That's journalism!

As another British soldier is reported killed in Afghanistan, two investigative sleuths from The Daily Mail, Tim Shipman and Matthew Hickley, breathlessly tell us that the announcement came "as Lt Col Richardson revealed that American, Dutch and even Australian helicopters are being used to launch British combat operations in Afghanistan." UK forces have used coalition aircraft to "seize areas of ground" from the Taliban, said the Colonel.

The Daily Telegraph goes one further as star reporter Rosa Prince scribes these immortal words:

The Daily Telegraph understands that American Chinooks were used for a combat mission as part of the Panther's Claw operation within the last month. Lieutenant Colonel Nick Richardson, spokesman for Task Force Helmand confirmed that UK forces were forced to rely on foreign helicopters.

These fearless hacks can however, shelve their dreams for nominations for the next Pulitzer prize for investigative reporting. The MoD Website for 23 June – nearly a month ago – blandly informs us that:

More than 350 soldiers from The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (3 SCOTS), have launched an airborne assault into one of the last Taliban strongholds.

Twelve Chinook helicopters, supported by 13 other aircraft including Apache and Black Hawk helicopter gunships, a Spectre gunship, Harrier jets and unmanned drones, dropped the British soldiers into Babaji, north of Lashkar Gah, just before midnight on Friday 19 June 2009.

Not only did we rely on helicopters (with the MoD thoughtfully providing a pic – see above), we were "forced" to rely on a USAF Spectre gunship, Harriers (USMC – ours have gone home) and probably US Predator UAVs. Since 90 percent – or thereabouts – close air support is provided by US assets, we are routinely "forced" to rely on F-15s, F-16s, B-1 Lancers, A-10s ...

And then, of course, on the ground, we are "forced" to rely on Danish Leopard II tanks, on their APCs, on Estonian APCs and even the Ex-MoD Mamba mine protected vehicles which we sold off for a song.

But Hey! This is a coalition effort. We are not alone ... and have not been for some time. But then, here's another "scoop". During WWII, the US stripped out the armour from its one and only armoured division and sent the Shermans to the 8th Army. To win the battle of el Alamein, we were "forced" to rely on foreign tanks.

Shock! Hold the front page!

COMMENT THREAD

The fog of war

If the United States acceded to president Hamid Karzai's demands, then military intervention in Afghanistan would come to an abrupt halt. That surely would be the effect of halting US air strikes in his country, which Karzia is currently demanding, in the wake of the reported civilian deaths last Monday after the bombing of villages in the Bala Baluk district of Farah province.

Without air support, there can be no prospect of US or any coalition forces – which rely on US air power – prevailing over the Taleban or even being prepared to risk their troops in the field.

Yet Karzai is apparently serious, having made his demand in an interview with CNN in Washington, after Farah province deputy governor Yunus Rasooli had told Reuters that residents of two villages hit had produced lists with the names of 147 people killed.

The issue of civilian casualties is a source of great friction between the Afghan government and the US, and Karzai told CNN's "Situation Room" that, at the beginning of the seven-year-old war that ousted the Taleban, Afghans had tolerated air strikes. But mounting civilian deaths had eroded that understanding. "We cannot justify in any manner, for whatever number of Taliban or for whatever number of significantly important terrorists, the accidental or otherwise loss of civilians," he said.

Following this, a joint US-Afghan investigation has now conceded that an unspecified number of civilians did die in the bombing. But the initial findings, released yesterday, appear to blame the Taleban for using "human shields."

Here, the US is at something of a disadvantage. When the team of investigators visited the villages, they saw two mass graves and one burial site with seven individual graves. However, they were unable to determine which of the casualties were Taleban and which were noncombatants. All those killed had been buried, and exhumation would be unacceptable. Thus, it will never be possible to determine an accurate body count, the numbers of Taleban and villagers killed, or the precise cause(s) of death.

What is missing from the latest reports though is any repetition of the suggestion that the Taleban may have murdered some of the villagers in order to claim a US bombing "atrocity", although that accusation may re-emerge at a later date.

If it turns out, though, that the parties agree on an inadvertant killing from US bombs, arising because the civilians were used as human shields, this in itself will be of little assistance to the US authorities, strugging to contain the growing tension over so-called colateral damage.

Furthermore, given the political sensitivities, the possibility that this might have occurred raises important questions, not least because – if we take the US military at its word – this type of incident should not happen.

That much comes from USAF Col Eric J Holdaway. During a recent teleconference, the proceedings of which were in part published by the Washington Post, he emphasised the awareness of the problem, noting the US was confronting "… enemies that not only hide amongst the population but also will open fire on our ground forces from amongst the population."

To reduce the possibility of killing innocent bystanders, Holdaway says, full-motion video from UAV platforms like Shadow and Predator and Warrior Alpha is used to reduce "the element of the unknown", such as "is there likely to be someone in that building … that is a noncombatant, or not?" The prefence is to get the enemy out in the open, where risks to civilians can be avoided.

Before any strike, Holdaway tells us, a collateral-damage analysis is performed "based on where the target is, what is near it and the destructive potential of the weapon that we're planning to employ." However, he concedes that it does not always work that way, when the counter-tactic of human shields is employed. "You'd almost call it Taliban air defense," he says.

When the United States is initiating the attack, he claims, "we can afford to be patient. And if we lose an opportunity, we can be patient ... keep working on the target and eventually get another opportunity."

But, he admits, when the strike is in response to American troops calling for help while under fire from a building, "unfortunately, in more than one situation ... in the aftermath, we find that there were noncombatants in there with the insurgents." Nevertheless, he does also claim that, "Some form of positive ID" is needed before missiles are fired or bombs are dropped.

Control of strikes is undertaken from comprehensive ground facilities such as the Combined Air Operations Centre pictured above – this one used in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom. But, most instances, the final clearance on releasing ordnance is made by the ground-based Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC), the man on the spot who is able to confirm the nature of the target and that weapons delivery will conform with rules of engagement.

Here, one wonders whether the man on the ground, whether the JTAC or his immediate commander, is always the best person to make the decision, bearing in mind that they may be in the thick of the action, stressed, emotionally charged, and with limited visual perspective.

Revisting the piece we wrote last month, and especially the forum discussion, the thought occurs as to whether there should be an additional layer of control, slightly – but not completely – detached from the fray, perhaps in the form of a command aircraft, such as J-STARS, or even the old-style Forward Air Controller, operating from a light aircraft orbiting the battlespace.

There are obvious disadvantages to such an arrangement and, with the presidential elections coming up, Karzai may be indulging in electoral politics. He will no doubt be induced to step back from his demand, making further controls less needed. Nevertheless, there will come a limit to the tolerance of repeated civilian deaths, while the Taleban will continue to exploit the propaganda opportunites afforded by such incidents – with the aid of some sections of the Western media.

In the past, these could be blamed on the "fog of war". Now, there are systems which could be used to penetrate that fog. Given the dire political - to say nothing of the humanitarian - consequences of an ill-judged decision, they must be used.

COMMENT THREAD

On the fingers of your hands

Following the attempted take-over of Lashkar Gah by the Taleban on 11 October 2008, 3 Commando Brigade, which had only taken over on 8 October, were effectively confronted with a baptism of fire, almost in the nature of a mini "Tet Offensive" experienced by US forces in Vietnam.

It cannot then be suggested that, even in the limited area of Lashkar Gah district, that the security situation settled down and was largely without incident. Setting aside the major operations undertaken by 3 Commando Brigade, such as Operation Sond Chara in December, which was mounted as a direct result of the October incursion into Lashkar Gah, the record shows steady, continuous background enemy activity in the district.

As before, the most complete record is the US Air Force daily airpower summary. Because the rules of engagement allow airpower to be called in only when there is observed enemy activity, this provides a useful metric, by which enemy action can be measured.

From that, we can see there was little respite. On 24 October, for instance, only days after the incursion had been defeated, a US Air Force F-16A Fighting Falcon was called in to drop a GBU-12 onto enemy positions in a building that was using RPGs against coalition forces near Lashkar Gah. That day, incidentally, 50 close air support missions were flown by US and coalition aircraft.

The next day, 25 October and the day after, the 26 October, saw typical low-level activity with coalition aircraft performing shows of force to deter enemy activities. No munitions were expended but the process demonstrates that there was enemy activity on those days, what might reasonably be described as "security incidents".

The 29 October saw a more serious incident, described as occurring in an area to the south of Lashkar Gah. ISAF soldiers killed a Taliban commander by the name of Mullah Ziauddin. He had been linked with other senior Taleban members and was said to have controlled forces responsible for attacks on ISAF and Afghan security forces. Another suspected Taliban commander, Mullah Mashar, was captured in the same area.

On 4 November, it was back to a show of force, this time comducted by a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet, followed by a coalition aircraft on 7 November, both "in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah." The 9 November also saw a show of force, this time from a US Navy F/A-18A Hornet.

Six days later, on 15 November, there was something altogether more serious. US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs were called in to fire cannon rounds and a B-1B Lancer dropped a GBU-38 onto Taleban hiding in a compound trying to shoot down an aircraft. A coalition aircraft also performed a show of force to deter enemy activities near the compound where the anti-aircraft fire was seen. This alone, had it succeeded, could have had devastating effects.

It was nearly two weeks later, on 27 November before air activity was again recorded, this time a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet. It conducted a show of force to deter enemy fighters and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. The next day, 28 November saw an A-10 and a coalition aircraft conducting shows of force to deter enemy activities near Lashkar Gah.

Much of the activity at this time fell into this category, indicative of background level enemy action. Thus on 30 November we saw US Navy F/A-18A Hornets and F/A-18Es conducting shows of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy conducting IED search operations in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

The 1 December, however, had a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet and a coalition aircraft firing cannon rounds onto the Taleban holding positions along a river, in order to clear the path for a coalition forces convoy travelling along that route. In addition, F/A-18Fs conducted a show of force to deter enemy fighters and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy in the same area.

Then, on 5 December, a US Air Force MQ-1B Predator used Hellfire missiles against the Taleban who were firing RPGs at coalition forces from the western edge of a tree line in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. In addition, coalition aircraft performed shows of force to deter further enemy activities in the same area.

On 6 December, a US Air Force B-1B Lancer dropped guided bomb unit-38s onto the Taleban who were firing RPGs at coalition forces from inside a compound in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

On 9 December F/A-18A Hornets conducted shows of force to deter a group of suspicious people gathering near a coalition checkpoint, on 10 December, a F/A-18C Hornet and a coalition aircraft conducted shows of force and, on 11 December a coalition aircraft conducted a show of force. Then, on 12 December, an A-10 and a coalition aircraft performed shows of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition forces convoy that was disabled near Lashkar Gah.

The 17 December saw a US Air Force B-1B Lancer dropped a GBU -38 onto Taleban who were firing RPGs at coalition forces from a nearby enemy compound in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. A US Navy F/A-18C Hornet conducted a show of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition forces patrol that had taken fire in the same area.

A day later, on 18 December, US Navy F/A-18C Hornets performed shows of force to deter enemy activities and provide armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy in the area. On 29 December, coalition aircraft conducted shows of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition ground forces convoy receiving RPG and small arms fire in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

With that, there was something of a break and the New Year seems to have started relatively slowly. Not until 6 January were shows of force needed, but these required an A-10 and a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet. The slow start continued, but with more aggression on 15 January when several US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets destroyed Taleban bunkers and firing positions using GBU-38s. The strikes were conducted after coalition ground forces began receiving fire from those locations in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

With the tempo hotting up, on 18 January a coalition aircraft routed a group of Taleban personnel gathered near Lashkar Gah with a show of force. The jet also scouted a roadway in advance of a coalition convoy movement to ensure it was clear of enemy personnel or improvised explosive devices.

The 27 January saw a US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle (pictured) performed a show of force, expending flares, in order to discourage enemy attack on coalition soldiers.

Two days later, on 29 January saw some serious action near Lashkar Gah when a US Air Force B-1B Lancer and coalition aircraft dropped GBU-38s and Paveway munitions to counter enemy fire on coalition units. The aircraft tracked the enemy shooters through several firing positions in civilian settlements, providing shows of force along the way to cover friendly ground forces' manoeuvres. The aircraft finally released weapons once the enemy was positively identified and in a position where the blasts would no longer endanger civilians.

The next day, 30 January, has US Navy F/A-18A and -C Hornets, plus F/A-18F Super Hornets out in force, initiating shows of force near Lashkar Gah to prevent enemy forces from interfering with coalition troop movements in those areas.

The 2 February had a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet executing a show of force over a settlement near Lashkar Gah. Enemy forces had been targeting coalition soldiers there with RPG and automatic fire, but dispersed following the manoeuvre.

The next day, 3 February again saw serious action in the Lashkar Gah area. A US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet and a coalition aircraft used several kinds of precision munitions and rockets to target enemy gunmen barricaded in buildings. The aircraft used strike tactics that avoided damage to nearby buildings and even caused only minimal damage to the occupied structures. The airstrikes supported coalition units fighting building to building against the Taleban.

On 4 February , it was a coalition aircraft that flew a show of force, this time over a group of armed individuals suspected to be Taleban. The aircraft also performed tactical reconnaissance along a heavily travelled highway, discovering signs of improvised explosive devices.

Three days the elapsed when, on 7 February a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet performed a show of force to deter enemy actions near Lashkar Gah. In total, 68 close air support missions were flown that day.

The following day, 8 February, had near Lashkar Gah, a coalition aircraft employing a GBU-12 and a strafing pass, striking enemy snipers concealed in a building. The snipers had been firing at coalition soldiers when the aircraft's weapons halted their attack. A total of 74 close air support missions were flown that day.

The 12 February had a coalition aircraft fly a show of force in the area of Lashkar Gah in order to discourage enemy forces from launching indirect fire attacks from a position they had used in the past.

The 13 February saw a US Air Force F-15E strafing a Taleban position concealed in a tree line near Lashkar Gah. Enemy gunmen had been firing at coalition soldiers with assault weapons and rocket propelled grenades.

Then, for the third day running, "air" was in action, on 14 February, when a US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle and a Navy Hornet teamed up near Lashkar Gah to engage and destroy anti-Afghan fighting positions that had opened fire on a coalition ground unit with a disabled vehicle. Using a combination of GBU -38s and strafing attacks, the aircraft destroyed or warded off the enemy force. The Hornet performed a show of force following the engagement to deter further enemy activity.

After a day's break, on 16 February, during a coalition convoy operation a US Navy F/A-18C flew overhead and conducted a show of force along the convoy's travel route. On 18 February, in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah, a Navy Super Hornet engaged an enemy firing position using a GBU-12. The air strike occurred in response to a call for air support after Taleban forces opened fire on a coalition patrol.

The 20 February had A-10s and a coalition aircraft flying shows of force over Lashkar Gah as deterrence against enemy action while coalition units performed their missions and, on 21 February, a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet conducted a strafing pass against enemy forces dug in behind a line of trees along a road near Lashkar Gah.

The Super Hornet had been flying overwatch for a coalition convoy when enemy gunfire erupted from the roadside. While the jet's cannons quickly ended the direct threat to the convoy, the aircraft followed up with a show of force and expended flares to deter a possible enemy counterattack.

The 22 February had a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet providing overwatch near Lashkar Gah, then using a GBU-12 to target an enemy indirect fire position launching attacks on coalition units. The strike successfully ended the attacks.

On 25 February, near Lashkar Gah, a coalition aircraft then flew a show of force to allow a coalition convoy to withdraw from an engagement there. Enemy troops in concealed bunkers had ambushed the coalition convoy with an improvised explosive device and automatic weapons, but broke off fighting as soon as aircraft arrived. The coalition jet then performed tactical reconnaissance overhead as coalition attack helicopters targeted the enemy from close up.

The next day, on 26 February , a coalition aircraft used a precision guided munition to destroy a Taleban compound near Lashkar Gah. The jet released weapons after coalition troops began taking fire from enemy fighting positions within. This was followed the next day, 27 February, by a US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper which engaged a group of enemy personnel with a Hellfire missile near Lashkar Gah. The UAV launched its strike in response to an enemy attack on coalition forces.

On 2 March, a US Navy F/A-18C Hornet and F/A-18F Super Hornet flew overwatch in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. They performed shows of force and expended flares when the convoy they were protecting received small arms and RPG fire. The attack stopped abruptly upon the appearance of the jets. The convoy reached its destination without further incident.

Two days later, on 4 March, US Navy F/A-18C Hornets and Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles provided air support to a coalition raid on an enemy narcotics production compound near Lashkar Gah. When personnel inside the narcotics compound started shooting with machine guns and RPGs, the Hornets executed shows of force to suppress their fire as coalition soldiers pulled back. Once ground forces had reached a safe distance from the facility, the Strike Eagles destroyed the narcotics compound with a series of GBU-38 strikes.

A day after that, on 5 March, near Lashkar Gah, a coalition aircraft performed a show of force and expended flares to deter enemy activity over a local settlement. The aircraft was providing aerial overwatch for a coalition unit in the area.

On 6 March, aircraft flew shows of force to suppress enemy activity and on 7 March multiple US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets provided their firepower to a battle near Lashkar Gah. Using 20mm auto-cannon strafes and a GBU-38, the aircraft knocked out several hostile fighting positions and an enemy facility.

The following day, on 8 March, US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles flying aerial overwatch near Lashkar Gah strafed a group of enemy personnel who had set up an improvised explosive device along a roadway. The individuals were hiding in a tree line, apparently waiting for an approaching coalition convoy, but were detected before they could carry out an attack.

The 9 March had US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets dropping GBU-12s on an enemy firing position and an enemy compound near Lashkar Gah. Both strikes took place in response to enemy forces firing at coalition personnel with small arms.

On 13 March, a coalition aircraft responded to a dawn attack against a friendly patrol base near Lashkar Gah, releasing a GBU -12 on one of several Taleban positions firing into the base. The air strike combined with howitzer fire from coalition field artillery served to stop the enemy gunfire and relieve the base.

Then, on 14 March, the RAF was in action with a GR-9 Harrier performing route clearance, searching for IEDs over supply routes and highways in Helmand province. The aircraft also performed a show of force in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah to deter enemy action.

The 15 March saw F-15Es and a coalition aircraft performing shows of force to deter attacks near Lashkar Gah, after coalition ground forces detected signs of enemy presence. In total that day, 74 close air support missions were flown.

On 16 March, a flight of Strike Eagles flew shows of force near Lashkar Gah, deterring enemy forces as a convoy traversed the area. The jets also performed a route scan ahead of the convoy and provided armed overwatch.

The next day, 17 March, US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets flew a show of force, expending flares, and then engaged using a GBU-12 near Lashkar Gah in response to enemy automatic weapons and mortar fire against a coalition convoy. The action targeted Taleban around an enemy supply compound. Coalition ground observers helped the strike land on target, passing coordinates for a direct hit using the precision munition.

On 20 March, a US Air Force MQ-1B Predator fired a Hellfire missile on an enemy compound near Lashkar Gah. Coalition ground forces were receiving enemy fire from within the compound.

And on 22 March a US Air Force B-1B Lancer used GBU-31 and -38 munitions to completely level a Taleban compound where enemy forces were holed up and firing away with machine guns and RPGs. The strike relieved a coalition ground unit a few hundred yards away, allowing them to continue on their mission.

Coalition ground controllers called in Navy F/A-18C Hornets and F/A-18E Super Hornets to hit a building where an enemy mortar team was hiding and firing rounds. The aircraft strafed and then dropped a GBU-38 and a GBU-12 on the building, destroying the mortar position.

F-15Es bombed and strafed an enemy force confronting coalition troops near Lashkar Gah. The aircraft targeted several groups of enemy fighters, including rifle, heavy machine gun, and RPG teams. The jets tracked and hit enemy personnel again as they unsuccessfully tried to escape into the mountains.

Two days later, on 24 March, a Super Hornet executed a show of force and expended flares near Lashkar Gah to prevent a pending Taleban attack after enemy gunmen had been spotted outside a coalition forward base. The aircraft's appearance provided a deterrent and prevented hostilities from developing further.

That day, in the district, an operation started. Afghan and coalition forces arrived at a compound militants had occupied for the night. The force immediately was engaged by Taleban from inside the compound. Several Taleban fled, while the force continued to receive small-arms fire from inside a building. The force cleared the building, killing three enemy.

One Taleban was barricaded in one of the buildings, using women and children as shields. The force used precision small-arms fire to kill the militant with no harm to the women or children.

The force pursued the Taleban who had fled the compound on foot. One was killed when he manoeuvred on the force. Four others engaged the force with a PKM machine gun and were killed. Two others armed with AK-47 assault rifles were killed after posing a serious threat to a nearby compound. One suspect was captured unharmed and detained.

It took four days before 28 March "air" was used again, this time with aircraft performing shows of force. The next day, 29 March had another RAF GR-9 Harrier in action, flying shows of force and expending flares to support a coalition ground patrol which was receiving RPG and small arms fire. The aircraft's manoeuvres kept the enemy pinned down while friendly forces overran the enemy position.

On 29 March, a local man on a bicycle was shot by ISAF forces after he failed to respond to warning signals while approaching a convoy. He was not in possession of any explosives.

The 2 April saw an Air Force F-15E executing a show of force expending flares in order to help a coalition unit break away from enemy gunfire. When the enemy's shooting continued after the fly-over, the F-15E strafed the hostile forces with its guns. An F/A-18E also flew a show of force, suppressing enemy fire from another enemy position.

On 3 April, a coalition aircraft and an A-10 executed shows of force near Lashkar Gah and Nangalam to prevent enemy activity in those locations. The aircraft supported coalition ground forces carrying out security and reconstruction efforts.

The 6 April had coalition and Air Force aircraft performing shows of force in Lashkar Gah to deter enemy actions. That day, 76 close air support missions were flown. The next day, 78 missions were flown, with 7 April a Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet flying a show of force over a group who appeared to be setting up an improvised explosive device. The manoeuvre prevented the individuals from succeeding while avoiding risk to nearby civilians.

The 8 April had a suicide bomber killing at least five people in an attack on an anti-drugs patrol. Police and civilians, at least one of them a child, were among those killed in the attack in Lashkar Gah. Nearly 20 others were hurt. The patrol was travelling north of Lashkar Gah in a convoy of six vehicles when it was attacked by a suicide bomber on foot. The attacker detonated explosives strapped to his body as he approached the convoy. One vehicle was completely destroyed, and four others were damaged.

On 9 April, in the mountains near Lashkar Gah, a Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet strafed enemy personnel shooting from a tree line. The enemy gunmen had opened fire on a coalition mounted patrol, prompting the aircraft to intervene. A second Super Hornet performed a show of force and expended flares to deter enemy reinforcements from moving into the fight.

On 10 April, the last day of 3 Commando Brigade deployment, a UK Royal Air Force GR-9 Harrier flew a show of force during an Explosive Ordinance Disposal operation near Lashkar Gah. The flyover deterred Taleban activity so that bomb squad technicians could remove an explosive threat without enemy interference. Nearby, a ground patrol called in a Coalition aircraft to fly several shows of force while the patrol was under attack.

Also, on that day, 15 insurgents were killed after opening fire on a U.S.-Afghan patrol. The coalition troops had returned fire, killing all 15 attackers with small-arms, heavy weapons and aviation weapon support.

Thus, by the conclusion of the 3 Commando Brigade deployment, in just one of the major population centres, of five – where there were supposed to have been no more "security incidents" than on the fingers of your hands - there were at least 69 which fitted that description, ranging from suspicious groups gathering, to attempted bomb laying, a major suicide bombing and full-blow gunfights, with aircraft strafing and bombing – plus an attempted take-over of the town by the Taleban.

During the Brigade's deployment, 32 men were killed. The Commanding Officer, Brigadier Messenger, said that is "something that will stay with me for the rest of my life."

COMMENT THREAD

Sacred cows to the abattoir

There were quite smiles of satisfaction in some offices in the darker reaches of Whitehall this week – and elsewhere. These were occasioned by an event in the United States which could mark a major turning point in a vicious battle that has been fought for fifteen years or more.

This is the battle for the future shape of our military, one that has barely been recognised outside a very narrow group of specialists. Unremarkably, therefore, it has been almost completely ignored or misunderstood by the media, most MPs and the entire political commentariat.

That, however, does not diminish its importance, with the putative turning point coming with the budget speech by Robert Gates, US Defense Secretary. Although in Washington, the battle over the future shape of the military has been led from across the Atlantic. Therefore, what happens there has a profound impact on British thinking - and actions.

The significance is that Gates has decided to bite the bullet and do the very thing which is needed over here, announcing that he is planning to "reshape the priorities of America's defense establishment." The aim is to "shift resources and institutional weight towards supporting the current wars and other potential irregular campaigns,"

If his proposals are approved by Congress, he says, they will "profoundly reform" how the Department of Defense does business. At the very heart of this is a rebalancing of his department's programmes in order, he says, to "institutionalise and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead". He will, however, also provide a "hedge" against other risks and contingencies.

To achieve this, Gates proposes to "reform how and what we buy," which means "a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting." Crucially, he tells us, his department must stop programmes that significantly exceed their budget or which spend limited tax dollars "to buy more capability than the nation needs".

In phrasing that will echo around Whitehall and find its way into British documents, Gates declares that conventional modernisation goals "should be tied to the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries – not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary given unlimited time and resources."

Thus, Gates is taking on the enemy in a full-frontal assault, the same enemy that we face here in the MoD, the "defence bureaucracies" which – here as in the US - "have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures".

The problem Gates identifies is that the defence establishment is a set of institutions largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern armies, navies, and air forces. Shifting that priority, he wants the department to be more people-centred, focused on programmes which directly support, protect, and care for the man or woman at the front.

In terms of hardware, his number one priority is to increase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support for the warfighter, adding $2 billion to the base budget.

This will include fielding 50 Predator-class UAVs, representing a 62 percent increase in capability over the current level and 127 percent from over a year ago, increasing manned ISR capabilities such as the turbo-prop aircraft deployed so successfully as part of "Task Force Odin" in Iraq, and initiating research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimised for today's battlefield.

Additionally, he aims to spend $500 million more on increasing the capacity to field and sustain more helicopters. The primary limitation on helicopter capacity, he tells us, is not airframes but shortages of maintenance crews and pilots. So the focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews.

Then, "to boost global partnership capacity efforts," Gates plans to increase funding by $500 million, to include training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counter terrorism and stability operations. He will also "grow" the special operations capabilities, increasing personnel by more than 2,800 or five percent and will buy more special forces-optimised lift, mobility, and refuelling aircraft.

On the broader front, Gates is closing down the F-22 programme and stepping up production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, an interesting choice as this multi-role aircraft has a ground attack and surveillance capability not shared by the F-22 air superiority fighter. A number of other programmes are being cut or cancelled, the latter including the VH-71 presidential helicopter, which is vastly overspent.

"The perennial procurement and contracting cycle – going back many decades – of adding layer upon layer of cost and complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build," says Gates, "must come to an end."

In this context, the really significant news for us is that Gates is planning to ditch plans to procure vehicles for the US Army's Future Combat System (FCS) – the direct equivalent of the FRES "utility" vehicles, on which the outgoing CGS, General Dannatt, had set his heart.

Although Gates intends to retain and accelerate incremental development of the technology enhancements to all combat brigades, he states:

I have concluded that there are significant unanswered questions concerning the FCS vehicle design strategy. I am also concerned that, despite some adjustments, the FCS vehicles – where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency, and greater informational awareness are expected to compensate for less armor – do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This was precisely the conclusion that we had come to in 2004 when we first wrote about the subject. Five years on, and many more millions spent, we finally have a politician who is brave enough to slaughter the military's sacred cow.

Thus, an $87 billion programme bites the dust, made all the more delicious by Gates's noting that the current vehicle programme, developed nine years ago, "does not include a role for our recent $25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today's conflicts." He then adds: "An Army vehicle modernisation program designed to meet the needs of the full spectrum of conflict is essential." And, at $25 versus $87 billion, it is pretty obvious which way the wind is blowing.

Pre-empting criticism – of which there is already plenty - Gates concludes by saying that his "reform budget" reflects the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan – while also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world.

In the coming weeks, he says, we will hear a great deal about threats, and risk and danger – to our country and to our men and women in uniform – associated with different budget choices. He continues:

Some will say I am too focused on the wars we are in and not enough on future threats. The allocation of dollars in this budget definitely belies that claim. But, it is important to remember that every defense dollar spent to over-insure against a remote or diminishing risk – or, in effect, to "run up the score" in a capability where the United States is already dominant – is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I will not take.

We must, he says, "critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements – those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead."

Gates could have used another phrase, such as "opportunity cost". While the generals hanker after their toys, men and women die for want of the correct kit, and we lose our wars.

The US Defense Secretary has delivered a mortal blow to the "toy brigade" both across the Atlantic and here. With the US pulling out of FCS, there is no way the FRES fantasy can survive here – and there may be other sacred cows headed for the abattoir.

Gates has also seriously wounded our most deadly enemy, the MoD, with a hope that a change of direction in the United States may now lead to a similar movement here, saving billions of pounds and many lives. There is now an outside chance that our military will get the kit it needs, instead of the toys the generals – and the rest of the defence establishment – want.

COMMENT THREAD

The watchdog that doesn't bark

Governments make mistakes. For a whole variety of reasons they mess up. That is the very nature of things and it is why over time there has developed a system of checks and balances, all aimed at making the government accountable. The system is also devised so as to detect mistakes early, remedy them where possible and, crucially, prevent repetitions.

It was with that in mind that we wrote this piece which also referred to this piece, pointing out the vital role of parliamentary select committees, in making the system work.

I would not be the first to observe that the committees do not function very well, but have indeed noted how one committee in which we take a special interest – the Defence Committee - functions very poorly. Therefore, I thought it would be useful to write a series of case studies on the Defence Committee. The idea is to pick a series of equipment projects that went wrong so to see what the committee did about them, and whether its activities could have been better handled – with some observations then on what could be done to improve the performance.

After this first one, which is below, I will post the case studies separately, and then write a consolidating post drawing out observations and conclusions, bringing them all together – with input from the forum where relevant – in order to frame recommendations. If this works as an exercise, I will then revamp it as a paper, possibly for publication.

For the first case study, I have chosen the Phoenix unmanned aerial vehicle project, which I first looked at in September 2006 in the context of the Nimrod crash in Afghanistan.

The flight of the Phoenix

Last year, on the tenth anniversary of its entry into service, the Phoenix unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was formally taken out of service.

In fact, though, it had last flown operationally in May 2006, giving less than seven years of operational service for the cost of £345 million since its inception.

From the start, the Phoenix programme was a disaster. The requirement emerged in the early 1980s as a battlefield UAV to support the British Army, originally designed for artillery spotting. As so often with these projects, though, there was "mission creep" and the final specification emerged to encompass a fully-fledged surveillance aircraft, something for which the original design had never been intended.

Nevertheless, the GEC/Marconi (later to become /BAE Systems) design was selected by the MoD in February 1985 with a planned in-service date of 1989. Although the first example flew in 1986, a the Defence Select committee in 1990 heard from the MoD that difficulties had been experienced with the datalink, which could lead to loss of contact with the air vehicle. The system had become known as the "Bugger Off - because often it did not come back once it had been launched.

There were also computer problems with the ground station and recovery problems. The aircraft was parachute-recovered, upside-down, with the landing impact to be taken by a shock-absorbing plastic hump. Frangible elements of the fuselage were supposed to breaking off to absorb the impact. Unfortunately, other non-frangible elements of the air vehicle were also sustaining considerable damage.

This left the British Army during the first Gulf War having to rely on ageing Canadair CL-89 surveillance UAVs, in service since 1972, which had to be recovered and film processed before targeting data were available. Artillery batteries more frequently were forced to use targeting data provided by US Marine UAV, the RQ-2 Pioneer (pictured left), an aircraft derived from an Israeli design and brought into service by the US in 1986.

The problems with the Phoenix had not by any means been fully resolved by 1994, by which time other concerns had emerged. Crucially, the machine had been originally intended for use in Central Europe and could not cope with hot-and-high conditions, such as in the Gulf. With the added payload the original machine had never been intended to carry, it needed a more powerful engine. In the financial climate of the time, however, that option was abandoned.

By early 1995, Flight International was reporting that the Army was considering cancellation. Six years behind schedule, it had already cost the MoD £227 million - double the original estimate when the deal had been signed.

In March, with the in-service date having already been extended to October 1995, the MoD was admitting that, if it opted to continue with the project, a further two-year minimum delay would be incurred, seeing it enter service by the end of 1997 - eight years late. Cancellation was being "very seriously considered". Not least, the method of recovery continued to cause unacceptable levels of damage.

With so much invested, however, the company was given another chance. In April, the then procurement minister, Roger Freeman, announced that the manufacturer would be allowed to complete an "additional programme of work" to resolve the remaining technical difficulties, lasting about a year, at the contractor's expense. Later that month, MPs were told that potential alternative systems were being considered, in case the Phoenix did not come up to standard. Significantly, highly successful Israeli machines were being examined.

In August 1995, James Arbuthnot was appointed as defence procurement minister. It would now fall to him to make the crucial decision as to whether the programme would continue or whether an alternative would be purchased. Any decision would be highly contentious and cancellation would be highly embarrassing for the government. Already it had been forced to abandon the ill-fated Nimrod airborne early warning aircraft, produced by the same GEC/Marconi/BAE Systems combine, with the airframes having been scrapped in 1991 at a loss of over £1 billion.

Mr Arbuthnot was asked briefly about Phoenix in the October but with the review underway, he batted down the question. With a year's grace bought by the "additional programme of work", it was not then until the anniversary of the announcement on 25 April 1996 that Mr Arbuthnot was called to give an account. By then, the US had been successfully operating its Israeli-designed machines for ten years. However, the announcement about the future of the project was not ready. Mr Arbuthot hoped to be able to make one "before the summer recess".

It was down to Flight International, therefore, to come up with any information on what was going on. From this it was learned that GEC was to resolve the landing problems by equipping the UAV with an air bag, similar to those used in motor cars, to absorb impact of landing. This was precisely the option used on the 25-year-old Canadair UAV which the Phoenix was to replace. There was also talk of fitting a more powerful engine, but nothing was to come of that.

Nothing was to come of Mr Arbuthot's announcement before the summer either. In fact, there is no record of him ever having made one to Parliament, a strategem which would have neatly avoided any questions in the House. Instead, the news of his decision was conveyed by an MoD press release in October, which broke the news: It declared: "We now have confidence in the cost-effectiveness, tactical performance and reliability of the system to meet the army's requirements".

This came to light in Parliament only because it was mentioned in a debate by an opposition spokesman, Dr John Reid. Phoenix was to become operational in 1998, nine years after originally planned, with 198 eventually delivered. Complaining of the delay, Reid declared:

We do not blame the Government for every delay. However, any objective observer who examined the pattern of consistent delays would conclude that it was the only area where the Government appeared to have a strategy. I am reminded that Napoleon once instructed Bourrienne not to open his letters for three weeks and, after that time, expressed satisfaction that most of the correspondence had resolved itself. I have a feeling that the Secretary of State is adopting a Napoleonic strategy to defence procurement: if we delay indefinitely, the need will go away. But it will not.

On 1 May 1997, Tony Blair's New Labour had won the general election and Mr Arbuthot lost his ministerial job. But his legacy, of which Phoenix was part, was to live on. Within months of the Phoenix becoming operational, it was deployed in the Balkans, coinciding with the day that Yugoslavian/ Serbian forces began their withdrawal from Kosovo on 9 June 1999. Eighteen months after it had been accepted into service, 16 machines had been lost or destroyed in the course of 200 sorties, including 13 during operations. Ten were lost or destroyed in Kosova and three more during further operations the following year.

Mr Bruce George, chairman of the Defence Committee in 2000 was less than complimentary about the system. "That is a pretty deadly weapon," he said, "because they do tend to drop out of the sky causing damage to anyone standing underneath. Was that a secret weapon? It was probably quite an accurate weapon." That brought from Vice Admiral Sir Ian Garnett, then Chief of Joint Operations, that, "Of course we would like to have better unmanned aerial vehicles to give us intelligence and perhaps we might have that capability in the future."

The capability provided by the Phoenix, however, was fully recognised by the Defence Committee it remarking in January 2001 that, "The momentum behind developing the capability of Phoenix to provide targeting data to strike aircraft must be maintained."

If that momentum was maintained, it did not extend to the Phoenix programme. The system was deployed during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, with 89 machines being sent. Between March and 3 April, some 23 machines were lost with 13 damaged but repairable. The equipment was openly described as a "dismal failure". Despite that, the Defence Committee, reporting on the war in March 2004 was uncritical. "We are pleased," it said, "to hear that, despite its chequered past, Phoenix made a valuable contribution to the operation."

Nevertheless, so obviously inadequate was the machine that the MoD, under new management since Arbuthnot's time, had already determined on a replacement. Rejecting the proven but very much larger US Predator model, it had an Israeli-built machine in mind, the very option that Arbuthnot and his predecessor had been asked about in 1995 and 1996, and which he had rejected. This was to be the Watchkeeper programme, a licensed-built version of the Elbit Hermes 450, with a projected in-service date of 2006.

One MP on this committee, however, expressed concern that the programme could not be "more aggressively accelerated". This was Gerald Howarth, on 21 May 2003, questioning Sir Peter Spencer KCB, then Chief of Defence Procurement. Sir Peter's answer was very revealing. The development could not be speeded up, "because we are buying a system of which the UAV is a component," he said.

This referred back to the "Strategic Defence Review – New Chapter" published in July 2002 in which the Government had committed to a major reorganisation of defence forces, in particular the Army. It was to introduce a new concept called the Future Rapid Effect System (FRES), linked into a vast computer and communications network, introducing what was known as a "network-centric capability".

Thus, at the time Sir Peter was being questioned, attention was focused on a high-tech "future war" while, at the very same time British troops were engaged in a vicious counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq, equipped with the Phoenix which, as was well known, could not operate in hot conditions – when indeed it operated at all.

This notwithstanding, in November 2003, Defence Minister Adam Ingram assured the House that the Watchkeeper programme was "on track to deliver a tactical UAV capability from 2006."

That, however, was not to be. In July 2004 the "preferred bidder" for Watchkeeper wasannounced, for a contract that was expected to cost £800 million. And not until the following July did then defence secretary John Reid announce the order. But the in-service date was no longer 2006. The capability would be delivered "incrementally" from 2010. This was from the same Dr Reid who in 1996 had complained about the delays in introducing the Phoenix.

Arguably, it was at this point that the Defence Committee might have intervened. As of July 2005, two crucial issues were evident. Firstly, that the Phoenix system was seriously substandard and also inoperable in Iraq during the summer months. Secondly, there was now no prospect of an early replacement. It might have even gone back earlier to 2003, when questions could rightly have been asked. But two years later, there can have been little argument that the Army urgently needed an effective UAV.


That intervention would have been valid and effective is unarguable. In May 2007, reported a month later the MoD, recognising for itself the critical shortage of UAVs, issued an Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) for a $110 million deal to buy Elbit Hermes 450 UAVs direct from Israel (pictured above), to fill the capability gap – a year after the Phoenix had been withdrawn from Iraq. The first machines were delivered to Iraq and operational by September 2007, a mere four months later. By then it was too late to affect the outcome.

More than a year earlier, however, in mid-2006, another opportunity had arisen for Defence Committee to intervene. It was then gathering evidence on operations in Iraq. That year, and since the general election in June 2005, the Rt Hon James Arbuthnot had taken over as committee chairman – the very man who as procurement minister in 1996, ten years earlier, had given the go-ahead for the production of the Phoenix.

Under his chairmanship in June 2006, the committee took evidence from the then Defence Secretary Des Browne on a range of problems, including the deficiencies of the Snatch Land Rover. But neither then, nor in the report, published on 10 August 2006 were UAVs mentioned.

In fact, it took until May 2008 before Mr Arbuthnot's committee focused on the subject of UAVs, in an investigation devoted to that subject. In its report, published in July 2008, Mr Arbuthnot's committee noted that the acquisition of UAVs, which by then had included the successor to the Predator, known as the Reaper, and Hermes 450 were providing our Armed Forces with "battle winning capabilities", and were "proving effective in the counter-insurgency style of operations which they face in Iraq and Afghanistan."

However, evidence was submitted by the MoD in a written memorandum to the committee, which noted:

Limited range full motion video surveillance is provided by the Phoenix tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) system. Originally designed for operations in central Europe, it has not proved suitable for supporting ongoing operations in the more demanding climatic and geographical conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A memorandum from the Royal Aeronautical Society also noted that the "UK experience with UAV technology has not been entirely happy, pace the Phoenix programme".

However, there was no reference to the Phoenix in the conclusions and recommendations section. As to the purchase of the Hermes 450s, the committee had asked why the requirement for the UAVs acquired as UORs had not been identified earlier. It had been told that "in many cases they were identified earlier". The Hermes 450 UAV had been acquired as a "stop-gap" filler because the Phoenix UAV system could not be operated effectively in a hot and high climate. To that, the committee responded:

The MoD has acquired UAV systems for current operations as Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs). In its response to our Report, we expect the MoD to set out its future plans for the UAV systems acquired as UORs and where the future costs fall within the defence budget. We also expect the MoD to set out its longer term strategy for acquiring UAVs systems, given the concern expressed by industry that keeping the UAV systems acquired as UORs in service for a long time could undermine the UK’s national capability in this area.

Thus did the committee convey the concern of the trade body representing the defence contractors, the SBAC. It wanted: "the balance being maintained between developing national capability and supporting UOR capability for urgent operational requirements." Roughly translated, that meant that the defence industry did not want too many off-the-shelf purchases in case it reduced the sales of custom-built machines. And that was the extent of the committee's concerns on UORs.

COMMENT THREAD

Lost before it started – Part 6

In this part six, we look at the vexed question of under-resourcing. Throughout the Iraqi campaign, the mantras of "underfunding" and "over-stretch" were frequently in the media and came easily from the lips of opposition politicians. More "boots on the ground" and more money were the answers to all ills. However, as always, there are more to these issues than meets the eye.

Underfunding

In August 2007, L/Sgt Chris Casey, and L/Cpl Kirk Redpath were getting murdered. They were pointless and unnecessary deaths. They had been "top covers" in a Snatch escorting a convoy of large trucks out from Kuwait and had been hit by an IED. Two other soldiers were seriously injured. The insurgents had seen the vehicles going down and were waiting for their return.

After all this time, when the Army had been losing Bulldogs, Warriors and even Challengers to IEDs, it was still sending men to die in Snatches. Mastiffs were in theatre and the soldiers' platoon commander had asked for one. Despite Mr Blair's assurances that the armed forces were "extremely well equipped," none had been available. And, for all these soldiers' sacrifice, neither had many "hearts and minds" been won on the six-lane motorway out of Kuwait where the "size and profile" of the Snatch had so obviously and desperately been needed.

A day later, Col Bob Stewart - "former UN commander of British troops in Bosnia" – was on the Today programme. He ventured that the Army was taking the casualties because: "we cannot dominate the ground". The options, he said, were to "retake and dominate the ground, or abandon it."

However, Liam Fox, shadow defence secretary, said the Army was paying for the Government's mistake of not investing enough men, equipment or money into reconstruction at the time of the invasion. "It's tragic that our Armed Forces are paying the price of a lack of political care and planning," he said.

Six months later, L/Cpl Redpath's girlfriend, Sharon Hawkes, echoed this theme: "It was underfunding by the Government that killed him," she said. But she had been pre-empted by Lord Rees-Mogg, who observed:

Throughout the Iraq war, our Forces have been short of suitable armoured vehicles. For years, the Basra palace run had to be performed in vulnerable Snatch vehicles; these have only recently been replaced by the Warrior, which is itself vulnerable to roadside bombs. Unlike American vehicles, the Warrior is not air-conditioned and can get unbearably hot in the sun.

These problems, Rees-Mogg – together with hundreds of the commentariat - attributed to "underfunding", thus illustrating the shallowness of the public debate. The Army had been turning down immediate funding in order to pursue the Eldorado of its £16 billion fleet of medium-weight armoured vehicles, an issue that had almost completely escaped attention.

Even at a more prosaic level, Rees-Mogg was out of touch. Warriors had been available since before the occupation and the use of the Snatch had been a policy issue. There had been no funding issues. Not least, the cost of operating Warriors was £250 per track mile, in normal peacetime use.

Aside from the far better protection afforded by the Mastiff – which was also fitted with powerful and highly effective air conditioning – this vehicle was far cheaper to run. The operational savings alone would have justified their use. And, compared with buying a basic FRES utility vehicle at £8 million each, the Mastiff – and Ridgeback – comes out at less than one eighth the cost, with far more durability and real-world capability.

Significant savings had been demonstrated by US forces, primarily through reduced long-term medical care, rehabilitation, and death benefit payments arising from the lower casualty rate. Additionally, many damaged MRAPs could be repaired and returned to service while conventional vehicles would often have to be written off.

Vehicles with add-on armour were also suffering reduced servicability and shorter lives. MRAPs lasted considerably longer. These factors, together with the decrease in force replacement costs due to casualties and improvements in operational effectiveness, made the MRAP significantly less costly than legacy vehicles.

It would have been cheaper to have bought L/Sgt Casey and L/Cpl Redpath their own personal Mastiff and kept them alive. But the Generals wanted their toys.

Light aviation

The funding problem, of course, was far more complex than either politicians or media allowed for. Take, for instance, the need for airborne surveillance – for tasks as diverse as intelligence gathering and providing "top cover" for routine convoys.

One obvious answer, as part of a mixed package of capabilities, would have been the use of light aircraft. However, the British had no such capability. The Iraqi Air Force did – militarised two-seater, single-engined club trainers called the Sama 2000. Purchased for £363,000 each, their surveillance equipment was capable of detecting a man-sized target at two miles range from 2,000ft – or a hidden bomb.

They were occasionally used to support British forces in Maysan. Although the aircraft were limited in their capabilities, they carried exactly the same optical equipment as the giant, four-engined Nimrod MR4 maritime surveillance aircraft, one of which was so tragically to crash while on a mission in Afghanistan in September 2006.

A fleet of Nimrods was being operated out of Oman, flying up the Gulf and deep inland to provide support for ground operations. Costing £30,000 an hour to operate and flying sorties of twelve hours duration – more with air-to-air refuelling – three days-worth of flying set back the military budget £1 million. The Samas provided a “good enough” solution to the problem of providing low-level airborne surveillance.

But that was not the British way. While "good enough" was entirely acceptable as a military solution to Iraq, when it came to equipment, hugely expensive adapted maritime aircraft or £14 million Future Lynx helicopters delivered in 2014 or sometime never – with very similar camera equipment – were the preferred option. As so very often in British military thinking, the best was the enemy of the good.

This lack of flexibility and the determination to opt for the "best" long-term solution – even though it would not be available for many years - was to deprive the Army of crucial air support. Through the Second World War, it had enjoyed its own light reconnaissance capability with the single-engined Auster – another adapted club aircraft.

Operating in far more dangerous environments than Iraq, its losses were remarkably low. The type was used in Aden and Oman, supplemented by the more powerful DHC Beaver, which also provided welcome support in Northern Ireland where it was the Army’s primary surveillance platform.

In other Armies, light fixed-wing aviation also had a long history, with the Australian Army in the Vietnam War operating Pilatus Porter for reconnaissance, liaison and for communications relay, the latter function carried out in Iraq by the Nimrod.

The Porter was an interesting aircraft. With exceptional short-field performance, it is still in production and with an airframe cost of around £2 million and low operating costs (under £2,000 an hour), it or something similar could have provided a useful stopgap. However, a fixed-wing option was never considered. In the early 70s, the Army Air Corps had converted to an all-helicopter fleet, with a few exceptions.

Techology galore - but not yet

One of those exceptions, though, was the two-engined Britten Norman Defender surveillance aircraft. Four of these were purchased in 2003, at a cost of £4.5 million each. Some were deployed to Iraq but, despite extensive inquiries, no reports of their performance were ever released.

They cannot have been overly successful because in May 2007 the MoD announced the order of four highly sophisticated Beechcraft King Air 350 aircraft - designated the Shadow R - as replacements, costed at £14 million each. Not intended for service until 2010, these were far too late for Iraq.

Meanwhile, the RAF had been waiting for five R1 Sentinel surveillance aircraft. Ordered in 1999 at a cost of just over £1 billion, it was equipped with high performance radar based on the equipment used in the U-2 "spy-plane" of Cold War fame.

It could – without any trace of exaggeration – detect footprints in the desert sand from an altitude of 20,000 feet. Originally intended to be operational by 2005, the date was deferred to 2007 because of development problems, then to 2008 and finally to 2010, once again far too late for Iraq.

This was a disease affecting the whole military establishment. With no end of high-performance kit just over the horizon, the money had been committed yet the capabilities were not available. However, their very existence as projects blocked – both financially and intellectually – consideration of cheap stopgap solutions that were "good enough" to solve immediate problems.

Boots on the ground

In May 2007, "senior army officers" were worried that Gordon Brown – soon to become prime minister - was going to cut the number of troops in Iraq to such a low level that their effectiveness would be jeopardised and lives endangered.

One officer complained: "We are sitting ducks and have very little in the way of resources to react. If we mount an operation to deter a mortar attack it takes an entire battle group and ties up all our people." Any further reductions in numbers, said the officer, would leave British troops "hanging onto Basra by our finger tips".

This was the limit of the argument and the public perception. More attacks required more troops for defence or, at least, the retention of existing manpower, with an officer openly stating that it took a complete battle group – some 500 men – to "deter a mortar attack".

Between May and July, as efforts to counter the increasing mortar fire had failed, with attacks intensifying by the day, five men were killed by indirect fire and two on the fruitless task of deterring mortar attacks. Many more were injured. Thousands of man hours had been expended, and dozens of operations launched, to no avail.

Yet, in early July, USAF operators of a Predator UAV had observed insurgents fire two mortar bombs then load the tube into the trunk of their vehicle. They had launched a Hellfire from the Predator, hitting the front of the car and destroying it. This was the job for which the British needed an entire battle group.

The task that the British were attempting could have been accomplished by a small fleet of Predators UAV armed with Hellfire missiles. This would have required no more than a few dozen men who would never have been exposed to any personal risk. By contrast, the profligate use of manpower – and money - did not achieve results. It was not the only example, by any means.

A waste of resource

In May 2007 the MoD bought new fleet of "munitions disposal vehicles" replacing its existing fleet of very similar vehicles. At a cost of £415,000 each – a cool £7.5 million – these were 18 Swiss-built trucks called the "Tellar".

They were unarmoured vans. Like the Vector, they had a "cab forward" design, making them extremely vulnerable to IED attack. There was only concession to the fact that they going into war zones: they had "a level of riot protection" - mesh screens on the windows.

However, "Felix wagons", as they are called by troops, are always prime targets for insurgents. One common tactic is to set up decoy explosions and then mine the area where an vehicle might be expected to park when it arrived with its crew to investigate. Another was simply to ambush the vehicles en route.

The lack of protection had very significant manning implications. While the US was equipping its disposal officers with MRAPs – armoured, armed and self-supporting, with small groups of men - the British, forever complaining about "overstretch", had to keep available large numbers of mounted infantrymen to escort the unarmoured and unarmed bomb disposal vehicles. No wonder they were short of men.

Not the issues

Underfunding was not the issue. Waste was, and the obsession with buying absurdly expensive "toys" certainly was. Underfunding was too easy an excuse – as indeed was the manning issue.

Many will argue that, without more troops, the campaign could never have succeeded. Allan Mallinson, former soldier, writer and military historian, argues thus. He may be right. But he also argues that the strategy must be right. "Without a coherent strategy," he says, "even the best tactics are futile: casualties just mount." He then adds: "But there is no getting round it: strategy needs troops on the ground."

One can agree with that, but also suggest that the troops did not have to be British. In the successful operations to recover Basra and then al Amara, the bulk of the troops were Iraqi.

They had strong American support but the US Army committed just 2,500 troops to southern Iraq – less than the British fielded throughout the occupation. The fault lies in handing over to the Iraqis before they were ready – and indeed before Maliki had secured his political base and could commit them to the battle with the Mahdi Army.

The real answers

The real causes of failure ran much deeper but even now few understand or want to address them. To deal with the tactical situation, the British could not "dominate the ground" as Col Stewart counselled because, every time they left their bases, they were brought down by IEDs and the constant attacks. When they stayed in their bases, the insurgents killed troops there as well. When the British left their bases in an attempt to track down and destroy their attackers, they were also killed.

It had become a vicious circle, one that could have been broken had the Army applied its mind to the problem, but it chose not to. Better use of the cash available, better use of technology, better politics and more use of brainpower were the real answers. But it was easier to complain.

COMMENT THREAD

More Reapers

Reported by us in November was the arrival of the first of three British operated MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Afghanistan. And, so impressed have been the military with their performance that now, the MoD is bidding for an additional ten.

The total package cost, including the sensors, communications equipment and nine Lynx ground scanning radar sets, technically designated as "Synthetic Aperture Radar/Ground Moving Target Indicator (SAR/GMTI) systems" – complete with support and training – is in the order of £500 million. This makes the package a considerable and welcome investment in the Afghanistan campaign.

The event is covered by The Daily Telegraph today, which notes that (with satellite relays) the aircraft could be directed by an operator in London, and "can drop laser-guided bombs or missiles on to Taliban targets".

It is also covered in detail by Lewis Page in The Register, who notes the "interesting bells'n'whistles on MoD shopping list", including the Lynx ground scanning moving-target radar (pictured). This equipment is, in fact, is incredibly sophisticated kit, configured to produce high resolution imagery akin to high-resolution photographs (pictured below left).

With a range of up to 50 miles, it also has all-weather capability, with the ability to penetrate fog (a problem at Musa Qala), cloud and even dust storms. And such is the sensitivity that it can even detect "small surface penetrations" such as footprints in a soft terrain.

When it comes to equipment, this is simply the best there is of its kind and, while the Telegraph makes great play of the Predator's weapons-carrying capabilities – calling them "drone bombers" from the look of the package, it seems these UAVs are to be used primarily for surveillance.

What both the Telegraph and the Register miss, therefore, is that these unmanned aircraft partially replace and certainly supplement the hard-pressed Nimrod MR2 aircraft currently deployed on Afghanistan. That the MoD should be seeking to purchase them so soon after the Nimrod inquest is probably not a coincidence. One question that could be asked, therefore, is why this capability was not sought earlier.

Another interesting thought is that these UAVs offer a not dissimilar capability to the RAF's Sentinel R1, the so called "Airborne Stand-Off Radar" (ASTOR).

Although ordered in 1999 – at a procurement cost of just over £1 billion - with the five scheduled for delivery by the end of last year, operational deployment is not expected until the end of 2008. But it is understood that there are some development problems with the aircraft, and this may explain why the current batch of Predators is to be procured under the Urgent Operational Requirement system.

Either way, this is good news for the RAF, better for the Army and seriously bad news for the Taleban.

COMMENT THREAD

Into the premier league!

Now, two days after The Daily Telegraph broke the news, brief details of the British Army operations in Musa Qala have finally hit the MoD website.

But the fact that only the Telegraph ran the initial reports, from an embedded reporter, shrieks of a deal, the MoD trading exclusive coverage of an event in exchange for a guarantee of publicity. Thus it is that news of a major British operation is deemed to be the property of the MoD, to be traded for favours offered by a commercial company – in this case The Daily Telegraph - to exploit for its own financial gain.

Clearly though, if information about British military actions is a tradable commodity, the MoD (and its predecessor) has been missing all sorts of opportunities. Just think, the War Office could have given exclusive rights to, say, The Daily Express (then the biggest seller) for coverage of the 1944 invasion of Normandy. Bids for Market Garden, the ill-fated Arnhem operation, could have been put up for auction and, of course, a premium might have been expected for the crossing of the Rhine.

But why stop there? The possibilities are endless. The MoD could get press organs to sponsor different battles, encouraged by opportunities to place their logos on the armoured vehicles and advertising slogans on personal armour. The Sun would really go for that. That newspaper might even sponsor a new Predator UAV, which the MoD could arrange to tow an advertising banner over the battlefield.

Even then, the creativity should not stop there - why limit this to deals with the media? With a bit of imagination, the MoD might get some interest from MacDonalds, with prominent slogans on the soldiers' rations, and exclusive interviews with victorious troops who could be schooled to extol the virtues of "chicken McNuggets" as a war-winner.

However, in the interests of fairness, one must not forget the enemy. With a little bit of careful negotiation, the Taleban could perhaps be persuaded to share the TV rights. The battles could then be carefully orchestrated so that live coverage could be beamed to the UK to coincide with prime-time television. The highest bidders could also be offered post-battle interviews with both sides, while the rest would be given action-replays of the highlights, at reduced fees.

Come to think of it, if the MoD really got organised, it could arrange "premier league" battles and run a whole season of them. There could be a cup for the victors, the "finals" being fought out at the end of the campaigning season. These "premier league" battles would, of course, attract long-term sponsorship deals, with the sponsors' logos embossed on the SA 80s and air support provided exclusively by B&Q Eurofighters.

Therein, obviously, lies the counter to defence cuts. Once the commercial opportunities of British operations have been fully exploited, the military could become wholly self-financing.

And, as historians write of the Barclay's battle for Musa Qala, fought by the Clydesdale Bank Guards and the 40th Vauxhall MasterFix Commandos in their Subaru Vikings, we could rest in the comforting knowledge that, at last, the British Army will be properly kitted out. Furthermore, we look forward to seeing the cup winners welcomed home after each successful season, to do tours of their home towns in the Carlsberg open-topped bus.

I think the MoD is really onto something here.

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