media's infantile treatment of the campaign.

Thus we see today the heart-warming story of the "lucky British Tommy", replicated ad nauseam in the popular media, who cheated death by 2mm when a bullet penetrated his helmet.

As a story, it has the fingerprints of the MoD "spin" machine all over it, a classic of the genre that represents both the extent and the style of coverage of the Afghan campaign, part of a deliberate media strategy promoted by the MoD.

It is attempting to shore up domestic support for the war, with a succession of "feel-good" stories, while strenuously avoiding any discussion of the strategic situation that might cause us to wonder what we are doing there and whether we are succeeding.

Given that the British media has all but abandoned any serious attempt at reporting the Afghan campaign, it is hardly surprising that it so readily falls in with this vacuous strategy. Thus it is to the Canadian press that we must turn for the latest slender clues as to what is going on. That, in itself, tells you all you need to know.

Even then the Canadian report has to be clothed in a "human interest" framing, although that in itself is revealing. It tells us that British troops in Helmand are largely unaware of the activities of their Canadian allies, fighting 40 miles away in the neighbouring Kandahar province, as indeed are most Canadians ignorant of the British efforts.

The vital pieces of intelligence, however, are buried in the report, from which we learn that the Canadians are about to hand over the largely unpopulated northeastern and southeastern half of Kandahar to a US Army Stryker Brigade, while the British are transferring the largely unpopulated southern half of Helmand to a US Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

That there has been considerable USMC activity in the southern part of Helmand is not news, their activities in Garmsir last year having been charted by us, but the fact that there is to be a formal hand-over of responsibility of part of Helmand to the US most certainly is news. Furthermore, it represents a major change in status – and presumably strategic direction – for British forces, about which we have been told absolutely nothing.

However, we learn from this Canadian report that the Brits and the Canadians have embraced the growing American presence and have adopted nearly identical strategies to try to win Afghans over. They are using provincial reconstruction teams comprised of civilians and soldiers that are "as joined at the hip as an organisation can be," says Col Greville Bibby, the British contingent's deputy commander.

This, we are then told, is part of a security bubble strategy, with Bibby enthusiastically endorsing it, telling the Canadian audience that it "works". It is absolutely fantastic to see, gushes the brave Colonel. "It is all about them doing it. I can tell you that if we pulled out, the locals would be very angry. They are really hungry for this."

One would be slightly more impressed but for Bibby trying to justify the British strategy of sending men out in poorly protected vehicles, as he tells us: "If you've got the enemy within, laying bombs and attacking with small pockets of men, there are not many scenarios in this small zone for armour." The populated terrain in this province (Helmand) was not practical for heavy vehicles, he says.

"Our experience in Northern Ireland is that you can't influence the people from behind 10 inches of armour. You can't do it whizzing past with armour, pushing them off the road," he then adds, apparently entirely unconscious of the fact that it was this dismal line of thought that cost the Army the campaign in Iraq.

If we get the impression that the British Army has learned very little from its experience in Iraq, at least we can be assured that the USMC is using armour in Helmand – and a great deal of air power. Whether that is or will be effective in the longer term is anyone's guess and, as far as this blog goes, it will be a guess – our masters are not rushing to do anything so rash as to keep us informed.

That, therefore, still leaves unexplained the strategic context of the USMC activity in Now Zad. So far, this has been completely unreported by the MoD and ignored by the British media.

One thus further wonders about Bibby. He retails, with other soldiers at Lashkar Gah, his "frustration" with their own (British) journalists for seldom wanting to report on the non-military war. "The British media focus on the kinetic stuff," says Sgt Paul Crawford, a Royal Engineer who has served previously in Iraq and Afghanistan. "They want to film firefights. But the majority of what we do is stability and construction."

As in Canada, we are told, there is a war to be won at home. While hugely supportive of their troops, many Britons remain sceptical about the mission. "My impression is that there is a lack of understanding as to why we are here," Bibby says. "Like so many things political, the media use this to discuss political implications, rather than what is actually happening on the ground."

But hey! The media doesn't do politics any more. And as for "a lack of understanding as to why we are here," that is mainly because the MoD and this current government is so heavily inspired by mushroom management that it dominates its public information strategy.

Thus, when it comes to what is happening on the ground, Bibby can hardly be unaware of the fact that not only is the media absent, so is the MoD. The brave Colonel only has to look at his own organisation's website to discover that. He will see that it is filled with inconsequential "feel good" PR puffs which do everything short of actually telling us what is going on. He should also know that the media is actively discouraged from coherent reporting – not that this presents much of a problem.

Nevertheless, a grown-up media would, by now, be champing at the bit, demanding to know more, and taking on the "spin merchants" in the MoD. But, as long as it can fill up its pages with tat and political soap opera, and our opposition politicians seem equally unconcerned about what is happening, absolutely nothing is going to change.

Thus are we left in a fog of ignorance and an impression that, whatever is happening, the MoD is extremely reluctant to enlighten us. That can only invoke grave suspicions and maximise distrust, purely on the basis that if the MoD is acting as if it had something to hide, then it is a reasonable assumption that it is indeed hiding something.

But, as long as the political children are content to play their own games, the MoD will get away with it, leaving the grown-ups struggling to work out whether the British activities in Afghanistan are as inept as we fear, or whether they are just being run at the normal level of incompetence.

Should the MoD deign to tell us otherwise – and put Bibby out to grass – we are all ears.

COMMENT THREAD

If we can't hack it …

What was once solely a British area of responsibility is no longer. In March 2006 British troops deployed to Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, with a view to imposing stability and bringing reconstruction.

Not only have they failed, the situation has become so tenuous that, increasingly, US troops are taking over, fighting for towns and territories that we have failed to capture or have lost.

Starting in December 2007, the US provided the bulk of the troops and most of the air assets to re-take Musa Qala. In April 2008, US Marines then re-took the town of Garmsir and now, having been effectively abandoned by the British in 2007, this month US Marines re-took the district town of Now Zad.

However, it says something of the paucity of information coming out of Afghanistan that the recent history of this small town is shrouded in obscurity, if not mystery.

Situated some 45 miles north of Gereshk and just under 40 miles due west of Kajaki, it was first occupied by British soldiers in June 2006, in response to a call for help from the governor of Now Zad. B Company, 3 Para, were flown out to the town. On arrival they found it calm but went ahead and helped shore up defences.

This had not been the first activity in the area. On 4 June, A Coy, 3 Para went on a mission codenamed Operation Mutay to a secure a suspected Taleban compound, close to Now Zad. They were supported by Patrols Coy, 3 Para, a platoon of Gurkhas and local police.

On their way to secure their objectives, the Gurkhas' Wimik convoy became involved in a heavy contact. Patrols Coy, also aboard WMIK Land Rovers, also had a heavy contact. Army Air Corps Apache gunships provided close air support.

A Coy were airlifted close to the target compounds by 2 RAF Chinooks, which came under heavy fire. A protracted fire fight ensued as A Coy fought their way into the compounds and then repelled counterattacks by determined Taliban forces. In addition to air support from AAC Apaches, US A-10s were also called in. Having secured and searched the compound, A Coy withdrew, fighting running battles with the Taleban, until they were eventually airlifted away.

The Paras in Now Zad were relieved by platoon from D Company of 2 Gurkha Rifles and then a Company from the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. From June to November 2006, in what was the longest defence of a static trench position in British Army history, the soldiers were holed up in the police compound in the centre of the town and, on occasion, came perilously close to being overrun.

In the course of just one month, July, the Gurkhas repulsed over two dozen attempts to overrun the compound, firing more than 30,000 rifle rounds and 17,000 machine-gun rounds. They killed an estimated 100 of their attackers, without losing a single man on their own side.

The Fusiliers then took over on 30 July, spending 107 days under attack before being relieved by 42 Commando Royal Marines in November 2006. The Marines then had as their mission "to provide stability for the local people during a period of ever decreasing security," something – through no fault of theirs – they singularly failed to do.

One of their number, Marine Richard Watson, was killed on 12 December 2006 as elements from his detachment were patrolling to the north of Now Zad. They came under attack from Taliban forces and Watson was hit by small arms fire and fatally wounded. The Commandos were replaced the spring of 2007 by 1st Battalion the Royal Anglian Regiment. They also lost a soldier, Pte Chris Gray, killed during a close-quarters firefight.

By July 2007, however – and possibly before - Now Zad seems to have been abandoned by the British, its population having deserted the town. It had, alongside Musa Qala, become occupied by the Taleban. We next hear of it again in December 2007, when US troops were engaged in a firefight in the outskirts during the operation to recover Musa Qala.

Then, on 15 June 2008, US Marines assigned to Foxtrot Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment mounted an attack on Taleban strongholds in Now Zad and, by the end of July seemed to have established a foothold.

Nothing much more was heard until September 2008 when the town was briefly mentioned after Royal Marines and US Marines of Foxtrot Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment were photographed sweeping the streets for improvised explosive devices.

By February 2009, however, the town was defined as a USMC area of operations and off-limits to journalists. Free-lance journalist David Tate was told by the Marines, "That's not the story we want to push."

Tate described the town as having been abandoned for three years, with the villagers living displaced to nearby village. The town's infrastructure was crumbling and it was a virtual "free fire" zone in the sense that the only people left in it were Taleban.

And so we come to 3 April this year, when we were told (yesterday) that a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force conducted a major combat operation against insurgent forces in Now Zad.

Marines of Company L, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), the ground combat element, "struck well-known enemy locations identified within and near the insurgent-infested Now Zad District centre." "Now Zad's District center is kind of a unique place in Afghanistan because there is no local civilian population," said 1st Lt Mike H. Buonocore, the executive officer of Company L.

The Marines targeted positively identified enemy positions from which insurgent attacks had originated over the past several months. Other locations were identified with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets.

The two major components involved in the operation were a ground force and an aerial assault. Enemy targets were destroyed by combined fires from rocket artillery, aircraft, mortars and ground troops. "The mission took some enemy forces out of the fight and showed them how much force we have with us and what we can use against them," said Cpl Andrew C Conte, a squad leader with the ground assault element. "It really cleared out some of the areas we were having troubles in."

The ground scheme employed Company L as the main effort by conducting a raid on a known enemy position. Other Marines held blocking positions to ensure insurgent reinforcements were denied freedom of movement and the opportunity to engage the Marine forces.

Navy F/A-18C Hornet fighter-attack aircraft, an Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber, Marine AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, the Army's tactical missile system and Btry. D, 2/14's high mobility artillery rocket system set conditions for the operation by employing precision munitions on key insurgent targets. "Once the bombs started dropping there wasn't too much movement," said Conte. "With all the ground forces out there and everything we had overhead, it was calm because we knew nothing was going to touch us."

"We were able to engage some enemy targets before they engaged us," said Cpl Taylor E. Vogel, a forward observer with the 81 mm mortar platoon. "We were able to drop mortars on [enemy] fire teams that were moving in on [Marine] units. We definitely achieved what we wanted to. We destroyed the big targets that have been occupied by enemy forces."

Leading up to the operation, the Marines had "proactively conducted combat operations" in Now Zad's District centre daily in order to shape the battlefield by moving insurgents into disposable positions. Marines took precautions by using leaflet drops and radio broadcasts in the area to warn the population in nearby villages of the danger, which helped reduce collateral damage.

"Throughout the winter in Afghanistan, you hear about the [insurgent] spring offensive," said Conte. "We caught them before they caught us in the spring offensive, and we set the tone of it with showing how much [firepower] we have and what we can use."

Insurgents attempted to counter the Marines' strike with IEDs, mortars, small-arms fire and two rockets, with no success. Instead, the Marines positively identified and pursued their targets. "The operation was a tremendous success on all levels," said Buonocore. "The confirmed battle damage assessment is pretty significant. There were no civilian casualties, and nothing was hit that wasn't a target."

The Americans are to be congratulated for this "tremendous success", but it does show up our inability to step up to the plate and solve the problems we undertook to deal with. However, this is a coalition operation, and there is no shame in accepting the help of the better equipped and more numerous US forces.

What is disturbing though is the silence of the British media and, indeed, of our own MoD. Full of praise for the welcome, if modest achievements of British troops, it is grudging to the point of churlish about acknowledging the achievements of our allies.

If we can't hack it on our own, the very least we can do is express our appreciation to the Americans who – even if they are acting in their own interests – are doing the fighting (and sometimes the dying) which would otherwise fall to our troops.

An alliance is an alliance – we are not alone. We should behave accordingly.

COMMENT THREAD

Mission impossible?

It was difficult not to be impressed by the "Mission Impossible?" Dispatches documentary on Channel 4 last night, not least for the galaxy of military "stars" that journalist Stephen Grey managed to interview – including Jock Stirrup, CDS, and Richard Dannatt, CGS.

However, as I suggested in my post on Sunday, such high-level access comes at a price, and the MoD would have driven a hard bargain to allow such prestigious interviews to have gone ahead.

This would not amount to anything as crude as an attempt to shape the editorial content of the programme, but the deal was undoubtedly in terms of what was left out, or left unsaid. That left Grey, rather cleverly I thought, to say on the Channel 4 website, "I will leave viewers to judge for themselves what these men have to say."

If we were intended to read between the lines, that was not difficult as they were far apart enough to drive a Challenger II between them. And, if there was a message to be read from that exercise, it was not a happy one. Certainly, what I took from it was an impression of uncertain objectives, lack of strategic direction, a confused chain of command, disastrous tactics, lack of resources and inadequate equipment.

Nor can we be assured that this is in the past, although it what there that the heavy hand of the MoD was probably at its most oppressive. We were allowed a backwards glimpse at the chaos, but there was very little analysis of where we stand at present, or what the future prospects might be.

Such was the detail, however, that we are going to have to come back to this for a more thorough analysis. But what was most striking of the early part of the programme was the rehashing of the story of the disastrous "platoon house" policy of 2006, the film centring on the events at Musa Qala, culminating in its retaking the year before last, largely by US forces.

We were also reminded that there were four such platoon houses, the other three at Sangin, Geresht, and Now Zad. We mentioned the latter briefly in February 2007, referring to the epic struggle of the Gurkhas at that site.

However, while we got the history of Musa Qala, nothing was said of Now Zad. But, yesterday evening we received the daily picture update from the DoD which, by complete coincidence, offered the photograph shown above, with the following narrative:

US Marines with 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment conduct an operation in Now Zad, Afghanistan, April 3, 2009. Residents have abandoned Now Zad, a village in the Helmand province of Afghanistan, because of the strong insurgent presence. The Marines, assigned to a ground combat element of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Afghanistan, are conducting operations to help the Afghans regain control of the area. (DoD photo by Gunnery Sgt. James A. Burks, U.S. Marine Corps/Released)

This actually reinforces the depth of British failure in Afghanistan for, not only has this village – once occupied by British troops – been abandoned, its recovery is being left to US forces with, it appears, no British involvement. This comes on the back of the recovery of Garmsir last year, almost entirely by US Marines.

But what is absolutely staggering is that, on the day that photograph was taken, the MoD ran a "puff" on its website, telling us that "British soldiers have been helping teach their Afghan Army counterparts English while at the same time developing their own Pashtu and Dari language skills to help improve understanding and the quality of training."

That was the sole extent of official British news from Afghanistan, yet from the official US site we get this:

In Afghanistan, an Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber destroyed an anti-Afghan forces staging area and several enemy positions in the area around Now Zad using guided bomb unit -31s and -38s. Enemy forces had targeted coalition units using heavy machine guns and automatic weapons prior to the bomber's arrival.

Coalition ground forces called in several Navy F/A-18C Hornets and F/A-18E Super Hornets to hit enemy targets in the vicinity of Kajaki Dam, including an enemy mortar position, observation posts, communication tunnels, and a spotter position in a walled compound. A variety of GBU-series precision weaponry was used to carry out the strike, which took place in response to anti-Afghan mortar fire.

An F/A-18C and a coalition aircraft used a GBU-12 and GBU-38, as well as a strafing pass to strike anti-Afghan forces spotted gathering in a staging area near Musa Qala. Enemy forces were engaged in readying rockets for launch against coalition units. The coalition aircraft struck a large group of enemy combatants, while the Hornet hit a series of pillboxes and bunkers in the area. The Hornet also attacked enemy targets in Now Zad following reports of enemy fire there.

The reference to Kajaki is also interesting, as last Saturday, a US soldier was killed there, while what were described as "joint forces" (i.e., US and Afghani) killed 15 militants during a raid on a compound reportedly used for making weapons and bombs.

Kajaki was also, until very recently, an area supposedly under British control yet, on 2 April we also saw an official report telling us that a Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet and an Air Force MQ-9A Reaper dropped guided bomb unit-12 and 38s on anti-Afghan compounds near Kajaki Dam.

Several enemy gunmen who had been firing rocket propelled grenades and assault rifles at a Coalition patrol from the structures, were killed in the strikes. The aircraft also provided overwatch to the convoy and provided tactical surveillance. Then …

During a second engagement taking place in the area around Kajaki Dam, Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles and A-10 Thunderbolt IIs dropped GBU-38s and performed strafes, targeting enemy personnel with RPGs and automatic weapons. The A-10 destroyed an enemy lookout tower with one of its bombs as an F-15E hit a gunman hiding behind the berm of a small irrigation water pool. Coalition ground forces followed up the airstrikes with a ground attack.

Additionally, near Lashkar Gah, still occupied by British forces, a US Air Force F-15E executed a show of force expending flares in order to help a coalition unit break away from enemy gunfire. When the enemy's shooting continued after the fly-over, the F-15E strafed the hostile forces with its guns. An F/A-18E also flew a show of force, suppressing enemy fire from another enemy position.

And, of the fabled Musa Qala, a Strike Eagle employed a GBU-38 to destroy an anti-Afghan forces bunker built inside a residential compound. Enemy personnel inside were shooting at coalition troops when the position was blown up.

There is a whole war going on out there, and not only are we being told nothing of it by our own government and media, it is one which is largely being fought by US forces in a region that was originally allocated to the British.

Instead of news, we were treated last night to a picture of squabbling, dysfunctional and clearly inept senior British officers. What Stephen Grey did for us, therefore, was explain why it is that US forces have largely taken over. This is Iraq all over again – another famous British "victory" in the making.

COMMENT THREAD