The shadow of history

While the world awaits with bated breath the announcement tomorrow from president Obama on his intentions for Afghanistan, coverage of the campaign has been relatively muted – although the traditional scaling down of campaigning as winter approaches doubtless has had some influence on the flow of news.

For my part, some little time ago I decided to step back from the day-to-day reporting and look at the history of the benighted land that is Afghanistan, filling in some woeful gaps in my knowledge. In some respects, I wish I had not started, as the broader appreciation not only underlines my own state of ignorance but also brings home the complexities of the strategic picture.

From the latest piece, however, is the very clear reminder that, ever since the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been enemies, with the tribal areas and the Northwest frontier territories being at the centre of the dispute.

The crucial issue is the unrecognised border set in 1893 as the Durand line, which is as fresh an issue now as it was then. Even more recently, Karzai has made recovery of these lands an important part of his overall political platform.

This historical perspective puts a completely different light on some the current initiatives, not least the development of the supposed AF/PAK policy, which assumes that Afghanistan and Pakistan can and will work as allies in pursuit of a Western-inspired "war on terror", against the common enemies, currently designated as the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

In fact, as the recent Pakistani adventure in South Waziristan has highlighted, there is no single "Taliban". More to the point, there are different tribal factions which are fighting out a proxy war between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the whole overlaid by a global jihad which positions the Pakistani and Afghani governments as puppets of the "great Satan", the United States of America.

It is in that context that we must look at reports of the recent meeting between UK premier Gordon Brown and president Zardari of Pakistan, where the British prime minister is said to have voiced his frustration over Pakistan's apparent lack of commitment to the fight.

Much of this frustration is focused on the failure to capture Osama bin Laden, with Brown, in common with Hillary Clinton, wanting to see proof that not just the Pakistani Army but the entire government machine was committed to his capture. Brown is said to have told Zardari that much greater effort is required in Islamabad, reminding him of where Britain's interests lie, with three quarters of all plots against Britain masterminded in Pakistan.

But, if Mr Brown is frustrated, he should perhaps have regard to the Zardari's own problems, not least of which is that, the more he is seen to be supporting the Western agenda, the more resistance he is likely to meet from his own people.

The Pakistan government is having to steer a precarious course between pandering to its Western paymasters and dealing with the internal stresses which threaten to tear the country apart. A more aggressive focus on the tribal areas could bring the government down, or precipitate a military coup.

Underlying Brown's demands, therefore, is a fundamental ignorance of the fragility of the situation in Pakistan but, even more so, there is a colossal hypocrisy.

The British government is seeking from Pakistan a resolution of a problem which it, itself failed to solve – the taming of the frontier regions. Moreover, this is a problem which the British made inestimably worse, with the creation of the Durand line, its failure then to regularise the position in 1947 and its continued failure, alongside the US, to mediate in the ongoing dispute.

And therein really does lie the issue. Until the border issue is resolved, nothing fundamentally is going to change in a region which, traditionally, the Afghans themselves called Yaghistan (the land of the unruly).

Thus did Abdur Rahman, ruler of Afghanistan when the Durand mission did its work, write to the Viceroy of India, warning him of the dangers of splitting the peoples of the tribal areas. "If you should cut them out of my dominions," he said, "they will neither be of any use to you nor to me: you will always be engaged in fighting and troubles with them, and they will always go on plundering."

Within seven years, Rahman was to be proved right, with the British having to put down major uprisings, dealing with the Chitral (pictured), Bajaur, Malakand, Waziri and Afridi wars. And, having dumped the problem on the Pakistani government, history is repeating itself.

The irony is that, with the current coalition policy of expanding the Afghan Army, Rahman was arguing back in 1893 that the "brave warriors" of the tribal regions would "make a very strong force" and that only a ruler of Afghanistan could "make them peaceful subjects". Divorced from Afghanistan, they are the problem – within Afghanistan, they could be part of the solution.

Yet, while Mr Brown is laying down the law to president Zardari, this issue is not even on the table. To his cost, the British prime minister will find that, in this region, you cannot ignore the shadow of history.

COMMENT THREAD

Playing games

After three weeks of media exclusion, the Pakistani Army lifted a corner of the veil on Thursday, flying in a group of journalists to a barren hilltop in deepest South Waziristan, to explain how swimmingly well the campaign was going.

It was duly rewarded with favourable headlines, such as is in The Guardian, which carried title, "Pakistan hails progress in Waziristan", slightly marred by the addition: "But will it stop the suicide bombers?"

The answer to the question is, of course, "no" – not if the bombings are being carried out by the Punjab Taleban, which can rely on resources based in Punjab province, without having to call for assistance from South Waziristan.

More to the point, since "militant" groups in North Waziristan seem also implicated in attacks in Pakistan proper, the Pakistani Army's venture deep into the southern agency is likely to have little overall effect. Nor indeed is the ponderous progress of the Army calculated to achieve anything lasting.

Much has been made of the discovery of a stack of passports and photos said to belong to foreign militants, and in particular the German passport that appears to have belonged to Said Bahaji, a member of the Hamburg cell that orchestrated the 9/11 attacks. Another passport belonged to Raquel Burgos Garcia, a Spaniard who had converted to Islam and later joined al-Qaeda as a low-level operative.

If genuine, says Time magazine, the passports would confirm what the US has been saying all along: "that Pakistan's wild borderlands have served as a sanctuary for global jihadis who may be plotting fresh attacks on the West."

This may well have been what Hillary Clinton had in mind on her visit to Pakistan, when she rounded on her hosts, telling them: "al-Qaida has had safe haven in Pakistan since 2002," adding, "I find it hard to believe that nobody in your government knows where they are and couldn't get them if they really wanted to."

In that precise context, for all its deliberately optimistic progress reports about its operations in South Waziristan, the number of "militants" claimed killed by the Pakistani Army is remarkably low – especially for a three-pronged advance which is supposedly aimed at entrapping the fighters.

Bearing in mind that the Army managed to recover only the passports of Said Bahaji and Raquel Burgos, and not the persons themselves – dead or alive – one can only imagine that the deliberate pace of the operation is affording al-Qaeda, and indeed any "militant" who chooses not stand and fight, plenty of opportunities to escape.

There is much to be said, therefore, for the supposition that the fighters are simply being allowed to disperse, one fortified by reports that jihadists have been seen shaving off their beards and melting into the civilian population.

Some, if not many, will of course seek sanctuary over the border in Afghanistan, where the Pakistani Army cannot follow. This would suggest that, to ensure the maximum effect, coalition forces should be in place to block the escapees, providing the anvil for the Pakistani "hammer".

Not a few eyebrows have been raised in the Asian press, therefore, with some distinctly critical comments over the US decision to withdraw its forces from its four key bases in Nuristan, on the border with Pakistan, leaving the northeastern province as a safe haven for the Taliban.

Nuristan is strategically located in the Hindu Kush, and is now said to be under the effective control of the network belonging to Qari Ziaur Rahman, a Taliban commander with strong ties to Bin Laden. This makes Nuristan the first Afghan province to be controlled by a network inspired by al-Qaeda. It also opens the US to exactly the same criticism levelled at Clinton – that the US doesn't really want to get al-Qaeda either.

With so many nuances to the situation – with different agendas, hidden and declared – one can only wonder at the naivety of The Times in London, which offers a leader declaring: "Pakistan has taken a brave and correct stance in the battle in south Waziristan. It deserves the support and help of Western governments." Thus does the paper opine:

The Government and military forces in Pakistan merit support and gratitude for their actions, which are hugely advancing the security and peace not just of their own citizens but also those in Britain, in the United States and, indeed, anywhere — Bali, Mumbai — that lives by values other than those of apocalyptic Islamism.

By contrast, only recently, we had the New YorkTimes reporting: "Pressure From US Strains Relations With Pakistan," pointing out that which has been evident for some time, that the Obama administration has been putting pressure on Pakistan to take action, employing a combination of threats and bribes, the latter having a powerful effect on a cash-strapped country.

There are more than a few indications thus that the Pakistani government is going through the motions, doing enough to look credible but, in fact, achieving nothing of any lasting significance – more so in the absence of coordinated US military action on the other side of the border.

As to "hugely advancing the security and peace ... ", the only noticeable effect has been to brand the Pakistani government in the eyes of the extremists as a stooge of the Great Satan. This has made it a legitimate target for terrorist attacks, the results of which are creating rising instability in the country, a process which may get worse as new groups emerge to fight on this newly created front.

Heedless of this, however, The Times goes on to argue that Western governments "should extend strong diplomatic support to Pakistan's Government", but then complains of its "misguided" and "confrontational" stance with India which, for too long, they regarded as the principal battle.

What this neglects is that, whatever the historical overtones, Pakistan's stance is not illogical, and neither is India a passive, innocent party in the relationship. Some of its activities have been distinctly hostile to Pakistan and its pursuit of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan and Iran is, to say the least, provocative.

Any longer-term solution in this crisis-strewn region, therefore, is going to require the active participation of India, and central to the enmity between the two nations is the running sore of Kashmir, which seems no closer to resolution than it was in 1947, in which India is by no means playing a straight hand.

And, with both sides maintaining huge armed forces ranged in opposition to each other, not only does this impose huge financial burdens on the parties, it hampers economic development in the contested areas, and hinders regional cooperation on a wide range of matters, to the detriment of both.

When it comes to such hard issues, though, the "diplomatic support" goes AWOL. The otherwise forthright Mrs Clinton sidestepped the issue, merely observing: "It is clearly in Pakistan's and India's interest to resolve ... But it isn't for us to dictate a solution. That wouldn't last a minute."

As for the European Union, only yesterday it was telling us that it wanted to become "more capable, more coherent and more strategic as a global actor, including in its relations with strategic partners, in its neighbourhood and in conflict-affected areas."

This was the European Council in Brussels yet, when it came to is declaration on Afghanistan and Pakistan, all it could manage was weakly to tell the world that it: "shares the concern about the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan and supports the government of Pakistan in its efforts to establish control over all areas of the country."

If the EU is unutterably weak though, British foreign secretary David Miliband is not much better. His last substantive utterance on the issue was in January of this year on a visit to India, when he made the eminently sensible observation that: "Resolution of the dispute over Kashmir would help deny extremists in the region one of their main calls to arms and allow Pakistani authorities to focus more effectively on tackling the threat on their western borders."

Such was the hostile reaction of self-interested Indian politicians to this home truth though, that Miliband's intervention was widely branded as a "gaffe". He has maintained a monastic silence on the subject ever since.

Nevertheless, as this commentary makes clear, Kashmir occupies a pivotal role in the stabilisation of the region. Yet, while the pressure is on Pakistan to put its house in order, India is getting a free ride, despite being a major player and a vital part of any overall settlement.

One does not, therefore have to take sides in the dispute to observe that it is not only Pakistan which is playing games. If there is a sense of grievance at the way it is being treated by the West, this is not altogether unwarranted. A commitment by Pakistan is one thing, but a similar level of commitment is needed from the other parties – and there is no evidence that this is forthcoming.

If, instead, the West chooses to play games, we should not be surprised if Pakistan does the same.

COMMENT THREAD

Changing the battlefield

A serious topic of conversation in Indian political circles is the very real possibility of Pakistan breaking up, the tenor of the discussion being not "if" but "when".

If it happens, it is felt that a key element will have been the proliferation of Taleban groups beyond the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and into the Pakistani heartland. This issue is discussed in a recent edition of the Hindustan Times, where it was noted that the attack on Pakistan Army Headquarters on 10 October, as well as other recent suicide bombings in Lahore and Islamabad, involved two Punjabi "militants", Commander Iqbal and Gul Muhammad.

Crucially though, the attacks have been mounted by a new organisation, which goes under the name of Tehrik-e-Taliban Punjab. Until fairly recently, "Taliban" was a word associated with Pashtuns, with two groups commonly acknowledged, the "Afghan" and the "Pakistan" (TTP) wings, both operating out of the northwest frontier province.

Recently, we noted the emergence of another Taliban group, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan (TTB), operating in southern Helmand against US troops, although it is believed also to be active in the Quetta district, in Pakistani territory. This now makes four, identifiable Taliban groups, two of which have non-Pashtun memberships.

What are now called "militant" groups are, of course, by no means new to Punjab, the environment having spawned the increasingly familiar alphabet soup of activists, such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and the Harkatul Jihadul Islami (HUJI). These all have a history of involvement in Afghanistan, alongside the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), with the tacit support of elements of the ISI. Some of the groups, and especially LeT, had a history of activism in Kashmir.

What is different about the new grouping though is that it seems to have formalised links with the TTP, expending its energies on attacks inside the Pakistani heartland, either as solo operations, or providing logistic support and personnel for TTP-initiated attacks.

One of the core groups of the Punjabi Taliban is thought to be the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Says Rohan Gunaratne, author of Inside al Qaeda, many Jhangvi fighters have moved to the NWFP. "Jhangvi is now the eyes, ears and operational arm of al Qaeda and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan [based in Waziristan]," says Gunaratne. "It is hard to distinguish between the three."

The focus of the new activism is the Pakistan Army, which is seen to be "siding with the forces of the infidel" in its operations in the tribal areas, and has thus become a "legitimate" target.

Once again, we see the coalition intervention in Afghanistan, and the pressure on the Pakistan government to take action against the sanctuaries in the frontier area, having a perverse effect. More and more of the resources of its security forces are expended on internal security, rather than against activists operating in Afghanistan.

The main recruitment area for the Punjabi Taliban is said to be South Punjab, in what is known as the Seraiki belt, where rising poverty levels have helped turn the area into a fertile breeding ground for militant outfits. The call to arms is aided by a massive rise in the number of Punjab madrassas, from 1,320 in 1988 to 3,153 in 2000, a rise of almost 140 percent. Many are said to be Saudi funded.

A more detailed analysis suggests that the growing power of the Punjabi Taliban poses a serious threat, providing fresh recruits for the jihad from a population of approximately 27 million.

Once indoctrinated at the madrassas, students from Punjab are being taken to the terrorist training camps in the country's Pashtun tribal belt. Over five thousand youngsters have reportedly moved to South and North Waziristan. Once they completed their military training, these youngsters eventually proved themselves to be valuable partners for the TTP, providing valuable local knowledge of the important urban centres of Punjab, such as Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad.

However, despite the acquisition of the new name, it is believed that the Punjabi Taliban lacks any organisation or command structure and still operates as a loose network of elements comprising its former elements. The attraction of working under the Taliban franchise, apparently, is that it gives activists the freedom to work outside the control of the more established groups, some of which are reluctant to support attacks within Pakistan.

Further, as "free-lancers" they have been welcomed by Mullah Omar, leader of the Quetta Shura "Afghan" Taliban group, having previously rejected alliances for the jihad groups of which they were members. Based within the tribal areas, therefore, the "Punjabi" Taliban comprise an autonomous group, not answerable to their leaders in the Punjab.

There also seems to be a linkage between these recruits and the 313 Brigade led by Ilyas Kashmiri, which has moved from Kashmir to support the dissident Mahsuds in South Waziristan.

Thus, in effect, we have a four-way nexus of Pashtun activists from Afghanistan and Pakistan, reinforced by Punjabis and Kashmiri, all linked with al Qaeda, which – according to Small Wars Journal - is providing training and helping to co-ordinate attacks, both inside Paskistan and in Afghanistan.

With these developments, one [unnamed] Pakistani analyst warns that if the Taliban now spread their tentacles across Punjab, "this would change the battlefield completely." The prospect of a collapse of the Pakistani government might be that much closer. And, while Indian commentators are avidly discussing the possibility, none of them are prepared with any confidence to predict the results.

COMMENT THREAD

British resolve?

The Times leader is taking Obama to task for "dithering" over Afghanistan, contrasting his lack of action unfavourably with sentiments expressed by David Miliband, recently highlighted in a New York Times op-ed.

While Obama havers, torn between the Biden-inspired "counter-terrorism" approach and McChrystal's brave new world of "counter-insurgency", there is no such irresolution from the British foreign secretary. When asked if the mission needed substantially more troops, Miliband said, "What I think that you can see from the prime minister's strategy is that we believe in serious counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is a counterterrorist strategy."

Fortified by these words, The Times is suggesting that the US president must show at least as much resolve as his British allies, although it cannot mean this literally. While the British commitment is to 500 extra troops, McChrystal is demanding another 40,000 – a slightly different proposition.

Miliband's "resolve", in fact, may be more a question of fools rushing in. Even more to the point, in the context of a solid phalanx of media pressure demanding more "boots on the ground", backed by ranks of politicised ex-generals, deploying another battlegroup was the easy option – a relatively cheap way of stilling the incessant clatter, taking a politically embarrassing issue off the front pages.

On the other hand, while the strategic focus has shifted to Pakistan, it is secretary Hillary Clinton who is in Islamabad, pledging an extra $243 million in aid, and seeking to stiffen the Pakistani government's resolve in the battle against the Taleban.

Yet, while a US secretary of state is trying to broker deals in a former British dominion, where the Raj once held sway, Miliband's latest contribution is to suggest that we walk away from formulating our own foreign policy, and throw in our lot with the European Union, his idea being "to take a lead in developing a strong European foreign policy".

Thus, while The New York Times applauds Miliband for being "candid", wishing for the same from Obama, the difference is between a powerless emissary, who can comment freely on issues for which he bears no responsibility, and an executive of a nation that exerts real power, and has to step up to the plate with real commitments to back any decisions made. Talk, as they say, is cheap – and you don't get much cheaper than Miliband's contribution.

Perversely, just as the British government had thought the issue "parked", we are seeing the glimmerings of a change in the political wind, this side of the pond. Veteran commentator on Pakistani and Afghan affairs, Christian Lamb, writes in The Spectator this week, declaring "more troops will just mean more targets". Then, in The Financial Times, even the great sage Max Hastings, is going "wobbly", questioning whether it is "sensible for the west to continue pushing military chips on to the table if each spin of the roulette wheel obstinately delivers a zero."

Gradually, it seems, wiser heads are drawing back from the strategic wisdom enunciated by the likes of The Sun, and beginning to think about the broader issues – perhaps starting a debate which has been notably absent in the UK.

Nowhere is this more welcome than in Pakistan itself, where the Daily Times is arguing for a "regional approach to Afghanistan", invoking a grouping almost unknown in the West, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This, says the paper, is "steadily becoming an important factor of emerging architecture of security, economy, culture, people-to-people contacts and cooperation in Asia".

A key player here is China, with which Pakistan has good relations, and which is exerting increasing influence in Afghanistan. But the paper also highlights the tension between Pakistan and India, pointing out that resolution of differences between these nations is an important part of the overall solution. The SCO, it believes, could be an important player in bringing the parties together.

Clearly, the EU is waking up to the potential of the SCO – or is being warned that it must take an interest - with a commentator last year noting that it offered "opportunities for positive cooperation". Previously, the Centre for European Reform made its pitch, noting multiple (and largely unsuccessful) EU initiatives in the area.

And therein lies the hidden cost of our membership of the European Union, and this government's determination to cede our policy-making responsibilities to Brussels. While we are a major player in Afghanistan – more so than any other European nation – news of contacts between David Miliband and this grouping on behalf of HMG is hard to find. On the wider diplomatic front, already we seem no longer to have a voice.

Thus, the initiative goes to, and stays with, the United States, our vassal status in the European Union robbing us of our voice and our initiative, leaving Mr Miliband to mouth inane platitudes to the New York Times, which the paper mistakes for "resolve".

Miliband's only "resolve" however, is to ensure that the once mighty Great Britain ends up with less power and influence than the independent state of Afghanistan, where we are singularly failing to make a mark.

COMMENT THREAD

An Indian elephant

The high-profile attack on its embassy in Kabul earlier this month (pictured) briefly brought to the attention of the Western media the Indian presence in the Afghan capital.

Yet, apart from when Indian assets are attacked, very little notice is taken of what is a major factor in the Afghan "insurgency". India stands accused of using the Afghan conflict to destabilise its old enemy, Pakistan, part of a wider regional effort that includes supporting the independence movement in Baluchistan, and even paying the Taleban to mount attacks on installations in Pakistan.

This issue came to a head yesterday when Pakistan interior minister Rehman Malik directly accused India of creating unrest within Pakistan by funding the Taleban based along the Pak-Afghan border and by interfering in Baluchistan. He went further to say that Islamabad had "solid evidence", adding the information could be shared with Indian ministers or representatives at any forum of their choice.

The Indian media, predictably, dismissed these claims as "over-the-top posturing". They are seen as a diversionary tactic to draw attention away from claims that the Pakistani ISI is funding the Tehrik-e-Taliban, al-Qaeda and other extremist groups operating from its soil.

This is by no means the first time Islamabad has made such accusations, having been arguing the point since 2003. Even last July, Malik was telling his senate that Indian intelligence agencies were running "terrorist camps" in Afghanistan to train Baluchi youths to "create disturbances" in the south western province.

That there should be tension between India and Pakistan is hardly surprising. Between the countries, there have been three major conflicts since 1947 and there is still an armed confrontation across the so-called "line of control" in Kashmir, where only a cease-fire prevails and violations are frequently reported. The latest was last Sunday, when it was claimed that an Indian soldier had been wounded in "unprovoked firing that lasted for some 30 minutes."

Even as of today, India has advised its citizens against travel to Pakistan, citing security reasons, Normally, thousands of Indian pilgrims, mainly Sikhs, travel to Pakistan's Punjab province, home to some of the most revered Sikh sites including the birthplace of Guru Nanak, the 15th century founder of their faith.

The tension is exacerbated by Pakistani intelligence service support for an active insurgency by Moslem extremist groups within the Indian-held area of Kashmir, while the Indian intelligence service, known by the initials RAW, is also active in throughout Kashmir, with the alleged involvement of the Israeli spy agency Mossad. Israel has also become a major arms supplier to India, inflaming Moslem sensitivities.

A politically fragile Pakistan firmly believes that the Indian long-term objective is the dismantling of the Pakistani state, and it looks nervously across the border at the huge 1.4 million-strong Indian army, the third largest after China and the US, comprising 34 combat divisions - with seven of its thirteen Corps poised against Pakistan.

Relations were not improved by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with India, then a client state of the Soviet Union, supported the Soviet action, in contrast with Pakistan, which created and launched the Taleban in opposition to Soviet forces. After the Soviet withdrawal, India belatedly supported the Northern League in its bid to overthrow the Taleban, and has since been an open supporter of Karzai's government, pledging to spend $1.6bn in aid, making it the fifth largest bilateral donor.

The very closeness of that relationship worries Pakistan, which sees India's involvement as an attempt to encircle their country. Says analyst Ahmed Rashid, "India's reconstruction strategy was designed to win over every sector of Afghan society, to give India a high profile with Afghans, gain the maximum political advantage and, of course, undercut Pakistani influence."

A significant element of this strategy could be construed as "economic warfare", deliberately designed to undermine the Pakistani economy. Thus, when Pakistan announced plans to develop a new deep water port in Gwadar, on Baluchistan's Makran coastline – with significant Chinese investment – India teamed up with Iran on the other side of the border to expand the deep water facility at Chabahar. It is also investing in upgrading the Chabahar-Milak road to the border with Afghanistan (pictured), giving India direct access without having to pass through Pakistan.

Few consider it a coincidence that, while the development of Chabahar and its road links have forged ahead, not least of the problems with Pakistan's Gwadar development has been an upsurge in Baluchi "terrorism", with the Pakistani government convinced that this is both organised and funded by the Indians.

On the diplomatic front too, it has been noted that India has been a powerful player, joining and to an extent orchestrating the now US-led international pressure on Pakistan to undertake military operations in South Waziristan. This is forcing the Pakistani Army to confront its former (and continuing) Pushtan allies, thus incurring the wrath of Moslem fundamentalists, who see the government as a stooge for the US and India.

While it is said that the Indian aim is to sour relations between the tribes and the Pakistani Army, to an extent that the latter refuse to side with it in case of an Indo-Pak war, the ploy could backfire. Rather than simply exert this passive effect, it could energise and unite the tribes. If they then went on to strengthen links with fundamentalist terrorists in south Punjab and even the Moslem population in Karachi, the already weak Pakistani government could fold.

With that, Hakimullah Mehsud, the new leader of the Pakistani Taleban – in what may be a show of bravado, but maybe something more – is threatening a massive escalation. "We want an Islamic state, if we get that then we will go to the borders and fight the Indians," he says.

In a situation that has parallels with the 1947 Kashmiri war, we could see a "free-lance" tribal invasion of India, with the Pakistani Army sucked in to protect their "brothers" when they confront the all-powerful Indian Army, the conflict spiralling into an all-out war.

Even short of that, observers are noting that the increasing Indian involvement in Afghanistan, and its support for liberation movements on Pakistani territory, is "a hurdle in getting Pakistan to fight the Taleban."

Certainly, the suspicion is that the Pakistani Army, in its current operation in South Waziristan, is going through the motions. It has sent in about 28,000 troops to take on about 10,000 guerrillas, a relatively low ratio. According to Javed Hussain, a retired Pakistani Army brigadier, probably only 11,000 are infantry. Instead of a ratio of one to one, he says, the ratio should be at least five to one.

One could suggest that the Army is "aiming to fail". In fact, with the US maintaining a close and amicable relationship with India, and Afghanistan likewise with India, the Pakistan government is more likely, through the ISI, to step up its covert support for the Taleban. In so doing, it will reason that the Taleban's efforts to destabilise the Karzai government, and undermine coalition forces, are a legitimate and necessary counter to growing Indian influence.

All of this tends to put the Afghan conflict in a new light – or, at least, give it a new perspective. As well as the obvious and much documented battle between the Taleban and the Afghan government, supported by coalition forces, there is another "proxy war" being fought out over the same territory, between India and Pakistan.

This, while policy-makers have been widely discussing their "AF-PAK" strategy, the real need is for an "Af-Indo-Pak" strategy. And this has wider implications for any eventual drawdown of coalition troops, and the Afghanisation of the "war". If reduced coalition presence – especially if it is premature – creates a power vacuum, that could be filled by India, provoking a violent reaction from Pakistan.

To that extent, it also adds another strategic dimension to the presence of coalition forces in Afghanistan. There is an elephant – an Indian elephant – not so much in the room, as wanting to come in. It would seem that we need to be there to keep it out (or under control), which then adds a further complication to an exit plan which is already deeply problematical.

COMMENT THREAD

Wrong war, wrong country

If the aim of our intervention in Afghanistan is to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat" al-Qaeda in that country, writes Mehdi Hasan in The Guardian, then we have already won. There is no longer any al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Hasan relies for his information of Dr Marc Sageman, of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, who recently testified to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Sageman is a forensic psychiatrist, sociologist and scholar-in-residence with the New York police department. He has also served as a CIA case officer in Islamabad in the late 1980s, working closely with the Afghan mujahedin, and has recently undertaken a study of the terrorist threat.

One of his key findings is that 78 percent of all global neo-jihadi terrorist plots in the West in the past five years came from autonomous home-grown groups without any connection, direction or control from al Qaeda Core or its allies. The "resurgent al Qaeda" in the West argument has no empirical foundation.

He thus concludes that al-Qaeda has ceased to function as an organisational or operational entity and that the "present threat has evolved from a structured group of al-Qaeda masterminds ... to a multitude of informal local groups trying to emulate their predecessors by conceiving and executing operations from the bottom up. These 'home-grown' wannabes form a scattered global network, a leaderless jihad."

Far from being directed by a Comintern, Sageman asserts, global neo-jihadi terrorism is evolving to the structure of anarchist terrorism that prevailed over a century ago, when no such global coordinating committee was ever found despite contemporaneous belief in its existence.

Turning to the current policy debate of Afghanistan, Sageman notes that there is an "insidious confusion" between Afghan Taleban and transnational terrorist organizations. Afghan fighters, he says, are parochial, have local goals and fight locally. They do not travel abroad and rarely within their own country. They are happy to kill Westerners in Afghanistan, but they are not a threat to Western homelands. Thus we are told:

Foreign presence is what has traditionally unified the usually fractious Afghan rivals against a common enemy. Their strategic interest is local, preserving their autonomy from what they perceive as a predatory corrupt unjust central government. They do not project to the West and do not share the internationalist agenda of al Qaeda or its allied transnational terrorist organisations.

This may be so, even if there are some indications that the Taleban is evolving, and taking on the character of a transnational organisation, albeit limited to the region. But, if it is largely a localised operation and the uniting force is the presence of foreign troops, then their removal (or reducing their footprint) would perforce deprive the jihad of its force.

Reducing troop presence, however, opens up the possibility that al Qaeda could return to Afghanistan, especially if the Taleban regained power. But Sageman maintains otherwise. It is by no means a foregone conclusion that the insurgents could take over.

Unlike 1996, when the Taleban captured Kabul, the label "Taleban" now includes a collection of local insurgencies with some attempts at coordination on a larger scale, but it is deeply divided. Local Taleban forces can prevent foreign forces from protecting the local population, through their time-honoured tactics of ambushes and raids, but this local resistance does not translate into deeply divided Taleban forces being able to coalesce in the near future into an offensive force capable of marching on Kabul.

Command and control frictions and divergent goals hamper their planning and coordination of operations. They lack popular support and they have not demonstrated ability to project beyond their immediate locality.

Then, even if the Taleban did return to power, this would not automatically mean a new sanctuary for al-Qaeda. There is no reason for al Qaeda to come back. It seems safer in Pakistan at the moment. And if they did think about it, surveillance augmented by networks of informants in contested territory, combined with the nearby stationing of a small force dedicated physically to eradicate any visible al Qaeda presence, would prevent it.

Thus informed, Sageman is keen for policymakers in the west, who promote falsehoods and myths about Afghanistan while sitting "several thousand miles from the war zone". He wants them to acknowledge the futility of escalation, and switch the focus to Pakistan.

"The problem is in Pakistan," he tells Hasan. "But that's not where we are sending troops to. We're sending them to the nation next door." It is high time that our politicians, generals and spies wake up to the fact that we are fighting the wrong war, in the wrong country.

COMMENT THREAD

Unravelling the unknowable

The current offensive Pakistani offensive in the South Waziristan tribal area can be reported on many different levels, the simplest being that projected by some analysts as "the mother of all regional conflicts".

That is one description offered in a remarkable piece in the Asia Times, written by Syed Saleem Shahzad, the Pakistan bureau chief, as a prelude to a long interview with Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri, styled as an al-Qaeda leader who, according to American intelligence, is al-Qaeda's head of military operations.

Shahzad frames the conflict on the one hand as a Pakistani military operation against the Pakistani Taleban and al-Qaeda and – from the perspective of al-Qaeda – as part of its "game plan" in the South Asian war theatre, a continuation of its "broader campaign against American global hegemony that began with the attacks in the United States of 11 September 2001."

Al-Qaeda's target, we are told, remains the United States and its allies, such as Europe, Israel and India, and it does not envisage diluting this strategy by embracing Muslim resistances on narrow parameters. In this context, militant activity in Pakistan is seen as a complexity rather than as a part of al-Qaeda's strategy.

Complexity or not, al-Qaeda (if that is the correct description) seems committed to defending a territory of approximately 2,550 square miles which has, of the face of it, little strategic value, against Pakistani rather than US forces, risking substantial loss and disruption.

In that area, it is estimated (by the Pakistani Army) that there are about 10,000 "hardcore fighters", mostly members of the region's ethnic Pashtun tribes, augmented by about 1,000 Uzbeks, some al-Qaeda Arabs and even a handful of "militants" from Western countries. There are also said to be factions from other parts of Pakistan in the area, in particular from the south of Punjab province.

The military action now under way follows a spate of what might be termed "terrorist" attacks in the region. These have included an attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, when a car loaded with explosives rammed into the compound wall, killing at least 17 people. In Pakistan, there was an "audacious attack" on the Pakistani military headquarters in Rawalpindi, the twin city of the capital, Islamabad. Then, a suicide bomber detonated a bomb in market town in the Swat Valley region, killing 41 people and injuring 45 others.

These attacks, however, have been carried out by a kaleidoscopic mix of different groups which, to the causal follower of the conflict attuned to the idea that this is a Taleban conflict, present a bewildering variety of names. Not least, the Rawalpindi attack might have been carried out by Lashkar I Jhangvi, described as a "vicious Punjab-based sectarian outfit", which may or may not have links with the Taleban and al-Qaeda.

And so it is with the offensive in South Waziristan, where one is presented the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Taliban (PTT), the Lashkar al-Zil or the Shadow Army, another of al-Qaeda's fighting forces, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and, in the charge of Ilyas Kashmiri, the so-called 313 Brigade, a collection of jihadi groups, such as the Harkat-ul Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI), which has fought for many years against India in India-administered Kashmir.

If these are the foreign "players", the diversity of the local Pashtuns is doubtless even greater, with huge variations in the degree of commitment to the fight, the levels of equipment, the experience and the loyalties, both to other tribal groups and to the "cause". Although the Taleban is nominally led by Hakimullah Mahsud, a member of the Mahsud tribe, this is no homogenous "army", trained and equipped as a coherent fighting force, but disparate and fractured groups, each with their own agendas.

On the other side, there is the Pakistani Army, with its own agendas, loyalties and pressures, some domestic and some international, specifically from the United States which is looking to a greater involvement from against the elements holed up in the Afghan border regions.

Possibly, though, the domestic issues have been understated. Pakistan is very far from being a stable state, if indeed it can be called a state at all. One way of describing it is as a Punjab-based military oligarchy, occupying rather than ruling the territories of the domain, maintaining an uneasy and fragile peace by force of arms and brute oppression.

Recruited mainly from the Punjab, but with a significant component of Pashtuns in their ranks, the Army has a history of supporting the Taleban through the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and loyalties forged then are still evident.

To what extent, therefore, there is a firm intention to destroy the Taleban, and to what extent this is merely an extension of the historic battle to contain border tribes, or to suppress groups which threaten the Pakistani state, is unknown. What the Pakistani Army declares as its objectives, and what they actually might be, are not necessarily the same things.

A particular issue here is the involvement of India – and it was no accident that the Indian embassy in Kabul was attacked, some say with the tacit (if not actual) support of Pakistan. India's support for the Afghan government is especially vexatious to the Pakistan government, which sees India's efforts as an attempt at encirclement, against which the natural allies of the Pakistanis are the Pashtun-led Taleban.

This dynamic is reinforced by Indian support for dissident groups in Baluchistan and Sindh Province, plus the never-ending dispute over Kashmir, which make for further complexities which are not always fully factored in to the analyses of the regional situation.

Especially relevant is Kashmir, and the involvement of the Pushtan tribes, mainly the Mahsuds who raised a tribal lashkar and invaded the briefly independent Kashmiri state after the British had withdrawn, leading its ruler, the Maharaja of Kashmir to call for Indian military assistance.

Following the first Indo-Pakistan war, with the Pashtun irregulars fighting alongside the newly-formed Pakistani Army, the outcome was that nearly 40 percent of the province is now under Pakistani control (the rest now split between India and China), with the India occupation hotly contested by Pakistan, which is supporting a separatist movement.

That movement is also heavily supported by Afghan mujahideen and by an increasing number of foreign fighters. Thus, a regional dispute has morphed into part of what is termed the "pan-Islamic global struggle" with al-Qaeda having established a wing in Kashmir.

We thus have Ilyas Kashmiri's 313 Brigade from Kashmir moving to support the dissident Mahsuds in Waziristan (effectively renewing the 1947 alliance), in what might appear to be the anomalous situation of their fighting against their historic ally, the Pakistani Army. Concurrently we see Pakistani troops being withdrawn from the Indo-Kashmiri border to take part in the operation in Waziristan, fighting against the forces they have formerly supported and are now opposing.

The point, of course, is that thus is indeed a highly complex situation, with local, regional and indeed global influences at play, some in seeming contradiction, the combination of which defy easy – or any – analysis.

And, at the edge of this power play, we have coalition forces in Afghanistan, who may or may not benefit from the suppression of dissident forces in Waziristan, if the Pakistani Army is successful. Alternatively, we may see massive displacement of undefeated fighters into Afghanistan, adding to the rebellion there, the strength of which is even now unknown, and about which there is no agreement.

Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri, however, was at pains to tell the Asia Times that the aim of the current battle is "to bring the world's biggest Satan [US] and its allies into this trap and swamp [Afghanistan]." Afghanistan, he says, "is a unique place in the world where the hunter has all sorts of traps to choose from."

NATO does not have any significance or relevance, he adds. They have lost the war in Afghanistan. As a military commander, he told the Asian times, "the reality is that the trap of Afghanistan is successful and the basic military targets on the ground have been achieved." But his ultimate target is "to chop off American strength". His fight, he says, "was never the Pakistan army that was against me, but certain elements who branded me as an enemy to cover up their weaknesses and to appease their masters."

And so does the "game" play out – a man branded as a terrorist, leading fighters against an army he does not consider his enemy, embarking on a battle to the death, in a territory where his real enemy holds no sway, with an outcome which is as yet uncertain and which may resolve nothing.

It has been said of Irish politics, that if you think you understand what is going on, you haven't been listening. If anybody thinks they know what is going on in this region, they need a very powerful hearing aid.

COMMENT THREAD

Where angels fear to tread

How easy it is, when dealing with the "war" Afghanistan, to reduce it to the level of The Sun and depict it as a biff-bam contest between "Our Brave Boys" and "Terry Taleban".

Such a child-like pastiche then makes it obvious that, to prevail against this perfidious "enemy", all we need is more "boots on the ground", more kit ... and more "bangs". Aided, no doubt, by heroic bayonet charges from "Our Brave Boys", the Taleban can be driven from their last redoubts, freeing the peasants from the yoke of their oppressors.

The Afghan security forces – dutifully trained by our skilled and dedicated forces - can then be trucked in to guard the liberated Afghans as they applaud "Our Brave Boys" for their bravery and sacrifice. With yet another "job well done", they can climb on board their aeroplanes to jet off home to a tumultuous reception - medals all round and tea and crumpets with the Queen.

At a more elevated level, our Great War Leaders talk profoundly of their "counter-insurgency", and – in the manner of Gen McChrystal – of "protecting the people" and then of winning their "hearts and minds". Others talk knowingly of "force projection", and the need to "dominate the ground", all in the hope of bringing that elusive "security", from which all other blessings will flow.

Then there is the chimera of "Afghanisation" where, miraculously, concerned citizens will line up at the recruiting stations in their hundreds of thousands – as they did in Iraq, presumably – ready to become loyal foot soldiers of the Karzai government, taking on the "Taleban" after being taught their soldiering and tactics from Western soldiers – the same who are being comprehensively outmanoeuvred by ... the "Taleban".

Equally miraculously, Hamid Karzai will suddenly see the error of his way, fire his cabinet and ministers and appoint staunch, upright servants of the people. Eschewing corruption, they will spread their benign rule throughout the land, bringing peace, prosperity and the Afghan equivalent of apple pie.

Amid the tranquillity and happiness that thus ensues, the Afghan peoples, their ancient rivalries forgotten, will stand behind their president and bring the country leaping into the 21st Century to stand proudly alongside the "international community", co-equal with the best, ready to take on such pressing issues as climate change, universal gender equality, gay rights and the destruction of Israel.

There may, however, be an alternative scenario. It has taken us a long time to get there but we have come to the conclusion that we are not dealing with a classic counter-insurgency at all, but with a Pashtun nationalist movement that has as its agenda the reunification of their fractured territories split by the historical Durand line between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

That, at least, is one of the agendas that motivate some of the factions. But nothing is that simple. Pashtuns are divided into four major groups dominated by the two largest tribes, the Durrani and the Ghilzai – the latter from which most of the Taleban are drawn. But, at different levels on the family tree, there may be as many as 405 distinct tribes, depending on how they are classified – with 60 being a generally accepted figure.

Additionally, there is a tribe known as the Urmars that is not Pashtun and claims to be of older stock. They speak a different language while residing in the midst of the Pashtuns in the Waziristan Mountains, the Logar Valley, and districts of Peshawar.

Getting to grips with staggering complexity of the different groups, their varied and shifting loyalties and aspirations, political and otherwise, is not to be taken on lightly. This is a road down which we did not really wish to venture, although many have done so, in diverse newspapers and magazines. Many more will follow and, despite our reluctance, we are being forced down this path ourselves.

We are helped on our way by a response to our earlier piece - a lengthy e-mail from a military officer attached to the Special Forces. He had worked in Peshawar in the Autumn of 1988 at the end of the Russian occupation and, more recently, in Helmand had spent much time talking to Afghan interpreters of various ethnic backgrounds and, through them to many Afghanis, including "Taleban" foot soldiers.

Having also spent time in India, looking towards the North West Frontier through Indian eyes, he concurred "entirely" with our point that we have found ourselves at war with the "Pathan nation", for whom "Taliban" is a very clumsy epithet. There are no hearts and minds now to be won, only rented, he tells us.

Our correspondent's view is that, until we start looking at our intervention in Afghanistan in this way, there is no prospect of a "win"; or of comprehending the Pashtun mindset; or in realising that a "one nation" solution to Afghanistan is unworkable.

Indeed, he says, it may well be that we need to redraw the maps, erase the Durand line, and finally create an autonomous, legitimised Pathanistan out of Eastern Afghanistan, the Frontier badlands and North West Frontier Province, working with the governments of Pakistan and India in a regional solution akin to the great European political settlements of the past century.

The payback, of course, would be that in return for nation building support, the Pathans purge the "Arabs" from their hospitality list.

This then addresses the issue of partition, splitting off the south leaving a rump nation of Afghanistan, where the dominant ethnic groups are the Tajiks and Uzbeks. Attractive though this is, it could have far-reaching implications which could impact not only on Afghanistan but the whole region.

Not least, it could energise the peoples in the southernmost districts of Afghanistan, the Baluchis, who would likely be ill-disposed to Pashtun rule, and claim to be "natural allies" of ISAF in helping defeat the Taleban. It could, therefore, intensify the long-standing campaign for a Baluchi homeland.

This, at the moment spans the three countries of Iran (which was given a large part of Baluchistan by the British), Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pressure to restore an independent Baluchistan (something the Pakistanis accuse India of fomenting), is already strong, especially as the Baluchis deeply resent Pakistani repression.

On top of a separate "Pathanistan", this could threaten the territorial integrity of the Pakistani state, as the Kashmiris would not be far behind in demanding full independence. It could even bring into play tensions in the Sindh province of Pakistan, leading to the complete breakup of the nation.

A "local" solution, to resolve a specific problem in Afghanistan, could thus throw the whole region into turmoil (although some argue that the longer-term solution would come from that). By any reckoning, therefore, Afghanistan has to be part of a much bigger regional solution, taking into account a wide range of factors. For the moment though, all our troops can do (at best) is keep the cork in the bottle.

At worse, they are making the situation inestimably more instable - and the more they do the greater the damage done. As they expand their territorial coverage, it simply puts them into contact with even more disaffected peoples, increasing rather than reducing the risk and thereby increasing casualties.

All of this also renders the talk of "counter-insurgency" and "nation-building" child-like in its simplicity. We are creating a situation where young men and women are being poured into a geopolitical cauldron, the nature of which they understand not, and which they themselves have no means of resolving.

COMMENT THREAD

In the melting pot

The video (below) records a conference organised by the Cato Institute on the general theme of whether the US should withdraw militarily from Afghanistan. In a number of taut, well-presented speeches, the arguments were powerfully put, giving much food for thought.

Unfortunately, Cato has not produced a transcript, but they do have a blog which adds some interesting comments. And the theme set by Cato is very much mirrored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. It argues that the growing influence of fanatical Taleban-style groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan has thrown into doubt the value of an expanding war effort, setting out its stall for a reduced military presence.

There now seems to be emerging a clear divide between the foreign policy establishments on both sides of the Atlantic, and the military, the latter represented by US Chief of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, who is arguing for more troops and resources.

He is clearly supported by the British military establishment, with Bob Ainsworth speaking for them, rejecting "the proposition [that] a reduced military presence will lead to less Taleban success." Actually, that is not the issue. The strategic threat – which was used to legitimise out intervention – is al Qaeda and not the Taleban. The latter is regarded as a localised problem and, as the conflict develops, increasingly difficult to separate from Pashtun nationalism.

When it comes to al Qaeda, current strategic appreciations suggest that this is no longer a significant issue in Afghanistan and, when it comes to the use of military force, it was never the case that successes against this shadowy, decentralised group have been achieved by massed military might.

We are devoting our resources to fighting the wrong enemy, so the argument goes. Preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for those who would conduct external terrorist activity does not require a massive "nation-building" exercise in that country.

The drag of Afghanistan, however, was very much on the mind of Ainsworth, who delivered a long speech yesterday to the Centre for Defence Studies and the War Studies Department at King's College. In it, he referred to the forthcoming defence review, pointing up the need to "consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit of national security."

Noting the obvious, that there are competing demands on the public purse, he went on to say that we will need to be better at spending the money we have, and more rigorous in prioritising what we spend it on. That much was picked up by The Daily Telegraph which also reported Ainsworth's observation that there did not seem to be much public appetite for increased defence spending.



He was, he said, looking for "a serious and wide-ranging national defence debate," inviting the Conservatives and the Liberals Democrats to take part, arguing that defence of the nation should always come before party politics. "We have to be able to reach beyond our political differences and put the interests of the country first," he said.

That is unlikely to happen though, and nor does it look as if we are going to get a serious debate. After Osborne's intervention yesterday he is now accused in The Times of "posturing" on defence cuts. Even a Tory frontbencher was driven to complain that Osborne had been "amateurish". It is very hard to disagree. With virtually every aspect of defence in the melting pot, we need more serious input than what he had to offer.

COMMENT THREAD

For the record

A major public speech by a shadow defence secretary of an opposition party which will in all probability win the next general election should, by any normal measure, be an important event. It is in that light that we approach yesterday's keynote speech from Liam Fox to the UK Defence Conference 2009.

Fox takes as his theme the thesis that the world is becoming a more dangerous place and that we are living in "a deteriorating global security environment". He takes in Afghanistan, next door Pakistan, and then Putin's Russia, which he tells us is "an ever more assertive state" which is rearming, is still occupying Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has threatened to militarise the Arctic region, to the great concern of our close allies in NATO, especially Norway and Canada.

To his mix, Fox adds the piracy "running rife not only off the Horn of Africa but also in other less frequently mentioned places like the Gulf of Guinea and the Strait of Malacca." He mentions Iran, on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapon, North Korea, which has tested a second nuclear bomb, and then declares that, "in all parts of the globe new threats are emerging which require a response from the international community."

Next, we are told that "defining our strategic interests and determining how to protect them is one of the biggest challenges facing any government," which one might expect to be preparatory to Fox's ideas for when he takes control of the MoD.

However, there then follows a lengthy dissertation on the failings of the Labour administration – which is fair enough. This is what party politicians do, and have to do. They attack the other parties, especially when they are in opposition.

Once past this obligatory section, though, Fox is still not ready to offer his recipe for defence under a new administration. Instead, he continues with his analysis.

We learn from him that the world is "becoming more complex." Globalisation means that Britain's economic and security interests are increasingly interlinked to others with an unavoidable shared set of interests and the unavoidable importation of strategic risk. We are also reminded that instability in one corner of the globe can quickly affect everyone.

Fox then tells us that "this interdependence must have major implications on how we organise our national (and international) security structures and identify our threats." It goes without saying, he says, that the challenges this presents to our Armed Forces are numerous and complex.

Thus are we informed that the 21st Century strategic environment demands that Western militaries are able to simultaneously conduct war fighting, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Furthermore, says Fox, it requires Western Governments to supplement these military operations through an array of soft power tools, such as international aid, diplomacy, and the spread of information and ideas.

This is followed by a warning that organising our Armed Forces to combat the current insurgency in Afghanistan, "coupled with a defence budget with a black hole of £35bn", offers a temptation to lose sight of future conflicts for the sake of the ones we are fighting today.

This has led many, Fox adds, to believe that we have to choose between fighting the war or a war - but this is a false dichotomy. Insurgencies are not a new phenomenon and the operations currently being conducted in Afghanistan are not a guarantee of what warfare will look like in the future.

As to the future – and still in analytical mode – Fox is prepared to make some "educated guesses". Although state-on-state warfare is still a possibility, he says, it is unlikely to take the same linear, symmetric, and conventional form as state-on-state warfare did in the 20th century.

Rather, he opines, it is likely that many of our potential adversaries, knowing that they cannot match our technology, resources or conventional firepower, will resort to strategic and tactical asymmetric measures in an attempt to defeat us. Attempts to disrupt our social and economic well being through international terrorism, cyber attack or threats to our energy security can be anticipated.

This, Fox declares, has implications for our procurement plans. "We need to focus more on capability and less on specific equipment." However, we are told, "the equipment programme is only one piece of the puzzle." All three services need to be asking if they have the correct up-to-date doctrine to meet and defeat the challenges they may face now and in the future. "Do they have the institutional framework in place to ensure that our military leaders can grow, learn and adapt when required?"

Now we learn that it is the Government's role to ensure that our military has the tools and resources needed to make this possible. Saying that we can only focus on the war at the expense of a war is not good enough for the British people.

And then more questions: How do we balance competing defence priorities? How do we ensure that current commitments are properly resourced without neglecting future strategic challenges? And then answers. A future Conservative Government will immediately do three things: launch a wide ranging and detailed strategic defence review; conduct an in-depth capability review; and carry out a radical root and branch reform of the procurement process.

The purpose of the SDR will be to define what Britain's strategic interests are and where they exist at home and abroad. Unless you have clear foreign policy objectives you cannot have a proper defence strategy, says Fox. This will allow the strategic environment and the threats posed to our interests to be assessed within reasonably predictable limits. It will then determine the capabilities we need to protect those interests.

Only then, Fox tells us, will we be able to look at specific programmes and the shape of our Armed Forces to see if they can deliver the capabilities we need. "Of course," he adds, "the main challenge here is between equipping our forces to succeed in our current conflicts and preparing for any future contingencies."

Finally, Fox announces, we will have to determine the affordability of the designated equipment programmes and whether they offer value for money. All defence programmes, he says, will need to demonstrate their value for money before we start spending taxpayer's money.

Then, strangely, we get to some detail. The capabilities review will be used to get the structure of the Armed Forces and civilian component inside the MoD correct to ensure that we, as a department, are best configured for the tasks we have to accomplish.

It is time for the MOD to get its house in order, Fox says. There are questions for all three services as to whether they have an over abundance of senior posts. Furthermore, there is one civilian for every two armed forces personnel in the Ministry of Defence. In other words the total of civilians in the MoD is larger than the Royal Navy and the RAF combined – 16 percent of the civil service is in the Ministry of Defence.

We need to do a proper capability review which looks at all aspects of manning and force structure to ensure that we have the right balance of personnel-both in and out of uniform.

As to defence procurement, this will have four main objectives. Firstly, it will provide the best possible equipment to our Armed Forces when they need it, where they need it and at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer. It will underpin Britain's strategic relationships. It will provide better stability to the Armed Forces and better predictability to the defence industry. And it will preserve UK defence jobs by maximising exports.

To meet these objectives, any future equipment programme will be tested against five criteria.

First, the question will be asked: does this piece of equipment enable our Armed Forces to fight effectively and win on the modern day battlefield? Second: can we afford not only the initial procurement costs but also the through life costs? Third: how can we get the greatest flexibility, while ensuring that as many potential roles as possible are fulfilled? Fourth: will this piece of equipment allow the British Armed Forces to take part in Combined and Joint military operations with our allies, specifically in NATO? And finally, will this piece of equipment have a high export demand which, may in the long term, create jobs at home and positively affect the British economy?

And so the peroration. The MoD needs a new vision, fresh thinking, and new leadership that only a new Government has the energy and confidence to provide. You can delegate authority, but not responsibility. Labour Ministers are to blame for the failings at the Ministry of Defence - not the Civil Service or the Armed forces, says Fox. In the sphere of security we need to stay ahead of the curve-changing if we wish to stay ahead of the threats. We need to adapt if we want to keep safe and time is not on our side.

That is the Fox view. That is the platform on which the Conservative Party, presumably, will go to the people during the general election. Make of it what you will.

COMMENT THREAD

Brown on Afghanistan

"I want to take head on the arguments that suggest our strategy in Afghanistan is wrong and to answer those who question whether we should be in Afghanistan at all."

So said Gordon Brown yesterday, in a widely trailed speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, under the general heading of "Afghanistan - National Security and Regional Stability."

Addressing the issue of why we should be in Afghanistan, Brown chose to make a limited pitch. Not from him was there any suggestion that we should be there to support the United States, such an activity in support of our most powerful and steadfast ally being very much in our national interest.

Such an argument would invite such a torrent of vitriol that it has to remain unsaid. Thatcher might have got away with it, but it is not a sentiment that any Labour prime minister could articulate.

Thus, all we heard from Brown was the well-worn and oft-repeated claim that our intervention with America and other allies - on behalf of the international community as a whole - helped to remove from Afghanistan a regime which enabled al Qaeda to plot terror around the world, and which culminated in the attacks on 9/11.

That is fair enough, but our continued presence depends on his thesis that al Qaeda relocated to the remote mountains of Pakistan. A new crucible of terrorism has emerged, the present threat coming mainly from the Pakistan side. But, if the insurgency succeeds in Afghanistan, al Qaeda and other terrorist groups will once again be able to use it as a sanctuary to train, plan and launch attacks on Britain and the rest of the world.

And since al Qaeda retains some contacts and provides limited support to the Afghan insurgency, and continues to view Afghanistan as fundamental in the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, a peaceful and stable Afghanistan would be a severe propaganda blow and strategic failure for al Qaeda.

Whether you agree with that or not, the real test though is whether a "peaceful and stable Afghanistan" is achievable, given the current strategy. Brown, therefore, devotes some time to this issue, outlining a four-pronged strategy "for accelerating the Afghanisation of the campaign."

First, he says, we will now partner a growing afghan army presence in central Helmand. Second we will strengthen the civilian-military partnership, including on policing. Third, we will support the governor of Helmand by strengthening district government - backed by targeted aid - and a more effective, cleaner government in Kabul. And fourth we will build on the success of the "wheat not heroin" initiative which I discussed with Governor Mangal - extending it to thousands more farmers.

As to the first prong, we must move from simply mentoring the Afghan Army to what we call "partnering" with them as they take more responsibility for their country's security. This, we are told, means that when we clear an area of Taleban, it is the Afghan Army and police who must hold that ground and prevent the Taleban from returning.

Thus Britain supports faster growth both of the Afghan National Army and police, going for a more ambitious target of 134,000 by an earlier date of November 2010 - which would mean increasing the rate of training to 4,000 per month. By November 2010 Brown envisages up to a third of our troops partnering Afghan forces.

The second prong of the strategy is strengthening the security of and support for the local population by the strongest possible civilian-military partnership, including on policing. This, it would seem, involves maintaining a fully joint military-civilian headquarters, doubling the number of our civilian experts on the ground and such initiatives as the "focused district development programme".

Brown also states that we need to go further in tackling problems of illiteracy, drug abuse and corruption - and logistical problems like ensuring police are paid adequately and on time, without which progress on tackling corruption will be impossible.

The third prong is the strengthening of local and district government - a vital part of any counter-insurgency strategy - and of countering the shadow governance of the Taleban. Our stabilisation experts will work with Shuras in more villages and districts in Helmand - and right across Afghanistan, and priority must be given to the training and mentoring of the 34 provincial governors and almost 400 district governors.

The fourth is moving the economy of Central Helmand over time from heroin to wheat and to diversify even further. This, Brown believes, was the key to the reduction in heroin in Helmand by 37 percent. With the support of the British military and civilian experts, wheat seed was delivered to 32,000 afghan farmers - combining an alternative to poppy with protection from Taleban intimidation in a secured area of Central Helmand.

The British will help Governor Mangal to expand this programme next year - and also help set up agricultural training college. Over time, Brown avers, we want to see Central Helmand restored to its former position as the breadbasket of Afghanistan.

And that is the core of the strategy. There are more bits that Brown adds on, but we have essentially, more responsibility devolved to the Afghans, a stronger civilian-military partnership, strengthening local and district governance, and swapping opium for wheat. Thus does the man say, as in the Cold War, achieving our objective depends not just on armies and treaties. It depends on winning hearts and minds.

Getting to grips with this is like trying to bottle smoke. We cannot even say it sounds good. Not one element or "prong" answers the question of how the British forces intend to achieve the security that the Army argues is the necessary precursor to any and all of this activity.

Certainly, even at the first hurdle, the strategy falls as no one but the wildest optimist would assert that the Afghan security forces will be able to take the load for many years to come – if, indeed, in the foreseeable future. The question that must be answered, therefore, is that essential element – the nature of the military strategy for clawing back the land from the control of the Taleban.

On that, Brown is utterly silent – as is the military. We seem no further forward than when we started.

COMMENT THREAD

When means now

As another two British soldiers die in Afghanistan, killed by an RPG - bringing the grand total to 210 – the coalition powers are now paying the price for grossly over-selling the Afghan presidential election.

Thus does The Times report today that "West faces losing battle over Afghan poll fraud", retailing an admission from "Western and Afghan officials" that that widespread and systematic fraud during the elections has tarnished the legitimacy of any future government and undermined the Nato campaign.

Cited also is David Kilcullen, "one of the architects of Nato's anti-insurgency campaign". He says that the failure of the Afghan Government to provide basic services in many areas was allowing the Taleban to establish its own courts, hospitals and security. "A government that is losing to a counter-insurgency isn’t being outfought, it is being outgoverned," he adds.

As to the election, one international election observer pulls no punches. He states: "The pattern is of systematic and widespread fraud, which really does call into question the legitimacy of the election. This is large scale and it is across the country." Ahmad Nader Nadery, head of the Afghan Free and Fair Election Foundation, agrees. He concedes that said the scale of the vote rigging was "serious".

Perhaps even more serious is a report from James Hider - one of the more reliable journalists – which tells us of "hundreds of angry tribal elders and local officials from southern Afghanistan" who gathered in Kabul today to protest against what they dubbed "massive electoral fraud that robbed entire districts of their votes and allocated them to the incumbent president, Hamid Karzai."

Writes Hider: "In a string of searing testimonies, community leaders told of how villages that had been too terrified to vote because of Taleban threats, of mysteriously produced full ballot boxes, and with most of the votes cast for Mr Karzai, often by his own men or tribal leaders loyal to him."

Abdulkayam Balets, "a grey-bearded and turbaned elder who had been in charge of a polling station in Shurawaq", in Kandahar province, speaks for the many. He said no ballot boxes reached his facility. They were instead sent to the district office, where they were stuffed with votes for Mr Karzai by members of his party. "We want Karzai to resign and an interim government installed, then we can have a free election that he can't manipulate by force," he says.

Sentiment that is driving increasingly voluble protest in Kabul is rippling around the world, with Michael Boyle in The Guardian accusing the US and UK of "flying blind" in Afghanistan, pouring blood and treasure into a war that looks increasingly senseless as the days go by.

He calls for a re-examination not only of our strategy but of the unconditional support we have afforded the Afghan government. The Afghan government has been the recipient of billions of dollars in aid, yet almost every ministry lacks basic capacity. It has 134,000 police and 82,000 soldiers, few of whom can operate independently of foreign forces.

Worse still, writes Boyle, the Afghan government has scored domestic political points by blasting the US and UK and ignoring their demands. We can no longer pretend we are partnering with a government when it does not govern or see itself as a partner. It is time, he concludes, to admit that unfettered support from the west may be undermining the efforts to fix the strategy in Afghanistan.

More worrying for the Obama administration is the op-ed in today's Washington Post, which declares unequivocally: "Time to Get Out of Afghanistan".

Written by George F. Will, it notes the death of two Marines, and observes that the war already is nearly 50 percent longer than the combined US involvements in two world wars, where "NATO assistance is reluctant and often risible".

Will questions the strategy of "clear, hold and build," pointing out that which has been obvious since day one, that the Taleban forces can evaporate and then return, confident that US forces will forever be too few to hold gains. Hence, he writes, nation-building would be impossible even if we knew how, and even if Afghanistan were not the second-worst place to try: The Brookings Institution ranks Somalia as the only nation with a weaker state.

US forces, Will goes on to note, are being increased by 21,000 to 68,000, bringing the coalition total to 110,000. About 9,000 are from Britain, where support for the war is waning. Counterinsurgency theory concerning the time and the ratio of forces required to protect the population indicates that, nationwide, Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, perhaps for a decade or more. That is inconceivable.

Instead, Will concludes, forces should be substantially reduced to serve a comprehensively revised policy: America should do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small, potent Special Forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan, a nation that actually matters (a strategy known as "offshore balancing").

To conclude, Will cites de Gaulle recalling Bismarck's decision to halt German forces short of Paris in 1870. Genius, he said, sometimes consists of knowing when to stop. Genius, says Will, is not required to recognise that in Afghanistan, when means now.

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