Three dead in a Jackal

The Times and others are reporting that three soldiers have been killed by an IED during a special operation north of Lashgar Gah, while riding in a Jackal.

The soldiers were all members of the Special Forces Support Group (SFSG) which was formed to add extra firepower and assault capability to the SAS and the Special Boat Service (SBS).

This brings to 195 the number killed in Afghanistan (163 KIA) and to 14 the number of soldiers killed in Jackals (plus one Afghan interpreter

Writes Michael Evans in The Times, "the Jackal armoured vehicle, sent out to Helmand to provide extra protection - it was designed to be mine-resistant - has proved vulnerable to the increasing size and potency of the Taleban’s improvised explosive devices (IEDs)."

The Daily Telegraph notes that it has previously been estimated that at least of quarter of the 100 Jackal fleet in Afghanistan have been severely damaged or destroyed by enemy action.

It thus reports that: "There is no doubt that the Taliban are targeting the Jackal upping the dose of explosives everytime," a defence source said in June, with the paper having first published concerns about the Jackal in March when five servicemen had been killed and MoD later confirmed that 18 of the vehicles had been targeted in attacks.

It was believed that the Taliban were deliberately targeting the vehicles because of a high success rate, the paper adds, stating that the Jackal has been seen as particularly vulnerable because the driver sits over the top of the front wheel which is generally the first point of contact with a bomb, it has Kevlar anti-ballistic protection rather than steel blast cover and it does not have a V-shaped hull to deflect the blast.

However, there may be more to this than meets the eye. Three killed in a Jackal (with one more critically injured) is an unusually high number, even for this vehicle and Evans may, therefore, be making an assumption in calling the vehicle "armoured".

As we reported two years ago the SFSG were issued with Jackals (then called M-WMIKs) about a year earlier than the rest of the forces. But the vehicles were completely unarmoured (pictured). Then, the troops were so worried about the kit that they were scavenging Kevlar pads to put on the seats and vulnerable points, in a vain attempt to add protection (arrowed).

The question is whether the SFSG was re-issued with the armoured version (or Jackal 2) or whether they kept the original vehicles. If the original vehicles are still in use, there are very serious questions to answer. Even the armoured vehicle, in our view, is dangerously vulnerable. Riding in a completely unarmoured version is tantamount to playing Russian roulette.

COMMENT THREAD

Good news ... and bad?

It is rare that one hears good news from the procurement front these days but, if Thomas Harding's story in The Daily Telegraph yesterday is correct, then a tiny ray of sunshine has broken through the gloom in Whitehall.

This is the story that the British government is leaning toward purchase of the "C" variant of the F-35 Lightning II - otherwise known as the Joint Strike Fighter – the type specifically designed for conventional carrier operations rather than the short-take off and vertical landing model, the F-35B.

The defence advantages of the "C" model are obvious. The aircraft, relieved of the burden of having to carry an extra lift engine and a complicated vectored thrust nozzle on the main thrust engine, and the control bleeds, has a longer range, can carry more ordnance and is easier to fly. It will also be considerably cheaper, at an estimated £90 million per model as opposed to £105 million for the "B", with technological issues still to be resolved. That, against the projected 150 order, could save us £2.2 billion.

Against that is the cost of modifying the two carriers we have planned, installing catapults and arrester gear to deal with the F-35C, but that also confers operational advantages. The carriers will be able to receive aircraft from other carriers – known as "cross-decking", which will extend the flexibility of the asset when working with carrier groups from other nations.

Importantly, our carriers will also be able to operate a wider range of aircraft, including fixed wing Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft such as the Hawkeye, instead of having to rely on helicopters with their limited endurance and altitude.

That said, such is the inter-relationship between the defence establishment and the industrial complex that there is a serious downside. Writes Harding, up to
750 British defence manufacturing jobs are at risk as Rolls Royce produces the lift fan used in the "B" and it will therefore lose out on 150 engines, their replacements and the ongoing maintenance, worth potentially some £5 billion over the life of the fleet.

There is also the question of the estimated £500 million of taxpayers' money paid to Rolls Royce to develop this highly complex engine, which would end up fitted to the 600 or so "B" aircraft to be bought by the USMC and the USAF but would no longer be of benefit to the UK.

One presumes that the investment would be recouped by the sale of engines to the US although fewer units will now be bought, which might extend the recovery period – unless the price can be increased dramatically, which looks unlikely, given the mood of Congress. And neither the USMC nor USAF would welcome the price hike, which could do nothing for relations with the UK.

Harding points to other issues arising from this switch, if it occurs, not least that Rolls Royce was not widely consulted on whether a change might be made. He cites a defence industry source saying: "This is a massive decision as it changes the whole industrial landscape. This will have a hell of an impact on Rolls Royce ... ".

Nevertheless, officially, the "B" variant currently remains the MoD's "preferred solution", which means that there is much lobbying and plotting to do before the final decision is made.

COMMENT THREAD

Shambolic

There seems to be no limit to the crass foul-ups of which the MoD is capable – but this one takes the biscuit. With British troops being torn apart by IEDs, there is a desperate need for better protected vehicles in Afghanistan, to which effect, an Urgent Operational Requirement has been raised to procure highly effective Ridgebacks which offer optimum protection.

The vehicles have been rushed into production and, so desperate was the MoD to get them into service that they even flew them from the United States, where they were built, in giant Antonov 124s (pictured above) so that they could be converted here to theatre standard with the minimum of delay (picture of converted vehicle, below right).

From here though, they were sent by sea to Dubai, where they were supposed then to be flown on to landlocked Afghanistan. But, as The Daily Telegraph and The Sun now reveal, nine (or eight) of them have been stuck in Dubai for the past month because the RAF does not have enough aircraft to fly them on to Afghanistan.

These vehicles are just the first – out of the 157 ordered – of a batch of fifty which is scheduled to have arrived in Dubai by November. But the whole delivery programme is stalled as the RAF's C17 Globemaster aircraft are committed to removing British equipment from Iraq, after the Iraqi government kicked us out.

The situation has been compounded by a ruling that the equipment carried by the Ridgebacks is so secret that it has been categorised as "UK Eyes Only". This means they are not allowed to go on allied or commercial aircraft shuttling out of the airbase.

No doubt the MoD is influenced by a recent incident where Polish Wolverine armoured personnel carriers, despatched by Ukranian-owned Antonov 124s arrived in a damaged condition, with sabotage being suspected.

But, for whatever reason, this kit has been stuck on the tarmac at Al Minhad airbase outside Dubai, with their specially-trained drivers kicking their heels, frustrated because "they want to get out to Afghanistan where they know these vehicles will protect their mates."

For once, we can actually agree with Liam Fox, the shadow defence secretary, who declares: "The idea that we would have bought potentially life-saving vehicles and then not have the ability to ensure that they would get to those that need them is inexcusable."

Actually, he is being far too mild. Commercial freight aircraft are readily available and all it needs is for an armed guard to accompany every vehicle and the problem is sorted. But even that is beyond the MoD, which – it seems – would rather see men die than get its act together.

Bereft of words as I am, to do justice to this crass, malign stupidity, readers are invited to lodge their own offerings on the forum. There must be a word – or group of words – in the English vocabulary which will describe the people responsible.

UPDATE: The story is also picked up by The Daily Mail, the BBC and the Press Association. The BBC cites "security concerns" as the reason why the vehicles could not be flown on by civilian transporter. Apparently, the Ridgebacks arrived in 16 July, which was just after the Polish Wolverine incident. It is possible that we are seeing a knee-jerk reaction from the MoD.

The story has now also been published by The Times.

COMMENT THREAD

Cutting corners

In March of this year, Ann Winterton asked the defence secretary (then John Hutton) how much it was going to cost to upgrade the Merlin fleet to theatre standard, to allow it to be used in Afghanistan. At that time he replied that the upgrade would cost "in the region of £50 million". This equated to an estimated average of £1.8 million per aircraft.

The same question asked in July, however, elicited a slightly different response. Then, the price for upgrading the 28 Merlin Mk3/3a helicopters had miraculously dropped to "the region of £42 million", equating to an average of £1.5 million per aircraft.

Defence secretary Bob Ainsworth explained this unusual as "due to improved maturity in our cost estimates following work undertaken in the intervening period." However, there may well be a different explanation – in part, at least.

According to Thomas Harding in The Daily Telegraph, in order to get the Merlins out to Afghanistan by the end of the year, Kevlar armour has been omitted from the load compartment – thus producing a saving of £100,000.

The armour, similar to that fitted to a Snatch Land Rover, protects troops from small calibre weapons and fragmentation from RPGs, and has been a requirement in operational helicopters ever since June 2003. Then, a Chinook attempting to land a relief force to aid embattled troops in the Iraqi town of Majar al-Kabir, took heavy gunfire which injured seven, some seriously.

Writes Harding, the lack of armour will severely restrict the operational use of these helicopters. Possibly, they will be restricted to "safe" areas (if there are any) and for the transport of supplies rather than personnel. At over £30 million each for the six ex-Danish Merlins, this would make them the most expensive delivery trucks in the world.

The one consolation (one must always look on the bright side) is that, without the armour, the Merlins will be able to carry considerably more supplies than they otherwise would and, when flying empty, the carbon footprint will be slightly reduced. Al Gore would be proud.

COMMENT THREAD

Not even a whimper

As of Friday, the British military presence in Iraq comes to an end. There will be no flags, no parades, no speeches and not even a formal withdrawal – just an administrative mess.

The warning signs were there in June when plans for Britain's final military mission in Iraq were in disarray, with no formal agreement finalised to maintain in place a Royal Navy detachment and upwards of 400 troops after the 31 July deadline, when the bulk of British forces were required to quit Iraq.

On the back of the ejection of the main force, this was the one diplomatic fig-leaf which enabled the British government to keep a toe-hold in the country and thus continue the pretence that we were still welcome.

However, even that has fallen apart. A "draft accord" which had been approved by Iraqi ministers in June allowed only 100 personnel to remain and that had to be ratified by the Iraqi Parliament. But, according to The Guardian, using an agency report, the Parliament has gone into recess without ratifying the instrument, forcing the remaining British personnel to leave the country by Friday.

Officially, of course, they have not left. They are being stationed over the border in Kuwait, pending the resumption of parliamentary business, whence it is hoped that the British detachment will be allowed to return in late September.

Defence secretary Bob Ainsworth is saying that the government has been "deliberately keeping a low public profile" on the issue - so as not to increase the risk to UK forces, he says. It is nothing to do, he might say if asked, with trying to conceal the humiliating prospect of British personnel having to scuttle over the border to avoid physically being ejected.

An MoD spokesman said US troops would stand in for British troops while they were out of the country, and explains that the "pause" is due to a "procedural delay," leaving the MoD website to laud the heroic work of the removal men, as the last ship sails for England with a batch of Mastiffs (pictured), there to be refurbished and sent to Afghanistan.

The Daily Telegraph tells us that the ratification was opposed by followers of Muqtada al-Sadr who stalled the process. That opposition should have come from that source is hardly surprising. But prime minister Maliki cannot have invested a great deal of political capital in trying to push the agreement through, if Muqtada's men were able to stop it going ahead.

The New York Times notes that the other two small remnants of the coalition, the Romanians and Australians, will also be gone on Friday, if not before, leaving the Americans as the sole members of a multi-national force which has seen contributions from 38 separate states.

My guess is that is how the situation will remain. Come September, the ratification will be quietly parked and the well-rested British personnel in Kuwait will be quietly found a flight home, where there will sneak in anonymously, with nothing more said. And that truly will be the end of what has been one of the more inglorious episodes in British military history in recent times.

And we leave not even with a whimper but ejected by a "procedural delay" which even the British government wanted to keep "low profile". Our presence lasted from 20 March 2003, when British troops crossed into Iraq, to 31 July 2009. And, in two days time, it's over.

COMMENT THREAD

Is this is what it's about?

Thomas Harding in The Daily Telegraph is reporting that the major British offensive in Afghanistan (Panther's Claw) that has led to a large loss of life and many wounded "has strengthened Britain's battered relationship with America".

This is according to a "senior defence source" who is telling us that: "It has shown that other people are making the sacrifice and sharing the burden. American has been through their Golgotha moment and they admire a country that steps up to the plate and does the heavy lifting."

Once again, it seems, the shadow of Iraq looms, with the British Army highly sensitive about its performance there, even if it is holding the line with its public pretence that the campaign was successful. A big "push" in Afghanistan, therefore, is seen as a way of restoring the Army's reputation.

We wrote about this in April, when the call for 2,000 more troops was first gaining traction. With a flood of US troops due into Helmand, there was no great strategic sense in adding a much smaller number of British troops to the fray, especially as the supporting infrastructure – such as protected vehicles, helicopters, UAVs and the rest – was already inadequate. What was very clear - as we then wrote - was that the Army was playing games:

Confronted with its own inadequacies, it has therefore - in the time-honoured fashion of bureaucracies since the dawn of time - raised a cry for "more resources" as the answer to all ills, not least because when they are not delivered the fault (and blame) can be transferred. It then "briefs" heavily to its friends in the media, to ensure its version of events lodges in the public consciousness, thus establishing its alibi for when things go "belly-up".

We returned to this theme in early June, noting how the Army "line" had evolved into a "warning" that the reputation of the armed forces would suffer in the eyes of senior American commanders unless an autumn surge was authorised. Our "senior commanders" are saying that such a surge would signal Britain's intent to "pull its weight".

Now it is that, for precisely that reason – it seems – theatre commanders have embarked on a risky and costly adventure, with uncertain effect and dubious strategic benefit, merely to salvage the tarnished reputation of the Army brass.

And dubious it is. Watching recently a Canadian journalist in Kandahar, describing the coalition air effort, I saw him explain how helicopters were so vitally necessary. Such was the poor condition of the road network that a journey to the area of operation, which would take no more than 20 minutes on good roads, could take four hours or more. And, as we know, mobility is further hampered by the inability of roads and bridges to take heavy traffic, limiting movement of certain types of vehicle.

Thus, the operation was entirely supported by a constant shuttle of helicopters, making a nine-minute journey to the "front line", leaving the road network under the control of the Taleban, who mine it and prey on the civilian population.

It cannot be stressed enough that the basis of governance is communications – roads in particular – and what we are seeing is the legacy of eight years of neglect, where the Western aid effort has been misplaced, misdirected and badly managed, leaving the road network in a worse condition than when we started. Thus, in the absence of the tactical mobility afforded by that network, we are forced to rely on expensive assets such as helicopters.

The point here is that the fundamental coalition strategy is one of "take, hold and build" – or "shake 'n' bake" as we call it. The idea is to create a "security bubble" in which the civilian development agencies can then operate, implementing their redevelopment agenda.

This is a strategy that has already failed – not least because the "security bubble" is urban-centred, where it is easier to maintain security. It failed because the bulk of the Afghani population is rural – 80 percent or more – highly dispersed, living off the land.

To maintain country-wide security on a "take and hold" basis would require the dispersion of the security forces, putting them in extreme peril, unless there are huge numbers. There, conservative estimates are of 500,000 or more, simply to maintain a basic presence. Clearly, there is no way the coalition is going to put that resource into the field, and the Afghani security forces cannot take up the slack. That simply is not going to happen any time soon.

The alternative is to build the road network, and then police it. It is not helicopters that are force multipliers, as Malloch Brown was saying in September last year – when no one was particularly listening – it is the tactical mobility afforded by helicopters. But these machines are only one mechanism of delivery.

In the "hold" phase of the current strategy, responsibility for security is supposed to devolve to the Afghani forces, and they are not generously supplied with helicopters – or at all. And there are no plans to remedy that situation. It would be hideously expensive even to try, and we are having enough difficulty equipping our own forces.

Therefore, the Afghan forces are going to have to rely on the road network, often using light, unarmoured vehicles with limited off-road performance. If they are to succeed, we have to build a high quality, secure road network. This should not follow the "take" phase – it should be part of it, just as building the rail system opened up the "wild west" in North America.

The communication system brought with it the security – it did not follow it. And, where the US Army Corps of Engineers played a vital part in opening up the territory, so too must the British Army open up Helmand. This can never be achieved by civilian agencies.

It is here, oddly, that helicopters are vital, but not the ponderous heavy and medium lift machines that are so much the focus of attention. Back in November 2006, we were writing about the need for small, tactical helicopters that could deliver rapid reaction units quickly, to where they were needed.

The thinking was very much on the lines of the highly successful Rhodesian Fireforce model, where small packets of troops could interdict terrorist movements, disrupting their communications and never allowing them to concentrate their forces or dominate the ground. A good road network, allowing policing by local forces, with the rapid back-up of highly mobile forces on these lines, together with good road security, has been demonstrated time and time again to be a winning formula.

Instead of that, we have large, ponderous formations, ploughing up the territory, "breaking things and killing people", fighting battles which have been described as similar to the conventional "break-out" battle, of a type and tempo known the generals of World War I. The objective is to take territory which we know we cannot hold, and for which there will never be the resources to hold within the context of the strategy so far defined. To assert otherwise is moonshine - this strategy could suck in the entire British Army and it would not make the slightest difference.

The campaign, therefore, is being set up for another of those "heroic failures" at which the British Army excels. We will have been seen to have been "doing our bit", contributing to the "heavy lifting" and spilling enough blood for the Generals to salvage their own pride and look the Americans squarely in the eye.

But as an exercise in counter-insurgency, the Generals might just as well parade their troops in red coats, lining them up to fire their muskets into the tree lines to scare off the natives. At least then they would do less damage and it may be just as impressive for the Americans, who always did have a soft-spot for our quaint traditions. Perhaps we could even burn down the White House again. With Obama inside, that could be as effective as anything "Our Boys" are actually doing in Helmand.

COMMENT THREAD

That's journalism!

As another British soldier is reported killed in Afghanistan, two investigative sleuths from The Daily Mail, Tim Shipman and Matthew Hickley, breathlessly tell us that the announcement came "as Lt Col Richardson revealed that American, Dutch and even Australian helicopters are being used to launch British combat operations in Afghanistan." UK forces have used coalition aircraft to "seize areas of ground" from the Taliban, said the Colonel.

The Daily Telegraph goes one further as star reporter Rosa Prince scribes these immortal words:

The Daily Telegraph understands that American Chinooks were used for a combat mission as part of the Panther's Claw operation within the last month. Lieutenant Colonel Nick Richardson, spokesman for Task Force Helmand confirmed that UK forces were forced to rely on foreign helicopters.

These fearless hacks can however, shelve their dreams for nominations for the next Pulitzer prize for investigative reporting. The MoD Website for 23 June – nearly a month ago – blandly informs us that:

More than 350 soldiers from The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (3 SCOTS), have launched an airborne assault into one of the last Taliban strongholds.

Twelve Chinook helicopters, supported by 13 other aircraft including Apache and Black Hawk helicopter gunships, a Spectre gunship, Harrier jets and unmanned drones, dropped the British soldiers into Babaji, north of Lashkar Gah, just before midnight on Friday 19 June 2009.

Not only did we rely on helicopters (with the MoD thoughtfully providing a pic – see above), we were "forced" to rely on a USAF Spectre gunship, Harriers (USMC – ours have gone home) and probably US Predator UAVs. Since 90 percent – or thereabouts – close air support is provided by US assets, we are routinely "forced" to rely on F-15s, F-16s, B-1 Lancers, A-10s ...

And then, of course, on the ground, we are "forced" to rely on Danish Leopard II tanks, on their APCs, on Estonian APCs and even the Ex-MoD Mamba mine protected vehicles which we sold off for a song.

But Hey! This is a coalition effort. We are not alone ... and have not been for some time. But then, here's another "scoop". During WWII, the US stripped out the armour from its one and only armoured division and sent the Shermans to the 8th Army. To win the battle of el Alamein, we were "forced" to rely on foreign tanks.

Shock! Hold the front page!

COMMENT THREAD

Mowing the grass

In The Daily Telegraph today are moving extracts from the personal journal written by Lieutenant Mark Evison, 1st Bn The Welsh Guards. They are moving because in May he died from wounds received in Afghanistan.

According to the MoD website, Lt Evison was the Officer Commanding Number 7 Platoon, which was part of the Number 2 Company Group operating in the south of Nad e-Ali.

The company had four patrol bases or check points, one of which - Haji Alem - was occupied by Lt Evison and his platoon. In addition to defending the check point they were responsible for patrolling the local area in order to deter insurgent activity and improve security for the local population.

On 9 May 2009, Lt Evison was leading such a patrol when they came under enemy fire. He was hit in the shoulder by a single round, and was evacuated back to the hospital in Camp Bastion. Despite the best medical treatment available, he was showing no sign of recovering, and he was flown back to Selly Oak Hospital in Birmingham. His family were with him when he died.

There are several aspects of the journal which invite comment, but the one entry which is particularly poignant is Lt Evison's description of the old smuggling fort which his platoon took over as its base. He wrote:

Around the fort it is hard patrolling country. There is not much cover and therefore movement is restricted. If we move to the SW then extraction back is difficult. There is a canal directly outside which although gives good cover is terribly exposed on both banks and can be covered by at least three or four firing points. Although one must not set patterns, with only two routes into that area it is virtually impossible. There is a definite lack of steer from above as to how to play this one. I am yet to be given a definite mission and clarity as to my role out here.

In this environment, therefore, Lt Evison and his men are committed to routine patrols, otherwise known as "mowing the grass". Evison himself is uncertain of his mission and the tactical situation is such that patrols are exposed to unavoidable hazards, in an extremely hostile area, where it would seem that the tragic result of his death was almost inevitable.

It would be wrong to draw too much from this single episode but it is reasonable to pose the question as to why Evison and his men were there, and what it was they were supposed to achieve. How did placing men in extreme jeopardy, carrying out a routine which was only too obvious to their enemy gain anything? How did his death, or his patrol routine, actually help further the declared aims of our government or the interests of the Afghani people?

Nad e-Ali district, as we now know, is the focus of a much larger operation, codenamed Panther's Claw, aimed at pushing the Taleban out of the area, following which British troops will, presumably, be repeating on a larger scale, that which Lt Evison's patrols were doing. And it is precisely that type of activity which led to the deaths of five soldiers from 2nd Bn The Rifles, last week.

Crucially, though, the ambush which led to their deaths was mounted in Sangin, a supposedly pacified area yet one in which violence continues, right up to date with the report of a civilian Mi-26 having been downed about a mile from the British base in Sangin, with six killed in the aircraft, and a child killed on the ground.

It is germane to note, in passing, that had this been a British military helicopter - as so easily it could have been - with British soldiers and airmen killed, this would have been at the top of the news agenda. But it seems that the deaths of civilians, to say nothing of an innocent child, are of little media concern.

And now it is that Dannatt bleats to the BBC Radio 4 Today programme that: "A high number of deaths inevitably makes you question what we are doing, how we are doing it. The conclusion one has to reach is, going right back to basics on this, that this mission is really important."

This is a man who is professional head of an Army which was unable give one of its front-line officers a "definite mission" and clarity as to his role, having him and his men "mowing the grass" and getting him killed. Dannatt is right to talk about "going right back to basics", but we cannot avoid thinking that he should have been looking in the mirror when he said those words.

COMMENT THREAD

Parity and more ...

Originally posted at 19:30 hrs Friday. Updated and reposted.


Sooner than we feared, another British soldier was reported killed in Afghanistan, bringing the number to three on the day and the total to 179.

Then, early in the afternoon, we began to get very strong rumours of many more in what was said to be a "major incident". By early evening, five more were said to have been killed, three seriously injured and three more less badly injured.

Early, unconfirmed reports said soldiers had sought cover from direct fire in a compound which was booby-trapped with an IED. Later reports suggested that troops had been ambushed after they had dismounted from their vehicle to investigate an explosion, and were hit by another IED and took casualties. More were killed and injured when the medevac Chinook arrived to pick up the original casualties. The tactics were said to be "sophisticated".

A different report, in The Daily Mail tells a different version, suggesting that after the first hit, "amid the chaos and appalling scenes, the Taleban is said to have opened fire with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades on the injured soldiers and those going to their aid."

Apache attack helicopters are then said to have been called in to strike at Taleban positions and provide cover as a rescue operation was launched with helicopters ferrying the wounded back to the field hospital at the main British base at Camp Bastion throughout the night.

The men, from the 2nd Bn, The Rifles, were reported to have been in the Sangin area - near Musa Qala. This is not part of the current Operation Panchai Palang (Panther's Claw), which is being carried out north of Lashkar Gah.

The official total for casualties since 2001 now rises to 184, exceeding the number 179, which was the death toll in Iraq. Predictably, The Guardian - commenting on the level when it reached 179 - said that the death was likely to intensify the debate about whether the Afghanistan operation is worthwhile.

The 179th reported killed was a soldier from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, said to have died in an explosion during an operation near Nad-e-Ali. He was from the same regiment as Trooper Joshua Hammond, who was killed last week in a Viking.

The AP report at that time was headed, "The Climbing toll raises British doubts on Afghanistan" and cited Conservative MP Adam Holloway, a defence committee member. He said, "The casualties should fix peoples' minds on the fact that we've let the soldiers down ... The death toll means we should do it properly or we shouldn't do it at all."

He added that Britain had never had the troop strength needed to hold ground there and had failed to provide the promised security or reconstruction, leading many Afghans to believe the Taleban militants will outlast Western forces. "We're in a mess," he said.

Guthrie, according to Channel 4 News blames Gordon Brown who, as chancellor when Britain went into Helmand, had given "as little money to defence" as the Treasury could get away with.

And, in The Daily Mail, Doug Beattie, retired recently after 27 years in the Army, said: "Whether it's the 179th or the 200th, the soldier will not think twice about that number. They're just numbers - but every number and every name has a story behind it."

He added: "No soldier serving in Afghanistan will say, 'that's 179', they will say, 'that's my friend, that's my roommate, that's my commanding officer'. Very soon we are going to hit the 200 mark. The likelihood is before we leave Afghanistan we are going to hit the 500 mark - maybe even the 1,000 mark. But they are all false landmarks."

"For the politicians and for the Ministry of Defence," he then said, "public perception of the loss is crucial. For the soldiers on the ground, it won't matter."

However, despite the growing list of British fatalities, troops are continuing to push the enemy back on operation Panthers Claw. This is seen as a "crucial" operation for the security of Helmand.

The fighting had been "exceptionally arduous" with the threat from the Taliban roadside bombs "enormous", Lt-Col Simon Banton tells The Daily Telegraph.

Gordon Brown, who was attending the G8 summit in L'Aquila in Italy, admitted that the troops faced "a very hard summer". He said that there was no question of Britain pulling out until the international community had finished its mission.

COMMENT THREAD

Bombs away ...

The US, for all that the Taleban played a major part in confusing the issue, got it wrong in early May when it launched a series of airstrikes on compounds near the village of Granai in western Farah province.

Despite the recent savagery of the Taleban, killing 25 people, including at least 15 school children, in a bomb attack in the central province of Logar, the Americans have belatedly realised that their killing of Afghani citizens is doing significant damage to the "hearts and minds" effort.

Thus, one of the first moves by newly appointed Army General Stanley McChrystal was to issue "revised guidelines" on the use of air support, telling commanders "to scrutinize and limit" air strikes against residential buildings and other targets that are "likely to produce civilian casualties." Such injuries and deaths, he says, can "turn the Afghan people against us."

According to The Times, this has had a significant effect. Since the guidelines came into force the proportion of contacts that resulted in calls for close air support has dropped from 35 percent of all engagements to 17 percent.

Since the US provides in the order of 90 percent of fixed-wing air support for British operations, this tighter control of air power will inevitably impact on our forces, with fears that this will result in a higher mortality rate amongst our troops.

This has been picked up by the British media, notably The Daily Telegraph which choose to focus on the negative, declaring: "Troop deaths are a risk worth paying, says Nato leader in Afghanistan."

The line here is that McChrystal believes that if civilians began to support the Taliban, it would make the war unwinnable. "In the long run it is more economical in terms of loss of life to operate this way because we can gain the support of the population," he thus says.

Putting that in perspective, he adds: "We want to protect the lives of civilians, but I believe that risks we accept now save coalition soldiers in the long run. If you create antipathy in the population, you are going to create more insurgents."

The Times focuses on that particular aspect, headlining its report with: "Troops in Afghanistan could defeat themselves, says new commander."

It has McChrystal "determined to end the costly bombing errors that he believes have threatened the entire success of the Afghan". It then has him saying: "The Taleban cannot defeat us militarily, but we can defeat ourselves ... We will not win based on the number of Taleban we kill, but instead on our ability to separate insurgents from the centre of gravity — the people. Following this intent requires a cultural shift within our forces."

His own fighting philosophy, we are told, is unwavering. "One thing I would want the British public to know," he says, "is that there are multiple ways to do this and one of them is to use overwhelming firepower."

"We could use artillery and airpower and that would do tremendous damage to the infrastructure and cause a tremendous number of civilian casualties — and in so doing we would probably seal the fact that we would lose the fight over time, because we would convince the Afghan people that no matter what we said, we are not much concerned about their wellbeing."

He adds: "Even if all our good intentions say we are here to save them it goes back to the old cliché of 'we destroyed the village to save it'. If you own the village you feel differently about that. If we operate in a way that creates damage or that actually, God forbid, kills innocents, it is pretty hard to see how the population could do anything but associate our arrival with something that hurts them."

The Times notes that, during the summer of 2007, British and other Western forces operating in Helmand called in an average of 22 tons of bombs per month - almost half the bombs that fell on Afghanistan at that time. Some of that dependency on air power, it says, would appear to have come from the under-resourcing of the British mission.

It is certainly the case that there is a tendency to over-rely on air power, not least by sending out poorly supported or ill-equipped detachments which need air support to enable them to extract if they are confronted by a sizeable number of Taleban.

Elsewhere, we have argued precisely that point, also arguing for the greater use of heavy calibre mortars, a point that is taken up on our forum.

With developing technology, there is also becoming available laser-guided mortar bombs which give ground commanders their own "surgical strike" capabilities over a range of nearly eight miles. With newly available, high performance mini-UAVs commanders can have their own air surveillance, giving them the capability to adjust and direct fire, offering a genuine alternative to air strikes for certain operations.

Even under the current state of art though, it is interesting to note the comments of a serving US soldier who noted that "the Air Force could never hit small groups of personnel." He watched and called corrections on numerous sorties and they could never hit the targets. "My verdict," he concluded, "is if you want it killed use you mortars."

On balance, therefore, it is probably fair to say that, with an adjustment in tactics and the better use of available weaponry, fears of increased casualties through a more restricted used of air power need not materialise.

COMMENT THREAD

DOTR in the media

The blog and its arguments are getting some attention and interest in the media, the latest being Defence Management, which has published a feature on the design of protected vehicles.

Booker, of course, has been a good friend, with several pieces mentioning the blog, and we recently made guest appearances in The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Sunday Times and even the Sunday Mirror - although the latter lifted a quote from the blog and attributed it to a "Richard Norton". Unfortunately, the Telegraph attributed its quote to Richard D North, who has taken it in good heart.

We continue to have the support of a number of MPs, most notably Ann Winterton, and communicate with others regularly. Some also tell me they follow the comments on the forum, many of which are of exceedingly high quality. I am also told that the blog is read widely in the MoD - not always with approval - and also in a number of other high places.

We are in turn informed by many people of far greater knowledge and influence than ever we will have, making us something of a sounding board for a wide constituency, some - but by no means all - military. We are happy to play that part and would not be ill-disposed to taking the occasional guest post.

The effort required to keep the blog running is huge - especially latterly - and, while other blogs have more spectacular success, in our quiet way, we are quite satisfied that we are having an influence and helping to highlight and steer the debate. We like to think that we are an example of how blogging can work, and that blogging itself works.

We thank our readers - and those sites who link to us - for making it possible. No honest blogger will deny that they live and die by their "hit rate". DOTR daily hits, modest though they might be, are building steadily - that helps give the blog its credibility. Thank you all again.

Back to work ... sigh!

COMMENT THREAD

The situation is serious

One truly wonders whether Bob Ainsworth is aware of the cynicism with which his statement is greeted in informed circles when he blithely tells us that conditions are improving in Afghanistan, based on the "message" he got "in Afghanistan when I visited last week".

One recalls the then newly appointed defence secretary Des Bowne visiting Basra on 18 May 2006, when he declared, "Basra is calm and British forces are working hand in hand with their Iraqi and coalition partners. Suggestions that the city is, in someway, out of control are ridiculous." Two weeks later, Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki announced a state of emergency in Basra, in a bit to contain the escalating violence.

Recalling also Stephen Grey's evidence to the Commons Defence Committee last week, one thus simply speculates how long the "lines-to-take book" was this time. The new defence secretary will have been told what he wanted to hear, and shown that which was convenient to show him, upon which basis he delivers the "upbeat" message that he was always going to deliver anyway – whether he had been to Afghanistan or not.

So taken with Grey's evidence was Jim Greenhalf that he was moved to write his own post on it, observing that much of what was said was worthy of the front page of The Sunday Times.

Anyhow, Ainsworth has delivered his own message to Chatham House today in a keynote speech which was delivered shortly after death of another soldier had been announced, the seventh in a week and the 176th to die since the start of operations in Afghanistan in 2001.

His response to those casualties is charted by The Daily Telegraph which tells us, "More British soldiers will be killed in Afghanistan and there is no end in sight to the campaign, Bob Ainsworth, the Defence Secretary has warned." He adds, "Let us be under no illusion. The situation in Afghanistan is serious - and not yet decided. The way forward is hard and dangerous. More lives will be lost and our resolve will be tested."

So much of the rest of the speech is the usual FCO/MoD extruded verbal material that the only rational thing to do is to glide softly by, although there is some merit in comparing the defence secretary's views with the critique by Matt Waldman, who has some sensible and realistic things to say but, in other ways, is part of the problem.

Of special interest to this blog, however, is Ainsworth's frontal assault on the media criticism of the Viking and other poorly protected vehicles in theatre. "Every effort is being made to increase protection - such as the introduction of Mastiff and Ridgeback troop carriers, the improved armour on Viking and Jackal vehicles, and the more heavily armoured Warthog vehicles coming in 2010," he says, continuing with the "line-to-take" supplied by the military:

With this suite of vehicles military commanders will deploy their assets according to the tactical situation on the ground. But as we develop measures to counter a threat like IEDs, so our enemies adapt - for instance by building higher yield bombs to overcome heavier armour. So let us be clear, sacrificing manoeuvre for heavy armour in every circumstance is not the answer.

We are doing everything we can to counter the IED threat at source. Our forces are finding and diffusing these bombs. But tellingly, they are also concentrating on the networks and the people building them and supplying the technology, the parts and the know-how.

We are getting inside the production process - some in the military call this approach 'getting left of the bang'. When we target the bomb makers and take out the capacity to produce, we cut the threat. Getting left of the bang will save lives - of our troops - and of the Afghans themselves.

This is part of a sustained counter-offensive which has also seen a formal attempt at rebuttal by the Ministry of Defeat, which once again falsely frames the debate as one between protection and mobility, as favoured by the BBC. This is not a ministry that its prepared to learn lessons. Rather it is one that will invest its resources in supporting its existing decisions, however wrong they might be, for want of acknowledging any error whatsoever.

Similarly, Ainsworth is not prepared to admit that which Waldman accuses the government – of miss-spending or wasting aid – not that he could since that involves attacking the FCO and DFID (which we must now learn to call UKAID). Instead, he cites the UK's non-military aid, amounting to £740m since 2001, with a further £500m is planned to 2013. We wonder whether he is aware of the Ferris wheel so generously provided by the British taxpayer, and how that fits in with this general scheme.

What immediately strikes one, however, is the disparity of spending on the military, with over £3 billion in the last three years and £3.5 billion forecast for this current financial year. If the military effort was directed towards civil aid, one might see a wholly different situation in Afghanistan than we see today.

It is rather odd, therefore, that Ainsworth concludes his speech by warning "us" to be under no illusion. "The situation in Afghanistan is serious ... " he repeats. One is tempted to ask: who is this "us", white man? The illusion rests with the secretary of state ... whose policy is not dissimilar to this bridge in the region, which has yet to have the attention of western aid officials. But then, Ferris wheels are so much more useful.

COMMENT THREAD

"Not designed for combat"

Currently running in Exeter is the inquest on the death of Pte Jack Sadler, which we covered last year, with the inquest proceedings attracting an interim report from The Daily Telegraph.

Jack, a TA volunteer in Honourable Artillery Company, was a Wimik gunner, attached to the Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) serving 52 Brigade in Afghanistan during Operation Herrick 7.

On 4 December 2007, the BRF, comprising a group of Wimiks, was scouting a route for an artillery convoy of made up of two Pinzgauers each pulling a 105mm light gun, plus DROPS trucks carrying the ammunition. They were on their way to a firing point close to Musa Qala to take part in the operation to recover the town.

Making pitifully slow progress over the rough ground, they had been observed by what they feared might have been Taleban "dickers" as they had skirted a village en route before then reaching a "problematic" steep-sided wadi which they had to cross, following a route they had taken the day before – the only one which the trucks could negotiate.

Because of the heavy trucks the Force was escorting, there were only a very limited number of points at which the wadi could be crossed. While scouting the route across, Jack's Wimik hit a mine, with him sustaining fatal injuries.

No mine clearance had been carried out as the convoy was static while the reconnaissance was carried out. It was a "sitting target" and an attack was feared if it remained in one place too long, so the pressure was on to get the convoy moving again. But, on the rocky ground, the Group commander did not suspect any danger. There were no "Combat Indicators" suggesting trouble and no one in the group "sensed" any danger.

Had there been enough helicopters, the two guns and their supplies of ammunition could easily have been transported by air – as underslung loads. This would be an easy job for a Chinook. But, with a major operation in the offing, there was no spare capacity and, therefore, the battery had to travel by road, with fatal results.

That then puts the focus on the Wimik, deployed in an area where the threat of mines and IEDs was ever-present. And, it emerges from the inquest that a report submitted to the coroner described it as "not designed to be used in a combat situation because of its lack of ballistic and munitions protection".

Needless to say, the Ministry of Defeat is represented at the inquest, with Col Charles Clee holding the line. He was quick to stress that Wimik has since been replaced with newer models fitted with better protection against mines and roadside bombs.

Clee, who is deputy head of urgent operational requirements at the MoD also stated that Wimiks were "valuable to commanders because of their flexibility." Their light weight meant they could operate on local roads. He also trotted out the familiar line that, it was up to commanders on the ground to choose which types of military vehicles to use for different tasks.

Indeed there was a choice ... Wimik, Wimik or Wimik. As for it being able to operate on local roads, as a convoy escort, the BRF was being tied to a predictable route which could only be negotiated by heavy trucks. It, not the convoy, was the "sitting target".

With the Viking in the news, and the past publicity on the Snatch Land Rover, the vulnerability of the Wimik has, by and large, passed under the media radar. Yet more have been killed in Wimiks in Afghanistan than any other vehicle, at least 15 as opposed to ten in the Snatch and Jackal and eight in the Viking.

The hearing continues tomorrow so it remains to be seen what the coroner will make of this, but there is not any great confidence that local coroners can see through the dissemination poured out by the MoD. The precedents are not good.

COMMENT THREAD

Street of shame

Not a few people in very senior positions, in government and the military, have made disparaging remarks about the low grade of journalists serving as "defence correspondents" in national newspapers. Sometimes, that must be considered as self-serving, but it has to be said that, in many instances, those journalists leave themselves wide open.

In the last week or so, we have seen an unusually high crop of reports on military matters – for obvious reasons – and amongst them, not a few errors. We have already had this gem from the BBC and another from the Mirror but the harvest is not over.

More recently, of the more egregious (or certainly more obvious), we have Sean Rayment – an ex-Army officer – who writes in The Sunday Telegraph about, "The flimsy armoured vehicles which were first sent to Helmand ... ". But his list includes, "armoured personnel carriers dating from the 1960s and rebranded as Bulldogs". These vehicles, of course, were deployed to Iraq, but have never been sent to Helmand. Nor, in the up-armoured form, are they particularly "flimsy".

Then we have Michael Evans in The Times write that " ... a soldier from the 2nd Battalion The Mercian Regiment died when he was hit during a rocket-propelled grenade attack against his Scorpion armoured reconnaissance vehicle."

The Scorpion was, of course, withdrawn from British Army service in 1994. It cannot, therefore, have been sent to Helmand, nor attacked by an RPG. The vehicle is believed to have been a Spartan. There is also an issue here, that the Mercians do not operate an "armoured reconnaissance vehicle", the actual vehicle of the series being a Scimitar.

Today, we have Richard Pendlebury and Jamie Wiseman writing in The Daily Mail about "ageing equipment" that "often offers little protection against the bombs", whence they refer to "armoured Land Rovers known as Bulldogs".

They mean either Snatch Land Rovers or Vixens. There is a picture of a Bulldog at the top of this piece.

In the context of the vehicles being branded "ageing", they refer to the "Viking tracked vehicle". These were not issued to units until 2001 – which is positively youthful in military terms - and many of the vehicles delivered to Helmand were brand new. But the pair also tell us that IEDs planted in the path of military vehicles "usually include armour penetrating rods or cones designed to cause maximum destruction". They don't. In particular, the EFP which projects a copper "cone" is largely confined to Iraq. Very few have been detected in Afghanistan.

Now, we all make mistakes ... my previous piece has one, where I have identified the wrong vehicle which GD intends to submit to the MoD for the CVR(T) replacement competition. But there are mistakes and mistakes. When journalists make such obvious – to anyone with even limited knowledge of the military – and basic mistakes, it suggests that their knowledge base is extremely limited.

That does not, of course, mean that nothing they write can be trusted. Much of what they write will be correct. But it does imply that they are ill-equipped to understand the finer – and often more important – points about military equipment that will enable them to report competently on what they see and are told.

It is Private Eye which runs a regular series commenting on the errors and behaviour of the Fourth Estate – under the heading Street of Shame. We are considering our own version. It looks as if we will not be short of material.

COMMENT THREAD

Welsh Guards CO killed

Recorded by Thomas Harding of The Daily Telegraph, Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe (pictured on patrol), CO of the 1st Bttn Welsh Guards, has been killed in Afghanistan by an IED.

He is the first CO to be killed in action since the death of Lt-Col H Jones of the Parachute Regiment in 1982 at Goose Green in the Falklands War and the highest-ranking British Army officer to be killed in either Afghanistan or Iraq.

Thorneloe's death comes less than two weeks after the death of Major Sean Birchall, also of the Welsh Guards. He is the third Welsh Guards officer to be killed on the current roulement, with Lt Mark Evison killed on 12 May after sustaining injuries whilst on patrol outside Check Point Haji Alem in Helmand.

The first bare details were reported early Wednesday afternoon by AFP, which released details of an incident in which a bomb blast (IED) had killed two and wounded six in southern Afghanistan, bringing to 158 the number of international soldiers to lose their lives in Afghanistan this year.

It took until mid-morning today for the MoD publicly to confirm what has been known to the media since yesterday – that they were two of ours, "one soldier from 1st Bttn Welsh Guards and the other from 2nd Royal Tank Regiment."

The MoD website, however, makes no mention of Lt-Col Thorneloe or of the injured – although two were very seriously injured, one of whom is "critical". No other names have yet been given, in accordance with normal practice. Tpr Joshua Hammond of the 2 Royal Tank Regiment has now been named. He was, presumably, the driver.

This, according to The Daily Telegraph and others, brings the number of British personnel killed since the start of operations in October 2001 to 171. The explosion, we are told, happened whilst on a deliberate operation near Lashkar Gah, the media informing us that they were taking part in Operation Panther's Claw.


According to The Daily Telegraph, Lt-Col Thorneloe, with the others, was riding in a Viking (pictured) as it was negotiating a canal crossing. The explosion took out the rear compartment of this articulated vehicle, as well as the tractor. That would bring to eight the number of troops killed in Vikings, with Thorneloe the most senior, regarded as a "high flier" and former aide to defence secretary Des Browne.

If the unverified details are correct, then they would seem to reinforce the intelligence coming out of theatre that the Taleban are resorting progressively to much larger IEDs. However, such information as is available suggests this was not a massive bomb, and possibly survivable in a MRAP such as the Mastiff.

With the known vulnerability of the Viking, and its scheduled replacement, the use of this vehicle was supposed to have been restricted. With such a high-profile death, this may bring into focus the use of this tragically vulnerable vehicle, and call into question the entire MoD protected vehicle policy.

More details in The Times and the story is also covered by The Daily Mail. The Guardian pastes in a Press Association release, which makes no mention of the Viking, although it is briefly mentioned by the BBC.

The Guardian follows up with a piece by Richard Norton-Taylor, who retails a defence official's description of a "huge bomb" that shattered the armoured Viking tracked vehicle. In the absence of a reliable source on this, we can expect the MoD to "talk up" the size of the IED in order to divert attention from the weakness of the Viking. Even in death, politics plays its part.

The Times then offers a "commentary" by Crispin Black discussing how "Rupert Thorneloe's death will affect Welsh Guardsmen deeply", with not a word about the manner of his untimely death.

In a second piece, Tom Coghlan offers his reflections of Colonel Rupert Thorneloe, the man, and then another piece where he describes an earlier ambush on a Viking supply convoy, completely missing the point. How the MoD must love him. We will review this piece separately.

James Blitz of the Financial Times comes in with his own piece. By now, the MoD is briefing freely and the focus again is entirely on the "commanding officer" aspect of the death. The MoD is cited as saying that only six Army COs have died on operations in command of their units since 1948. There is no reference at all to the Viking. This, and its extreme vulnerability to IEDs, is gradually being filtered out of the narrative as the "damage limitation" mechanisms go to work.

Reuters has its staff reporter Peter Griffiths write up the story. He also fails to include details of the Viking. This report will be reproduced in thousands of MSM reports. An "inconvenient truth" has been buried.

Note: Release of Lt-Col Thorneloe's name was originally embargoed until 10pm this evening, but The Sun has now published details on its web site. We have, therefore, now decided to publish our own post.

COMMENT THREAD

Let battle commence

Recalling the recent defence debate in the Commons, when, at one time there were only twelve MPs in the chamber of which only one was a Labour backbencher, it is encouraging to note that the much-needed debate on our defence capabilities is nevertheless under way.

In this respect, The Daily Telegraph is to be applauded for leading the way, with a long feature by Thomas Harding, responding to the speech by General Sir David Richards at RUSI this week.

With defence affairs on the cusp, and the campaign in Afghanistan very much in the balance, a wide-ranging debate is both timely and necessary, rendering the contribution of the incoming CGS of considerable importance. It is of some significance, therefore, that The Telegraph remains the only newspaper of substance to take on board and develop his views. And, taking the political blogs at their own estimation of their value, their silence on this intensely political issue should not escape attention.

That is not to say that the media as a whole is silent on defence issues, with The Times also offering a lengthy opinion piece today. Unfortunately, this paper has chosen for its author Patrick Mercer, former infantry officer and currently Conservative MP for Newark & Retford.

In writing on defence issues, Mercer tends to be a one-trick horse, beating the drum for more resources and more "boots on the ground". His arguments tend to be one-dimensional, lacking the depth of strategic thinking that we see, for instance, in Richards' recent speech. It is a measure of the poverty of the general debate, therefore, that The Times believes his views are worth publishing.

Similarly, The Guardian has an offering, this one by Simon Jenkins , one of such unremitting negativity that it encompasses just one idea – that the US and British forces should quit Afghanistan.

In the real world, however, we are committed to Afghanistan and will remain so for the foreseeable future. And since the best outcome is to succeed in creating a stable, prosperous nation, capable of governing itself without external intervention, then the task at hand is to determine how we can achieve this, with minimum cost and bloodshed, all within the constraints of our own budgetary limitations and broader defence requirements. The debate, therefore, should be on how to win – an issue neither Mercer nor Jenkins address.

It is here that Harding, in his Telegraph piece is actually different and welcome. Whatever its limitations – and nothing short of a lengthy book could ever do justice to the topic – the theme is that the nature of modern conflict means our Armed Forces urgently need a major overhaul.

Harding thus "anticipates a battle in which the Army must triumph." There is a campaign that needs to be fought, he writes, not against the Taliban, but between the dinosaurs and Young Turks in the military. The outcome will determine whether the Armed Forces are left burnt out in the wadis of Helmand or evolve into a sharpened and highly effective tool to fight the wars of the future.

As a healthy antidote to the leaden mantras of "overstretch" and “under-resourcing" that have so far dominated the defence debate, the piece starts with a recognition of the reality: "It is becoming clear that there is simply not enough money available to fulfill the separate aspirations of all three Services." This relies on the views of Gen Richards, who articulates that reality, paraphrased as "we can do many things inadequately or a few things well, but to try both will end in failure."

Thus has Richards "adroitly opened the debate on the future of our Armed Forces", this occurring at a time when both major political parties appear bankrupt of defence policies. And, in getting to this point, he has gathered around him some of the most dynamic military thinkers (and not just from the Army) to thrash out the immediate future of defence. They know that its experience in Iraq has left the Army shattered in body and mind and that Afghanistan could prove more burdensome still.

It is no exaggeration to suggest that we are, in dealing with the counter-insurgency battles of the kind being fought in Afghanistan, facing that "horse and tank moment, where it is clearly evident that existing structures, strategy, tactics and equipment are not working. We need a revolution in our thinking, the seeds of which, writes Harding, first appeared in the US earlier this year.

This was the famous episode when US defence secretary Robert Gates announced that the modernisation of non-nuclear forces "should be tied to the capabilities of known future adversaries – not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary, given unlimited time and resources".

The message to the Pentagon was clear: fight today's war, not one against some imaginary enemy of the future and, if the speech was poorly reported over here, it has nonetheless lodged heavily in the thoughts of some strategic thinkers, Richards amongst them.

This, of course, opens up the tri-service debate, where each of the Services have their own views of what is necessary for the defence of the realm, a taste of which is to be found in the letters column of The Daily Telegraph, and in particular from Major-General Julian Thompson, victor of the Falklands. He writes:

Britain is an island, reliant on importing goods by sea. With fewer warships (report, June 25), our trade would be vulnerable to the type of attacks being mounted by pirates in the Indian Ocean. The war in Afghanistan is important, but the bottom line is that after only a few weeks without imported oil supplies and food, we would starve.

Richards, in fact, addresses that issue noting that any future operations of any significance are going to be conducted as part of an alliance – not least in dealing with piracy in the Indian Ocean, where we have operated as part of a combined Nato force and (unfortunately) within an EU detachment.

Here we confront that other reality. The UK is no longer a global power and the Royal Navy does not rule the seas. In the Far East, where the Navy once maintained a powerful fleet, the US Navy roams free while Australia and India are important regional powers, developing substantial navies of their own. We protect our interests now not by flying the White Ensign but by diplomacy and forging alliances, as partners rather than rulers. Thus, while opinions vary – and there are strongly-held views on such matters – inconvenient questions must be asked and honest answers given.

But, writes Harding, where does this new mindset leave the three Services in Britain? Unfortunately, with a limited pool of cash the laws of survival apply, and the Services have reverted to unhelpful tribalism. The RAF will not give up its attachment to strategic bombing and the Royal Navy ardently clings to its aircraft carriers, advanced destroyers and fighter wing. There are many unglamorous parts of the Air Force that quietly go about achieving a great deal – from air transport to helicopters and surveillance. But those leading the RAF are fighter pilots who are loath to yield to the realities in front of them.

Then we address some of the detail. It's a big ask, adds Harding, but the idea of putting fighter pilots in a single engine, turbo-prop aircraft such as the Super Tucano has to be contemplated. Aircraft like the Tucano are cheap, low-tech and highly effective, as many South American drug barons have discovered. They provide surveillance, along with an armament of bombs and machine guns and an ability to loiter overhead for a long time, and they are also easy to maintain.

It will take courage for someone in the RAF hierarchy to advocate using the Tucano (cost £6 million) over the Eurofighter Typhoon (cost £65 million) but it is the type of thinking now required. The problem today is the RAF's attachment to fast jets. Either it goes for the Typhoon or for the US-made Joint Strike Fighter, but the defence budget cannot sustain both.

Harding raises many other such issues – very many of them having been discussed on this blog - and while neither he nor I could pretend to have explored them fully, much less come up with definitive answers, the very fact that they are being discussed is an advance on the previous sterility of the defence debate.

The ultimate problem though, which Harding identifies, is the "bed blockers" at the top of the MoD and in the military establishment, who do not seem to recognise the need for change. Perhaps more optimistically than we would allow for, Harding concludes that, "once they are removed and once a new government is persuaded that the Ministry of Defence is aiming to fight the wars of today, we are likely to see major changes in the configuration of our Armed Forces."

We hope that is the case. The current paradigm cannot continue and now is the time to face reality and decide honestly, clearly and with candour, what it is we want our Armed Forces to do, and then to make the changes necessary to ensure that they can succeed in what we ask of them.

COMMENT THREAD

A "horse and tank" moment

Following on from General Sir Richard Dannatt, the incoming CGS, General Sir David Richards has now taken the podium at the RUSI Land Warfare conference which ends today.

It says something of the media that the only newspaper so far to recognise the importance of his speech is The Daily Telegraph in a piece written by Thomas Harding. There, the message is summed us as "Army must change or risk failure, warns future chief."

Richards starts off by alluding to the apocryphal tale of armies historically preparing to fight the last war rather than the next. Successful armed forces, he declares, adapt and transform at a pace faster than their potential adversaries. With an eye to history, he cites Cromwell as an example who "unlocked the synergy of discipline, training, new equipment and new tactics in a manner that left the Royalists looking like barely gifted amateurs."

Richards immediate strikes a chord with that framing, as it is precisely that dynamic which drove the US forces to such success as they achieved in Iraq, the lack of which led to the British failure. The Americans learned lessons. The British did not – or not enough of them, fast enough. Those readers who have struggled through Ministry of Defeat will have seen this spelt out in some detail.

In a useful reminder, Richards also tells us of the struggles of Basil Liddell Hart and "Boney" Fuller in seeking to persuade soldiers everywhere that the era of the horse had been replaced by that of the tank and aircraft. But it was Dannatt in his own speech who had reminded the audience of Liddell Hart's rueful comment that "there is only one thing harder than getting a new idea into the military’s mind and that is getting an old one out."

Our incoming CGS says he is determined not fall into that trap and tells us that the Army is adapting to the challenges of war in Afghanistan, although the transformation is still localised and small in scale. The "often subtle and certainly hi-tech ways of fighting" taken for granted in places like Helmand have not yet been imported into the core of the Armed Forces. US forces are doing better.

Crucially, Richards asserts that there has been a radical change in the way wars are fought. We cannot go back to operating as we might have done even ten years ago when it was still tanks, fast jets and fleet escorts that dominated the doctrine of our three services, he says. The lexicon of today is non-kinetic effects teams, precision attack teams, Counter-IED, combat logistic patrols, information dominance, counter-piracy, and cyber attack and defence.

Then says Richards, the pace of technological change is bewildering. It has left every nations mainstream procurement process struggling to deliver equipment that will remain relevant against more agile opponents satisfied with cheap and ever-evolving eighty per cent solutions. Too often, he adds, we still strive for hugely expensive 100 per cent solutions – "exquisite solutions" as US defence secretary Gates calls them – relevant only in a hi-tech state on state war but that risk being out of date before they are brought into service.

In sum, tactical, operational and strategic level success in today's environment is beyond that of a military that draws its inspiration from visions of traditional state on state war, however hi-tech in nature.

As to Afghanistan, should we be content for NATO to be seen to fail on its first ground combat operation, Richards asks. If we do not succeed conspicuously in Afghanistan, and vitally by extension in and with Pakistan, then we risk losing the war against terrorism globally. Furthermore, the reputation of our armed forces is in itself a grand strategic issue. For many years, they have given the UK influence internationally, defeated our nation's enemies while deterring others and been an institution of which the British people are proud. And we would lose this at our peril.

Afghanistan, therefore, is to be our top priority and the key here is that this is not a traditional inter-state war, where success is easily defined. And, if the Afghani type of warfare was to be the norm (rather than aberrant, as some still think) then our generation is in the midst of a paradigm shift, facing its own "horse and tank" moment. If this is correct, then:

... those charged with the design and equipping of our armed forces need to do three things. Firstly to decide whether they believe conflicts with dissatisfied and violent non-state actors are here for the long term or are an historical aberration? Secondly do they believe that, despite globalisation and greater mutual inter-dependence, state on state warfare remains something for which they must prepare? And thirdly ... if it is decided that our armed forces need to be capable of succeeding in both, would not the two types of conflict look surprisingly similar in practise?

On this basis, Richards is asserting that our armed forces need to become better at fighting non-state actors. Not least, on an inter-agency basis, non-military activities must be given much greater weight and properly integrated into strategy. But the paradigm which has inter-state and non-state conflicts looking similar, would allow our armed forces to focus, albeit not exclusively, on a single version of conflict, developing common skill sets and weapon systems

There is though the argument that we cannot afford the ultimate risk of a return to traditional state-on-state conflict; that our capability and military culture should be primarily based on such a possibility, remaining firmly and conspicuously in the "big boys" league, while seeking to build a capability in new areas too.

Mercifully – and here we are seeing a glimmer of sense – Richards argues that this is "simply not affordable". In trying to do a bit of everything, we risk future failure across the board because, on the day, we will have insufficient of what is needed. Furthermore, even in inter-state conflict, traditional combat power can readily be made irrelevant through the adoption of asymmetric tactics or technology.

Nevertheless, Richards is not advocating the scrapping of all our aircraft and tanks to the point that traditional mass armoured operations, for example, become an attractive asymmetric option to a potential enemy. With our allies, he says, we need to retain sufficient conventional air, land and maritime forces to ensure tactical level dominance in regional intervention operations or enduring stabilisation operations.

The key point though is that the scale of employment and the context in which conventional weapons systems may be used in the future will be quite different to what may have been the case in the twentieth century. Should traditional inter-state conflict again become a serious possibility, we do not need to plan on winning these things by ourselves. Our contribution can prudently reflect better what our allies will bring to the party.

Then, if we ruthlessly apply our own policy that we will only undertake traditional state-on-state war with powerful allies, we can achieve savings in this hugely expensive area that will free up the resources needed for investment in other more likely forms of conflict.

To conclude, Richards then notes that our forces are still designed primarily to conduct short duration conventional war fighting operations. In these, one compensates absolutely correctly for what historically would be viewed as a shortage of troops with huge firepower, hence the bias of the equipment programme towards these capabilities over the last sixty years.

In wars amongst the people, however, if you are using a lot of firepower - often delivered from the air in extremis as a result of insufficient manpower - you are almost certainly losing. One must have enough troops firstly to retain the tactical initiative and, secondly, to provide the enduring routine security without which the population will not have the confidence to reject the insurgent or spoiler. They can, and ideally should, be indigenous forces, but you also need sufficient people to train them quickly and efficiently in the first place. Thus he ruminates:

So are our Armed Forces geared up properly for future conflict? In one sense I am not as concerned as perhaps I have given the impression. The essence of a good navy, army or air force is that they have fighting spirit, and can impose their will on a skilled, cunning and violent enemy. Armed forces of this quality, with the agile and innovative leaders they breed naturally, can with good training turn their hand to any type of conflict relatively quickly. I am in no doubt at all that our navy, army and air force is very firmly in this league. If you do not possess such fighting spirit, however good or hi-tech your equipment, you will not win against opponents who do, whether they are part of another states' army or Taliban style insurgents, and however shoddy or out of date their equipment.

Thus we see Richards saying that, from one key perspective, our fight in Afghanistan is the best possible preparation for any future conflict, whatever its nature. He thus is aiming to contribute to the case for a fundamental re-think of the way we prepare and equip our armed forces for the twenty-first century.

All three services have a vital role to play in it but we need to agree the essential character of future conflict. Much of what we need for the future is in today’s inventory, but the scale and context in which it may be required must be rigorously examined.

If our generation's horse and tank moment is not gripped our armed forces will try, with inadequate resources, to be all things to all conflicts and perhaps fail to succeed properly in any. The risks of such an approach are too serious for this any longer to be an acceptable course, if ever it has been.

There is much to think about in this speech. In many ways, Richards is putting down a marker for the forthcoming strategic defence review, which the Conservatives have pledged, and the issues he discusses will provide the basis for what is bound to be a closely fought debate. As a starter for ten, however, this is very encouraging indeed. We will return to it, I suspect, many times.

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