A reckoning

The MoD has now released the name of the latest British soldier to die in Afghanistan. He was Craftsman Anthony Lombardi of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME), attached to The Light Dragoons.

In an unusually detailed report, the MoD goes on to tell us that he was killed on 4 August in Babaji, in the Lashkar Gar district of Helmand province.

He was attached as a vehicle mechanic to The Light Dragoons and was, at the time, driving a Spartan as part of an escort for a Viking supply convoy, moving between the company's two locations when the vehicle was hit by an explosion. The force of the explosion breached the hull, killing him instantly.

This appears, on the face of it, almost a re-run of the circumstances surrounding Lt-Col Thorneloe's death. He too was with a Viking supply convoy, only that time it was the Viking that got hit rather than a Spartan.

Had it been a Viking this time, and/or a high ranking officer, the media might have taken some more notice. As it stands though, very few media reports bother to mention the vehicle type. It is not one with which they are familiar.

The details, however, do beg a series of questions. One would like to know why a lightly armoured vehicle like the Spartan – which is an armoured personnel carrier – was being used as an "escort" for the more heavily armed and armoured Vikings.

Even then, as the Thorneloe incident – and others – demonstrated, the Vikings are highly vulnerable when used for routine tasks such as supply convoys, where they are unable to exploit their mobility, which is supposed to confer their protection.

The same also applies to the Spartan and it was only fate that this was the vehicle targeted rather than a Viking.

One would also like to know whether the convoy route was such that the high mobility of these tracked vehicles was really necessary, or whether a better protected vehicle – like the Mastiff or the Ridgeback – could have been used.

That, of course, we will never be told, especially as it now transpires that the Ridgebacks in Dubai were never intended for immediate use. This comes over from the BBC report and has been independently confirmed.

Although Ridgebacks are available in small numbers, the Army has no intention of deploying them until there are enough to equip the brigade group, with fully trained drivers and all the infrastructure in place.

This, the Army argues, is necessary to save lives, as fielding new kit prematurely – they say – presents its own hazards. Thus, the nine Ridgebacks that have been (or are being) "rushed" to Camp Bastion will stay there unused until the new roulement arrives in October and is ready for action.

The Army, therefore, not the MoD, is the blockage, rather confounding our earlier story. The Ridgebacks were left in Dubai because there was no hurry, as there was no intention to use them yet.

It does seem extraordinary that the Army itself should reject life-saving kit and, if it could be shown that Craftsman Lombardi could have been saved, had he been riding in a Ridgeback – and that such a vehicle could have been used – then the Army case for delayed deployment looks pretty thin.

What is salutary about this whole affair, however, is the willingness of myself and others to leap in on the basis of very limited information, and condemn both the politicians and the MoD – when it is now clear that the delay in deployment is a military decision, taken for what the Army believes are sound operational reasons.

Arguably, the Army is wrong. It is displaying a peace-time preference for having everything neat and tidy, and properly organised, instead of the untidy and more difficult to manage "trickle" deployment, releasing the vehicles to theatre as they (and their drivers) became ready.

Tidiness is not a luxury the military can afford in wartime. Imagine, for instance, in wartime Malta when a decision was made to replace the outclassed Hurricanes with Spitfires. New machines were rushed in to fill the gaps, with the two types operating side-by-side for a period.

Imagine what would have happened if replacements had been delayed until a "big bang" switch-over was organised. The battle would have been lost.

It will take a great deal of convincing for me to believe that the Army is right in its current policy. If men could be alive today, but were killed for want of better equipment, then there should be a reckoning.

COMMENT THREAD

We don't know the half of it

Two more deaths have been added to the growing list of fatalities arising out of operations in Afghanistan. According to the MoD, one was a soldier from The Light Dragoons, killed "as a result of an explosion that happened whilst on a vehicle patrol in Lashkar Gah." In the other incident, a soldier from 5th Regiment Royal Artillery was killed by an explosion whilst he was on a foot patrol in Sangin district.

Not untypically there is little extra detail, and the vague description of a "vehicle patrol" offers no clue as to the type of vehicle involved. The Light Dragoons operate Scimitars, Spartans and Jackals so it could have been either. If it is a Jackal, that would bring to 12 the number killed in this type.

But, if we get very little detail about the fatalities – although more information often seeps out – we know much less about the wounded and their circumstances – unless they themselves tell the media. One such is 2nd-Lt Guy Disney, also of The Light Dragoons, who lost a leg in the same incident in which Pte Robbie Laws was killed.

Disney's story is told in last weekend's Mail on Sunday, from which we also learn during the first phase of Operation Panther's Claw, the spearhead 700-strong Light Dragoons Battle Group suffered 55 casualties of all kinds, including heat exhaustion and battle shock.

The Mail journalist Richard Pendlebury, in his piece about Disney, estimates that the killed to wounded ratio – as high as 1:3 in Vietnam – has now plummeted to 1:8. This is the result, in part, of speedy evacuation and the heroic medicine performed by the highly skilled military surgical teams.

While the MoD claims to withhold the details of wounded soldiers for reasons of "patient confidentiality" there can be no doubt that that the absence of any reports is extremely convenient in concealing from the public the carnage happening daily, at a rate far higher than the fatality rate would indicate. If, for instance, if the Vietnam ratio applied to this theatre, we would be looking not at 160 killed in action, as the figure now stands, but at well over 400.

For those of us whose grim task is to monitor the welfare of troops in the field, and to ensure that they are a best protected as possible, the lack of broad casualty data may also distort perceptions, when the only metric available, to which any detail is attached, is the fatality.

Often, the difference between a death and a "very severely injured" is a matter of pure chance while, on the other hand, when the enemy is "trying out" a vehicle in the field, early attacks may be – in their terms – less successful, yielding only injured, rather than the deaths for which they are aiming. Only later, when they get the measure of the vehicle, does the death rate climb.

This was definitely our perception – based on anecdotal reports and other evidence – that in al Amarah in 2005, there were a considerable number of injuries in Snatch Land Rovers before a significant number of fatalities were experienced.

Equally, in Afghanistan, there have been a significant number of attacks about which we have known nothing, although details of two have recently drifted into the public domain.

One report told of Carl Clowes, 23, from Bradford who in July 2007 was in a Land Rover in Helmand when it drove over a mine. Both his legs were crushed and he suffered more than 20 injuries. His left leg was amputated below the knee 10 months later and he still suffers pain in his right leg. He can now walk only short distances without the aid of crutches.

Another told of Lance Corporal Jonathan Lee who, in October 2007 in Afghanistan, was riding in a Snatch Land Rover when a bomb blast threw him 50 yards into a minefield. He lost a leg.

Knowledge of such incidents would help inestimably to judge whether specific vehicles were too fragile for deployment, as indeed would information on near misses, where no injuries or even damage occasioned. Here, though, there are serious operational security implications. The Army is naturally reluctant to give free after-action reports to their enemy, only to have this vital information used against troops as attacks are refined and strengthened on the basis of the details supplied.

Nevertheless, we note that the MoD is quite willing to release details when there is a propaganda advantage to be gained, witness a recent MoD-inspired report on a failed attack involving a female Jackal driver.

From this we learn, incidentally, that the Jackal was "guarding a supply convoy", the very antithesis of the purpose for which this vehicle was designed - as a Special Forces "raider", relying on speed and mobility rather than armour for protection. Tied to a predictable convoy route, this type of vehicle is a highly vulnerable target.

Elsewhere, we learn, via Lt-Col Stephen Cartwright, CO of The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland, that Jackals were used in the Panther's Claw operation, to seize ground at the top of the Shamalan Canal in preparation for the link up with the Welsh Guards. This is, again, not the purpose for which these vehicles were designed or procured. They are effectively performing the role of light tanks or armoured cars.

Then, also, we learn of a serious injury in a Jackal, from the Runcorn and Widnes Weekly News. It tells us that, on 16 July, L/Cpl Wayne Cox, of The 2nd Battalion the Rifles, was seriously injured by an IED while driving a Jackal in the Kajaki area. This, of course, is not within the Panther's Claw operational area, and amounts to yet another guerrilla-warfare type of ambush, against which the Jackal is ill-protected.

The paucity of detail, where details have to be culled on an almost random basis, has another effect. Recently, we learned of a court case taken by a civilian engineer wounded in a bomb blast in Basra in late October 2003, while riding in an unarmoured Land Rover Discovery.

This was Graham Hopps who lost a shoulder in the incident and was claiming for damages against the Ministry of Defence and his employer, arguing that he should have been provided with a better-protected vehicle,

The judge, Mr Justice Christopher Clarke, however, ruled that he did not believe that an armoured vehicle would have prevented Mr Hopps from suffering the same injuries. He also concluded that the security conditions in Iraq at the time were not bad enough to require his employer to issue its workers with armoured vehicles.

Considering that there had been three bomb attacks against vehicles that week – that we know of – and Army vehicles had also been attacked with fatal results, it is hard to see how Mr Justice Clarke could have come to that conclusion.

But it is also fair to say that, had we the information on all the incidents that had occurred, Mr Hopps might have stood a better chance of winning his case, especially as the route down which he was being driven was known locally as "bomb alley", which suggests that attacks cannot have been completely unknown.

If, of course, we had confidence that the Army was collecting the information and using it to effect, upping protection as vulnerabilities became apparent, then there would be no need for us to have any information. But we know this not to be the case.

Furthermore, on our own forum, we had an anonymous contributor – the authenticity of whom we have no cause to doubt – who informed us that, prior to its introduction, he had been asked to write an assessment of Jackal for a government department.

Then he had assessed it as a "death trap", saying in his report that he would not be prepared to risk his own life in one. His report, however, was discounted and his judgement considered flawed "because the manufacturers were able to make a convincing case as to why Jackal was the answer to everything."

Issues at the time which had influenced its acquisition were essentially political, based on a need to be seen to be ordering new equipment, the price (cheaper than a Mastiff) and industrial factors, maintaining employment in the UK defence sector and reducing imports. On top of that, there was the Army's obsession with the Land Rover, whence it wanted, "for some unfathomable reason" a replacement for the WMIK.

As more and more detail emerges, we find that the MoD (and Army) are being less than frank with the reasons for the purchase of many of their vehicles, the reasons they are deployed, the casualties incurred as a result and the reasons why deployment is continued, even when the evidence suggests they should be withdrawn.

Effectively, we don't know the half of it, that very lack of knowledge used against us by an MoD which cites our "ignorance" as a reason for ignoring our findings, claiming greater knowledge of a situation which it will not share.

That is unlikely to change but even the simple and crude death rate is sometimes telling a devastating story. If this latest fatality is related to a Jackal, it will add further to the growing evidence as to its dangerous vulnerability. We may indeed not know the half of it, but what we do know is occasionally enough.

COMMENT THREAD

A tale of two armies

Primitive British mine/IED clearance methods, compared with their US counterparts, may have been responsible for the death of Private Robbie Laws, 18, of the 2nd Mercian Regiment – to date, one of the youngest soldiers to die in Afghanistan.

On 4 July, Private Laws was attached to a squadron of the Light Dragoons which were operating Scimitar light reconnaissance tanks taking part in operation Panther's Claw. Laws was part of a four-man "dismount" team carried in a Spartan armoured personnel carrier (pictured below right), his and his comrades' task being to carry out mine/IED sweeps on foot, using hand-held detectors, ahead of the armoured vehicles, whenever their commander suspected a possible trap.

Recounted in detail by The Daily Mail, after Laws and his comrades crossed the start line in their Spartan on 4 July, they were soon called into action but, as they dismounted, Taleban fighters opened up with small arms. A Scimitar armed with 30mm Rarden cannon moved up to engage them, setting a pattern for the operation. The advance thus continued in a stop-start fashion as Laws and his comrades painstakingly cleared the route with their detectors.

Come the late afternoon as the light and intense heat began to fade, Laws and his comrades had been resting by the side of the vehicle for an hour or so, then helping to unload another Spartan which had come in from a water resupply run. Small arms fire started coming in and the Light Dragoons started their vehicle engines. Laws and the three other dismounts piled into their Spartan, which began to move.

Some 200 yards on, the squadron commander ordered two men to dismount to carry out a sweep ahead. Laws with one other completed the task and remounted. As the Spartan started to move off, there was a "massive bang" and the cabin filled with smoke. The vehicle had been hit by a Taleban RPG. Laws was killed instantly, another soldier was very seriously injured and one other was slightly injured.

It is of course the case that the Spartan could have been targeted at any time during the operation by a Taleban PRG, with fatal consequences. But the main defence of this lightly armoured vehicle is its speed and manoeuvrability over a wide range of terrain. Its constant stop-start progress, and pauses to allow manual sweeping, thus made it a predictable and highly vulnerable target while it was stationary.

Compare and contrast, however, the experience of the US Marines further south, confronted by multiple IEDs impeding their progress. In terms of delays, their clearance team was no less impeded. But, unlike the British using lightly armoured personnel carriers with infantry using hand-held detectors, working on foot, the Marines were properly equipped.

Their 10-vehicle clearance team included a vehicle equipped with a mine roller, pushed ahead to detonate pressure-pad actuated mines and IEDS, a Husky mine detection vehicle (pictured below) and a number of MRAPs, all manned by specialist combat engineers.


After 72 "tough hours" on the road, the first IED destroyed an anti-mine roller being pushed by the convoy's lead vehicle. The explosion sent the roller's pieces flying into the air, and flipped the 17-ton onto its side, nearly toppling it into a canal that ran beside the dirt road. The crew, however, escaped unharmed.

After an overnight wait, a recovery team with specialist lifting equipment was despatched along the same route, only to hit an IED that had appeared to have been planted overnight specifically to strike them.

The explosion wrecked their vehicle but fortunately, it was another MRAP and the crew escaped unharmed. Then, and only then with the scene secure, did the Marines used hand-held mine-sweepers to check the road between the two blasts and then destroyed burnt damaged equipment to stop it falling into Taleban hands.

The convoy finally got back on the road by the evening but within an hour it was hit by a third IED that destroyed the Husky. The crewman survived. In between that point and the first of the blasts, the team had covered only a couple of miles of road and had discovered and dismantled seven further IEDs.

Said the convoy commander, Lieutenant Dan Jernigan, "Vehicles are being blown apart but the Marines inside are being kept safe. Not to sound cavalier, but it is better we take the blast than Humvees or someone else such as villagers." He was surprised that there had been no Taleban ambushes targeting his convoy when it had been stranded, but the vehicles were well armed and armoured – unlike the Spartan – and able to protect themselves.

The clearance process here was being applied to a supply route, but exactly the same process could have been applied to the route taken by the Light Dragoons. Typically then, the route is kept under observation after clearing – by UAVs or even infantry stationed along the route. As a final safeguard, an MRAP precedes the tactical convoy – a process known as "route proving" – to take the blast from any device that has been missed, or where emplacers have managed to evade observation and plant another bomb.

With a route almost guaranteed free from emplaced explosives, light tactical vehicles can then exploit their mobility and speed, without being tied to the stop-start routine that dogged the Light Dragoons, making their vehicles such vulnerable targets.

With such procedures in place, even the lightly armoured Vikings could be used with impunity, their routes through danger areas cleared, allowing them to exploit their off-road performance once they safely reach open country.

Ironically, the clearance and proving procedures – and the equipment to carry them out – were pioneered by the British – and used with great success in Bosnia in the early 90s, being copied by US forces and applied to both Iraq and now Afghanistan. Since Bosnia, however, the specialist equipment acquired by the British has been sold or otherwise disposed of. The need for such now again belatedly recognised, more equipment was ordered last October under the "Talisman" project, but deliveries are not scheduled to commence until next year – although the vital Husky is not being procured.

That is the measure of the shortfall in the British operation, but this is not a shortage of finance – clearly, as the equipment is now on order. More likely, it reflects the failure of the British Army to recognise and pre-empt the threat of mines and IEDs, with tragic consequences which stretch back into the Iraqi campaign, where troops in Basra and elsewhere faced similar threats and were similarly ill-equipped.

In this day and age, while there is still a valid and extensive role for the hand-held detector, there is no excuse for the excessive reliance on dismounted teams to do a job which could often be done more safely with armour and machines. That they are not available is yet another of those scandals, for which there should be a reckoning.

COMMENT THREAD

Street of shame

Not a few people in very senior positions, in government and the military, have made disparaging remarks about the low grade of journalists serving as "defence correspondents" in national newspapers. Sometimes, that must be considered as self-serving, but it has to be said that, in many instances, those journalists leave themselves wide open.

In the last week or so, we have seen an unusually high crop of reports on military matters – for obvious reasons – and amongst them, not a few errors. We have already had this gem from the BBC and another from the Mirror but the harvest is not over.

More recently, of the more egregious (or certainly more obvious), we have Sean Rayment – an ex-Army officer – who writes in The Sunday Telegraph about, "The flimsy armoured vehicles which were first sent to Helmand ... ". But his list includes, "armoured personnel carriers dating from the 1960s and rebranded as Bulldogs". These vehicles, of course, were deployed to Iraq, but have never been sent to Helmand. Nor, in the up-armoured form, are they particularly "flimsy".

Then we have Michael Evans in The Times write that " ... a soldier from the 2nd Battalion The Mercian Regiment died when he was hit during a rocket-propelled grenade attack against his Scorpion armoured reconnaissance vehicle."

The Scorpion was, of course, withdrawn from British Army service in 1994. It cannot, therefore, have been sent to Helmand, nor attacked by an RPG. The vehicle is believed to have been a Spartan. There is also an issue here, that the Mercians do not operate an "armoured reconnaissance vehicle", the actual vehicle of the series being a Scimitar.

Today, we have Richard Pendlebury and Jamie Wiseman writing in The Daily Mail about "ageing equipment" that "often offers little protection against the bombs", whence they refer to "armoured Land Rovers known as Bulldogs".

They mean either Snatch Land Rovers or Vixens. There is a picture of a Bulldog at the top of this piece.

In the context of the vehicles being branded "ageing", they refer to the "Viking tracked vehicle". These were not issued to units until 2001 – which is positively youthful in military terms - and many of the vehicles delivered to Helmand were brand new. But the pair also tell us that IEDs planted in the path of military vehicles "usually include armour penetrating rods or cones designed to cause maximum destruction". They don't. In particular, the EFP which projects a copper "cone" is largely confined to Iraq. Very few have been detected in Afghanistan.

Now, we all make mistakes ... my previous piece has one, where I have identified the wrong vehicle which GD intends to submit to the MoD for the CVR(T) replacement competition. But there are mistakes and mistakes. When journalists make such obvious – to anyone with even limited knowledge of the military – and basic mistakes, it suggests that their knowledge base is extremely limited.

That does not, of course, mean that nothing they write can be trusted. Much of what they write will be correct. But it does imply that they are ill-equipped to understand the finer – and often more important – points about military equipment that will enable them to report competently on what they see and are told.

It is Private Eye which runs a regular series commenting on the errors and behaviour of the Fourth Estate – under the heading Street of Shame. We are considering our own version. It looks as if we will not be short of material.

COMMENT THREAD

FRES lives ... sort of

We are informed that the MOD is to invite two British companies to tender to supply reconnaissance and reconnaissance support variants to replace the aged Scimitar and Spartan vehicles now on operations in Afghanistan.

The two companies are BAE Systems Global Combat Systems and General Dynamics (UK), who will be bidding for a project grandly named the Future Rapid Effect System Specialist Vehicle (FRES SV). In reality though, with the FRES utility vehicle dumped for the foreseeable future, this is simply a much overdue replacement for the CVR(T) series which should have been scrapped many years ago.

General Dynamics will, no doubt, be offering a version of the Piranha, configured on similar lines to the Canadian LAV-25 Coyote - arguing for commonality with the proposed Utility Vehicle, if it is ever purchased.

BAE Systems may be submitting a version of the Swedish-built CV-903 Mk III, recently purchased by the Danish Army (pictured), on the basis that a tracked vehicle would be more suitable for the role.

Whichever platform is chosen, the likelihood is that it will be fitted with the French-designed Nexter CTA-40 caseless ammunition gun, together with the BAE System turret which is being used for the Warrior Lethality Improvement Programme (WLIP).

Although the prospect of a replacement for the CVR(T) series is good news – which should always have been put ahead of the utility vehicle – by the time the MoD nannies have finished with their procedures and integration programme, it could be some years before we see any new kit in theatre. By then, of course, it will be the Tories who will have to pay the bill.

COMMENT THREAD

Anything goes

Political editor George Pascoe-Watson, of The Sun needs to talk urgently to the paper’s defence editor (or vice versa).

On 11 March of this year – to the evident approval of the newspaper, GP-W announced a "£40m kit boost for our heroes", telling us in an "exclusive" report that British soldiers in Afghanistan were to get "72 new Mad Max-style troop carriers in tomorrow's Budget".

Although the story had a picture of the early version (unarmoured) - with photoshopped grenade launcher - amd acaption, "Tough ... Supacat armoured vehicle", it seems that defence "editor" Tom Newton Dunn (don't they have reporters anymore?) does not agree.

In another "exclusive" – despite it having been reported elsewhere - TND complains, under the title "Sent to die in open-top 4x4" (and a report that shows an armoured Jackal) that "commanders had to send a Household Cavalry soldier out to die in an UNARMOURED vehicle after their ageing light tanks broke down."

This was Trooper James Munday, the first (officially reported) death in a Jackal, the event described by TND as "…the latest in a long line of shameful equipment shortfalls to plague Our Boys on the Helmand frontline." He adds: Last night a Household Cavalry officer fumed: "It is a disgrace young men are being exposed to these sorts of dangers simply because the Government isn't prepared to pay for anything better … It makes a mockery of everything we serve for" - despite, it seems, the £40 million "boost" that The Sun has previously reported.

This is also rather at odds with the eulogising from The Daily Mail in June 2007, when it gushed over the "The 80mph 'Mad Max' monster targeting the Taliban". Furthermore, it is totally at odds with the mad "puff" in The Sunday Mirror of last March, which described the Jackal as "four tons of pure killing machine".

This paper was competing with The Sunday Telegraph's Sean Rayment who was happily burbling about the "Pitbull", citing "senior officers" saying: "the vehicle will greatly enhance the fighting capability of their soldiers, and will save lives", adding: "The vehicle and crew are protected against mines by reinforced armour plating."

Well, for sure, it did not save the life of Trooper James Munday, nor those of Marines Neil Dunstan and Robert McKibben (and the unnamed Afghan soldier), the latest casualties, with the MoD admitting that they too were killed in a Jackal - something which The Daily Mail has also noted.

For Newton Dunn, though, the “unarmoured” truck is a poor substitute for the Scimitar, drawing this pained response from the MoD. If Newton Dunn wants another view (not that he does) he could always read this. Rather, shoehorning the facts to fit his storyline, he is more intent on offering us this tale of woe:

The elite unit's 26 Scimitar armoured reconnaissance vehicles entered service in 1971 and have suffered mechanical problems for years. But they finally packed up this summer, as almost all broke down four miles from Camp Bastion at the start of one disastrous mission.

Half the troopers from the regiment's D Squadron, Prince William’s old unit, were stuck in the base for TWO MONTHS. Barely half the Scimitars could be repaired, leaving commanders with no choice but to rapidly retrain the other half of the squadron on the new Jackal 4x4 patrol trucks.

Even the Scimitars that were fixed could only operate in early morning or evening because of the blistering Afghan summer heat. A replacement — the FRES Scout Vehicle — was drawn up years ago but is not now due in service until 2015 at best. The MoD blamed problems with the Scimitar fleet on dust and heat and said £30million had been spent on upgrades.

The reference to FRES is interesting, with TDN presumably imbibing the legend that this system was in any way going to be up to the rigours of Afghanistan.

However, this defence "editor" finishes his piece telling us that "Last week an SAS commander quit in protest after three of his soldiers died inside an unarmoured Snatch Land Rover." Thus we have an "unarmoured" Jackal and an unarmoured "Snatch Land Rover", despite both being armoured – albeit lightly.

Perhaps Newton Dunn has not caught up with the latest version of the Jackal but it is always good to see the man keeping up his high standard of reporting.

As for the Scimitar, does he really think that this type is any safer, given the fate of the Spartan recently (built on the same chassis) or of this Scimitar in Iraq?

However, given the line taken by the man on the Jackal, it would not take many more casualties in this machine for The Sun to be making the government's life very difficult indeed. When you can be so cavalier with the facts, anything goes.

COMMENT THREAD

Not taking it seriously

Almost a year to the day, we reported the Canadian decision to purchase five Husky mine detection sets, with supporting vehicles, to deal with the rash of IED/mine attacks which were causing so many casualties in Afghanistan.

The "sets" comprising the Husky, a Buffalo and a 6x6 Cougar – which acts as a command vehicle - sweep roadways before the arrival of combat or supply convoys, thereby seeking to ensure safer passage by vehicles which are not mine protected.

The utility of these specialist vehicles quickly became apparent and we were able report with approval that at least the Canadian military seemed capable of learning lessons born of combat experience.

And indeed, they are continuing to learn those lessons. Reported by the Canadian Press, the Commander of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in Afghanistan is set to ask his government's approval to purchase another ten sets – known by their acronym EROC, standing for "Expedient Route Opening Capability" system.

What is particularly revealing about this report though are comments from unnamed "defence sources in Ottawa" who, "acknowledge the vehicles in theatre have been beaten up, but are continuing to prove their worth every day." One adds: "They've taken a pounding, but they're designed to go out and take a pounding and clear routes and not have the LAV targeted - or so other less protected vehicles."

Here, it is the reference to the LAV which is interesting – this being the armoured personnel carrier which forms the basis of Canadian Army formations. Although armoured, it is not mine protected and it has proved dangerously vulnerable to mine/IED ambushes.

Thus, before this type of vehicle is allowed to sally forth, the way is cleared for it. What a contrast this is with the British way of doing things, which resulted in the death of Trooper Ratu Babakobau, when his Spartan ACP – armoured but not mine protected – was blown apart by a mine.

Nevertheless, the strategy adopted by Canada is by no means entirely optimal. The military would prefer to transport more men and materials by the ultimate mine protected vehicle, the helicopter – but has been hampered by a chronic shortage of these aircraft.

Yet, while the same shortage of helicopters reportedly affects British forces, and despite the Husky sets being a relatively cheap option (the ten new sets estimated at $60-million – less than the price of one new transport helicopter), there are no signs of the British Army following suit. Instead, we see this ludicrous puff on the MoD website, as the Army unveils its latest weapon in the war against mines – hand-held mine detectors.

Nor, indeed, are helicopters the only option. Reported recently by Popular Mechanics (a surprisingly good source of reliable military information) is a new technique introduced by the US forces in Afghanistan. This is the GPS-guided or "smart" parachute – known as the Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS).

It can be used by high-flying transport aircraft to make precision drops of supplied to isolated outposts, reducing the need to use ambush-prone vehicle convoys and avoiding the hazards involved in helicopter re-supply. So successful has been the technique that the USAF delivered 313,824 pounds of supplies between August 2006, when the programme began, to September 2007 – keeping an estimated 500+ convoys off the roads.

In July 2007, the RAF acquired this technology, the first air force outside the US so to do, but the latest news of reduced C-130 capacity cannot assist in ensuring that maximum advantage is gained from its availability.

As a final option, the Army could, of course, ensure that troops were provided with mine-protected personnel carriers. After the first Canadian deaths attributed to IEDs, occurring outside Kabul on 2 October 2003 when a lightly protected Iltis jeep rolled over a mine, the Canadian Army procured RG-31s to protect their troops – with very great effect.

However, while belatedly the MoD is supplying mine-protected vehicles, the Army still content to send its soldiers out in ill-protected vehicles - despite more than adequate warning about Taleban intentions.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that British forces in Afghanistan still suffer from a huge capability gap. At the very least, we need mine detection vehicles, more helicopters, more transport aircraft and more mine-protected vehicles. But hey! Never mind! Harry got his medal for not being blown up in his Spartan. He was lucky not to get a state funeral.

What makes you think the government is not taking this war seriously?

COMMENT THREAD

Then there were six …

Yesterday brought news of the death of Trooper Ratu Babakobau, 29, from Fiji, late of the Household Cavalry Regiment. He was killed while on patrol in the Nowzad area of northern Helmand on Friday when the Spartan APC (pictured) in which he was travelling hit a mine. Three others, including an Afghani interpreter, were injured.

Trooper Babakobau's death brings the total number of British military fatalities in Afghanistan to 95 since the start of operations in November 2001. Of the last 14 soldiers to have been killed in Afghanistan, thirteen have been killed by either an IED or mine. Babakobau is the sixth soldier, this year.

That total also includes two Royal Marines in a Land Rover Wimik, two RAF Regiment soldiers in a Land Rover Wolf and a soldier in a Viking, which was hit by a "suspected mine".

What makes Trooper Babakobau's death different – or, at least, gives it greater media profile – is that the 28-year old soldier had served with Prince William in the Household Cavalry last year, the same Regiment in which Prince Harry (pictured below) had also served while in Afghanistan earlier this year.

But there was another link: Trooper Babakobau was killed in a Spartan light, tracked armoured personnel carrier, exactly the same type of vehicle commanded by Harry while he was on operations. It takes little extrapolation to posit that the younger brother of the heir to the throne could have been killed.

Predictably, much is made of the first link, but nothing of the other. Yet, in many respects, this is another unnecessary death, brought about by an inadequately armoured vehicle.

For sure, like the Viking, the Spartan is an armoured, tracked vehicle. Both will protect crews from rocket propelled grenades and rifle fire, they offer little, if any, protection against anti-tank mines or powerful IEDs. Some have undergone mine strikes where the crews have survived but, since neither are specifically designed as mine protected vehicles - unlike the Mastiff - crews will always be vulnerable.

Furthermore, the predominance of mine/IED strikes is now clearly signalling a change of tactics on the part of the Teleban. This is something that the BBC noted on its main evening news bulletins yesterday, when it reported the death of Trooper Babakobau, and is picked up by The Sunday Telegraph today.

The paper cites Gen Sir David Richards, the Commander-in-Chief of Britain's Land Forces and who commanded Nato forces in Southern Afghanistan in 2006. He confirms that the conflict is becoming more "asymmetric", noting that "…the conflict in Helmand is broadly is going the same as Iraq."

But, in a sentiment that seems to suggest a certain complacency or lack of realism, he adds, "… that does not mean we can't succeed. As professional soldiers we don't weep over these things, we find ways of getting around them."

Without the right equipment, however, there is very little soldiers – professional or otherwise – can do to protect themselves against the hidden threat of mines and IEDs, indicating that we are to see more such casualties and will continue to do so for as long as the military continues to field inadequate vehicles.

That theme, coincidentally, was also picked up by our favourite coroner, Andrew Walker, whose latest inquiry verdict was also widely reported yesterday, not least in The Sun and The Daily Telegraph.

Walker's complaint this time concerned the death of Marine Richard Watson who had been shot dead last December, after his patrol had been ambushed by the Taleban.

The circumstances are redolent of other incidents we have reported but, in this case, Marine Watson was riding in an unarmoured Pinzgauer utility truck (pictured).

A request had been made for a Viking but none had been available and Mr Walker ruled that, had one been provided, Watson – who had returned to his vehicle when the firing broke out - would have survived.

Of course, the Viking – as noted above – does offer protection against gunfire but does not resolve the mine/IED threat. One other vehicle – apart from the Mastiff - that goes a long way towards doing that is the Cougar/Ridgeback and it is perhaps appropriate that, at long last, the British government formally placed the long-awaited order for 157 of them last week.

Too little, perhaps, and – if not too late – certainly a lot slower than should have been the case, these will save lives when they finally arrive in theatre. But more than a few men are going to die unnecessarily before they do.

COMMENT THREAD

Where do you want me to stick my head?

"Questioning is good," writes one of our forum members - "but might you not dilute the value of your posts by so consistently going above and beyond?"

He goes on to say:

I do not think anyone would disagree with your general argument that there have been occasions when the troops have been ill-equipped for specific missions during this campaign. However, this is not news to anyone in the Army and our general philosophy is that you make the most of what you have. What is more, officers and NCOs these days are quite able to speak up and object to an order if they think it is a tad daft and will do so.

Now, fast-forward to the latest coroner's report, this one on the death of Lance Corporal Sean Tansey. He was crushed to death when an eight-ton Spartan armoured vehicle collapsed on his head while he was carrying out repairs.

According to the BBC report, Tansey would have survived had proper wooden supports been placed under the vehicle. The inquest in Oxford was told that the only cushioning support available was old bits of pallet wood. The jack used could lift a Ford Cortina, but not a Spartan.

The inquest was told that cushioning planks, known as "skidding", would have saved the soldier's life while L/Cpl Edward Sampson, who was helping to repair the tank's broken torsion bar, said the team had no proper wooden planks. He told the court: "There was a big clunk. The vehicle pitched forwards and Sean's head was underneath it."

The tools Tansey needed were at his base in Helmand, so he was told to ignore engineers' advice and fix it. But, he could only obey his orders by going against Army guidelines and crawling under the vehicle, which fell on his head. When the coroner asked if soldiers could refuse to do repair work on health and safety grounds, L/Cpl Sampson answered: "That's not the way the Army works. If you are told to do something you do it."

Taking a dispassionate view of this, one does not have to be an expert – much less a military genius – to realise that you do not stick your head under an eight-ton vehicle, supported only by a lightweight jack and some pallets. This is not so much an arcane technical issue as a basic survival strategy.

After all, we have all been there (or most of us). Having to do basic vehicle maintenance, the one thing you do not even think of doing is climbing under a jacked-up vehicle without proper support.

But hey! This is not some fly-by-night, cowboy outfit. This is yer actual Army – dedicated, committed professionals, staffed with NCOs who, "are quite able to speak up and object to an order if they think it is a tad daft".

So – here's the scenario: "Lance Corporal, stick your head under this badly supported vehicle, and fix the old gubbins!" And, says the L/Cpl: "Certainly Sir!"

Unfortunately, the reporting coroner here is our old friend Andrew Walker, and he chooses to pin the blame on the MoD and focus the "serious failure" on "equipment shortages".

But this is not about equipment – it is about mindset, about adopting safe systems of work and levels of supervision at unit level, which ensure that basic safety procedures are adopted. And, before anyone asks, yes – that is a qualified view. In a previous career, I was a health and safety enforcement officer, carrying out routine inspections of workplaces to ensure compliance with health and safety law.

Had this incident been in civilian jurisdiction, there would not just be a coroner's inquiry. On the face of it, there are good indications that a criminal prosecution would be warranted, under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. As it is, an MoD spokesman says: "We note the coroner's comments and will ensure that lessons are learnt from this tragic incident."

That is not good enough. There is prima facie evidence of a criminal offence and, if civilian supervisors would be exposed to prosecution, why is the Army any different? Ah, we are told, in the Forces, "you are taught that you make the best possible decisions with the available facts and do not crucify yourself in hindsight." Obviously, no need for a prosecution then.

Nor, it would seem, is there any need to "crucify yourself in hindsight" with the "best possible decision" – for example – to field Pinzgauer trucks in mine-infested country, the drivers so positioned as to take the full force of mine blasts, with no protection at all. So – here's the scenario: "Lance Corporal, stick your bum on that unarmoured wheel-arch and drive down that road where there might be a buried mine!" And, says the L/Cpl: "Certainly Sir!"

Never mind, the people involved at the tactical level are "intelligent and committed types" who "might really have to live with the fact that a death occurred as a result of their bad decisions."

So that's alright! Where do you want me to stick my head?

COMMENT THREAD

Per ardua ad exitum

A report carried by Defence Talk tells us that the Afghan army air corps is going through rapid growth, but it will take eight years for the force to be self-sustaining and independent.

This is from Brig Gen Jay H Lindell, commander of the Combined Air Power Transition Force in Kabul, who told reporters via video-teleconference that the air corps has doubled its capability since October and that he expects it to double again in the next six months.

He has 133 US military personnel helping the Afghan National Army establish the air corps. Ultimately, he says, the force will have 112 aircraft and 7,400 members. It now has 1,950 members, about 180 of them pilots.

This is the good news, but the bad news is that the priority is being given to building the “air mobility aspect” of the air corps, concentrating on acquiring and integrating Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters (strangely because these are "Hind" attack helicopters), Antonov transports and C-27A Spartan transport aircraft. There is no mention and apparently no intention of developing an offensive capability, such as the provision of aircraft capable of close air support for ground operations, which is currently the domain of coalition forces.

In a recent paper produced from a seminar held by the (US) Air Force University, however (frustratingly, we can no longer find the link), the role of "host nations" in counter-insurgency was explored. The conclusion was that the quickest way for the USAF (and the United States in general) to extract itself from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan was to build up host nation air power, so that indigenous air forces could take the load from the foreign powers.

Recognising that the high-tech fast jets currently used by developed nations for CAS were too complex for host nation air forces to operate, the authors went on to suggest that the USAF should operate low-tech (relatively) CAS squadrons for use in COIN. These could encourage the host nations to acquire a similar capability, they would provide a reservoir of expertise in the USAF which could be passed on, and would provide a training resource into which the host nations could tap.

This line of reasoning makes such eminent sense that we can only wonder why it has not been articulated before (redolent as it is of the US "Vietnamisation" policy during the VietNam conflict). It is also the best possible argument for coalition air forces acquiring fixed wing aircraft such as the Super Tucano, which are already on order for the Iraqi Air Force.

Putting this in the national perspective, although the Harrier squadron in Afghanistan is undoubtedly doing sterling work – soon to be augmented by a Eurofighter detachment – the RAF offensive effort is doing very little to develop the Afghan national capabilities, unlike the Army which is not only providing mentors for ANA forces but also integrating its formations into their own.

It does add "legs" to the argument for Super Tucanos, therefore, if it is suggested that the RAF should operate a squadron of these machines, into which Afghan pilots could be integrated, thus acquiring experience under controlled conditions, before moving over to form their own independent squadrons which could gradually take the load off the coalition forces.

If it is going to take eight years for the Afghan army air corps just to develop its "air mobility" capability, and the USAF thinkers are right that we will never be able to leave until the Afghanis have developed their own offensive forces, then we are going to be there an awful long time unless we do start thinking how to speed up the process. Per ardua ad exitum, as they say.

COMMENT THREAD

Force multipliers

It was none other than Lord Malloch-Brown, junior foreign office minister, who yesterday was holding forth on the BBC Radio 4 programme The World Tonight about the need for European "force multipliers" to support the United Nations troops in Dafur.

In particular, he spoke of the need for helicopters. Otherwise, he said, the 26,000 troop detachment had no chance of covering the territory. Restricted to vehicles, they could take days to reach a trouble spot, too late to intervene and tying down forces in unproductive travel.

Such clarity from Malloch-Brown, however, might also have been directed at the Ministry of Defence. If we are to believe The Sunday Telegraph defence correspondent, Sean Rayment, (and there is no reason why we should not) then, to support something like 7,200 British troops in Afghanistan, we are able to field a mere ten support helicopters, eight Chinooks and two smaller Lynx. Furthermore, the Lynx cannot fly during daylight hours because of the high temperatures.

And it is not only a question of force multipliers. "Support helicopters," writes Rayment, "are vital to operations because of the dangers of moving troops, fuel, ammunition, rations and water by road."

Those dangers were highlighted last May when the MoD posted an account of a convoy operation which was delivering fuel and ammunition – plus other supplies – to troops in the Sangin valley.

The MoD quoted convoy commander Captain Andy Rouse recounting that there were "mines to negotiate in certain areas, left behind by Russian forces in the late 1980s", him saying that, "It is not uncommon for vehicles to be struck by them". He continued:

Although there is the threat of attack from insurgent forces along any part of our route, one of our main concerns are hitting land mines, so map reading is key during any convoy operation.

This could have been the reason for the death of a soldier, reported today by the MoD. He was killed and another injured when in the same general area of Captain Rouse’s convoy, "an army dump truck was hit by an explosion whilst taking part in a routine logistics convoy".

There is, of course, the possibility of an IED or a deliberate mine attack. The Taliban are known to re-use mines and have even been reported to have paid children to harvest them for that purpose.

Unfortunately for the troops who must so often run the gauntlet, not only do they not have Lord Malloch-Brown as their advocate, senior military officers are under strict orders not to make public demands for more helicopters because the RAF has no more to send. It will be next year before the first of the new Merlin helicopters arrive.

All this once again reinforces the need for additional heavy-lift helicopters, right now, an issue we have raised several times. And, at £6,000 an hour compared with the £34,000 an hour it costs to run a Merlin, the Russian-built Mi-26 helicopters could not only provide better value, they could as the photograph below shows (and here) even carry heavy vehicles like the dump truck (illustrated below right: a Volvo FL-12 at 10 tons unladen weight - half the maximum load of a Mi-26) in which the unfortunate soldier was so recently killed.

What is also of great importance is the arithmetic of the convoy operation. In the MoD article referred to above, Captain Rouse's convoy comprises 40 vehicles and takes three days to travel the 150 miles to its destination and return. Inspection of the multiple photographs supplied (two shown) suggest that at least half the vehicles were escorts (WIMIKs and others) and with each of the cargo trucks carrying at least two men (driver and "top gunner"), there cannot be less than 100 men in the convoy – effectively a Company equivalent.

Estimating the carrying capacity from the types of vehicle shown, the total supplies delivered cannot exceed 200 tons, taking up 300 man days, plus considerable wear and tear – plus on this most recent occasion, the loss of an expensive vehicle, the death of one man and the injury of another.

On the other hand, a Mi-26 could deliver 200 tons to the same location in less than 30 flying hours - easily achievable over three days - with the direct employment of 2-3 men, less than one-thirtieth of the manpower the Army used.

Nor indeed does it stop here. In other of its routine propaganda "puffs", the MoD extols the virtues of its 35-year-old "robust and effective" Scimitar light tanks and Spartan APCs (pictured) in operations in Afghanistan. In one operation, it describes tactical operations thus:

In Helmand it's impossible to avoid the attention of the Taliban's own reconnaissance network; motorcycles trailed the multinational patrol from a distance, reporting their approach throughout. The deliberate crossing of the kilometre wide and 100 metre deep natural obstacle of the wadi and the final 45 kilometre approach of the patrol was therefore completed at high speed in just five hours, with the patrol changing direction every kilometre to keep Taliban ambush teams en route guessing as to its ultimate destination.

The imaginative tactical manoeuvring is admirable but the long distances and hard pounding is wearing out these ancient machines and creating considerable maintenance burdens. It should, therefore, be noted that a Mi-26 can carry a Scimitar tank and, in the five hours over the distance, could have delivered ten such vehicles. The tactical advantages are only too apparent and the savings on wear and tear would be substantial.

Once again putting all this together, we have an option which is cheaper, safer, needs substantially less man hours, saves on troop numbers and is a proven "force multiplier".

Yet, despite months of lobbying and an unanswerable case, still the MoD does nothing.

COMMENT THREAD

Keep it simple stupid

It was interesting to see, this morning, The Daily Telegraph pick up on the shortage of combat vehicles in Afghanistan, in a piece by Tom Coghlan in Kabul and Thomas Harding.

The piece itself could invite a sour note from us, as we dealt with this issue on 19 April and the specialist media has been on to the issue much earlier, also pointing out that this problem is affecting all the Nato forces.

However, the newspaper can be applauded on the basis of being better late than never, although the story is no mere catch-up. It does take the issue further forward, actually providing figures, which we have not yet seen. Apparently, a fifth of the 126 Wimiks in Afghanistan are not working and, in addition – another interesting detail - a large number of Land Rovers have been lost to mine strikes.

The Army has been losing an average of one Wimik per week in Helmand and, last month, the Marines of 42 Commando lost four vehicles in a single day during an advance on Sangin. All were the victims of mine strikes. One of the Wimiks blew up directly in front of our vehicle, sending a plume of black smoke rolling skyward and pieces of vehicle and equipment 50 yard into the air. Says the paper, though three men were injured and the top gunner landed 15 yards away, the reinforced armour on the vehicle's underside saved their lives.

That mines are such a significant problem certainly does reaffirm our concern about the deployment of the Pinzgauer Vector (pictured) in theatre. A more unsuitable – and dangerous – vehicle it would be hard to imagine. And, of course, if the Army had been using Cougar mine protected vehicles – or even RG-31s – the likelihood is that no vehicles would have been lost and the men reported injured would have escaped unhurt.

Nevertheless, the paper offers the narrative that "huge demands" are made on equipment in Afghanistan, with engineers toiling daily to replace thrown tank tracks, burnt-out engines and clogged filters on Scimitar and Spartan "tanks" (the Spartans are APCs). On average, it says, there are one to two breakdowns a day in a squadron, "though perversely the antiquity of the tanks make them relatively simple to fix."

This is precisely the point Ann Winterton has been making in her two speeches in the Commons (here and here), stressing the need for equipment which is less complicated and easier to maintain. There is no point in having the most sophisticated kit in the world if it spends most of its time in the workshop.

That point, though, is lost on the Telegraph which talks up the virtues of the Land Rover "Wimiks". In fact, although popular with the troops – appealing to "boy racer" tendency, it is a ridiculous vehicle. Built to the latest European automotive standards, it is difficult to maintain, requiring many complex spare parts and specialist tools. It is also top heavy – especially with the weapons kit - and vehicles are constantly being overturned.

Crucially, also, the track is far too narrow. Where, as is so often the case, it is sharing unmade roads with lorries, their wider track carves out ruts which the Land Rover cannot fit. The vehicle is force to ride with the wheels on one side on the ruts and the other on the raised part of the road, a hair-raising experience which exacerbates the tendency to roll.

This reminds me of that ill-fated project of the 1970s, the Africar (pictured). This was the idea of Tony Howarth, an English photo-journalist who sought to build a car that could cope with the notoriously bad roads of Africa and which could be maintained using the simplest of tools and the most basic of materials. And one of the features was that it has the same track-width as a truck, allowing it to mix freely with heavy traffic on unmade roads.

It is that sort of thinking that the Army chiefs need to be focusing on. The kit carried can be sophisticated, but there is no reason why the platform should be complicated.

What price then the final part of the Telegraph article which has Lt Col Charlie Mayo, the military spokesman in Helmand, saying, "Our achievements against the Taliban show that British troops are not only among the best in the world but also among the best equipped." If he really believes that, we are in bigger trouble than I thought.

COMMENT THREAD