FRES lives ... sort of

We are informed that the MOD is to invite two British companies to tender to supply reconnaissance and reconnaissance support variants to replace the aged Scimitar and Spartan vehicles now on operations in Afghanistan.

The two companies are BAE Systems Global Combat Systems and General Dynamics (UK), who will be bidding for a project grandly named the Future Rapid Effect System Specialist Vehicle (FRES SV). In reality though, with the FRES utility vehicle dumped for the foreseeable future, this is simply a much overdue replacement for the CVR(T) series which should have been scrapped many years ago.

General Dynamics will, no doubt, be offering a version of the Piranha, configured on similar lines to the Canadian LAV-25 Coyote - arguing for commonality with the proposed Utility Vehicle, if it is ever purchased.

BAE Systems may be submitting a version of the Swedish-built CV-903 Mk III, recently purchased by the Danish Army (pictured), on the basis that a tracked vehicle would be more suitable for the role.

Whichever platform is chosen, the likelihood is that it will be fitted with the French-designed Nexter CTA-40 caseless ammunition gun, together with the BAE System turret which is being used for the Warrior Lethality Improvement Programme (WLIP).

Although the prospect of a replacement for the CVR(T) series is good news – which should always have been put ahead of the utility vehicle – by the time the MoD nannies have finished with their procedures and integration programme, it could be some years before we see any new kit in theatre. By then, of course, it will be the Tories who will have to pay the bill.

COMMENT THREAD

The clogs of war ...

British troops in Afghanistan will get 200 new combat vehicles this year, The Daily Mirror informs us.

Although other sources report the cost as £350 million, The Mirror writes of a "£74 million upgrade" which is says willl bring faster, tougher, versions of cars already in use there - dubbed "dogs of war" by troops - which can withstand 50-degree heat and some explosions.

They will include, we are then informed, 110 Jackal Mark II patrol vehicles and 70 Coyotes for tactical support. A "senior military source" (i.e., press release) is then recruited to tell us that: "The Jackal has become very popular amongst reconnaissance troops. It is a long range vehicle, heavily armed with high-calibre machine guns, and is extremely versatile in difficult conditions."

Then, for the pièce de résistance, the paper grandly proclaims: "The Jackal II is Land Rover based and open-topped - vital for reconnaissance work and engaging with civilians," with the added information that, "The vehicles are to replace dozens that have been battered or blown up ... ".

The Coyote graphic (above) comes from the BBC site, illustrating how the vehicle is "designed" to protect UK troops.

This is what passes for reporting these days. We are so lucky that the media is on the ball.

COMMENT THREAD

Propaganda corner

The MoD publicity machine has been hard at work over the last few days, selling "puffs" on the latest kit for "Our Boys" out in Afghanistan.

Leader of the pack of respondents – with actually very few takers so far in the MSM – is the BBC, which has a gloriously uncritical report from Robert Hall extolling the virtues of the latest tactical support vehicles procured, including the Husky, Wolfhound and Coyote.

These were unveiled today at the DVD fest at Millbrook Proving Ground in Bedfordshire, the Defence Equipment & Support's (DE&S) "key stakeholder event" where Hall obligingly told his audience that the MoD had learned a great deal from its experience in Afghanistan, then happily being driven away in a Husky.

Equally obligingly, Hall gives defence equipment minister Quentin Davies plenty of air time to tell us how this new stable of vehicles would provide troops with high-quality and versatile equipment to give a "battle-winning edge in Afghanistan".

"We are working tirelessly to ensure they have the right equipment for the right job and ensuring that we respond quickly and innovatively to equipment requests from the frontline," Davies adds.

Hall's online piece also features a new lightweight textile-based armour to protect vehicles from rocket-propelled grenades. This is called the Tarian system, developed by Dorset-based company Amsafe, and is intended as a partial replacement for bar armour.

This is given a good airing by Deborah Haynes in The Times, telling us that the main benefit of the product is that it is 85 percent lighter than steel blast protection and 50 per cent lighter than aluminium bar armour. Thus we learn that troops can take advantage of the weight saved to fit other protective measures to their vehicles, "making them more survivable in Afghanistan, where the greatest risk to lives is posed by roadside bombs."

The idea of saving weight to add weight elsewhere is recognisably MoD propaganda, reflecting exactly that unchanging mindset which equates protection with weight of armour rather than design.

But what is interesting – to put it in as neutral a way as possible – is how willing the media seems to regurgitate the official line, without in any way questioning what they are told. This is especially the case with the BBC who in Robert Hall had the ideal propagandist, worth his weight in gold.

COMMENT THREAD

A sense of proportion

"I find it so distressing to hear lavish praise being heaped upon the procurement of vehicles that are potential death-traps and to listen later to expressions of condolence to the families of those who have perished in them."

Thus said Ann Winterton on Thursday (pictured below right), to a near-deserted Commons debating chamber, addressing on the government benches the minister of state for defence, Bob Ainsworth (below left).

Spoken from the heart, with more than a hint of anger, that went entirely unrecorded by the MSM which 24 hours later was to be engulfed in a "day of drama", precipitated by the sudden resignation of James Purnell. Little did we know that, by the end of that day, John Hutton would have resigned and been replaced by Ainsworth as the new secretary of state for defence.

Why Hutton should have resigned so suddenly is not known. He claims "family reasons" but nothing is that simple in politics and, with only eight months in office, he had barely begun to make his mark. For him to leave at what is a crucial moment in the Afghani campaign, however, can hardly help matters. Unsurprisingly, it has been described by Field Marshal Lord Bramall, former CDS, as a " dereliction of duty ".

Back on the Thursday, Ann could hardly have guessed that she was addressing that man soon-to-be-king, when she complained to Ainsworth about the all-important "protected vehicle fleet" in Afghanistan, using General Dannatt's word to describe it as "unbalanced".

There were, she said far too many other vehicles in service (or about to arrive) without the basic mine protection afforded by the "v-shaped hull", those including the Coyote, Viking, Tellar and Warthog - and the Jackal (pictured above, being driven by John Hutton).

It augers ill that Ainsworth, now in the dominant position, did not get the point. The hon Lady, he said, "must accept that we cannot put all our people into the same kind of vehicles. We have to give them a range of different vehicles of different sizes."

There is no way that Ann was arguing thus. Simply that all military vehicles in a part of the world where mine strikes and IED blasts are tragically common should be suitably protected. It is not part of the case that the choice should be restricted to that which are – the point being that better vehicles are required to supplement the range.

Ainsworth, though, ploughed on regardless, heedless of this point, picking up the points Ann had made about the Jackal which, she averred, "highlighted the failed concept of bolting on armour, as proved by the American Humvee vehicle."

Repeating the tired and discredited mantra which he had been fed by his advisors, Ainsworth launched into its defence, declaring: "We have to try to mitigate the effect of using a smaller vehicle and that can be done only to a degree. The main protection of the Jackal is its massive manoeuvrability; it does not have to go down the well-trodden path. If the hon. Lady goes to theatre, she will know that it is a very well thought of vehicle among all ranks."

This invited the obvious retort from Ann: "I would not like to hazard a guess as to how many young men have been killed in it unnecessarily," she told Ainsworth. But the now defence secretary would not leave it there. "The hon. Lady is suggesting that there is some easy alternative that would give our people the capability that they need to do the job and yet remove if not the entire risk, a lot of the risk associated with the Jackal. I do not believe that she is correct."

Ann showed her anger once more. "I hope that the right hon. Gentleman does not think I was born yesterday," she responded. "War is bloody and people get killed in it, but what is desperate is the fact that this country has not supported its soldiers in conflict with the right kind of vehicles, which can be obtained, and has instead made major mistakes in procurement."

While we would not attempt to argue that the recent events have not been important, the "drama" embraced so enthusiastically compares poorly with the real-life struggle that lies out of sight and out of mind, ignored by an indifferent media and uncaring politicians – the real world where men and women are dying needlessly because of mistakes made in London by people who should know better – mistakes to which Ann was seeking to draw attention.

The stark peril facing those men and women is underlined by an article in The Daily Telegraph today, but as no more than a curiosity, detached from the political process.

Written by the paper's stringer, Ben Farmer, he records that troops in Afghanistan "are facing a major increase in the number of roadside bomb attacks as a surge of reinforcements has forced insurgents to shun direct attacks".

This is based on a Nato report that the incidence of IEDs has jumped 80 percent and last year killed 172 international troops. Hundreds more Afghan police, soldiers and civilians have been killed and maimed. Then cited is Gen Richard Blanchette, spokesman for the Nato-led forces, who says: "This is very serious business for us."

He adds that the increase was prompted by insurgents changing tactics and an influx of international troops patrolling on the ground, telling us that, "They are using this as a last measure".

The piece also tells us that armies including the British have been forced to abandon lightly armoured "patrol jeeps" and Snatch Land Rovers, and spend hundreds of millions of pounds on heavier, more cumbersome armoured protection. Yet, it then continues, "despite these efforts, casualties have still dramatically risen", with this year 28 British troops having been killed, 21 by bombs.

Had the paper tied in this piece with last Thursday's debate, the issue would really have come to life, as Ann Winterton told of the wasted money, the poor designs and those procurement mistakes, all explaining why the "efforts" in Afghanistan have not met with complete success.

Perhaps, like this blog, Ann was "too strident" and "too sanctimonious", or perhaps she is simply too detached from the real "drama" of politics. After all, how can the unnecessary deaths of soldiers begin to compare with the "tumultuous" events – as they have been described – of the last 24 hours?

One must, after all, keep a sense of proportion.

COMMENT THREAD

Failure is not an option

In June 2006, Gerald Howarth, shadow defence procurement minister, posted on his own website: "We welcome the Government's announcement that the Vector vehicle will enter service next year." He did, however, add: "It is more manoeuvrable but, according to the Secretary of State, is not much more armoured than the Snatch Land Rovers."

Not quite a year later, we reported that the same Gerald Howarth was praising the Pinzguaer Vector, even to the extent of appearing on the company's website (now defunct), giving it his endorsement.

However, to be scrupulously fair – something for which we are not famous – Gerald did later complain that the vehicle was not suitable for Afghanistan, and he did draw attention to then procurement minister Lord Drayson that the driver was exposed by sitting over the front wheel.

Now fast forward to yesterday and we see Gerald in Defence Questions asking: "Does the Minister agree with the former Secretary of State, who described the Pinzgauer Vector as 'an excellent solution to our soldiers' requirements', or does he now accept that, at a cost of more than £100 million, it was a massive defence acquisition fiasco".

And, to give credit where it is due, Gerald also recognised the role of Ann Winterton in drawing attention to the defects in this vehicle, then asking what had been done "to improve the technical evaluation process to restore our troops’ confidence in the acquisition process".

This is real politics, the opposition challenging the executive on a very specific issue, bringing attention to a serious defect which needs addressing and without remedy will cost lives. We would have preferred earlier intervention but at least the system is now working.

As for the government response, this came from Quentin Davies. It can be said that he did not acquit himself with honour – this being his reply:

The hon. Gentleman should wake up a bit, get with it and start to look at the realities of life. The fact of the matter is that those who invest in a portfolio of armoured vehicles, as we are doing - or, indeed, in a range of equipment for any purpose in this world - will want to ensure that they have the best, in terms of meeting different requirements in terms of mobility, capability, fire power, protection and so forth. We will inevitably have some vehicles that are less effective than others; we will inevitably have some successes and some failures; that is what a portfolio policy is all about, by the way. Vector was not a success and it is being withdrawn. Its problem has been its "operationability": it has great difficulty carrying some of the loads that it is required to carry on the Afghan terrain. It has not been able to live up to expectations there, and we will be replacing it with the new tactical support vehicles that we have ordered - the Coyote, the Husky and the Wolfhound -which I have mentioned in the House in different contexts. That is one more example of this steady process of flexibility, improvement and enhancement, which is the policy to which we are committed.

It would take far too much space in this post to deconstruct, word for word, Davies's statement but there are three points which can be dealt with. Firstly, the MoD is in denial about the Vector, refusing to admit that the vehicle failed primarily because of its lack of protection. Its load-carrying problems came with the stupidity of adding a great weight of armour in an unsuccessful attempt to improve that protection.

The second point is that Gerald is quite right in drawing attention to the "technical evaluation process". There is clearly something drastically wrong with the process, as a result of which the MoD is consistently – at ever-increasing expense – making the wrong choices on vehicles.

Contrary to perceived wisdom, mine protection and off road-performance are not mutually incompatible. The mistake has been - as with the Vector - to take an existing, non-protected vehicle and then to try to add protection by means of "bolt-on" armour. This can never succeed and degrades the original vehicle with the addition of weight.

The MoD is thus working to the wrong paradigm - to optimise protection without prejudicing performance, the protection must be designed in, not added on.

From that stems the third point. The same false paradigm is being applied to the successor vehicles, not least the Coyote and the Husky. That these are actually Vector replacements come as no surprise. Particularly with the Husky, with a ton and a half load space, this was never a credible support vehicle. It is, in effect, the new Snatch.

As to the effect of this flawed approach, the figures are stark. Approximate figures for deaths in unsound vehicles are: ten in Snatches, fifteen in Wimiks, at least six in Vikings, nine in Jackals and five in Vectors. At 45 deaths, these account for one in four of the total of 165 troop deaths in Afghanistan, almost all of them preventable.

Thomas Harding in The Daily Telegraph points out the hazards of the Jackal, estimating that, in addition to the deaths, at least of quarter of the 100 Jackal fleet in Afghanistan has been severely damaged or destroyed by enemy action. By contrast, in an earlier post, we showed a picture of a Mastiff which had taken a serious explosive strike. Yet, despite the damage, it was easily repairable – not so the Jackals, each costing close on to £400,000. We are thus dealing with a serious equipment issue, as well as the death and injury rate.

Clearly, neither the MoD nor its ministers are up to the job of sorting these problems out. The long-stop is Parliament, and it is beginning to stir. This is the only hope of keeping people alive. We need this system to work – failure cannot be allowed to be an option.

COMMENT THREAD

A pig with lipstick

More details of the Jackal 2 are emerging, not least with a report from the BBC which outlines some of the changes and an entry on the MoD website. And we have now obtained a photograph of the prototype (above – with the MoD offering below).

From the various sources, we learn that the engine, transmission and suspension are basically the same, but the chassis has been upgraded to allow the vehicle to carry a greater load and give it greater strength.

This, as we surmised, has permitted the installation of additional armour. The main changes here are the fitting of a number of blast plates on the floor of the vehicle, underneath the gunner's position. The two seats also have steel protection surrounding the underside and back.

The new vehicle can now also carry four soldiers, one more than the Jackal 1 and the armoured door locks back into the open position, allowing troops travel while looking out of the door.

The rear of the vehicle has also been redesigned, allowing fuel or water cans to be carried on the outside of the vehicle, enabling troops to store their Bergens (backpacks), extra ammunition, or other equipment.

With the additional armour, crew survivability will undoubtedly be enhanced and, without question, the vehicle offers better capability and protection than the Land Rover Wimik, which it replaces - not the Snatch Land Rover, as so many journalists insist on stating.

That said, this is still a poor design and bolting on additional armour simply makes it a poor design with additional armour. A pig with lipstick is still a pig.

However, while this vehicle in many ways symbolises the lack of coherence in British military vehicle design and procurement, the problems go far deeper than that, reflecting the underlying confusion in strategic aims and tactical doctrines (or the lack of them).

Starting at the top, the very existence of this vehicle is a testament to that confusion. At one, we have a vehicle that is a special forces raider, a weapons platform and a scout/reconnaissance vehicle. It is also used as a convoy escort and performs the assault role that would in past conflicts have been fulfilled by light tank or armoured car.

Therein lies the heart of the problem. What started as a high mobility truck was adapted for the very specific requirements of the special forces and, in the absence of any suitable replacement for the Land Rover Wimik – which in itself was a stopgap, much misused for a variety of roles – was then pressed into service, thus perpetuating the original confusion.


Basically, if the Army needs an armoured car (which indeed it does, being virtually the only modern army without such equipment) then it should procure a suitable design. If it also needs a scout car – which is altogether a different animal – then it should also obtain one, and if it wants convoy escorts then something very different is also required. The fatuous attempt to provide what amounts to a multi-role vehicle, that ends up being all things to all men, is fundamentally flawed.

Turning specifically to the fabled off-road performance of this "beast", this - when the Jackal was first introduced - was cited as its main advantage. Thus we were told:

Although incorporating a fully-integrated protection system and reinforced armour plating, Jackal's main defences are its mobility and agility. This makes Jackal perfectly suited to the operational terrain of southern Afghanistan, where speed and manoeuvrability are essential.

As it turns out, the "mobility and agility" have proved dangerously insufficient so the Army now finds itself in the classic position of having to ask for more armour to be bolted on to overcome the inherent defects of the vehicle and the underlying concept.


This puts it in an unenviable position. Having relied on a flawed concept for protection, it has ended up with a vehicle which is optimised for off-road performance, to which it now has to add protection. This contrasts totally with the US concept which has been to procure a vehicle optimised for crew protection and then to improve its off-road mobility.

Thus, we have the US awarding a contract to Force Protection, to upgrade the 1,500-strong Cougar fleet with the retro-fitting of independent suspension at a cost of $122 million.

What we could well see as a result is a convergence between the two design concepts. As the Jackal acquires greater weight in an attempt to improve protection, its off-road performance will be degraded (as indeed has been the case) while the Cougar fleet with its enhanced suspension is able to match that degraded performance, while offering far better protection.

Therein lies the fatal (quite literally) flaw in the British approach. As we are reminded on our forum and elsewhere, mine and blast protection, to be effective, must be designed in, ab initio. It cannot be bolted on.

The route the British are taking, therefore, is to end up with a vehicle with only moderate off-road performance and poor protection, for the price of a vehicle with superb protection and no significant difference in off-road performance.

What makes this worse, however, is the complete inability of the MoD and the Army to admit their own mistakes. Having started down the wrong path, they follows in the classic mould of poor generalship of reinforcing failure, bolting on more armour to a poor design, in the vain hope that this will somehow overcome the inherent defects.

Then, as always, they devotes huge amounts of time and effort to their propaganda machine in an attempt to convince themselves and others that they have made the right choice. With the one exception of Ann Winterton, they will succeed with the MPs and the BBC report already shows that we need expect no criticisms from the media.

But the final outcome is that they are compounding the original errors in also purchasing the Coyote (pictured above). If actually fielded in the configuration shown, this will transcend the normal incompetence we have come to expect from the MoD and the Army. Without even the bolt-on protection of the Jackal, sending troops out in this will be nothing short of murder.

COMMENT THREAD

Jackal two

First it was a truck, then they added guns and it became a Supacat M-WMIK. Then they bolted on some armour, so it became a truck, with guns with bolt-on armour. And lo! It became the Jackal.

Now, after the loss of at least eighteen of these trucks-with-guns-with-armour, and four dead, we have the life and the resurrection, with the emergence of the enhanced Jackal or the Jackal 2.

Although not specified officially (and there have been no photographs released), the vehicle has been further armoured, adding more to its weight, so that we now have a truck-with-guns-with-armour with more bolt-on armour. That is the way the British Army works.

Some 110 Jackal 2s have now been ordered, with more than 70 Coyote Tactical Support Vehicles, a six-wheel version of the same thing, set up to carry cargo in support of the Jackal detachments.

For these miracles of military engineering, the MoD is to pay £74 million of our money, split between Supacat, which will provide the design and programme management, and Babcock Marine which will make the things. That averages out at just over £400,000 per machine.

Needless to say, the beneficiaries of this largesse are gushing about their good fortune. Nick Ames, the managing director of Supacat, is saying: "This alliance will help to ensure that our armed forces receive the best possible equipment within the shortest possible timescale. More importantly, it will both enhance their operational effectiveness and their protection."

Quentin Davies, the minister of state for defence equipment and support, who could have announced the order to parliament during Monday's defence debate, obviously did not think this venerable institution was important enough. He thus announced it at the British Army's Long Valley testing ground.

"These impressive vehicles will give our troops increased protection on frontline operations," he purrs. "We are showing our commitment to provide our service personnel with the very best equipment we possibly can."

Thus does the BBC report, "this deal protects jobs and troops." Meanwhile, Gary Wakefield, recently injured in Afghanistan from a mine or IED, tells his local newspaper, "The amount of injuries coming back is unbelievable." There is, of course, no connection.

COMMENT THREAD

On the ball … as always

Mr Gerald Howarth, shadow defence procurement minister, was displaying his usual excellent grasp of military equipment yesterday during a House of Commons defence debate. Says Mr Howarth:

Mention has been made of the inconsistency between the Ministry of Defence's core programme and the urgent operational requirements, which I accept are essential if we are to protect the lives of our servicemen and women. But where is the strategy for Land Systems to replace a fleet of 35 to 40-year-old CVRT armoured fighting vehicles? I haven't a clue what CVRT stands for. I think that it is —

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. If the hon. Gentleman is not sure, I am sure that the House is mystified—and those outside the House even more so. Perhaps he can seek advice.

Hon. Members: Come on, Gerald, what are you going to do?

Mr. Howarth: I think I am going to phone a friend, actually. I am looking around for my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Mr. Blunt), who might bail me out. CVRT? I know that the "T" bit is "Tracked". Forgive me; I am sorry about this failure. Anyway, they are armoured fighting vehicles that are 35 to 40 years old, and I believe that the Department needs a strategy. The Minister mentioned new "dog" - type equipment—further to confuse us all — that is being introduced: Coyotes, Wolfhounds and goodness knows what. I do not believe that this is a substitute for a strategy; it is a strategy that we need.

Just to help you out, Gerald, CVR(T) stands for Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked). But then, you knew that really, didn't you? You were just testing us. That was all part of your own strategy. (The piccy is a Scimitar, by the way, one of the CVR(T) family – but then you knew that as well!)

We are in such good hands.

COMMENT THREAD

Let loose the dogs of chores

So far, reported only by one obscure (to me, anyway) online business site, the MoD has at last given some more details of its new £700 million armoured vehicle package announced by John Hutton last month.

This is the Tactical Support Vehicle (TSV) range – all given names from the canine genus, as has become customary in British Army armoured vehicle nomenclature. These, though, are to be the workhorses, doing the fetching and carrying and other chores, rather than fighting.

At the heavy end – very much as expected – we see the Force Protection Inc nominated at the preferred bidder with the Cougar flatbed. The MoD offers a photograph (above), which includes the vehicle being dressed up with the characteristic Barracuda Mobile Camouflage System (MCS) which we see adorning the Snatch Land Rovers and Vectors, so one might think that this is the final form, without bar or additional side armour.

However, once the wonks back home get at it, we could see it come out in a very different form. The MoD is, in fact, saying that it will be "up-armoured and integrated with UK specific equipment such as communications systems and protection measures in a similar way to Mastiff."

Less impressive is the nomination for the Husky – the "medium" vehicle. The preferred bidder is Navistar Defence with a vehicle based on the International MXT-MVA (pictured). As a cargo truck, it will have a four-man cab and a cargo capacity in excess of 1.5 tons. It will, however, come as three variants: utility, ambulance and command post.

This vehicle does not come with rave reviews. It is not a proper MRAP, with the classic v-shaped hull, but is a conversion built on an International MXT 4x4 pick-up chassis, with appliqué armour.

The last thing the Army needs is yet another truck type on its inventory. An alternative is the cargo version of the Bushmaster called the Copperhead. With the Bushmaster about to enter service with the special forces, there would be some commonality but, it appears, this is not to be.

The third and least satisfactory of them all is the Coyote TSV (Light) which is to be a 6x6 derivative of the Jackal designed by Supacat Ltd. We are told that it will also have a cargo capacity in excess of 1.5 tons and a four-man crew.

The MoD does not offer a photograph of this, but it may well be similar to the Supacat "Extenda" seen in Paris earlier this year (pictured). There are no indications, as yet, as to whether this will be armoured in the same way as the Jackal but, if it is not, soldiers would be better protected going to war on bicycles.

The best thing that can be said of this vehicle is that it will share the same degree of vulnerability as its smaller cousin. Frankly, if the extreme mobility for which this vehicle is famed is really needed in the supply role, then the best option would not be a ground vehicle at all, but a helicopter or even – as was adopted by the LRDG in World War II - light aircraft (spool down to fifth picture).

Of this new package, John Hutton tells us the vehicles "will give the troops in Afghanistan the additional bite they need in the fight against the enemy. They do a formidable job and deserve nothing but the best." Despite these fine words, it is by no means clear that they (the troops) are about to get what they deserve.

COMMENT THREAD

Is this a coincidence?

Yesterday we get an announcement by John Hutton on the new package of armoured vehicles for the Army (set up by his predecessor, Des Browne).

Names are given, but few details, especially the "Husky: TSV (Medium)" and the "Coyote: TSV (Light)." The former, we are told is are "Medium armoured support trucks - carrying out the support roles in lower threat areas and where heavy vehicles, like Mastiff, cannot be used." The latter are "Light armoured support vehicles - supporting Jackals across the harsh terrain of Afghanistan."

Then, today, we get an announcement from Force Protection in Ladson, South Carolina – makers of the Mastiff and the Ridgeback, ordered by the British Army, and the Buffalo, which has also been ordered.

This was to introduce the new version of their "lightweight" MRAP, the Cheetah (pictured), weighing in at a mere 8 tons. With the current version of the RG-31 (Mark 6) now having inflated to an obese 11.6 tons – from the original seven, the Cheetah is currently the lightest MRAP available, yet its manufacturers claim for it similar protection levels to those of the heavier Cougar.

Is this a coincidence?

Looking at the photograph, the ECM dome on top of the cab looks suspiciously … er … British. Are we looking at a Husky or a Coyote, perhaps?

COMMENT THREAD

Lessons to learn

The Canadians have taken another hit in Kandahar province, losing yet another soldier to an IED, once again the casualty riding in an Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV - pictured) – the same basic vehicle type as the Coyote, three of which have also been involved in fatal bomb/mine incidents.

The incident happened in western Panjwaii, a district which, only six months ago, one senior Canadian officer had described as one of the "safer areas" of Kandahar province. The district had been taken from Taliban insurgents in September 2006 during Operation Medusa but, since then, the Taleban have re-established a strong presence in parts of the district.

Furthermore, their insurgency activities seem to be focused on mounting ambushes, using mines and IEDs, rather than direct military confrontation, inflicting at least one casualty every week since 30 December.

Tragically, the LAV in this latest incident was part of a road clearance team which would, therefore – one presumes – have included Cougars, a Buffalo and a Husky mine detection/detonation vehicle. These latter vehicles being more resistant to attack, the incident invites speculation as to whether the LAV was specifically targeted as the most vulnerable vehicle in the group.

Either way, the Canadian experience offers lessons for the British in the neighbouring Helmand province who, as we recorded recently, have also been victims of mine/IED attacks on vehicles, the last three deaths having been sustained through this type of attack.

It also underlines, once again, the fragility of the LAV, and raises questions as to the survivability of the FRES vehicles, one of which – the Piranha – is very similar to the LAV and shortlisted as a candidate for the utility vehicle role.

The indications are that the Canadians are getting more attention from the Taleban than are British forces. But, as our troops establish themselves around Musa Qala and extend further south – perhaps in the new campaigning season, when 3rd Para take over from the Yorkshire Regiment - they will come under renewed attack. Then, the Paras will be equipped with the Supacat M-WIMIK (pictured - now called the Jackal), which will make them highly vulnerable to the Taleban ambush tactics.

One recommendation of a commission studying the deployment of Canadian troops in Afghanistan is the provision of more transport helicopters – of which they have pitifully few – to move troops between locations, to reduce unnecessary exposure to attack.

In that context, we learn that the Nato bureaucracy has heaved mightily and brought forward a tiny mouse, in the form of one transport helicopter on lease from civilian contractors. With an option for one more – this covering the whole of southern Afghanistan - this is barely enough to make a dent in the pressing need for more helicopter lift.

That notwithstanding, there will always be a need for considerable ground movement and, while the Canadians have responded to the mine/IED threat with the procurement of dedicated mine detection/clearance vehicles, there is no sign that the British are even beginning to respond adequately.

In fact, far from that, in the wake of the recent Board of Inquiry report on the incident when a soldier bled to death in a minefield while awaiting rescue, the MoD seems to have resorted to the time-honoured strategy of posting a propaganda puff on its website.

Thus we see a post headed, "EOD team clear the way for Helmand patrols", claiming that, "First on the ground to clear the dangerous path of landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices for British patrols throughout Helmand are the Joint Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group, based at Camp Bastion."

Clearly, that was not the case when a soldier spent five hours in a minefield bleeding to death, and nor was it the case the last three times a soldier has been killed in a vehicle, respectively two Pinzgauers and a WIMIK.

Furthermore, far from being reassuring, the post actually shows up just how ridiculously poorly equipped our people are, one photograph showing the absurdly ill-protected "Tellar" bomb disposal vehicle (above left), recently purchased at great expense for overseas deployment.

Herein lies another story, as this photograph (right) taken in Iraq shows. Notoriously a target for insurgents when they are called out to incidents (sometime with decoy bombs for just that purpose), EODs are especially at risk. So ill-protected are these unarmed vehicles that they use that they require massive infantry support just to escort them to a scene.

Thus, the scene shows of mixed convoy of Snatch Land Rovers and a Warrior MICV, the whole convoy (part unseen) comprising possibly as many as fifty troops just to escort two Tellars – trying up scarce resources wholly unnecessarily. What was that about "overstretch"?

By contrast, this picture (right) shows a US IED detection/disposal convoy. The difference is immediately evident. Leading the convoy are two RG-31s, followed by a Husky and a Buffalo, an armoured Humvee and a Cougar JERRV – the latter performing the same duties as the Tellar. The photograph, incidentally, is taken from the cab of a second Cougar, bringing up the rear of the convoy.

The point, of course, is that the vehicles are armoured and armed, a self-sustaining force with the capability to fight its way out of an ambush (and less likely to be damaged by one). Not only does the convoy need no escort, the personnel are all combat engineers, thus relieving the pressure on hard-pressed infantry.

The particular issue relevant to Afghanistan is that, as British troops recover territory from the Taleban – like Musa Qala – they revert to the routine patrols and "reassurance" missions, where their movements are known and their routes more predictable. Currently, they operate with WIMIKs and Pinzgauer 710 4x4 trucks, equipment which has been equated to the Chrysler light trucks of the LRDG and the armed jeeps of the SAS in the North African desert during World War II.

Then, and now, it is argued that the speed and mobility of these vehicles provided the necessary protection. But, in the case of the LRDG, they relied on concealment and stealth so that the Germans and Italians were unaware of their presence.

In the case of the SAS, their task was to mount raids, in which case surprise was their greatest asset. But, in both cases, their roles were analogous to guerrilla warfare against the more numerous Axis forces. In current operations, the Taleban are the "guerrillas" fighting the British who, in the security phase of the campaign, lack either stealth or surprise. They are set up as targets for the ambush which has become the main tactical weapon of the Taleban.

These circumstances strongly dictate the use of protected vehicles, and a more proactive mine detection and clearance programme. This demands far more and better equipment than is available – not lest mine protected vehicles to carry out route proving to clear the way for unarmoured vehicles like the Pinzgauer.

Ironically, we now find that BAE Systems, having acquired Pinzgauer as part of its purchase of Armor Holdings, are to relocate the manufacturing operation from Guildford to South Africa, where it will become part of OMC, the company which manufactures the RG-31.

Perhaps when the South Africans are confronted with the Pinzgauer's vulnerabilities, they will refuse to manufacture a machine which could not be better designed to kill soldiers, and prevail upon the British government to purchase their RG-31s – or other of their mine protected products. For our soldiers, this could not be a better development as South Africa (with the former Rhodesia) is the home of mine protection technology. If the British government will not learn the lessons from the Canadians, they might at least listen to the South Africans.

Is this the answer?

While the MoD is still dickering about buying the next batch of mine protected vehicles, the United States is forging ahead with the second generation of what it calls Mine Resistant and Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.

This promises to be a huge defence contract, with a potential order for some 20,500 units. With testing, spare parts and logistics support, this could turn out to be one of the largest land contracts of a generation.

One of the front runners in the competition is our very own BAE Systems which is only one of two contractors selected to develop and produce prototypes for the next generation vehicle, with the award of a $5.7 million contract.

Within the contract are two categories of vehicle. One is the so-called Category I, which will support operations in urban environments and other restricted/confined spaces, including mounted patrols, reconnaissance, communications, and command and control. The other is the Category II vehicle, which provide a "reconfigurable vehicle that can support multi-mission operations such as convoy lead, troop transport, explosive ordnance disposal, ambulance, and route clearance."

The Category I test vehicles will be based on the BAE System's Caiman 6x6 design, morphed into a 4x4 design (pictured above), while the Category II will be based on the company's RG-33 6x6 vehicle (right), itself a development of the ground-breaking RG-31.

In view of the controversy over the British WIMIK Land Rover, versus the Mastiff, the Cat I vehicle is of special interest. Its intended role most closely approximates that of the WIMIK, offering – in the words of the manufacturer – "the right balance of payload capability, automotive performance, and blast protection", complete with all-important "mobility upgrades". It also has the advantage of being based on the well-proven Stewart and Stevenson FMTV in widespread use in the US Army, with 85 percent parts commonality.

In the protection department, the Caiman certainly presses all the buttons. It has the classic v-shaped hull and a conformation which gives it a central armoured cell, with the front and rear axles outside the cell, offering maximum protection against mine strikes. But, at 14 tons, a very high profile and car-type doors which do not permit rapid dismount under fire, it is hard to see that this would be accepted as a WIMIK replacement in the British Army.

While Defense Update discusses the broader issues, however, we learn that another Canadian LAV has succumbed to a mine blast in Afghanistan, this one the Coyote - the reconnaissance version of the wheeled APCs chosen by the Canadian Army – with the death of a soldier.

This is the third Coyote to have been involved in a fatal incident (illustrated: see here), on top of several other LAVs, compared with only two (to our knowledge) RG-31s, underlining the vulnerability of conventional armoured vehicles in asymmetric warfare. It also raises further questions about FRES, as the LAV is based on the Piranha, one of the types submitted for the FRES competition.

Against this background, we see US defence secretary Gates argue in the LA Times that most of the European Nato forces in Afghanistan are not trained in counterinsurgency. "They were trained for the Fulda Gap," he said, referring to the German region where a Soviet invasion of Western Europe had been deemed most likely.

Training apart, their armies are certainly equipped for the Fulda Gap, and they are going to have to look hard at the MRAP II project to see is this can deliver vehicles more suitable to the needs of Afghanistan. But, from the look of the Caiman, it would seem we are a long way from seeing a light, armoured tactical vehicle which would fit British requirements.

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