In place of flesh and blood

We need to remind ourselves occasionally that, while it is very easy to deride the efforts of journalists, those who are embedded with troops in the field do take very real risks.

That is brought home by the latest piece from Tom Coughlan, doing what he does extremely well, reporting from the front. And this time, out on patrol south of Garmsir with the Fox Company of 2nd Battalion, 8th US Marines, he nearly gets blown apart by an IED for his trouble.

This, however, is no derring do account. Coughlan manages to weave this into a clinical account of the difficulties encountered by a squad on foot in hostile country, ambushed by enemies who refuse to show themselves and resort to multiple and increasingly complex IED ambushes.

The bomb which nearly ended Coughlan's life was two devices strapped together, buried at the base of the wall on the corner of a compound, to which the Marines were advancing. Two men were badly injured: one, a Marine with shrapnel injuries to his face and hands, would survive; the other, an Afghan interpreter, would later die.

They were part of a force of 40 Afghan soldiers and 70 Marines, supported by two (Cobra) attack helicopters and a UAV. One hour into the patrol, at 6.45am, the ambush began. The thump of the first bomb detonating and sound of enemy small-arms fire was quickly followed by a call for casualty evacuation.

As the Marines began to run for cover, their commander, Captain Junwei Sun, senses a trap, telling his men: "Watch right, we could be being baited for another IED." He was right. There was a second IED placed so as to catch the squad as they ran for cover.

Fortunately, although smoke and debris enveloped the men, there were no injuries. The Taleban bombers had made several mistakes in the way they had made and buried their devices, the result being to channel their force upward rather than outward.

They had also incorrectly wired what was to have been a third bomb. Discovered and destroyed by US combat engineers some minutes later, it was 30lb of fertiliser-based explosive that sat directly under the commanders of Fox Company. Had all three blown correctly it is likely that a dozen or more soldiers would have died or been badly injured.

Despite this, the presence of the bombs give the tactical advantage to the Taleban. Caught in a spider's web of bombs, the men have to move out into the exposed fields rather than take cover. But, notes Coughlan, if the Taleban were still around they remained hidden, wary of the Cobra helicopters overhead.

This enables the unit's bomb disposal engineers to sweep methodically with metal detectors. They find naked, hair-thin copper wires in the soil, trailing towards the treeline and a compound 100 yards away. But, as the Americans prepare to advance on the compound with ANA soldiers, the Taleban deploy another "weapon": a group of women and children emerge, moving into the middle of the unfolding battle and making for the same compound. The attack has to be halted.

Then, as the troops move forward again, engineers find a fourth bomb, buried in a wall. This is defused and the advance resumes. But, as they traverse a field, one soldier spots two stakes buried in the ground. They are a marker for a watching bomb triggerman. The unit halts and explosives experts moved forward with their minesweepers. They find a command wire and two separate 40lb cylinders of explosive. These are detonated, scattering earth over a 100 yard area.

As they pull up the wire they discover it appears to lead to the village mosque. And, as had been the case all day, none of the locals appeared to know why.

From all this, though, Coughlan draws certain conclusions, which are not entirely in accord with his own experience on the day: "... firepower," he observes, "can become meaningless when the enemy makes skilful preparation of the ground and has no scruples about cloaking itself with the lives of the local population."

On one level, of course, he is right but he himself notes that the Taleban are reluctant to follow through their ambushes with direct fire attacks, owing to the presence of the Cobra attack helicopters. Firepower has its uses.

Furthermore, while firepower does not influence the placing of IEDs, technology certainly assists in detecting them, as does the fieldcraft of one of the Marines. Here, though, one must ask why it is that the UAVs were not of more assistance in this endeavour.

Coughlan's colleague on The Times himself reports on the utility of UAVs in detecting bomb emplacers. One wonders whether the UAVs were used merely as "top cover" once the operation had started and whether they were over the area well in advance, in an effort to detect the enemy's preparations.

One also has to note the use of hand-held detectors, which are only deployed after the first IEDs are detonated, even though their presence in this area must be assumed. And it is here that we wonder whether the Americans are much better prepared to deal with the IED than the British.

In a previous piece we drew attention to the use by the Rhodesians of the Pookie mine detection vehicle, which was used to clear the way down bush trails, ahead of food patrols. In this instance, we have the photographs of Jack Hill which shows a considerable element of open country.

The terrain maybe would not permit the use of equipment such as the Buffalo or even the Husky, but a vehicle similar to the Pookie (with the advanced technology available today) surely would be of value. As in the past, where tanks were used to shield foot soldiers advancing on the enemy, in this different type of a war, it does not seem untoward to argue that a different type of armour should be used for a different but nonetheless deadly threat.

Such technology is not always the answer and, in some cases, even dogs are being used by both the British and the Americans. These animals, though, have their limitations in a kinetic (combat) situation, not least because they become the targets. This leaves again the question as to why the military seem so keen to expose flesh and blood to the perils of IEDs when steel could do more of the job.

COMMENT THREAD

Is this is what it's about?

Thomas Harding in The Daily Telegraph is reporting that the major British offensive in Afghanistan (Panther's Claw) that has led to a large loss of life and many wounded "has strengthened Britain's battered relationship with America".

This is according to a "senior defence source" who is telling us that: "It has shown that other people are making the sacrifice and sharing the burden. American has been through their Golgotha moment and they admire a country that steps up to the plate and does the heavy lifting."

Once again, it seems, the shadow of Iraq looms, with the British Army highly sensitive about its performance there, even if it is holding the line with its public pretence that the campaign was successful. A big "push" in Afghanistan, therefore, is seen as a way of restoring the Army's reputation.

We wrote about this in April, when the call for 2,000 more troops was first gaining traction. With a flood of US troops due into Helmand, there was no great strategic sense in adding a much smaller number of British troops to the fray, especially as the supporting infrastructure – such as protected vehicles, helicopters, UAVs and the rest – was already inadequate. What was very clear - as we then wrote - was that the Army was playing games:

Confronted with its own inadequacies, it has therefore - in the time-honoured fashion of bureaucracies since the dawn of time - raised a cry for "more resources" as the answer to all ills, not least because when they are not delivered the fault (and blame) can be transferred. It then "briefs" heavily to its friends in the media, to ensure its version of events lodges in the public consciousness, thus establishing its alibi for when things go "belly-up".

We returned to this theme in early June, noting how the Army "line" had evolved into a "warning" that the reputation of the armed forces would suffer in the eyes of senior American commanders unless an autumn surge was authorised. Our "senior commanders" are saying that such a surge would signal Britain's intent to "pull its weight".

Now it is that, for precisely that reason – it seems – theatre commanders have embarked on a risky and costly adventure, with uncertain effect and dubious strategic benefit, merely to salvage the tarnished reputation of the Army brass.

And dubious it is. Watching recently a Canadian journalist in Kandahar, describing the coalition air effort, I saw him explain how helicopters were so vitally necessary. Such was the poor condition of the road network that a journey to the area of operation, which would take no more than 20 minutes on good roads, could take four hours or more. And, as we know, mobility is further hampered by the inability of roads and bridges to take heavy traffic, limiting movement of certain types of vehicle.

Thus, the operation was entirely supported by a constant shuttle of helicopters, making a nine-minute journey to the "front line", leaving the road network under the control of the Taleban, who mine it and prey on the civilian population.

It cannot be stressed enough that the basis of governance is communications – roads in particular – and what we are seeing is the legacy of eight years of neglect, where the Western aid effort has been misplaced, misdirected and badly managed, leaving the road network in a worse condition than when we started. Thus, in the absence of the tactical mobility afforded by that network, we are forced to rely on expensive assets such as helicopters.

The point here is that the fundamental coalition strategy is one of "take, hold and build" – or "shake 'n' bake" as we call it. The idea is to create a "security bubble" in which the civilian development agencies can then operate, implementing their redevelopment agenda.

This is a strategy that has already failed – not least because the "security bubble" is urban-centred, where it is easier to maintain security. It failed because the bulk of the Afghani population is rural – 80 percent or more – highly dispersed, living off the land.

To maintain country-wide security on a "take and hold" basis would require the dispersion of the security forces, putting them in extreme peril, unless there are huge numbers. There, conservative estimates are of 500,000 or more, simply to maintain a basic presence. Clearly, there is no way the coalition is going to put that resource into the field, and the Afghani security forces cannot take up the slack. That simply is not going to happen any time soon.

The alternative is to build the road network, and then police it. It is not helicopters that are force multipliers, as Malloch Brown was saying in September last year – when no one was particularly listening – it is the tactical mobility afforded by helicopters. But these machines are only one mechanism of delivery.

In the "hold" phase of the current strategy, responsibility for security is supposed to devolve to the Afghani forces, and they are not generously supplied with helicopters – or at all. And there are no plans to remedy that situation. It would be hideously expensive even to try, and we are having enough difficulty equipping our own forces.

Therefore, the Afghan forces are going to have to rely on the road network, often using light, unarmoured vehicles with limited off-road performance. If they are to succeed, we have to build a high quality, secure road network. This should not follow the "take" phase – it should be part of it, just as building the rail system opened up the "wild west" in North America.

The communication system brought with it the security – it did not follow it. And, where the US Army Corps of Engineers played a vital part in opening up the territory, so too must the British Army open up Helmand. This can never be achieved by civilian agencies.

It is here, oddly, that helicopters are vital, but not the ponderous heavy and medium lift machines that are so much the focus of attention. Back in November 2006, we were writing about the need for small, tactical helicopters that could deliver rapid reaction units quickly, to where they were needed.

The thinking was very much on the lines of the highly successful Rhodesian Fireforce model, where small packets of troops could interdict terrorist movements, disrupting their communications and never allowing them to concentrate their forces or dominate the ground. A good road network, allowing policing by local forces, with the rapid back-up of highly mobile forces on these lines, together with good road security, has been demonstrated time and time again to be a winning formula.

Instead of that, we have large, ponderous formations, ploughing up the territory, "breaking things and killing people", fighting battles which have been described as similar to the conventional "break-out" battle, of a type and tempo known the generals of World War I. The objective is to take territory which we know we cannot hold, and for which there will never be the resources to hold within the context of the strategy so far defined. To assert otherwise is moonshine - this strategy could suck in the entire British Army and it would not make the slightest difference.

The campaign, therefore, is being set up for another of those "heroic failures" at which the British Army excels. We will have been seen to have been "doing our bit", contributing to the "heavy lifting" and spilling enough blood for the Generals to salvage their own pride and look the Americans squarely in the eye.

But as an exercise in counter-insurgency, the Generals might just as well parade their troops in red coats, lining them up to fire their muskets into the tree lines to scare off the natives. At least then they would do less damage and it may be just as impressive for the Americans, who always did have a soft-spot for our quaint traditions. Perhaps we could even burn down the White House again. With Obama inside, that could be as effective as anything "Our Boys" are actually doing in Helmand.

COMMENT THREAD

The trouble with armoured vehicles

Originally published by Defence Management
Wednesday, July 08, 2009

Several of the MoD's newest armoured vehicles already have major design flaws according to defence author Richard North. The old way of thinking has to change.

The MoD and Armed Forces are unable to learn from their mistakes or admit erroneous decisions in the design and procurement of armoured vehicles resulting in a string of inadequate vehicles being sent to the frontlines of Afghanistan and tragically as a result, large numbers of casualties, a prominent defence author has said.

The death of Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe last week in a Viking armoured vehicle brought a renewed focus to the MoD's armoured fighting vehicle strategy. Although IEDs and landmines have proven to be an effective weapon utilised by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MoD has only been partially successful in buying better protected vehicles. .

Richard North, author of the book "Ministry of Defeat" and the editor of the Defence of the Realm blog, outlined to Defencemanagement.com a series of poor procurement decisions and strategies that have resulted in a widely ineffective fleet of armoured vehicles coming up against IEDs and landmines.

"The concept of risk has been ignored," North said in an interview. As a result this premise is "eroding the ability to field certain vehicles."

The vehicle protection problems faced by British troops today in Afghanistan can be traced back to various campaigns during the Cold War era including in Rhodesia. The effectiveness of using IEDs on vehicles became clear yet military planners in the US and Britain for the most part ignored the new threats. Heavier armoured vehicles have to be transferred by ship because they are too heavy to fly. Military planners felt that this negated the advantages that an expeditionary force would have.

Even after the use of IEDs became a prevalent tool of the insurgency in Iraq, procurement officials in Britain continued to buy the same types of vehicles for operations in Afghanistan.

The Snatch, Viking and Vector were all sent to Afghanistan in the first year of major British combat operations but are now all being withdrawn from service due to their flawed designs and a lack of adequate armour to deflect explosions. Dozens of British servicemen have died in the vehicles during operations due to poor protection even though Snatch was upgraded with additional armour and the Viking and Vector vehicles were procured in 2006.

Protection has been the primary focus of vehicle designers in an effort to overcome casualties caused by bomb attacks. While there have been some successes such as the Mastiff and Ridgeback armoured vehicles, which the Taliban have effectively given up attacking, there have been widespread concerns with other models in the new fleet of vehicles the MoD has procured under an urgent operational requirement.

The Jackal has attracted the most concerns due to its design according to North. The front seats are over the front wheels making the driver and front passenger vulnerable to any explosion. Problems with the weight distribution have made the Jackal susceptible to rollovers, and bolt on armour has proven to be ineffective and has taken away the little mobility the vehicle has.

Army commanders have also been forced to use the vehicle, originally designed for off-road reconnaissance, for fixed road reconnaissance, supply escorts and patrols.

Already ten servicemen have died in the Jackal, despite the MoD spending hundreds of millions of pounds procuring it.

But the problems do not stop there. Last year the MoD ordered 262 Husky armoured vehicles from Navistar Defence, to be used as medium sized command and support vehicle in less dangerous areas. But according to North the deal came just as it was confirmed that the Husky had failed a blast test during a US Army vehicle contract competition. US Army officials are alleged to have expressed concerns over the "basic" design of the hull bridge which resulted in the Husky failing the mine test.

Given the success of v-shaped hulls on vehicles in Afghanistan, it is not clear why the MoD is procuring a standard hulled vehicle. Word of the US Army test failure was not announced until after the MoD had signed the £150m contract with Navistar.

There are also concerns over the new Panther armoured vehicle which North calls fundamentally flawed and "stupidity beyond measure". Panther is a designated command vehicle which will allow the Taliban to target higher ranking officers and field commanders in greater numbers than ever before.

The MoD is scheduled to buy 400 of the vehicles which North describes as "a fine modern product of the Italian automobile industry, and therefore completely unsuitable for military use."

The outside of the vehicle is made from "crushable" or "deformable" materials. While the Panther is well protected, any attack by an IED or mine will cause significant damage to the vehicle resulting in it becoming non-operational.

Procurement officials spent £400,000 per vehicle but it did not come with adequate protection for the engine, no electronic counter measures equipment and it only held three people. North estimates that by the time the full upgrades are completed, the MoD could be spending up to £700,000 on a vehicle that the insurgents can destroy with £20 worth of explosives.

The MoD for its part has argued that a number of upgrades have made the Husky, Jackal and Panther better protected and more able to deal with the operational challenges in Afghanistan.

The number of vehicle design flaws is part of a wider debate on mobility v. protection. Many vehicle design experts have argued that you cannot have both. If you have an agile vehicle it is limited in how much armour it can have. If you have a heavily armoured vehicle, case in point the Mastiff, you lose the element of surprise and ability to rapidly descend on the enemy or exit an operational centre.

North disagrees.

"I think it is a false paradigm. The Army doctrine says that you optimise on mobility and for specific theatres or specific threats you add on protection. Protection is seen as a separate issue added on after the event with design parameters," North said.

The problem is that when a "mobile" vehicle needs additional protection, engineers use bolt on armour which prejudices mobility. Vehicle engineers and procurement officials in turn conclude that mobility and protection are mutually contradictory.

Bolt on armour in many cases has proven to be ineffective against IEDs and mines.

Engineers should instead be "optimising for protection and then adding mobility" in vehicles according to North. A mobile well protected vehicle is possible but it would require a different mindset throughout the MoD's project teams and within industry.

There is still a large adherence to the successes of the past, North argued. Using mobile armoured vehicles to defeat Rommel in North Africa in the 1940s is still a primary reference point for today's armoured vehicle fighting strategies even though the scope of warfare has changed dramatically since then.

As a result, of the hundreds of new vehicles the MoD is rushing into service, many are plagued with design flaws or are used the wrong way.

"They are repeating the same mistakes and are doomed to repeat them over and over again," North said. With problems and concerns already arising in the Husky, Jackal and Panther vehicles, more mistakes could be on the way.

Richard North is the author of "Ministry of Defeat" and the website Defence of the Realm.

COMMENT THREAD

Playing politics with peoples' lives

Although ostensibly addressing a serious deficiency in our military capabilities which is affected the campaign in Afghanistan, there is something distinctly tawdry about the way the Defence Committee has today "rushed out" a report on helicopter lift.

The nuance would not be apparent to most but this is the same committee which has never seriously addressed the issue of mine/blast protected vehicles – and the management of the IED threat generally. Yet, a significant proportion of the current casualty rate stems demonstrably from inadequacies in the Army fleet of vehicles, and the lacklustre approach to controlling IEDs. The problem here is far more serious than the perceived shortage of helicopter lift.

On that basis, it is very hard to escape the conclusion that chairman James Arbuthnot is indulging in the not-unknown political sport of bandwagon-riding, hitching his star to an issue because it has – more for the sake of expediency than on its intrinsic merits – been catapulted into the public consciousness.

One cannot nevertheless gainsay all the Committee's findings or its primary conclusion that the lack of helicopters is "undermining operations". Even then, we could dispute its conclusion that this stems from a shortage of medium and heavy lift battlefield helicopters.

When one looks at the ponderous tactical deployment of British forces in the field, and the intrinsic vulnerabilities of such helicopters, there is at least an argument that the operational need would be better served (in part at least) by a larger number of smaller, tactical helicopters, on the lines of the Rhodesian "Fireforce" model which deployed multiple sticks of four soldiers from Allouette III helicopters, each machine armed with a 20mm cannon.

Arbuthnot and his merry men, however, do not even enter this territory, trapped as they are in an orthodoxy which rests with their oft' demonstrated inability to think outside the box – or draw evidence from outside the military-industrial complex.

Thus we see the Committee recommending the "pork barrel" route to enhancing capacity, going for the procurement of new helicopters, oblivious to alternatives and totally ignoring the cost implications. More seriously, given that the capacity shortfall needs addressing urgently, the MPs have opted for the slowest possible route, offering absolutely nothing that will fill immediate needs.

Then, although not given prominence in the Committee's press release, the
"bandwagon agenda" emerges in the media coverage of the report, as was surely the intention. Thus we have The Times currently reporting that, "The lack of helicopters available to British troops in Afghanistan is costing lives, MPs concluded today." Worryingly, we also see written, the assertion that:

Extra medium-lift support helicopters would cut down on the number of road convoys that have proved vulnerable to Taleban attacks. Twelve of the 15 deaths in Afghanistan over the past fortnight have been caused by roadside bombs.

This, possibly, is added in by the journalist Michael Evans, and relies in part from the populist (child-like, even) tendency to describe IEDs as "roadside bombs".

However, to make the link between these casualties and a shortage of helicopters is tendentious, to say the very least, if not downright dishonest. But, once the virus is in the system, never let it be said the British journalists will ignore it. This is now the narrative, and narrative it shall be.

As for cutting down the number of road convoys, thereby reducing the number of attacks, we have the news of the recent loss of the Mi-26 which was performing precisely the role of cutting down road convoys, yet neither Michael Evans nor the Defence Committee take this into account. One could take the cynical view that, because only six Ukrainians and an Afghani child died, this does not matter – as long as our "Brave Boys" are not killed.

But, as David Axe discusses, although civilian helicopters may not be as well protected from missile (MANPAD) threats as military hardware, this machine may have been brought down by an RPG – against which there is no protection other than tactical flying.

Yet, as one of our readers reminded us, not too long ago, an RAF Chinook was very nearly brought down by an RPG. Only exceptionally skilled flying – and luck - saved the day. And, if that is hazard enough, if the Taleban do manage successfully to deploy anti-aircraft guns, the machine they hit is toast. "Game over," as we said. It is unlikely that the momentum for withdrawal would be stoppable.

In his narrow pursuit of more helicopter lift, therefore, Arbuthnot and his committee may be pushing for a course of action which might increase risk, not reduce it – even without taking into account other factors, which we rehearsed in an earlier post.

The idea that transferring troops from the roads to helicopters very much stems from experience in Northern Ireland but, as we pointed out, the situation in Afghanistan is not the same. While in the earlier campaign, the troops were largely the targets of the terrorists, in Afghanistan, the Afghani security forces and the civilian population are also being killed. If we abandon the roads, in pursuit of the notional (but possibly ephemeral) safety of our own troops, we cede the game to the terrorists.

This is brought home by a recent, haunting piece in the New York Times which refers to the tendency of the coalition forces to look after their own, concerning themselves less with the safety of Afghan forces who work alongside them and who are taking far greater casualties.

Given that the strategic plan is eventually to hand over to Afghan forces, it is difficult to accept that these personnel will even begin to assume the burden as long as they see their better-equipped – and highly risk averse - "partners" using their resources to avoid the very hazards to which the indigenous forces are also exposed, with far greater consequences (pictured above – an ANP patrol vehicle destroyed by an IED which killed five, including a senior commander).

Support for the Afghanis, therefore, would suggest that we have to share the same threat environment, which means that countermeasures and protection must apply to all, not just the select few.

The answer there – in dealing with IEDs – is not for coalition forces to run away from the threat but to deal with it, using the many technical and other measures at their disposal, to ensure not only their safety (as far as that is possible) but also to protect Afghani forces and civilians.

While, thus, the Defence Committee is enjoying the ride on its new-found bandwagon, it is missing the point – perhaps deliberately – and playing with peoples' lives.

COMMENT THREAD

An unwinnable war?

The Daily Mail has deployed its heavy weapon on the Afghan front today, rolling out Max Hastings to tell us, "Why Lance-Corporal Elson and our other 175 soldiers killed in an unwinnable war deserve better from this country."

L/Cpl Elson is the last but one, of seven, soldiers to be killed in Afghanistan within a week – killed by an IED. At least Hastings cuts though the cant, remarking that it is hard to find much heroic about being blown up by a mine, the fate of so many soldiers in Helmand.

IEDs, he writes, impact significantly upon morale. Most men cheerfully take their chances in firefights, where superior skills and equipment usually enable them to prevail. But it is a wretched business, to march or ride daily through the Afghan countryside, knowing that at any moment one might be blown to eternity without the smallest chance of averting fate.

Unfortunately, Hastings then repeats the corrosive manta which is so beloved of the MoD and much of the military, telling is that "No armoured vehicle is proof against mines containing up to 500lb of explosive, such as the Taliban now employ." He is actually wrong there, which is why we've put up that famous picture of the destroyed Cougar again. That is reputed to have taken a hit from a 300lb charge – and the crew walked away with very light injuries.

That is not, of course, 500lb, but the weight comparison is misleading, as the really big bombs the Taleban are using are made from agricultural fertiliser – helpfully provided by the Western aid agencies. As such, they have only about a third of the explosive force of TNT and other military explosives – of the type that hit the Cougar. Not always, but even the big bombs are survivable.

As much to the point, although some big bombs are used, they are still the exception – they are difficult to get to site, very difficult to bury and expose the emplacers to a much higher risk of detection. More typical is this example recounted by a "Gateshead soldier" Corporal Dan Henderson.

He was on a routine patrol in Helmand Province when he noticed a suspicious bump in a road frequently used by food and medical supply vehicles. And after inspecting the mound, a 20-kilo roadside bomb was discovered – "the kind which has claimed the lives of scores of our troops."

With no time to spare, Cpl Henderson and his unit sealed off the area, close to the town of Musa Qala, before calling in bomb disposal experts to destroy the device. "It was 20 kilos of homemade explosive – the sort of thing that could do some serious damage," said Henderson. "Even a heavily-armed vehicle could still be knocked a few feet in the air."

He then added: "An unarmed vehicle wouldn't stand a chance. A British convoy was due to move across the route that it happened to be on. The Taliban obviously had their own information."

Even at that level, a Viking would be ripped apart if the bomb was detonated in the right place, but a Mastiff, a Ridgeback – or any other vehicle designed on the same principles – would shrug it off. There may, nevertheless, be bombs that will defeat these protected vehicles, although none have killed anyone in a Mastiff yet.

But to argue that we should not use protected vehicles because "bigger bombs" can defeat them is akin to arguing that soldiers should not wear bullet-proof body armour because it will not defeat RPGs. Similarly, we can dispense with tanks and go to war on bicycles because even the heaviest tank can be knocked out by an anti-tank missile.

To my mind, these are the sort of issues we should be discussing – how to bring protected mobility into theatre so as to restore freedom of movement to the battlefield, not only for mounted operations but also for foot patrols.

Here, we see a link to a BBC TV report from Ian Pannell, describing how the Taleban use multiple IEDs to slow down the advance of British troops, who have to use hand-held nine detectors to clear the way before they can move into positions. This gives time for the Taleban to assemble their forces to mount an attack.


Yet, in their Bush War, the Rhodesians had the Pookie mine detection vehicle (illustrated above) – small enough and light enough to lead the way down tracks, to clear the way for advancing troops. Surely, thirty years on, it is not beyond the capability of our procurement geniuses in the MoD to come up with something similar?

The trouble is – as with the Clegg – we do not get that sort of debate. Clegg, for instance, talks about wanting more troops for the "take and hold" (aka "shake 'n' bake") strategy, without any discussion of the possibility that this might be fundamentally flawed, and can never work.

So it is with Hastings. There is a long whinge in which – in passing – he refers to Major Patrick Little, and cites his comment that, "All is not well in the British Army." But he does not develop the theme. Instead, he withdraws to his comfort zone by declaring that, "There is still supreme professionalism in the British Army, together with a cheerful willingness to accept the risks of a soldier's calling."

There is a growing climate of unrest and anger that they [the troops] are called upon to fight a costly war with inadequate resources, no Afghan gratitude and cynical indifference from the British Government, then declares the Hasting, deciding that "this Labour Government sent the British Army to fight and die in Afghanistan, and bears an absolute responsibility."

For all that, Hasting is "not one of those who favours quitting immediately." Afghanistan's collapse into anarchy could have a grave effect on Pakistan, he says. But, he avers, "the security situation is deteriorating, and those in charge are muddling. We must do Afghanistan differently or admit defeat and come home."

Yea ... alright Mr Hasting. We must do it differently. But how would you do it? Come to think of it Mr Clegg, how would you do it - apart from more European co-operation?

COMMENT THREAD

The wrong debate

See also: Time to get this sorted

With its unerring instinct for getting it wrong, the BBC – in the persona of its defence correspondent Caroline Wyatt – is framing the debate over the use of the Viking and the deaths of Lt-Col Thorneloe and Tpr Joshua Hammond as one of "armour versus mobility", suggesting that there is "a fine balance."

To be fair, she is not the only one to get it wrong. This is the way much of the British military thinks, thus channelling the argument into a sterile comparison between the merits of the heavy but well-protected Mastiff and the lighter, more mobile vehicles such as the Viking and the Jackal.

As the military would have it - enunciated by Amyas Godfrey to the BBC and also to The Guardian - the choice of which armoured vehicle to use in any campaign is a question of balancing risks and benefits.

"It is all about getting the balance right between the need for armour and the need to be light and flexible, with the ability to go off-road," says Godfrey. "Mobility is a form of protection in itself, and with heavier armour, you sacrifice mobility for greater protection."

At that entirely superficial level, there is some merit in Godfrey's assertions. Roads are a natural target for terrorists and, as that picture above shows, one particular weak point is the culvert bomb, which is fiendishly dangerous and requires a great deal of manpower and other resource to thwart. The ability to transit an area avoiding the roads – and such devices – is therefore an obvious advantage.

However, one almost gets tired of the repetition here, having yet again to draw the distinction between design and weight. Godfrey, in common with so many of his ilk, equates protection with "heavier armour".

Such are the constraints on their own thinking that they seem incapable of understanding that mine/IED protection is not primarily a function of weight of armour but of design – the principles of which we elaborated recently. It is this complete failure of the military establishment to understand these fundamentals which lies at the heart of this sterile debate.

To that extent, as we have so often observed, mobility and protection are not mutually exclusive. It is only the sterile thinking of the British military which makes it so. It would be perfectly feasible – by design - to produce a tracked vehicle with the mobility of the Viking, yet with the inherent protection of a Mastiff. This should not add significantly to the weight or, more particularly, hamper mobility.

Those proponents of the Viking, who argue that its mobility has saved more lives than its lack of protection have lost, are therefore arguing from a false premise. Mobility and protection are not mutually exclusive – it is possible to have both.

There are, however, other issues to address, where the whole argument on off-road mobility falls apart. One of those is the "pinch" or "choke" point problem, which we have also discussed. No matter how good a vehicle's off-road performance might be, there are natural features in any terrain which restrict and funnel movement into predictable areas, and it is there that ambushes are so often mounted.

Even in wide open spaces, there are constraints. As Tom Coughlan writes in The Times of the Viking, "in the heavily irrigated fields along the Helmand river, room for manoeuvre is more limited, and churning up farmers' fields with its tracks will not help to win the support of the local populace."

This then leads to a paradox, where designers optimise for off-road performance and then, to deal with the occasional but deadly ambush, add armour to their vehicles. They end up – as they did with the Vector – compromising performance without significantly improving protection. The outcome is an off-road vehicle with less performance than a custom-design protected vehicle, from which stems the mantra that you cannot keep increasing weight.

Locked into this trap – yet under pressure to reduce casualties - they have nowhere to go but to develop bigger and stronger vehicles in order to carry more armour. This is precisely the line adopted with the Viking, where it is to be replaced by the Warthog – a vehicle with heavier armour but sharing the same design flaws.

However, Major-General Julian Thompson, who commanded 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines in the Falklands conflict in 1982, makes a different point. He tells The Times - undoubtedly based on his experience in Aden and then Northern Ireland: "The question is not whether one vehicle or another is sufficiently armoured, it's about the lack of helicopters. We need more helicopters in Afghanistan to ferry troops in high-risk areas."


This is a good point. The ultimate mine protected vehicle is the helicopter. Unfortunately, as we pointed out earlier, the option of relying on helicopters is not available to the coalition forces, and not entirely because there is a shortage.

Unlike Northern Ireland, where the security forces were the main target of the terrorists, in Afghanistan the population in general is being attacked, particularly on the roads, which are needed to move large quantities of supplies. They are used heavily by Afghan security forces and civilians.

To abandon those roads to an enemy which is indiscriminately slaughtering civilians as well as the security forces is also to abandon any attempt at winning "hearts and minds". The military must maintain a strong presence on the roads and, therefore, will always be exposed to a risk that cannot be mitigated by the greater use of helicopters.

Nevertheless, there are limitations to the amount of protection that can be afforded, even in the best designed vehicle. To make that point - or something akin to it - Caroline Wyatt calls in aid the spokesman for Task Force Helmand, Lt-Col Nick Richardson.

He insists the Viking remains an excellent vehicle, telling us that, "Armour is the last resort in terms of defeating the threat. It is much better to be able to avoid the threat than to have to rely on the armour defeating the threat when it is initiated. He then states: "It doesn't matter how much armour you have - it can always be overcome if you make the charge big enough."

The "bigger bomb" threat is overstated, an issue we have promised to address in a separate post, and neither should "armour" (more properly, protection) be considered the last resort.

In their Bush War between 1962 and 1980, the Rhodesian Army found that it was impossible to ensure that the thousands of miles of unpaved roads were kept clear of mines and IEDs. Therefore, vehicle protection was treated as a routine precaution. (See this study by Franz J Gayl - 147 pages, pdf).


That notwithstanding, protection is by no means the only precaution. Route clearance – using basic devices such as mine rollers (pictured above) plus more sophisticated technical aids, and even sniffer dogs - route proving, surveillance, routine patrolling to deter activity, intelligence, interdiction of supplies and disrupting the bomb-makers are all part of the armoury which must be deployed to defeat the joint threat of the mine and the IED.

To distil the argument down to one of "armour versus mobility", therefore, is as facile as arguing that either armour or mobility is the answer. But there is no more facile an argument than to assert that "armour" – i.e., protection – must be sacrificed to mobility. That is the wrong debate.

COMMENT THREAD

Boy Racer procurement syndrome "killing soldiers"

Recent deaths of soldiers in military vehicles in Afghanistan are the result of poor procurement choices, influenced more by looks and performance than operational needs claims Richard North, author of Ministry of Defeat published later this week. Many of the vehicles pressed into service in Iraq and Afghanistan would be more at home amongst the middle aged boy racers on Jeremy Clarkson's Top Gear programme or tearing round city centres late at night than on a modern battlefield.

The Army policy appears to be to buy vehicles for their looks, "uparmour" them at great cost but still leave them as effective as chocolate fireguards against the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) – the insurgency weapon of choice in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

One of the worst examples is the Army's new Jackal high mobility gun platform, described as a "Land Rover on steroids" and dubbed the "Mad Max monster machine" when it was unveiled by the Army in June 2007.

Hugely popular with troops for its speed, manoeuvrability and comfortable ride, it's nonetheless lethal! Including the two soldiers tragically killed on Saturday May 30th in Helmand Province, already eight soldiers have since been killed in these £400,000 machines, many more have been seriously injured and over 20 vehicles have been written off after mine strikes or roadside bomb damage.

The loss rate is not surprising says North. The vehicle was originally designed as a high mobility truck and gun tractor and has since been converted into a "weapons platform" with the addition of two machine guns. First introduced into Afghanistan without armour, it has since been "uparmoured" twice, each time because it could not withstand Taleban attacks.

Modern protected vehicles are custom-designed and can withstand bombs as large as 300lb, something which converted vehicles can never do. In the Army's dedicated mine protected vehicle, the Mastiff, no lives have been lost, despite it being in service in two years longer than the Jackal.

An even worse example is the recently ordered Husky "support vehicle". It is based on the US-built International MXT pickup, a civilian competitor to the Hummer. Launched in 2004, it was decribed by the manufacturers as a "sleek and dominant truck geared for the 'image' truck market, a growing niche of truck owners who want to make a powerful statement about who they are."

With 200 ordered by the MoD in April this year, at a cost of £120 million, the Husky has been converted for military use with "bolt-on" armour. The same version was offered to the US Army for a procurement competition for an off-road mine protected vehicle to serve in Afghanistan. But, in the same week of the MoD order, it was learned that the US Army had failed the vehicle during its compulsory mine protection test and had been ruled our of the competition.

Again, North is unsurprised. Without what is known as a "v-shaped hull" as a basic part of the design, it is difficult to protect vehicles properly. Yet, with the right design, even light vehicles can withstand blasts that cripple tanks ten times their weight.

The Army, he says, is regressing in its approach to armoured vehicle design. The first ever production armoured car was built by the French in 1904. It was a commercial vehicle with bolt-on armour. After the Second World War, new technologies and experience enabled far more effective vehicles to be built, incorporating the armour into the basic structure. Now, the Army is going back to pre-war technology – pre First World War. And men are dying as a result.

Ironically, the British were the pioneers in mine protected vehicles, building army trucks in 1966 for the Aden campaign. The technology was further developed by the Rhodesians for their Bush War in the 1970s and then by South Africans. It has since been adopted by the US which is currently running a competition for a high-mobility mine protected vehicle.

It was in this competition that the Husky failed which means that the MoD is buying vehicles rejected by the Americans. But, with its chunky, macho looks, on the Top Gear show, it would win every time.

COMMENT THREAD

Not that important

Two more soldiers have been killed, probably in a Jackal, bringing the number eight who have lost their lives in this machine. Two more have died in Vikings, one in an incident on 14 May and the other on the 22nd.

Compare and contrast with the Mastiff (pictured above) after a mine or IED strike in Afghanistan. From the damage – not least to the bar armour on the sides - it looks to have been a very significant explosion. Whether there were any injuries, we do not know, but there were no deaths. Despite multiple strikes, not one soldier has ever been killed in a Mastiff.

What also comes over very clearly from the video grab – taken from a short film on the 2 Scots Mastiff Company – is the "v-shaped" hull profile. It is this that provides the degree of protection which has enabled the occupants of the vehicle to survive – a design attribute which cannot be "bolted on" after the event.

Other techniques can also be used. One is "distance" – maximising the distance between the expected location of the blast and the crew compartment. This can be achieved by putting the engine in front of the cab – the so-called "engine forward" design – and by ensuring the vehicle has high ground clearance. This latter attribute is, in any event, a feature of off-road vehicles.

The use of energy absorbing materials is also valuable – and not necessarily high-tech. The Rhodesians found that by half-filling tyres with water absorbed much of the blast from a mine strike, improving survivability. At the other end of the scale are deformable materials which, in the process of being deformed by a blast, absorb energy and thus reduce the force transmitted to the hull of the vehicle.

This technique is often combined with the use of "sacrificial" parts – like wheels and mudguards – which are so designed as to allow them to be blown off by the force of a blast, so absorbing energy.

Both the Jackal (right) and the Viking (below left), however, lack the "v-shaped" hull profile and although they are armoured, without this design feature, there is a limit to what armour can do. Up to a point, heavy armour can provide a degree of protection but, unless it is shaped to deflect blast, the weight requirement will end up being so formidable that the vehicle so equipped will not be able to function.

In each case, other protection features are absent as well, especially with the Jackal which has a "cab forward" design, making the driver and his front passenger particularly vulnerable to IEDs and mines which explode under the front wheels.

That these vehicles should be so vulnerable – by design – is an indictment of the MoD and its military "customers". In a theatre where the IED and mine are the weapons of choice for the insurgents, it is – to say the very least – unwise to field vehicles which cannot protect their crews from these basic weapons.

Basic principles, developed in the 60s by the British Army and industry, since developed and refined by the Rhodesians, the South Africans, Israelis and Americans, have been virtually ignored by the very people who pioneered them, with the inevitable result that troops have died and are dying unnecessarily.

But, if the MoD and military have been slow to embrace this – with successive defence secretaries failing to force the pace – theirs is not the ultimate responsibility for our troops being furnished with inadequate equipment. As we never tire of saying, the buck ultimately stops with Parliament as it – constitutionally – is the body charged with scrutinising the government and holding it to account.

To be fair, it is not just this Parliament which is at fault. The first mine-protected vehicles were taken on charge in 1966 and, when they were finally paid off, they do not appear to have been replaced. Then and subsequently, no one seems to have asked why not.

When in 1992 or thereabouts, the Army again found the need to purchase mine protected vehicles, the event seems to have gone unrecorded outside the military. And when again, those vehicles were paid off in 2003, and replaced by small numbers of different vehicles, again no one seems to have remarked on the event.

Yet, when the need for mine/blast protected vehicles is so evident, and the US is undergoing a programme of identifying the next generation, light high-mobility mine protected vehicles, there is very little evidence that Parliament as an institution is taking the matter seriously.

For sure, Ann Winterton has raised the matter again and again and again and again. But no other MP seems to have embraced the issue, the opposition front benches have remained largely silent and the Defence Committee has been worse than useless. And one MP endlessly "banging on" is not enough. MPs must "hunt as a pack" if they are to achieve anything. Without more support, this issue is going nowhere.

Now, at the end of this Parliament – some time next year, one assumes – Ann will be retiring. Almost certainly, we will have a new administration, drawn from the very MPs who have not yet stirred themselves on this issue. That does not auger well for the future. Whether the demoralised and much depleted numbers of Labour MPs will be able to mount an effective attack looks very unlikely.

On that basis, the prognosis for the future looks very poor – depressingly so. With the one consistent champion of properly designed vehicles departing the field, there does not look to be a replacement. Even if there was, one would not be enough. Parliament will be the weaker for the loss of its champion and it is a poor reflection on the institution that, when all is said and done, MPs do not really regard the unnecessary deaths of soldiers as that important.

COMMENT THREAD

They still don't get it

It is quite amusing in a macabre sort of way to see the so-called "political" media and blogs dive for cover when there is a real political issue on the agenda.

And whatever the finer details, the final retreat of the British from Iraq and the ongoing war in Afghanistan are intensely political issues which cast their shadow into the future, defining and shaping our defence and foreign policies and indeed our perception of ourselves as a nation.

The sheer complexity of the issues, however, defy easy analysis. Furthermore, the paucity of information make attempts at analysis and comment prone to error and misunderstanding, while following through the threads of discussion and argument require brutally hard work.

All of which might explain in part why so many take the easy option and either ignore the issues or rely on "drive-by" comment little better informed than "man-in-pub" gossip.

Heavily into that category is the pathetically tivial analysis of the Iraqi campaign by David Blair in The Daily Telegraph. This is put into perspective by just one comment on the online edition. It reads:

As a former regular officer, I am fed up with all these pieces of so-called reportage which are permeated by talk of the Forces' "quiet pride". Sickening stuff. This article is very short on statistics - and offers not even a perspective on the situation from a few locals which might answer the headline's question. The whole Iraq episode was shameful - politically and strategically, even if individual soldiers did their duty as (still!) expected.

This, in respect of Iraq is very much the line we take. Individual soldiers did do their duty and too many paid the ultimate price for what indeed were "shameful" military and political failures. At least, though, The Times is reporting defence secretary John Hutton declaring that there would need to be a "proper investigation" into the failings of the mission.

It is this which is exercising David Cameron and other opposition politicians, with Cameron calling for an immediate inquiry similar to that carried out by Lord Franks following the Falklands War in 1982. "After years of foot dragging," he says, "I believe it is the time for the Government to announce a proper Franks-style inquiry. Instead of starting in many months' time, it should start right now."

The problem is, however, that this is likely to rake over old ground as The Telegraph suggests that an inquiry is expected "to examine the faulty intelligence that led to the invasion, including information on weapons of mass destruction, and should look at why British forces were poorly equipped and under-resourced."

Con Coughlin picks up on this on his blog, arguing that Cameron should forget the Iraq inquiry and concentrate on Afghanistan.

"I would love," writes Coughlin, "to see David Cameron show the same enthusiasm for discussing our critical mission to Afghanistan as he does with his repeated calls for an inquiry into the invasion of Iraq." Given that we have already had two inquiries into the build-up to the war - Hutton and Butler – he cannot see what new material would be provided by a third.

What really worries me, he adds, is that while the leader of Her Majesty's Opposition is happy to provoke debate about events that happened six years ago, he is less forthcoming about the current parlous state of our military.

Coughlin, as so often, is both right and wrong. He is right that there is little to be gained by once again rehashing the events that led up to the Iraqi war. But there is everything to be gained from an inquiry which is focused specifically on the conduct of the post-invasion occupation and counter-insurgency campaign which started formally in 1 May 2003 and ended yesterday.

Not least, many "lessons learned" from such an inquiry would be directly applicable to the current military adventure in Afghanistan, where the same mistakes are being made that we saw in Iraq.

However, what is concerning Coughlin is his view that Gordon Brown has "seriously undermined the effectiveness of our military commitment to Afghanistan" by refusing to authorise the deployment of the extra troops our commanders require to fulfil the mission. This, he says, is a golden opportunity for Mr Cameron and his defence team to drive another nail into the coffin of this increasingly discredited government.

And yet, he asks rhetorically, what have we heard from the Opposition on Afghanistan, an issue that is infinitely more important and perilous than Iraq? The answer is: "Next to nothing."

Perversely, there is a response from the Conservative opposition but it comes not from David Cameron or, as you might expect, shadow defence secretary Liam Fox. Instead, in The Independent we see former shadow home secretary and now back-bencher David Davis. He writes under the heading: "Brown's policy in Afghanistan is never going to work".

It would have helped Mr Davis's scribing if he had shown any knowledge of what "Brown's policy" actually was. In the absence of any such knowledge, so fatuous and superficial are his comments, including the obligatory reference to "Vietnam", that they need not detain us.

What is worrying Coughlin though is his perception that "Brown's half measures will put our soldiers' lives at further risk". Falling for exactly the same military/MoD "spin" that afflicted Michael Evans yesterday, in a long piece in the print edition, repeated online, thus tells us that "Peace in Afghanistan will be even longer in coming if the Army is not at full strength."

As usual when dealing with a Gordon Brown policy initiative, we are told, the devil is in the detail. Couglin then ignores that detail – and the background to it – and writes that "by far the most alarming feature is the humiliating rebuff he has delivered to our Armed Forces." By denying the request by senior officers for an extra 2,000 troops, Mr Brown is seriously jeopardising the chances of achieving the success he craves.

This extra manpower, we are informed, would make the world of difference to commanders on the ground, giving them the resources not only to capture territory, but to hold it. All too often, important gains have been made, only to be surrendered because of a shortage of troops.

"Put simply, the more troops we have, the more able we are to dominate the space in Helmand and keep the Taleban at bay," says a senior Army officer. "Without the extra troops, we simply won't have the resources to impose our presence on Helmand in the way we would like."

Strangely, it is Michael Evans who – doubtless unwittingly – in his own piece today gives us the clue as to why more troops are not the answer. There we see evidence of the same ponderous "garrison mentality" referred to on the Rand Report on the Rhodesian counter-insurgency, which we reviewed in March.

This was also brought up by Ann Winterton in the recent procurement debate, where she pointed out that, while convention dictates a ratio of 10:1 for security forces needed to combat insurgents, the Rhodesians succeeded with a ratio of 1:1 and a minuscule budget. Thus did she remind us:

The Rhodesian security forces functioned under severe financial constraints that limited their access to late model, sophisticated high tech weapons and to large quantities of material. The Rhodesians’ ability to overcome these constraints by embracing innovative strategies and tactics, including novel techniques in road security, tracking and reconnaissance, small unit tactics, special operations, and intelligence gathering, suggests that the successful prosecution of counter insurgency need not entail huge expenditure.

However, neither the military nor the journos seem to be able to drag themselves out of the "more resources" mindset, the latest to join the refrain being the Financial Times, which offers its own story of the Army's woe, with the legend: "UK block on Afghan surge riles army chiefs."

The paper cites a "senior defence figure" who gets the boot in, telling us: "People are pretty angry about the decision around here … We're not in a situation where generals are thinking of resigning. But the outcome announced by Number 10 this week has come as something of a surprise to people."

It should not have surprised anyone who knew what was going on. We flagged up the doubts here and here and the Financial Times itself points to on of the reasons why this "surge" was never going to happen. Some Whitehall officials, the paper says, argue that the UK operation in Afghanistan is well resourced. They note that the operation will cost a projected £3bn in 2009-10, while the cost of UK operations in southern Iraq never rose above £1.5bn.

Despite this, it seems the editorial writer cannot read his own paper, offering a leader headed: "War on the cheap." The point, of course, is that not only is the campaign in Afghanistan not cheap, the military have yet to be able to demonstrate whether they are getting (or could get) any useful effects from the flood of cash pouring into theatre.

But, as the hacks pile in, with Robert Fox of The Guardian adding his penn'orth, there is not a single one of them with an original thought.

Still, the basic flaw in the strategic thinking survives unchallenged, typified in a Reuteurs report, which has an interview with Brigadier David Hook in Helmand. Warning that a "Bloody summer" looms, he tells us that insurgent attacks in the first three months of this year were 73 percent higher than the same period a year ago.

But, with the influx of US troops, he talks of international forces being able to provide a "degree" of security to over 90 percent of the population in the south, up from 60 percent. "That is the pivot point," he says. "That is the point where we will have created the humanitarian space to allow the agencies to come in behind and do the reconstruction and development."

There is it in all its glory – this totally artificial distinction between "security" and "reconstruction and development", with the latter conditional on the former. As long as there is this continued failure to understand the very point that is addressed in "Brown's policy", there is going to be no progress at all in Afghanistan.

They didn't get it in Iraq, and they don't get it now. Watch the video (and enjoy the little girlie struggling).

COMMENT THREAD

"The situation is increasingly perilous"

So said Obama , launching his new AF/PAK strategy. This includes an extra $5 billion in direct aid for Pakistan in what is billed as a "stronger, smarter" strategy.

Additionally, a further 4,000 troops are to be deployed, on top of the 17,000 already promised. These "top-ups" are to focus on training Afghan security forces, with a target of bringing the strength of the Afghan National Army to 134,000 by 2011. In the same period, police expansion to 82,000 is also planned.

The Obama strategy has invoked reports British Forces could also be reinforced, with suggestions that up to 1,700 more troops could be sent.

This in turn has provoked a rare response from Cameron on matters military, his view being that sending more troops would only be worthwhile if they were able to deal with problems "on the ground" such as tackling corruption and drugs.

"More troops," he says, "could be part of the answer but in our view they should only be sent if they are sent with the right equipment, with the right number of helicopters and the right civilian back-up and support so we deal with the other problems in Afghanistan like corruption and drugs. It is no good just pouring in the troops if you do not deal with the other problems on the ground."

However, this anticipation may be ill-founded. Quoting "Whitehall sources", Thomas Harding of The Daily Telegraph suggests that the maximum "uplift" could only be as many as 300. It could even be less, and that conditional on the Army being able to make a case for more troops.

Harding takes a more sanguine view of the utility of adding to the existing forces, noting that the solution in Helmand is not just numbers on the ground but "how to use them appropriately rather than in the belief that there will be a magic cure by throwing in more men." Foremost, he adds, we need the logistics in place to support the troops but in addition "we have to adjust our tactics accordingly." He continues:

Having more foreigners could just as easily work against us if the local population do see any benefits.

Firstly we really have to commit to a significant road building programme. This will allow farmed goods swift access to markets before they rot and make non-opium products more popular. When that happens the Taliban will attack the roads which will mean they will come to us and we will regain the initiative.

In tandem we also need to deploy the well-honed Rhodesian Fireforce counter-insurgency tactic using very small numbers of troops agile enough to swiftly interdict the enemy.

It is no good, he concludes, going in and "smashing" a Taliban stronghold one week only to leave and abandon the remaining population to insurgent retribution. The military needs to spell out clearly what its strategy is in Helmand, now more than ever because the doubts over its direction are growing.

The reference to the Rhodesian Fireforce counter-insurgency tactics is well founded, from which the British could learn a considerable amount. And the lessons were spelled out by the Rand organisation in a remarkable report, published in 1991. The report includes such gems as this:

We concluded that low-tech and improvisational solutions can be effective in LICs (Low Intensity Conflicts) and that, moreover, LICs need not entail huge expenditures. The Rhodesians, for example, made innovative and inexpensive modification to ordinary military and commercial vehicles that dramatically reduced the deaths and injuries suffered by passengers travelling in vehicles that struck land mines (e.g., filling tyres with water and air to dissipate the explosive force). Such modifications had the additional benefit of instilling confidence in the troops and enabled the security forces to retain control over the countryside by defeating the guerrillas' attempts to force the army into a "garrison mentality" by making road travel dangerous (if not impossible).

Also, confronting the US attitude to counter-insurgency, also prevalent in British forces, it noted:

Army planners … have paid scant attention to the essentially low-tech requirements of LICs, assuming as a matter of course that by preparing for the largest (even though it may be the least likely) contingency, a range of responses could be sized downwards to fit any lesser contingencies.

This wholly flawed idea was addressed fully, making it clear – as we have constantly averred – that such conflicts cannot be treated simply as a scaled-down big war, using the same equipment. And, as for the other myth, that the forces are underfunded, the report notes:

The Rhodesian security forces functioned under severe financial constraints that limited their access to late-model, sophisticated "high-tech" weapons and to large quantities of material. The Rhodesians’ ability to overcome those constraints by embracing innovative strategies and tactics, including novel techniques in road security, tracking and reconnaissance, small unit tactics, special operations, and intelligence gathering, suggests that the successful prosecution of counterinsurgency need not entail huge expenditure.

Those who complain of "overstretch" could also do well to note that this was the most recent example of a successful counter-insurgency and that:

The tactical achievements were all the more impressive given that the balance of government forces to insurgents was roughly 1:1 – a ratio far below the 10:1 balance normally cited as necessary for the effective prosecution of a counterinsurgency.

This is where Harding is pointing – and he is not alone. The constant politically-inspired complaints on the problems facing our forces are wide of the mark. Having never having clearly defined its own strategic aims, the Army also has not delivered a new counter-insurgency doctrine, while is current operations seem ponderous and ill-suited to dealing with a highly mobile and adaptive enemy.

Until the Army can demonstrate that it is itself adapting to the conditions in Afghanistan and adopting tactics (and equipment) which will enable it to prevail, then any decision to withhold further troops is probably well-founded. As it stands, even those we have in theatre could be doing more harm than good. Lacking the numbers and the cash, the Rhodesians found they had to fight smarter. We need to do the same.

COMMENT THREAD

The Army has spoken

Picked up early by The Daily Telegraph today was a statement to be delivered by defence secretary John Hutton on the continued use of the Snatch Land Rover in Afghanistan.

Correctly forecast – and now retailed by the BBC - Hutton was to say in a written statement to MPs that "The clear advice to me from military operational commanders, unanimously endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff, is that Snatch remains essential to the success for our operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.”

In the text of the statement, he declares that, "In the light of this authoritative assessment, I have decided that it would be inappropriate and unnecessary to conduct an inquiry." Justifying this decision, he adds: "These are matters on which I must rely on the considered judgement of military commanders who have experience of conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan and access to specialised military engineering expertise."

Hutton then said that the Snatch was to be rapidly replaced by, as The Daily Telegraph puts it, "the allegedly more robust Snatch Vixen" (pictured top) of which he claims, there is "no better vehicle in the world" to fulfil the light protected patrol vehicle requirement. The Snatch 2A - the current model - will be reduced in numbers "until it is used only in our camps".

A rationale for the continued use of the Snatch is offered in terms of the military tasks in Afghanistan being "largely ones of counter-insurgency". To achieve their aims, British forces "need to win the support and confidence of local people". This, we are told, "can only be done by face-to-face interaction, demonstrating to the local people that we are working in their interests".

Hutton thus argues that, "Our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has proven that better armoured vehicles, which tend by definition to be larger and heavier, are viewed by the local population as aggressive and intimidating. Their size and weight means too that they can cause serious damage to roads, buildings, irrigation channels and drainage systems".

All these factors, we are told, "can inflame local opinion against UK troops – working in favour of our enemy and actually increasing the threat levels to our people". Thus:

It is for these reasons that military commanders require a range of vehicles, from which the can choose the best one suited to the required task – and in this context there remains a critical requirement for a Light Protected Patrol Vehicle (LPPV) such as the Snatch Land Rover. Small, mobile and agile, it is ideal for allowing engagement with the local population, often in areas which would be inaccessible to heavier vehicles.

As a small but important point, the secretary of state concedes that "37 servicemen have died in these vehicles or as a result of injuries sustained in them". We had the figure as 38, but that includes Sgt Hickey, who was not actually in a Snatch at the time he was killed. We regard his death as "Snatch-related" but it would not come within the MoD definition. Removal of that puts our figure completely in agreement with the MoD's. We got that one right.

Turning to the substantive issues in the Hutton statement, there are four. Firstly, there is the "hearts and minds" issue, the need for a vehicle which allows "face-to-face" interaction. Secondly, there is the related issue of minimising the military "footprint", reducing damage to roads and infrastructure, and the need for a light agile vehicle to access areas which are closed to heavier vehicles.

Ostensibly, both these are persuasive arguments, but they are also disingenuous. In many of the episodes where we have recorded deaths and injuries, "hearts and minds" were not a factor.

We have seen Snatches being used for such diverse task as convoy escort, and for "fighting patrols" in wide open spaces, where there is no interaction intended, and no likelihood of a heavier vehicle causing either nuisance or damage. In effect, the Snatch has been misused as an armoured fighting vehicle – performing the role that would in past campaigns have been fulfilled by an armoured car. To that extent, the "hearts and minds" requirement is overstated.

But what we have also seen – and this is very much the case in Afghanistan – is that many of the attacks are mounted when units are transiting too, and most often from their area of operations. The most common of these assaults occurs when the unit is on its way back to base, and often when it is not very far from it.

The great danger, therefore is when units are in transit, and it is there that the protection is most often needed. What the military are saying, therefore, is that troops must be put at risk while moving from place to place in order that, when they arrive, they can carry out their duties.

Of the third issue, this is the claim in relation to the Snatch Vixen that there is "no better vehicle in the world" for the light PPV role. Frankly, this is delusional and reflects the classic Army response to a problem vehicle. Given that the Snatch is horribly vulnerable, they have simply bolted more armour on (pictured above right). This is very little different from what they were doing over 40 years ago ... bolting steel plate on the underside of Land Rovers to protect against mines (see above left). In this case, they have also beefed up the vehicle so that it can carry the extra weight. And that is the best the MoD can offer.

What these "experts" – the same experts that gave us the Jackal - do not seem to be able to understand is that if you take a basically inadequate design, simply adding bits of armour does not confer any significant additional protection.

This was precisely what the Rhodesians found so that, when they converted a Land Rover into a mine protected vehicle, it became the Kudu (pictured left) and looked very different from the Snatch. The Vixen will thus be better than the basic Snatch, but it is a long way from being the "best in the world", and nowhere near the standard of protection the Rhodesians were delivering over thirty years ago.

That brings us to the fourth issue – the inquiry. This had been requested formally by Sue Smith's solicitor and its rejection marks a determination of the MoD to keep some very suspect decisions under wraps.

In the Iraqi campaign particularly, it must have been known by late 2003 that the Snatches could not do the job intended. By the end of 2004, that was abundantly clear and by mid-2006 there can have been no question at all. Yet the Army persevered with this vehicle, also taking it to Afghanistan, where more soldiers died unnecessarily.

We needed an inquiry to find out something of the decision-making process – why the vehicles were introduced in the first place, why the Army persevered with them for so long, after they had been proved dangerously inadequate, and why then it took (and is taking) so long to find a more suitable replacement.

These are issues the Army clearly does not want to discuss in public, which means that it has not yet come to terms with a failure that could well continue and which we are already seeing in the wholly inadequate design of the Jackal, another death in which was seen last week.

Hutton may feel he is entitled to rely on the "considered judgement of military commanders who have experience of conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan and access to specialised military engineering expertise." But if Des Browne had relied on these geniuses, we would not have bought Mastiffs and the Army would have put Pinzgauer Vectors in to Iraq and Afghanistan to replace the Snatch, as originally intended.

These are the "experts" that got it wrong, and are continuing to get it wrong. And even in the final throes of the Hutton statement they still get it wrong. They tell us that they are "looking to the future" and "anticipating new threats", to which effect they "have begun a programme to develop the next generation of LPPV which will in due course take the place of Snatch Vixen".

But that "next generation" vehicle is already here. It is called the Cheetah (above right), made by the same company which produced the base vehicles for the Mastiff and Ridgeback. Yet the Army which looked at the RG-31 as a replacement for the Snatch and decided it was "too big for Basra" - and then went on to buy the Mastiff which was even bigger - has decided that the Cheetah is "simply too small in terms of capacity".

This is a vehicle that is actually bigger than the Snatch – 14 inches wider and 20 inches longer - yet the Army is saying it is "too small". Never mind that it is designed specifically for urban patrolling or that, with independent suspension, it has been optimised for off-road performance. The Army has spoken.

And that is why we still need an inquiry.

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