"Bloody criminally sad"

Asking a journalist to write an account of a series of actions in which his soldier brother was seriously injured does not seem the best way to ensure objective writing.

But such is the task of Miles Amoore, working for The Sunday Times, whose younger brother Jim, 24, a second lieutenant with 2 Rifles, was blown up as he walked through a compound door in Wishtan, near Sangin, to reach fellow soldiers hit by another explosion.

In a piece entitled "Carnage in Wishtan, 'the devil's playground'", Amoore claims to be the first reporter to reach Forward Operating Base (FOB) Wishtan and speak to those fortunate enough to have survived a series of bomb incidents which he describes, the drive from Sangin to the base taking him along "a dirt track known as Pharmacy Road".

Pharmacy Road is, of course, familiar to us, the subject of the famous report from Michael Yon, who dealt with the operation to clear the road, an operation which the MoD also described.

Amoore adds to these accounts, confirming something that we had worked out for ourselves – although never admitted by the MoD. "Until bomb disposal experts cleared this road," he writes, "the soldiers in FOB Wishtan had lived under virtual siege, supplied only by helicopter. The Taleban had placed a cordon of mines 50 yards from the perimeter walls of the base."

Previous accounts, however, refer to near misses, as helicopters delivering supplies were attacked. This, with Amoore's additional detail, further supports the contention that the base was effectively cut-off and that "Operation Flint", deploying 200 soldiers from 2nd Battalion The Rifles, was an emergency measure to break the siege and allow a supply convoy through.

These details are important as they illustrate the increased power of the Taleban, the perilous situation of British troops and, all importantly, the failure of the MoD – and indeed the media – in any way to convey how serious the situation really was.

Also supplied by Amoore is more detail of the Taleban tactic of laying multiple IED ambushes, with primary devices and secondaries emplaced to kill or injure personnel coming to the rescue of those caught by the initial blasts – about which we have written, in some detail as the tactic became apparent.

But what is lacking from Amoore's account is any sense of complaint or criticism, as he records soldiers – including his own brother – being sent out time and time again to patrol an area known to be seeded with IEDs. He simply records that, of the 120 soldiers who served at Wishtan in the past six months, one in three has been killed or injured, the vast majority - eight killed and 30 wounded, including Amoore's brother - caused by IEDs.

There are many reasons why one should be critical of the Army for allowing this to happen. The positioning of an isolated base, without the manpower or the equipment to keep the supply route or the patrol area safe, was asking for trouble. The failure of the Army to adapt its patrol pattern – or suspend patrolling altogether – once the new threat had been experienced, is unpardonable.

What is now also clear – from Amoore – is that there was plenty of warning. In April soldiers could patrol more than a mile from the base, carrying full kit and weapons. But as the poppy harvest came to an end in May, he writes, "the warning signs began to appear."

The Taleban blocked alleys with lumps of concrete, channelling the soldiers onto paths booby-trapped with IEDs. They mined doorways, forcing troops to enter compounds by blowing "mouse holes" in the thick mud walls. Then they mined those, too. "Everything started to tighten up. We knew it was coming," said 9 Platoon's Sergeant Jamie Moncho, a softly spoken soldier of Italian descent.

One prominent casualty, on 20 August, was Sgt Paul McAleese, killed as he tried to recover the body of Private Johnathon Young, the circumstances of whose death Amoore describes in detail.

With the benefit of the overview gained from piecing together the many disparate pieces written about Sangin and Wishtan, we have been highly critical of the failures, and had already argued for better solutions to combat the threats.

Despite what have been very obvious military failures, however, The Sun chose to exploit the death of Sgt McAleese as a tool to attack the government, illustrating perfectly the thesis enunciated by Paul Robinson.

In this case though there is criticism but it does not come from us. In a comment on Amoore's piece, James Duffield, who describes himself as "ex Sapper to Capt 1967-1988", asks: "Where were their Sappers in 'intimate' support? Where are the Explosive Detection Dog teams? Where are the officers demanding this support? Where is the UK in providing it?"

He may not be covering all the bases, but his final point does sum it up. "Bloody criminally sad," he writes.

COMMENT THREAD

Institutional inertia

Things are improving in Sagnin. From the desperate picture painted by Anthony Loyd earlier this month – referring to his experiences in August – we get a completely different "take" from Miles Amoore.

The district, Amoore writes, which has seen the vast majority of British casualties during the bloodiest summer of the eight-year war, is now the focus of operations to counter the IED threat. Helicopters, UAVs and aircraft, which were sucked into Operation Panther’s Claw around the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah during the summer, have been made available to Sangin.

The helicopters, in particular, have allowed commanders to launch Operation Storm: over the past two months troops have air-assaulted into areas that lie beyond the belt of IEDs ringing the army's main bases, moving behind the Taleban's frontline in an onslaught against known IED teams aimed at preventing them from setting their lethal traps.

"We have shifted our operational mentality," said Capt Tom Beasley, who manages operations for the 2 Rifles battle group in Sangin. "Patrolling and looking for a fight meant that we were hitting IEDs. It was not going to be practical unless we changed things. Operation Storm was a response to the IED belt getting so close it was foolish to keep pushing out, finding an IED and then the entire patrol revolving around that incident."

That is how it should be, of course, with different tactics evolving to counter specific threats – and from all accounts they are being relatively successful. Certainly, we have not recently been appraised of any casualties from the area so, mercifully, they seem to have worked.

However, although the new tactics were evidently resource-led, it has long been known that, as Capt Beasley admits: "Patrolling and looking for a fight meant that we were hitting IEDs." Pending the availability of resources, there had been nothing to prevent the Army adopting a more passive stance, to avoid the inevitable casualties.

Nevertheless, even if the Taleban have been thwarted in Sagnin, that does not mean the battle is over – far from it. The focus of attacks has merely shifted to a different location, the previously "safe" main base at Camp Bastion. First of all it was an attack on an RAF Regiment Vector, patrolling the perimeter.

Now, we learn that Guardsman James Hill, of the Coldstream Guards (pictured), who killed last week, had fallen foul of an IED emplaced near the entrance to the base's firing range. The attack, described as "an unprecedented breach of security", also injured ten others.

Hill was in a group of soldiers walking to the range, which is outside the main camp. A soldier is believed to have stepped on the pressure plate of a bomb, detonating it. Amid the confusion, it is claimed, a second bomb planted close by had also gone off, killing Hill.

If the location is different, the tactic of using primary and secondary bombs to maximise casualties, is precisely that which has been used to such devastating effect at Sangin. And if a technique works well in one location – from the enemy point of view – then it will be used elsewhere.

Nor, frankly, should the attacks have come as a surprise. We pointed out earlier the well-worn truism that guerrillas operate to a well-defined pattern, part of which is that they will probe for the weakest spots and exploit them.

The inevitable consequence of this is that, no sooner does the Army manage to suppress activity in one area, the enemy will re-appear elsewhere, its aim as always to kill and injure coalition soldiers with a view to weakening the resolve of the home front.

Here, then, we have a direct conflict between the McChrystal "strategy" of protecting the people – even if it means putting troops at risk to do so – and Taleban strategy of maximising troop casualties. If the coalition intends to pursue the McChrystal strategy, it will become a race against time as to whether it can prevail before the weight of casualties turn public opinion irrevocably against the campaign.

In this, the Taleban's advantages are the Army's slowness of response and its seeming inability to think ahead and pre-empt their next moves. This "institutional inertia" is an almost unavoidable feature of a lumbering, bureaucratic entity – and that is primarily what any modern army really is. A nimble enemy can invariably outwit and outmanoeuvre such a machine which, for all its size and sophistication, is surprisingly vulnerable.

Thus, while the Army sees "boots on the ground" as its greatest asset, the Taleban see not soldiers but targets. Still, though, the British high command is wedded to the idea of sending more troops to theatre and is complaining that the 500 uplift proposed – which is to be formally announced on Wednesday – is not enough.

Some of those troops, it is rumoured, are destined for Sangin, to deal with a threat that was rampant in the earlier months of this year. Others, no doubt, will have to be assigned to base protection at Bastion, to meet the newly emerging threat there. In time the Army will deal with that threat and contain it. But, by that time, the Taleban will have moved on to exploit another vulnerability.

This is a battle the British Army cannot win – as long as there is no tolerance on the home front for continued losses. Gen Sir David Richards, the newly-appointed CGS, recently spoke of the drumbeat of casualties, claiming that that "the Army was ready to bear the sacrifice".

It is interesting how the people who do not have to bear the direct personal brunt of the consequences of that "sacrifice" are so sanguine about bearing it but, that notwithstanding, the evidence is that the population at large is less inclined to allow it.

Unfortunately, "institutional inertia" may well ensure that it has no option in the short-term. But public opinion has an inertia of its own and, once set, it is very difficult to change. Then, the "drumbeat" will have to assume a different tempo.

COMMENT THREAD

The values of the harlot

One wonders quite what the media are seeking to achieve with the prominence they have given today to a letter from aggrieved relatives directly blaming the prime minister for the death of Sergeant Paul McAleese. He was killed by an IED on 20 August in Sangin, while coming to the rescue of his stricken colleague, Private Johnathon Young (both pictured).

Leading the fray is The Sun, which runs the story on its front page (below right), with the headline "Dear PM, You killed our boy."

This, by its presentation and prominence, goes far beyond straightforward reportage, implying the paper's endorsement of the accusation, an endorsement made more explicit in the body of its story. The Sun, effectively, is accusing the prime minister of being directly responsible for the death of a soldier.

In general terms, of course – in the context of any war – the charge of being responsible for the deaths of our soldiers can be made against any prime minister, the office holder being the notional head of government and thus responsible for the prosecution of the war and its conduct.

This accusation, however, is different in tenor. It makes specific charges as to shortages of "manpower, surveillance kit, vehicles and helicopters", directed specifically at Gordon Brown. "As the Prime Minister, you must accept responsibility for the deployment of our troops," the letter goes. "You have a duty to ensure they are provided with the best equipment available and the operational tactics that are used are sound and sensible," it then declares.

Herein rests one of the crucial issues in the conduct of the war in Afghanistan – and generally – as to where the responsibilities lie between the politicians (at all levels) and the military. But this newspaper is not prepared to address this issue, preferring instead to direct its ire at the prime minister.

In so doing, it fails to recognise that there is, and always has been, a distinction between policy (and the direction of overall strategy), which rightly comes within the political ambit, and strictly operational matters, which are the responsibility of military commanders.

Inevitably, there is often a blurring of the line but, in general, operational matters are left to military commanders. This is territory into which the politicians will not venture and, if they attempted to do so, there would rightly be a media furore, with the politicians condemned for meddling.

The particular issues surrounding Sgt McAleese's death, however, are problematical. McAleese was operating from the Wishtan patrol base on the outskirts of Sangin, about which we know something, not least from Michael Yon's descriptions of operations in the vicinity.

We know, for instance, that Wishtan is a small base, out on a limb, and for some time was cut off from its support at FOB Jackson, to the extent that a major operation had to be mounted to restore access and re-supply the base.

The first question to confront, therefore, is whether the base should have been maintained at Wishtan. And, for such a small base – amounting to a company deployment – this is not something in which politicians would be involved. This has to be considered a military decision.

Then, through the good offices of Michael Yon, but also from other sources, particularly this moving account, we are aware that Army tactics are heavily reliant on establishing remote bases, from which routine foot patrols are mounted – for diverse reasons, not least in pursuit of the "hearts and minds" policy adopted as a core part of the strategy.

Given that McAleese was killed while on foot patrol, the next issue to confront is whether such patrols should have been mounted from Wishtan. Dismounted soldiers are extremely vulnerable and dozens of soldiers have been killed whilst on foot, mainly by IEDs. It must, therefore, at least be questionable as to whether the tactic was appropriate for this base, in the particular circumstances.

On the face of it, this again is an operational matter, which puts it firmly in the military sphere - something for military commanders to decide, based on their appreciation of local conditions. It could not be, and should not have been, a decision made by politicians, especially from their desks in London.

Given that two hurdles were passed – that the military had decided that the base was essential, and that the patrols were equally so – only then comes the question of resources.

In this instance, the question is focused on manpower, surveillance equipment and armoured vehicles. There is also an issue of detection capabilities, as it is alleged that the Taleban had access to the same type of mine detector used by the British and were thus able to devise IEDs which were undetectable with this equipment. Helicopters, although mentioned, are not strictly relevant.

However, before addressing the relevant issues, it has to be noted that a decision to maintain a base in the heartland of Taleban activity, and then to mount foot patrol from it, must be taken having regard to the resources available. If there were insufficient resources to secure the safety of the troops, then it would seem logical that operations should have been curtailed.

This is actually a key element of the whole debate on the conduct of the war. It boils down to the question of whether the military, given overall policy/strategic directions, should plan and execute their operations in vitro - i.e., without regard to the resources available – and then demand those resources. Failing their provision, the question devolves as to whether the Army should undertake those operations anyway, the politicians (or resource providers) being held accountable for any failures or calamities arising from their lack.

Here again, the matter is not completely clear-cut. If, on the one hand, the Army is bound specifically to carrying out a strategy which has been devised and imposed by the politicians, the implementation of which necessarily and unavoidably required mounting foot patrols from isolated bases in hostile territory, and which required certain resources which were asked for and denied by those politicians, then there could be no doubt as to where responsibility lay.

On the other hand, if the patrol tactic was entirely discretionary, under the control of the Army, which could decide whether to maintain a specific base and mount particular patrols, then this perhaps puts a different perspective on where the responsibility lies for any failure or calamity. Lack of resources would not be a political issue, as the command decisions would be taken having regard to resource availability.

Even then, there are complications. We see in this instance, the complaint about the lack of armoured vehicles. But, in the context of foot patrols, this hardly seems relevant. However, should they have been judged necessary, we know that a number of Ridgebacks were available, but the Army had decided to hold them back for issue en masse to the new roulement. This was despite the wishes of the politicians that they should be have been used immediately. Where then, does the responsibility lie?

More relevant perhaps, is the matter of mine clearance vehicles – something not brought up in the relatives' letter. We had our own suggestions for this, and have written on the need for vehicles such as the Buffalo, the Husky and even a variant of the Pookie for more restricted areas.

If we accept that there was an operational imperative which demanded routine foot patrols, such equipment would on the face of it seem appropriate and necessary. But, before attributing responsibility for any failure to supply such kit, we have to return to the questions of whether it was asked-for, by whom, when, under what conditions, and whether any such requests had been refused. If that equipment was available – but was not requested at the appropriate level of command – then responsibility lies where it falls.

Another issue raised was surveillance, the lack of which allowed the Taleban to emplace IEDs without being observed. This is very relevant, and there are several technical means by which it could be provided. The most obvious is the UAV but, for a fixed base from which troops mounted routine patrols, area surveillance might best be achieved by using fixed sensor masts.

Here, there has been some controversy. But before any blame can be attached for the failure to make suitable arrangements, the questions yet again have to be asked – and answered – as to whether such equipment was requested and whether any request was refused.

That then brings us to the vexed question of manpower. Whether more troops, in the short-term, deployed to Sangin would or could have led to a reduction in casualties is moot. One of the issues confronted by the US planners of the surge in Iraq was that more troops, initially, would yield more, not less casualties. More troops in Sangin, likewise, could have led to more casualties.

But again, the relevant issue here must surely have been whether, given the current manpower levels, it was safe and militarily appropriate to maintain the base at Wishtan.

All of these issues, collectively, point to the responsibility for the death of Sgt McAleese – and Pte Young – resting on complex issues and many unanswered questions. Notwithstanding that the soldiers were actually murdered by the Taleban, it is far too simplistic to point a finger of blame at the prime minister.

That then returns us to the question posed at the beginning of this piece – as to what media is seeking to achieve by giving such prominence to a letter from grieving relatives.

One can quite understand their grief and their very natural – and entirely commendable - desire to seek explanations. And it is forgivable that they should lash out at those who they think might be responsible. On the other hand, the writers are neither expert nor informed critics, nor necessarily balanced in their views.

Arguably, a responsible media would take this into account. Furthermore, while there is no restraint on grieving relatives making what accusations they think fit, the media should bear the responsibility for levelling informed accusations, directed at those who could reasonably be found wanting. Promulgating or supporting wild or unsubstantiated accusations – made for whatever reason – should be no part of the media brief.

Yet, no sooner had The Sun published its charges, the story was picked up by diverse other media outlets, including The Daily Mail, The Daily Telegraph and The Times. But the process of publication is not value-free. Without explanation, caveats or commentary, it implies endorsement. The media is, in effect, exploiting the grief of relatives to pursue an attack on the prime minister, adding to a narrative already in place.

Against that is the marked reluctance of the media to address any of the issues raised in this piece, or even to question the tactics of the Army, or its responsibilities for keeping its soldiers safe. To that extent also, the media seems to be exploiting the deaths of these soldiers, all in the guise of concern for their welfare, when not one of the papers involved is prepared to expend the time or energy needed to understand the issues.

What is so very depressing is that a properly focused and informed media could be a very powerful force in ensuring that our troops are properly equipped and that tactics and strategy are properly scrutinised and improved. Instead, the media have chosen the role of the harlot – power without responsibility – milking the grief and misery of relatives, and exploiting the dead, for their own sterile agendas.

They are always the last to accept any responsibility for their actions but, as with politicians and the military, we should let the responsibility lie where it falls.

COMMENT THREAD

The enemy owns the terrain

Whether it was his intention or not, the overpowering impression conveyed by Michael Yon's most recent post is one of utter hopelessness.

We see small numbers of British troops, besieged in their own garrisons, completely under-resourced and unable to prevail, with the Taleban operating freely under their very noses, dominating the surrounding countryside.

What brings this home is Yon's description of the difficulty in transferring from the main operating base in Sangin – FOB Jackson – to the secondary base at Inkerman. Although only four miles away, walking or driving was not possible. Enemy control of the terrain is so complete in the area between Sangin and Kajaki than the route was deemed too dangerous. Helicopter lift is required.

However, writes Yon, we need more helicopters. The helicopter shortage is causing crippling delays in troop movements. It's common to see a soldier waiting ten days for a simple flight.

When Yon finally managed to get a seat, it did not take him direct to his destination. Instead, it flew probably eighty miles to places like Lashkar Gah, and finally set down at Camp Bastion. The helicopter journey from Jackson began on 12 August and ended at Inkerman on the 17th. About five days was spent - along with many thousands of dollars in helicopter time - to travel four miles.

At Inkerman, it is still mostly a gunfight, though the use of bombs is increasing. The base sits on the desert side of "highway" 611 that goes from Highway 1 (the "Ring Road") to Kajaki. The 611 marks the border between the deadly Green Zone and the desert. The road is almost completely controlled by the enemy. Only tiny patches of the 611 are under serious NATO/ISAF influence.

Some will take issue with this statement, Yon writes, then adding: "if they claim to be in control, they should readily accept the challenge to drive in an unarmoured car in those areas they claim to control."

Only two platoons are stationed at Inkerman, which means only one platoon at a time can leave the base. But using one platoon to cover this area is like trying to water a football pitch with a drop of water, Yon observes. The enemy fights just outside the base, even planting IEDs in view of the guard towers.

This is not the only base under pressure. There are several satellite FOBs and Patrol Bases, each of which is essentially cut off from the outside world other than by helicopter or major ground resupply efforts (which only take place about once a month).

The latest ground resupply effort from Camp Bastion resulted in much fighting. The troops up at Kajaki Dam are surrounded by the enemy, which has dug itself into actual "FLETs." FLET is military-speak for "Forward Line of Enemy Troops." In other words, the enemy is not hiding, but they are in trenches, bunkers and fighting positions that extend into depth. The enemy owns the terrain, writes Yon.

So different is this picture from that we see presented on the MoD website, for instance, that it is impossible to reconcile what we are told officially with what Yon tells us. But then, from the tip of the spear, we get this:

The soldiers keep streaming in from the mission. The Pentagon and British MoD spin lies (though I have found Secretary Gates talks straight), but veins of pure truth can be found right here with these soldiers. The Pentagon and MoD as a whole cannot be trusted because they are the average of their parts. There are individual officers and NCOs among the US and UK. who have always been blunt and honest with me. Among the higher ranking, Petraeus and Mellinger come to mind, but for day-to-day realities this is where it's at. Out here. Nothing coming from Kabul, London, or Washington should be trusted.

So much of this have we heard previously, with the MoD issuing structured lies about the situation, that, in fact, there is no difficulty in accepting Yon's version and rejecting the official "spin".

"We owe it to all those that are sacrificing themselves in Helmand, to be brutally frank about what is going on there and what is going wrong," said Stephen Grey recently, "because it is only with that frankness that I think certain things can be put right."

Yet compared with the candour of Yon, we get the mindless assertion of our Chief of Defence Staff. Nothing coming from London should be trusted, says Yon. Quite.

COMMENT THREAD

Hard landing

Reports coming in tell of another RAF Chinook having been destroyed in Afghanistan.

This time, according to the MoD, enemy action was not thought to be involved. The helicopter, lifting 15 soldiers to a location six miles east of Sangin, made a "heavy landing" and sustained damage to its undercarriage, nose and front rotor. No one was hurt and the troops were allowed to continue their mission, the crew being evacuated by one of two other Chinooks which were taking part in the same operation.

The aircraft was unflyable and was later blown up by military personnel. The decision to destroy rather than retrieve the aircraft was taken "due to the difficult terrain and poor security situation around Sangin".

With a replacement cost of anything up to £40 million, it says something of the tenuous situation in the Sangin location that an operation was not mounted to secure the machine and arrange its salvage. That amount of money involved must be worth some risk and, if this was deemed too great – which clearly it was – then it must have been significant.

Of course, it would have helped if there had been a Mi-26 handy (pictured) – whence terrain would not have been an issue - but the one we had is no longer available. Interestingly, the site seems to have been secure enough for land forces to place explosives, rather than relying on air-delivered munitions, as was the case with the previous Chinook which had to be destroyed.

Clearly, the loss of this helicopter – the second in 10 days – will add further stress to the already stretched lift capability, although all options are being considered for an early replacement.

COMMENT THREAD

The official version

Possibly stung by Michael Yon's trenchant report on the Battle for Pharmacy Road, the MoD has rushed out its own version of the operation, currently on its website.

The Yon version is better and much more detailed, but both bring something to the table. Neither, though, is complete and – it would seem – neither tell the full story of what happened or is going on. From the joint accounts, however, a picture begins to emerge which is more than a little disturbing.

The MoD account, by way of adding missing detail, tells us that the "battle" is codenamed Operation Flint and that 200 soldiers from 2nd Battalion The Rifles are involved, together with "experts from the Joint Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group". We also learn that this was one of two operations, the second being the clearance, a few days later, of a pathway known as "Route Sparta", also in Sangin. In total, 37 IEDs are discovered.

Interestingly, the MoD account relies on some of Michael Yon's photographs (some of which we have reproduced), acknowledging their source – which adds a further dimension to the apparent withdrawal of Yon's embed, after the publication of his despatch. The mystery deepens.

The MoD's account of the early stages of Operation Flint very much follows the narrative set by Yon, the MoD describing Pharmacy Road as "notorious", also telling us that it had "previously" claimed the lives of five soldiers in one day. This presumably is the incident on 10 July, when five were killed in the complex ambush.

Lt Will Hignett from 2 Rifles sets the scene, telling us: "The ground in Wishtan is made up of a maze of high compound walls and narrow alleyways. It is ideal for insurgents placing IEDs in cover and a real challenge for patrols trying not to get channelled or set predictable patterns for patrolling."

As to the operation, we learn that The Rifles surrounded the "one-kilometre stretch of road to provide cover for the specialist search and bomb disposal teams" and, as Yon describes, IED after IED is uncovered.

What then gets very interesting is the way that the MoD then describes (or more accurately does not describe) the blockage caused by two blown-up vehicles, about which Yon gives us some detail and provides photographs.

According to the MoD, the clearance teams, as they moved further down the road, "discovered the wreckage of two vehicles, clearly decimated by an earlier blast." The use of the word "discovered" is, to say the very least, puzzling. They did not know they were there? We are being fed BS.

Moreover, we are led to believe that the vehicles are "decimated by an earlier blast" – i.e., a single blast. Yet, we know from Yon that one vehicle is a "Jingle" – i.e., civilian – truck. The other is, from the look of it, an armoured wheeled loader. We know it is military – Yon tells us so - and, as a JCB (Yon calls it a "scooper") is part of the recovery effort, we are told (by Yon) that "the soldier who is driving the scooper is the same driver who got blown up on Pharmacy Road."

Putting the narratives together and making our own deductions, what appears more plausible is that the civilian truck was blown up and then, subsequently, the armoured loader was despatched in an attempt to clear the wreckage, only to get itself blown up.

Originally, we had assumed that this vehicle was another JCB but, on close inspection of Yon's photograph (above right), it appears similar to the much larger and better-protected Caterpillar loader - the very same type that the MoD are selling off (left). This might explain why the driver survived. But it also tells us the Army has a serious problem. At 37 tons, and a back wheel missing, this is serious heavy metal creating a major obstruction. (It could, however, be a Case 721B Medium Wheeled Tractor with a Penman armoured cab – weighing in at a mere 16 metric tons.)

With the two hulks blocking the road (and then booby-trapped), it must have been these which finally closed off Pharmacy Road, effectively isolating PB Wishtan, forcing it to be re-supplied by helicopter. And, when – as Yon but not the MoD tells us – a supply helicopter was attacked by an RPG, which cannot have been long after the Mi-26 had been shot down, one surmises that helicopter flights were suspended, leaving the base cut-off and under siege.

Thus, it would appear, Operation Flint was not simply a "route clearance" operation. It was an emergency relief force to break the siege of PB Wishtan, before its supplies ran out and it was over-run.

This is, effectively, borne out by the MoD itself, which tells us that, 22 hours after 2 Rifles deployed, the road was declared clear as the soldiers reached Wishtan. The rest of the night, we are then told, a "convoy resupplied Wishtan with everything from fridges to missiles." That detail is not mentioned by Yon.

That is what this convoy must have been all about. Several of the photographs show the convoy driving through Sangin market, which is the route to PB Wishtan from Jackson. We are looking at a relief convoy, breaking the siege – hence the elation of the Wimik driver.

Such is speculation, of course, but it all fits. And it explains the sensitivity of the MoD to Michael Yon's report – and its eagerness now to rush out its own version. The last thing the MoD wants is anyone to realise quite how desperate the situation really is in Sangin, with a Company base not three miles from the main FOB Jackson having been cut off by the Taleban.

That subsequently, the Taleban were effectively able to isolate FOB Jackson on election day also tells you a great deal about the security situation in Sangin, and the strength of the Taleban. Operation Flint – or at least the MoD version of it – seems to be hiding that in plain sight.

Things are perhaps now worse than even the growing casualty rate tells us. Yon got perilously close to revealing this.

COMMENT THREAD

The battle for Pharmacy Road

We have written a great deal of the situation in Sangin, deploring the growing toll of casualties in that town, the brunt of which are being taken by the 2 Rifles Battlegroup under the command of Lt-Col Rob Thomson.

Their headquarters are at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Jackson near the banks of the Helmand River just outside Sangin town, in the so-called "green zone", the lush area of vegetation fed by the river waters.

Embedded with 2 Rifles – until yesterday when his permission to remain was withdrawn by the MoD after he had posted this report – Michael Yon was able to describe in detail one small action, which I have dubbed the "battle for Pharmacy Road", the narrative here culled from Yon's much longer report.

The unpaved Pharmacy Road, flanked by 15ft-high baked mud walls forming the boundaries to sizeable compounds, starts about two miles to the south east of FOB Jackson - a route which passes through Sangin market. It runs east north-east connecting two secondary bases, about a mile apart (see above - note, this is not oriented north/south). At the western end is Patrol Base (PB) Tangiers manned by the Afghan National Army while, at the eastern extremity is PB Wishtan, named after the locality, occupied by C Company 2 Rifles.

Pharmacy Road, however, has effectively been closed by enemy harassment, including a blockage caused by two blown-up vehicles (a "jingle truck" and a British Army armoured JCB). IEDs are planted in broad daylight and the enemy chisels small firing holes through the walls and fires bullets down the tight spaces and alleyways.

Resupply and troop movements, therefore, had to be performed by helicopter, even though a patrol could walk from Jackson to Wishtan in an hour and straight driving would only take fifteen minutes. With the shortage of helicopters (and the fact that an RPG was recently fired at a helicopter as it lifted out of PB Wishtan), closure of the road increased enemy freedom of movement while decreasing that of the British and Afghan forces.

The British soldiers of 2 Rifles were thus given a mission: clear and hold. The task is not easy. With no direct line of sight from one end of the road to the other, and a network of narrow alleys between compounds, giving ambush opportunities to the enemy, the troops will be hemmed in by the high walls.

Snipers are of little use because they can neither see nor shoot through the walls, which are so robust that even 30mm cannon rounds fired from aircraft will not penetrate. A 500lb bomb exploding in the middle of a compound will leave the walls standing. And there is no commanding terrain other than the air.

The mission began under cover of darkness, the troops equipped with night vision goggles and led by a soldier with a sniffer dog.

"We set off down the market road," Yon writes. Then, in an oblique reference to his MoD "minders" – who were subsequently to pull the plug - he adds: "Some folks believe such reports are 'security violations', as if the thousands of people living here do not know exactly where the bases are, or do not know exactly where we came from and went to. Operations take place here every day. Civilians are everywhere."

Despite being observed by so many civilians, the troops, Yon still with them, reach PB Tangiers with no dramas. Some Afghan soldiers were on guard there, while others seemed comatose.

With the troops is Cpl Mark "Axle" Foley, the JTAC who controls air strikes. He is allocated support from A-10s but about 0314, as they approach, still about 40 miles out, they are called away for a TIC (troops in contact) somewhere in South Helmand. The men bed down to sleep.

It is not until nearly half past five in the morning that ordnance clearance (EOD) teams start moving down the road, clearing IEDs with controlled explosions – dealing with six in the space of an hour. They have a soldier with a sniffer dog with them. This is not entirely successful, leading his handler at one stage over an undetected pressure-activated IED.

With one stretch "cleared" - there have been many instances where soldiers heve been blown up by ground that has just been cleared, so cleared is more like "cleared" - Lt-Col Rob Thomson leads some of his men to check the progress in clearing some of the most dangerous ground, where the blown-up vehicles are blocking the road.

The plan to clear the blockage is ingenious. The area surrounding the vehicles is booby-trapped with explosives, and the wrecks themselves also are booby-trapped. So, instead of trying to drag the vehicles the length of the road, the goal is to blow down the wall of the adjoining compound and drag the vehicles off the road and into this compound.

About 200lb of plastic explosive is used to make a breach. This also brings down electrical wires so the breach is widened with an armoured JCB, to allow a heavy truck through into the compound, which is used to winch the wires clear. Then the wrecks are dragged into the compound and the way is now clear for the EOD teams to continue.

That night, however, the troops stay in the compound, the aim being to build a permanently manned observation post halfway down the road. Yon sleeps while soldiers from 2 Rifles and the engineers work all night erecting the sanger (guard post).

As the sun was rising on the second day, Pharmacy Road had been cleared and the sanger had been built. Yon and most of the troops headed back to FOB Jackson. Back at the base, an explosion shook the room. Word came that a local person was pulling parts from one of the vehicles that were dragged off Pharmacy Road. He encountered a Taleban booby-trap and he had been killed.

EOD had not cleared the vehicles of booby-traps; the two vehicles had merely been pulled off the road. Next day another local was killed on a parallel road that he thought the British had cleared. It had not. The Taleban blows up a lot of local people in Sangin, writes Yon.

The mission was an obvious success. It was surprising, Yon adds, that we endured no fatalities or serious injuries. The mission was well-executed and since many of the soldiers have substantial combat experience from Iraq and Afghanistan, major dramas were averted.

Although at least one IED has been placed on the road since, C Company and the ANA are now regularly patrolling and the freedom of movement has resumed. This is a brutal fight. Since that mission, eight more British soldiers and two interpreters have been killed in the area. That's ten KIA plus the wounded. The soldiers keep going.

COMMENT THREAD

Fine words ...

"I find it so distressing to hear lavish praise being heaped upon the procurement of vehicles that are potential death-traps and to listen later to expressions of condolence to the families of those who have perished in them."

So said Ann Winterton in a debate in the House of Commons on 4 June this year, but her distress might easily apply to the expressions so freely offered (and repeated) every time troops are killed.

"Fine words butter no parsnips" – a phrase which seems to have its origins in antiquity - seems an appropriate response to these gushing outpourings, so easily trotted out every time a soldier is killed.

Thus we see, yet again, the MoD website tell us that: "It is with great sadness" that it must confirm that one soldier from 3rd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's) and one soldier from 2nd Battalion The Rifles have been killed in Afghanistan.

The soldiers, we are told, died as a result of an explosion that happened whilst on a routine foot patrol, not connected to election security, near Sangin, northern Helmand province, on the morning of Thursday 20 August 2009.

Yet the "great sadness" phrase is just words, pulled off from a standard MoD template, to be pasted in against the details of whichever incident is then current.

Even now, the media team are rushing around collecting statements from the colleagues and relatives of the deceased, to paste into the increasingly lengthy eulogies that are in the process of being written, but they too will be just words. They butter no parsnips – they do not bring the dead back to life and nor do they prevent troops yet to die from being killed.

Furthermore, built into the brief announcement from the MoD is a "lie" – a circumlocution, if one wants to be charitable. The incident happened while the troops were "on a routine foot patrol" says the MoD.

We saw this "routine patrol" lie in November 2006 when the MoD described the deaths of four military personnel on the Shatt al-Arab waterway in Iraq in terms of them being engaged in "a routine boat patrol".

In fact, they were in a "water taxi", sent to their deaths, wholly unprotected when it was thought that this was the safest way of transporting personnel between bases. It certainly was "routine" – and that is what killed them – but it certainly was not a "patrol". These were lambs led to the slaughter.

Nor indeed was this current incident a "routine patrol" – at least, not wholly. In fact, according to Thomas Harding of The Daily Telegraph, it was not one incident, but three. The first may have arisen from such an event, although the whole idea of a "routine" is an anathema in counter-insurgency. Routines kill, as they did on the Shatt al-Arab.

The first soldier, writes Harding, from the 3rd Bn The Yorkshire Regiment, a unit sent out as emergency reinforcements to Afghanistan last month after the very high casualty rate this summer, was killed instantly after his foot patrol was targeted.

The second soldier, from 2nd Bn The Rifles, died as a force was sent out to retrieve the body of their dead colleague. Then, as the remainder of the force attempted to evacuate both fatalities a third device went off. Two soldiers were wounded in addition to the two killed in the attack, bringing the total number of British fatalities in Afghanistan to 206.

These facts immediately elevate the incident into a different league. We note that the location is what we have called the mincer of Sangin and that these two deaths bring the total in this area to 57, and this year to 22, with nineteen of them arising from IEDs.

With the grand total of 206 fatalities now recorded, an estimated 176 of these are KIA, which has Sangin and its immediate environs accounting for nearly a third of all deaths in action (32.4 percent).

That, in itself, is remarkable, as the area is often cited as one of the government's key targets for its "co-ordinated delivery of military and civil effect". Its aim has been "to provide a secure environment to allow stabilisation activity to take place", an aim in which it seems singularly to have failed, despite numerous intensive operations - although the MoD claims otherwise, one observer "noting" that ISAF is making "small baby steps" that, if continued, will soon pick up greater pace and confidence.

But what has marked out the most recent casualties – and magnified the rate of attrition – is the Taleban tactic of employing multiple IEDs in complex traps, with secondary devices aimed at killing rescue parties when they come to the aid of those caught in the primary blast.

With this current incident, this is the fourth time in the Sangin area since 10 July that troops have been caught out with fatal effect. That is not to say that similar tactics are not being used by the Taleban elsewhere – they are. Earlier this month we saw a soldier killed near Gereshk (although not so very far from Sangin) when he sought to recover an Afghan soldier's body. Then there was the incident in December 2008 when a soldier was killed after a complex ambush on a Viking near Lashkar Gah.

From other reports, though, it would appear that complex IED ambushes are now theatre-wide, these also having been experienced by USMC patrols further south in Garmsir.

Nor indeed is the slaughter confined to British troops. While we have lost 15 so far this month, the total losses for all coalition forces have now reached 50, not so very far short of last month's rate, when the total reached 76.

Public (and therefore political) acceptance of this continued toll of fatalities – which admittedly by contrast with previous campaigns is relatively modest – requires us to trust that the Army knows what it is doing, and the casualties are a necessary and unavoidable consequence of war, all in the context of the military making progress towards achieving its aims.

Sensitised by the saga of the Snatch Land Rover, however, and many other subsequent episodes where it has been demonstrated that the military (with or without the dereliction of the MoD – and it is difficult to assess where the responsibility lies) has been somewhat cavalier in its responsibilities, we are less than convinced that the Army has a grip on the situation.

Looking down from this end of the telescope – lacking the context and broader appreciation of the campaign in Helmand – all we see is a progression of casualties, some of which are evidently caused by the same Taleban tactic, for which the Army seems to have no obvious counter.

The Army response (and that of so many of its fellow travellers) is to retreat behind the wall of OPSEC (operational security) oblivious to the very obvious fact that the enemy clearly knows a great deal about its operations, with so many others directing sneering condescension at those who have the temerity to question or even doubt the wisdom and professionalism of "Our Brave Boys".

So often are our soldiers cast as "heroes" that there is virtually a cultural taboo against offering even the mildest criticism of soldiers, even though there is nothing particularly heroic about being blown apart by a hidden IED, or having limbs ripped apart. In fact, it is a squalid, miserable way to go.

Somehow, though, the military – or perhaps the politicians – are going to have to come to terms with the legitimate, but often overstated demands of OPSEC, and the need to provide enough information to assure its critics that the Army is responding effectively to the different threats in theatre, and is taking them seriously.

Fine words are no longer good enough – if they ever were.

COMMENT THREAD

Chinook shot down

At the moment, even though the incident apparently happened last night, details are sketchy. We learn from Reuters that a British Chinook helicopter made an emergency landing in southern Afghanistan following an engine fire, but the crew escaped unhurt.

From the MoD website, we learn that the incident happened after two helicopters dropped off cargo and passengers a few miles north of Sangin. Shortly after take-off "the four-strong crew of one Chinook saw cockpit indications of an engine fire during take-off."

The pilots skilfully continued to manoeuvre the helicopter about 1km away from the "danger zone" (the MoD phrasing) "to safely make an emergency landing." All four crew onboard managed to evacuate the aircraft safely. They were recovered by the second helicopter which took them out of the area.

The MoD, initially, quite deliberately did not rule out enemy action, and have now confirmed that the aircraft was brought down by a combination of "RPG and small-arms fire".

Precisely what damage was caused has not been revealed, but a Chinook has a sophisticated and highly effective fire suppression system and, therefore, a straight engine fire should not present a catastrophic emergency. Furthermore, the engine casings are heavily armoured, which makes you wonder what sort of weapons were deployed. Then, the aircraft has a capability to fly on one engine, especially if it is lightly loaded, as was the case.

Interestingly, the extraction of the four crewmen was effected by the other Chinook, rather than relying on – say – the quick reaction force from Sangin (or even the troops who had just been dropped). One should not read too much into this, especially as the other Chinook was in the air over the scene, but in the event that the crew were uninjured, one might expect them to remain by their machine, pending either repairs or arrangements for recovery.

This brings in a fourth point, that the aircraft was subsequently destroyed by a coalition airstrike, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Taleban. This clearly indicates that it there was a significant enemy threat and that it was thought tactically inadvisable to commit ground troops to secure the area.

For such a high-value asset, the possibility of recovery would have been strongly considered – unless of course the aircraft was much more badly damaged than has been indicated, and was already deemed to be beyond economic repair.

In fact, that seems to have been the case. According to The Times, a Special Forces unit had disembarked with their kit only minutes earlier, but when the helicopter lifted off with just the four-man crew on board, it came under attack. The engine burst into flames and the crew had to fight the controls to make an emergency landing. "They managed to fly the Chinook forward 500 metres to reach a safe area before landing it," one MoD official says.

The "unrecoverable" helicopter was still on fire and a decision was taken to destroy it to prevent Taleban insurgents from seizing any of the equipment on board. A Nato bomber was called in and dropped a 500lb bomb on the wreckage.

The fact that it was destroyed says a great deal about the strength of the coalition grip in the area, where a considerable number of operations have been mounted to "chase out" the Taleban. Normally, the preference would be to secure the site, even if the aircraft was destroyed, in order to carry out a crash investigation.

That this aircraft was downed as result of enemy action comes as no surprise. Since April, we have been aware of a deliberate Taleban strategy to down a Chinook, with it becoming very obvious that these helicopters were targets.

Further evidence came with the downing of the Mi-26 in July, followed by an initial announcement by the Taleban that they had shot down a Chinook, when it was even more evident that the enemy was aiming for a "spectacular". Fortunately – the aircraft downed was empty, and no one was hurt. The Taleban still have not succeeded, but it is quite obvious that they are trying.

If as a result of all this, helicopter re-supply to forward areas is considered too dangerous, this will impose considerable extra strain on resources, as may already be happening. But it also calls into question the prevailing narrative that more helicopters are the answer to reducing troop casualties.

As we have pointed out, again and again, more helicopters operating in a highly insecure environment, could simply expose troops to a different kind of risk, with the possibility of casualties in the 40s. That would be a "game changing" event, creating huge political pressure for withdrawal.

This loss, therefore, could have significant implications for on-going operations and raises serious questions as to the overall tactics of "take and hold". Already, we have seen complaints of the huge "percentage of time and effort sucked up into the black hole" of orchestrating road moves, simply to re-supply outposts. The situation could be about to get a whole lot worse.

COMMENT THREAD

Coincidence?

In July, we reported the shooting down of a Mi-26 as it was delivering supplies to the British military base at Sangin.

Now we learn from the MoD website that a convoy stretching for five miles and consisting of more than one hundred UK, US and Afghan National Army vehicles set off recently to resupply coalition bases in northern Helmand.

The 116-vehicle convoy, one of the biggest to ever leave Camp Bastion, was travelling a dangerous 40 miles to bases in the Sangin Valley via the outskirts of Gereshk and then off-road through open desert. It took a full day to get to the first base, with a Manoeuvre Operations Group [MOG] in Vikings acting as a screen for the convoy and clearing the path ahead (one of which took an IED hit).

The road convoy was mounted, incidentally, at a time that the US forces are increasingly relying on airlift. Since 2005, there has been an 800 percent increase in air drops – from two to three per week to seven to eight per day. In July, the USAF made 1,700 air drops over Afghanistan. That is the most since the start of the Afghan conflict, in 2001.

Given the considerable manpower required to mount extensive road convoys and the danger of attack, one would have thought that the British would be keen to use helicopters as force multipliers. But then, with 20 tons of lift capacity having been taken out, and the situation obviously very dangerous in Sangin, here we see land convoys being mounted.

Of course, this could be a coincidence. It could be that the British have so many troops that they are short of things to do with them.

COMMENT THREAD

A smell of corruption

One of the most bizarre episodes most recently carried on this blog was the news of the Mi-26 crash in Sangin last month, not only for the dubious history of the operator, but also for the fact that the MSM did not touch the story.

However, there was a brief flurry of interest when later that month an Mi-8 crashed at Kandahar airbase, killing 16, but there was absolutely nothing written about the operator, Vertikal-T, which also has a very dubious history.

As to the British use of these helicopters, it is assumed, inter alia that these rather dubious operators were employed for their willingness to take risks and, especially, for their cheapness. However, it has also been admitted that the MoD does not deal directly with these operators but hires the helicopters through an intermediate company, Skylink, yet another operator with an extremely dubious history.

But what now emerges from unlikely source is the actual cost of these helicopters. This comes from a private background briefing note being used by MoD press officers for when they talk to the media about helicopters, where it is revealed that the contract "provides 340 hrs at a cost of around £3.9M per month" (figures the defence secretary would never give to Parliament).

The payments are for one Mi-26 and two Mi8s, the average working out at about £11,500 per hour. Now, another general assumption is that, for routine contracts, the MoD – all things being equal – goes for the cheapest bidder. And here is the rub.

This blog has sight of a formal offer made to the MoD for the supply of the same helicopter types, costed at £3,500 per hour for an Mi-8 and £6,000 per hour for an Mi-26. This would work out at considerably less than half the cost of the Skylink contract, potentially saving the MoD £2 million a month. However, the eastern European and Russian operators are known to offer their services at rates considerably below these figures, offering potentially even greater savings if they were employed directly instead of through Skylink.

Furthermore, other things were not equal. The bid seen by this blog included the services of ex-Nato force pilots, all of whom could be security cleared and who were willing to be vetted as a condition of their employment. The aircraft maintenance was to be supervised by western-certified mechanics, and the supplier, having already operated in Afghanistan, had an excellent safety record.

Not only was this bid rejected out of hand, it emerges from a recent AP backgrounder that not only do the helicopter operators employed by the British and Nato have very suspect safety records, with links to known illicit arms dealers, there are also serious security concerns.

This is freely admitted by one of the Russian operators, Valery Gabriel, who admits that "Russia is delighted to be involved with the supply contracts" through its nationals and its aircraft. Not only is it "big business" – with one supply contract to the US worth over $400 million a year - this makes the coalition forces increasing dependent on Russia, conferring obvious political advantages.

But Gabriel also adds that Russia's GRU, its military intelligence arm — believed to have close links with several Russian companies operating in Afghanistan — may also stand to benefit. "From a GRU standpoint, you have an extremely useful source — low-level but extremely useful intelligence," he said.

When asked what safety and security checks it carried out on the operators and the personnel who were delivering high-value supplies into UK military bases throughout Afghanistan, the MoD replied that they had no responsibility to carry out "due diligence" on subcontractors.

Mark Galeotti, a military and organized crime expert at New York University, ventures that companies such as the Toronto-based Skylink are often used as intermediaries to give an element of "plausible deniability" when "cowboy" operators are used – but the MoD is paying dearly for the privilege.

And when, in this case, nothing stacks up, with the MoD hiring sub-standard providers, with dodgy safety and security records, at more than twice the price of legitimate operators, there wafts gently into the nostrils that unmistakable smell of corruption. While the MoD is short-changing injured troops on compensation, someone, somewhere in the chain, is making a great deal of money.

Strangely though, the AP backgrounder – damning in its own right – has been ignored by the British media. Of the very few users that have published the complete piece, you can count the Tehran Times and The Moscow Times - as well as the New York Times.

That tells you something about our media. The stink is not confined to the corridors of power.

COMMENT THREAD

Unacceptable attrition

Reflecting precisely a comment on our forum, we have Lt-Col William Pender (rtd) in the letters column of The Daily Telegraph today, making the essential point about the war in Afghanistan: either we fight it properly, or not at all. More specifically, he writes:

The fundamental question, both for the Government and for Nato (if it is to remain a meaningful alliance), is whether defeat of the Taleban and establishment of a stable, long-term democracy in Afghanistan really is a vital interest.

If it is vital, then since national security is the prime duty of any government, whatever it takes in manpower – but primarily willpower – from all Nato member nations, must be allocated to fulfilling this aim. If this means putting economies on a war footing – fine.

If, on the other hand, these aims are merely desirable rather than vital – and with governments led by politicians with no personal military experience, and more concerned with interest rates, credit crunches and unemployment – why, let them say so.

Then the nations that contribute combat troops can resign themselves to long-term attrition of their soldiers committed to an unwinnable war.

For "attrition", read feeding troops into a mincer, sustaining a never-ending toll of casualties for no strategic effect. In such a battle, with our small, expensive Army, we can never win against the unlimited manpower of the Taleban, sustained by a never-ending supply of young men from the North-West frontier. Even at an exchange rate of 1000-1 in our favour, we cannot win.

Iain Dale notes that "politics is upside down" when Sunny Hundal supports the war and EU Referendum says we should withdraw.

For the record, we support the war. But that support is conditional on it being prosecuted effectively, with clear objectives and some prospect of success. None of those conditions currently apply.

In our overnight post, we write of the tragic episodes where three foot patrols in Sangin in the space of just over a month are confronted with the same type of complex IED ambush, each suffering multiple casualties in exactly the same circumstances.

On a smaller scale, the Army response seems to mirror the tactics of the First World War when the Generals, having experienced the carnage of sending troops "over the top" to face the German machine guns – to be slaughtered in their tens of thousands - hit upon the new, "war winning" tactic - of doing exactly the same thing again.

In terms of this war, it is not the machine gun but the IED which is the decisive weapon. And, as in the First World War, we see an Army which is completely unprepared, both physically and intellectually, to deal with the threat.

Faced with the endless attrition arising from sending men out on foot patrol to confront IEDs which have been manufactured and emplaced on an industrial scale, the Army's tactic is simply to do exactly the same thing again, and again and again. We are not alone in being less than impressed with what passes for Army tactics.

The point is, of course, that the Taleban's use of the IED was expected and predicted - back in June 2006, when we arranged through Ann Winterton for the defence minister to be asked what he intended to do about it. The answer was not reassuring.

Only now, three years later, is the outgoing CGS at last taking the threat seriously. In a long interview with ITN yesterday (summarised here) Gen Dannatt "vows" to deliver swift retribution to sneak bombers who attack UK soldiers with deadly booby traps in Afghanistan.

He calls for his troops to be given better "technical" equipment to locate the devices and catch those responsible in the act so they can be eliminated and we are told that the General "has been forced to endure reports of death and injuries inflicted on those under his charge" by IEDs.

"IEDs are a critical issue at the moment. We need more technical equipment to have 24/7 surveillance and the ability to target these people and kill them, if necessary, when they are laying these devices," he says.

The (rhetorical) question is, where was Dannatt three years ago when the threat was being predicted but had not then materialised? Well, as we know, this "honest general" was obsessed with the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES).

Interviewed by RUSI in Summer 2006, he spoke of having "won the argument for the medium-weight equipments," predicting confidently that "we will have them." Even then, with "roadside bombs" ripping the heart out of his army in Iraq, IEDs were never mentioned.

With the Army three years behind the curve, there can be no "swift" retribution. It will take several years to devise the necessary countermeasures, equip and train the troops, deploy the equipment and introduce new tactics. The consequence is that, in the interim, the Army must cede the tactical initiative to the Taleban in order to minimise casualties, or sustain losses which would make continuation of the current campaign unacceptable.

The alternative, as Lt-Col William Pender writes, is to put the UK on a war footing, injecting massive resources into the campaign to overcome the years of neglect. If we had any confidence that this might happen, either under this or the next administration, then our view of the war would be different.

Devoting the necessary resources, however, is as politically unsustainable as bearing the current casualty rate. Brown is not going to do it, and neither is Cameron. For want of that, therefore, we must withdraw. There is no way out, other than to resign ourselves to long-term attrition of our soldiers committed to an unwinnable war.

And that simply is not acceptable.

COMMENT THREAD

Why we are losing

Anthony Loyd in Sangin reports for The Times on the latest fatal attack, which killed three soldiers and injured many more. He writes as follows:

As the dust cleared around them, revealing the terribly injured body of one of their comrades, the fusiliers knew that the horror might have only just begun.

Three of their number had died on Thursday in the same green zone south of Sangin — killed by a secondary device that exploded among soldiers trying to rescue the wounded from the first blast.

Shortly after first light on Sunday, the same was about to happen again, killing three more British soldiers and taking the death toll to 204.

As the troops of 3 Platoon, A Company, 2 Rifles battlegroup carried their casualty through reeds on the bank of the Helmand River towards ground that was clear enough for a medical helicopter to land upon, another blast ripped through them.

"I was blown on to my backside," said Sergeant-Major Pete Burney. "I thought, 'That's me then' but as I picked myself up I saw I hadn't a scratch. Then I realised we were among a belt of IEDs [improvised explosive devices]."

To his right he could see a medic, a woman who seconds earlier had been attempting to resuscitate the first casualty, but who had been blown past him and lay wounded on the ground. Another fusilier and a Royal Military Police corporal were injured. A fusilier lay dead among more IEDs.

The other incident to which Loyd refers happened on 13 August. But then there was the incident on 10 July when five died, again through a combination of a primary bomb and a secondary set to kill members of the rescue party.

To paraphrase Lady Bracknell, once may be regarded as a misfortune; twice looks like carelessness. Three times?

But we had exactly the same dynamic with Snatch Land Rovers. On 29 May 2005, L/Cpl Brackenbury is killed in a Snatch by a type of bomb then new to the British sector – the explosively formed penetrator (EFP) – against which the vehicle was defenceless. Three others are injured.

Then, on 6 June, an EFP "daisy chain" is discovered intact and successfully defused. It is taken away for forensic analysis, from which the Army confirms with no room for doubt that Snatch Land Rovers offer no protection at all to this type of device.

So what does the Army do? On 15 July it sends another Snatch patrol out into the same general area where the device is known to be used. Three soldiers are killed and two more injured. And then the Army does it again and again and again.

We are led to believe that the Army is manned by professionals – soldiers who know what they are doing. We can criticise the politicians freely, but not our "Brave Boys" who put their lives on the line.

So which politician was it that decided to send a foot patrol out into an environment where twice previously soldiers had encountered complex, multiple IED ambushes and experienced multiple casualties?

Or could we possibly surmise that this was an "operational" decision, just like the decisions to deploy Snatches into a territory where weapons were being deployed which rendered them defenceless?

And just how many times do soldiers have to walk into such traps before it dawns on someone that this is not a terribly good idea?

Incidentally, it was on 10 March 2007 that Anthony Loyd, soldier turned photographer and war correspondent, argued: "for once" an Afghan war is winnable, declaring that, "the tide is turning against the Taleban".

Some tide ... some Taleban.

COMMENT THREAD

A matter of interpretation

A tactical decision to pull some British units out of Sangin, in northern Helmand province, led to a surge in Taleban attacks in and around the town in which 14 British soldiers were killed by IEDs in five weeks.

Thus writes Michael Evans in The Times today, a report that can be interpreted at several levels.

The information comes from a "senior defence source", who says that to make up numbers for Operation Panther's Claw, units in Sangin were "thinned out". The Taleban had then suffered such heavy losses that they had looked elsewhere to see where they could inflict the most damage on British troops and selected Sangin for their attacks.

Ostensibly, this makes complete sense. That is what "guerrillas" do. If their enemy saturates one area with troops, the classic strategy is to move out and cause mayhem elsewhere.

That this was the dynamic at play is "confirmed" by Lt-Gen Simon Mayall. Commanders had used the resources available for the "main effort." "As a corollary, the Taleban moved elsewhere and they turned to Sangin," he says.

However, this may not be an accurate (or complete) explanation for what is happening. In Sangin this year, there have been 20 British fatalities. Six were killed prior to the start of Panther's Claw and 14 afterwards. But raw numbers do not tell the whole story.

Between 1 January and 19 June when the operation started, there were six attacks on British troops, giving rise to six fatalities. Three of the deaths were from shooting. Three were from IEDs.

After the start of Operation Panther's Claw, there were 14 deaths, but also six fatal attacks. The main difference was that all the attacks involved IEDs and three of them gave rise to multiple deaths: five, three and three respectively, accounting for 11 of the 14 deaths.

On the face of it, therefore, we are not seeing substantially increased Taleban activity in response to Panther's Claw, especially as half of the pre-19 June attacks took place in May, with one in early June.

What we are most definitely seeing, however, is a change in tactics. There is a greater reliance on the IED, with the use of multiple devices, and the sophisticated use of secondary devices, increasing the kill rate per attack.

Thus, while displacement of guerrilla activity is one thing, if the Taleban are increasing their kill rate for a roughly constant level of activity, this is a very much more serious development.

Unknown to us though is the number of unsuccessful attacks, those where injury and no deaths occurred, and those involving foreign nationals, which have not been factored into the story in The Times.

We do know from Michael Yon, however, that on 13 August, when three British soldiers were killed in one IED attack, there was another ambush which killed two interpreters. This was not recorded by the British media (or the MoD) – foreigners do not count.

This actually changes the arithmetic slightly, but we do not have enough information overall to draw definitive conclusions. But then, neither does The Times. Lt-Gen Mayall may know more, but he does not bring any facts to the table.

Crucially though, from what we know, we cannot assume that a reduction in troop levels in a particular location (and/or an increase elsewhere) is responsible for increased casualties. For all we know, more troops could have meant more patrols, more "targets" and more deaths. The precise situation, therefore, is not clear – to us, at least. It is a matter of interpretation.

COMMENT THREAD