Hard landing

Reports coming in tell of another RAF Chinook having been destroyed in Afghanistan.

This time, according to the MoD, enemy action was not thought to be involved. The helicopter, lifting 15 soldiers to a location six miles east of Sangin, made a "heavy landing" and sustained damage to its undercarriage, nose and front rotor. No one was hurt and the troops were allowed to continue their mission, the crew being evacuated by one of two other Chinooks which were taking part in the same operation.

The aircraft was unflyable and was later blown up by military personnel. The decision to destroy rather than retrieve the aircraft was taken "due to the difficult terrain and poor security situation around Sangin".

With a replacement cost of anything up to £40 million, it says something of the tenuous situation in the Sangin location that an operation was not mounted to secure the machine and arrange its salvage. That amount of money involved must be worth some risk and, if this was deemed too great – which clearly it was – then it must have been significant.

Of course, it would have helped if there had been a Mi-26 handy (pictured) – whence terrain would not have been an issue - but the one we had is no longer available. Interestingly, the site seems to have been secure enough for land forces to place explosives, rather than relying on air-delivered munitions, as was the case with the previous Chinook which had to be destroyed.

Clearly, the loss of this helicopter – the second in 10 days – will add further stress to the already stretched lift capability, although all options are being considered for an early replacement.

COMMENT THREAD

More cut and paste

It was only yesterday that we were complaining of the "stock merchants". They are not getting down in the weeds, picking up raw data or attempting systematically to collect data and analyse it, building their views and crafting their phrases on the basis of what the evidence tells them.

Another of these merchants is in full flight today, none other than Lord Guthrie, former CDS. He is holding forth in The Times, inter alia about the mess over the Chinook HC3s, about which there has been a great deal written of late - most of it wrong.

Taking the rather tendentious assertions at face value, though, Guthrie launches into a familiar panegyric about these "lifesavers". They are, he tells us, the safest way to evacuate injured soldiers from the battlefield - and a brilliant tactical device to get behind Taleban lines to confuse and mystify the enemy. Chinooks, he then proclaims, also help resupply and reinforcement where land movement is dangerous.

What reveals this as mindless stock phrasing are recent events, not least the account of what we now know to be Operation Flint.

This, the Taleban attempts to down a helicopter, the shooting down of the Mi-26 and the more recent loss of a Chinook to enemy fire tells us that areas of Helmand have become very dangerous for helicopters, so much so that it is no longer safe to use them in some locations. Land movement may be dangerous, but helicopter movement is even more so, with the potential for far greater casualties.

Guthrie, however, does not even begin to address this issue and nor – as he should if he had the welfare of the Army at heart – does he draw attention to the fact that ground movement is needlessly dangerous, owing to the lack of appropriate kit, while seeking to maintain road security is consuming an inordinate amount of manpower, seriously degrading our military capability and, in part, causing our excessive casualties.

It takes one of our forum members to draw attention to the startling photograph taken by Michael Yon, showing troops clearing Pharmacy Road using hand-held mine sweepers, with not an armoured mine detection or clearance vehicle in sight.

Nevertheless, the former CDS is voluble about his role in seeking to improve matters, reminding us that he "and other former chiefs of defence have repeatedly warned ministers" about the need for better equipment. But, while Dannatt is at last admitting that countering IEDs is now "core business", neither Guthrie nor the other former chiefs have ever warned about our grave deficiencies in anti-IED capabilities.

And, while the man then waxes voluble about the deficiencies of the MoD and the lack of political leadership, he never mentions or acknowledges that, when it comes to highly technical issues such as the complex equipment mix to deal with the IED threat, the lead has to come from the military. And it is there, as much as anything, that our problems lie, in the lack of high-level military leadership.

Meanwhile, Thomas Harding tells us that the British force in Helmand suffered one casualty for every Afghan vote in the area retaken from the Taliban during the recent and bloody Panther's Claw offensive.

By the measures the military themselves set, Operation Panther's Claw was a tactical and strategic failure. As such, it exemplifies the poor operational leadership in Helmand, about which Guthrie is also silent.

Interestingly, other things about which Guthrie seems always to be silent are his non-executive directorships of N M Rothschild & Sons Ltd and Colt Defense LLC – the latter one of the biggest arms manufacturers in the world. Both companies have significant financial interests in Afghanistan, which puts Guthrie in the same boat, but with an agenda he never declares.

Yet this is the man with whom The Times feels safe entrusting its latest batch of stock phrases. And therein is one of the reasons for the poverty of our defence debate.

COMMENT THREAD

Chinook shot down

At the moment, even though the incident apparently happened last night, details are sketchy. We learn from Reuters that a British Chinook helicopter made an emergency landing in southern Afghanistan following an engine fire, but the crew escaped unhurt.

From the MoD website, we learn that the incident happened after two helicopters dropped off cargo and passengers a few miles north of Sangin. Shortly after take-off "the four-strong crew of one Chinook saw cockpit indications of an engine fire during take-off."

The pilots skilfully continued to manoeuvre the helicopter about 1km away from the "danger zone" (the MoD phrasing) "to safely make an emergency landing." All four crew onboard managed to evacuate the aircraft safely. They were recovered by the second helicopter which took them out of the area.

The MoD, initially, quite deliberately did not rule out enemy action, and have now confirmed that the aircraft was brought down by a combination of "RPG and small-arms fire".

Precisely what damage was caused has not been revealed, but a Chinook has a sophisticated and highly effective fire suppression system and, therefore, a straight engine fire should not present a catastrophic emergency. Furthermore, the engine casings are heavily armoured, which makes you wonder what sort of weapons were deployed. Then, the aircraft has a capability to fly on one engine, especially if it is lightly loaded, as was the case.

Interestingly, the extraction of the four crewmen was effected by the other Chinook, rather than relying on – say – the quick reaction force from Sangin (or even the troops who had just been dropped). One should not read too much into this, especially as the other Chinook was in the air over the scene, but in the event that the crew were uninjured, one might expect them to remain by their machine, pending either repairs or arrangements for recovery.

This brings in a fourth point, that the aircraft was subsequently destroyed by a coalition airstrike, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Taleban. This clearly indicates that it there was a significant enemy threat and that it was thought tactically inadvisable to commit ground troops to secure the area.

For such a high-value asset, the possibility of recovery would have been strongly considered – unless of course the aircraft was much more badly damaged than has been indicated, and was already deemed to be beyond economic repair.

In fact, that seems to have been the case. According to The Times, a Special Forces unit had disembarked with their kit only minutes earlier, but when the helicopter lifted off with just the four-man crew on board, it came under attack. The engine burst into flames and the crew had to fight the controls to make an emergency landing. "They managed to fly the Chinook forward 500 metres to reach a safe area before landing it," one MoD official says.

The "unrecoverable" helicopter was still on fire and a decision was taken to destroy it to prevent Taleban insurgents from seizing any of the equipment on board. A Nato bomber was called in and dropped a 500lb bomb on the wreckage.

The fact that it was destroyed says a great deal about the strength of the coalition grip in the area, where a considerable number of operations have been mounted to "chase out" the Taleban. Normally, the preference would be to secure the site, even if the aircraft was destroyed, in order to carry out a crash investigation.

That this aircraft was downed as result of enemy action comes as no surprise. Since April, we have been aware of a deliberate Taleban strategy to down a Chinook, with it becoming very obvious that these helicopters were targets.

Further evidence came with the downing of the Mi-26 in July, followed by an initial announcement by the Taleban that they had shot down a Chinook, when it was even more evident that the enemy was aiming for a "spectacular". Fortunately – the aircraft downed was empty, and no one was hurt. The Taleban still have not succeeded, but it is quite obvious that they are trying.

If as a result of all this, helicopter re-supply to forward areas is considered too dangerous, this will impose considerable extra strain on resources, as may already be happening. But it also calls into question the prevailing narrative that more helicopters are the answer to reducing troop casualties.

As we have pointed out, again and again, more helicopters operating in a highly insecure environment, could simply expose troops to a different kind of risk, with the possibility of casualties in the 40s. That would be a "game changing" event, creating huge political pressure for withdrawal.

This loss, therefore, could have significant implications for on-going operations and raises serious questions as to the overall tactics of "take and hold". Already, we have seen complaints of the huge "percentage of time and effort sucked up into the black hole" of orchestrating road moves, simply to re-supply outposts. The situation could be about to get a whole lot worse.

COMMENT THREAD

Helicopter blues

The demand for more support helicopters in Afghanistan cannot be met fully because there are not enough crews to fly them, RAF commanders have acknowledged. Five trained crews were required for each one to ensure safety. So says The Times which cites Air Commodore Simon Falla, deputy commander of the Joint Helicopter Command.

He also reveals another reason why Britain could not send too many more helicopters to Helmand - a shortage of parking space. "There is pressure on real estate. There is this cry for more helicopters but where are you going to park them? They have to be parked somewhere," he says.

Backing up the military inertia is defence secretary Bob Ainsworth, who blandly declares that the military will not be rushed into redeploying Merlin helicopters to Afghanistan, as "we won't jeopardise safety".

The helicopters are on now display at RAF Benson in Oxfordshire, following the return of the last two from Iraq. A flypast took place to celebrate their achievements, with senior RAF and Joint Helicopter Command officers gathered at the base, along with friends and families of personnel from the armed forces.

Meanwhile, the Canadian government has announced a $1.15 billion contract for 15 new CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, which are expected to be delivered between 2013 and 2014.

Pending delivery, Canada's defence minister Peter MacKay has said that Canada would overcome a critical shortage of support helicopters by buying six used machines from the United States as well as leasing six Russian-made aircraft.

Presumably, the Canadian government have already booked the parking slots, and one assumes that pilots will be found to fly them – unless, of course, the Canadian military take lessons from the British military and find ever more inventive reasons why the aircraft cannot be deployed.

COMMENT THREAD

A common enemy

David Hughes, The Daily Telegraph's chief leader writer, is waxing outraged about Quentin Davies, complaining that he is blaming defence procurement delays and cost overruns on a government of which he was actually a member.

Thus, in what Hughes calls "a shameless piece of sophistry", he has Davies identifying "the real problem" in as the last Conservative Government which had made such a mess "that we are still living with the consequences."

Hughes really cannot get to grips with this as, in order to dismiss Davies's point, he splutters: "The last Tory government shuffled off into the wilderness more than 12 years ago. That's the equivalent of the Second World War, twice over. And it's still to blame?"

People like Hughes or, of course, far too grand to read blogs – other than their own - but he would have benefited greatly from reading one of our pieces written on 20 July 2006 where we noted that a then-emerging defence "funding gap" raised ...

... important questions about the very nature of our democracy, arising from the lengthening period between ordering military hardware and taking delivery. We are getting to the situation where typical procurement cycles are longer than the length of several parliaments, so that one government can make huge spending commitments which may have to be met by a completely different government.

That effectively the point to which Davies was alluding and, while he placed it in a party political context, it is a good one. Any number of projects with which the Labour administration have had to deal with (and fund) were originated during the tenure of the last Conservative government. These include the Eurofighter, the Merlin helicopter, the Type 45 project, the Nimrod MR4, the medium armoured vehicle project(s) and even the A-400M, to say nothing of the failure of the UAV project, with the purchase of the Phoenix.

Cited in particular by Davies was the Chinook debacle, about which Hughes is so dismissive, yet this was indeed a Tory failure. Strangely, while we have discussed this in previous posts, we have never set down an analysis of what precisely went wrong, but it is only from this knowledge that one can see the full extent of the Tory culpability.

Revisiting the issue therefore, we can recall that the problems go right back to July 1995. Then, the MoD, under Michael Portillo, decided that eight of 14 Chinook HC Mk2 helicopters on order from Boeing should be delivered to an enhanced (HC Mk3) standard, to meet the emerging requirement for a dedicated Special Forces support helicopter.

The point at this stage was that, instead of the standard troop-carrying version, the MoD could have bought the special Chinook MH-47Es, which had been designed specifically by the US for special forces operations. But these were considered too expensive so, as a cost-cutting measure, Portillo agreed that eight airframes should be converted – to a lower standard, incidentally, which would not match the MH-47E and would not even meet known special forces requirements.

Therefore, right from the very start, the project was dictated by cost-cutting, with a "bastardised hybrid solution" devised to give the new helicopters a basic capability at minimum extra cost.

Thus, while the new aircraft were to have improved range and navigation capability, and be fitted with night vision sensors and a new weather radar, the MoD decided to shoehorn new, state-of-the-art digital systems into the existing, old-technology analogue cockpit.

With a projected cost of £259 million for the eight aircraft, the "In-Service Date" (defined as delivery of the first six aircraft) was set for November 1998, with the contract for the avionics upgrade agreed in early 1997, one of the last acts of the dying Major government. In the hot seat then as procurement minister was James Arbuthnot, now chairman of the defence committee.

Unfortunately, only when the conversion work was actually in progress was it discovered that the displays for the weather radar and other systems would not fit inside the existing cockpit, requiring extensive re-working.

This, then was the situation that the Labour administration inherited in May 1997, with the new defence secretary, then George Robertson, having no option but to agree a redefined In-Service Date for a programme which was now slipping badly. Thus, in March 1998, only eight months before the helicopters were due in service, a new ISD was set for January 2002.

Seven of the eight aircraft were actually delivered between July 2001 and May 2002, but then the real problems began to emerge. The aircraft had to be certified for safety before they could be used on operations and it had been assumed that since the systems and displays in the HC Mk 3 cockpit were based upon those fitted to the Royal Netherlands Air Force's advanced CH-47D Chinooks, there could be a "read-across" on the basis of similarity with the Dutch avionics.

Therein lay the real disaster. So many changes had been made that the new hybrid digital/analogue cockpit was now unique. This meant that the software used to make it function had to be fully tested, as of new, in order to the prevailing defence safety standards.

And no one had thought to specify in the contract (agreed in 1997 by the Tories) that software documentation and code for avionics systems should be analysed in accordance with UK defence standards in order to demonstrate software integrity. As a result it was not possible to demonstrate that the helicopter's flight instruments meet the required United Kingdom Defence standards.

Much is then made of the fact that, initially, the manufacturers, Boeing, were reluctant to allow access to the source codes that would allow the systems to be analysed, but they did eventually relent. But that could not resolve the problem.

The process of proving that the software met UK standards was itself time-consuming and extremely expensive. Moreover, because the legacy software in the hybrid cockpit was not amenable to the techniques required to confirm the robustness of new software design there was no guarantee of a successful outcome.

Consequently, the Chinook HC Mk3 was restricted to day/night flying above 500 feet, clear of cloud, and in circumstances that ensured that the pilot could fly the aircraft solely using external reference points and without relying on the flight displays. These restrictions meant that the helicopters could not be used except for the most limited flight trials.

This left the Labour government with an extremely difficult situation, the only option then to do exactly what is now being done - to strip out the new work and restore the helicopters to their original condition, at a cost originally estimated at about £127 million, over and above the £259 million originally estimated.

With that, the helicopters could have entered service in mid-2007 - nine years later than the original In-Service Date, and five years after the revised date. But even then, with dithering in the ranks of the MoD while all possible alternatives were explored – including scrapping the aircraft and using them for spares - it was not until last year that Des Browne bit the bullet and ordered them to be refitted.

Technically, therefore, the bulk of the blame for the problem – and certainly the extra costs – lies with Tory ministers. In fact, though, no lay minister could possibly be expected to second-guess a highly technical contract, and spot the missing details. They were – as are their successors – totally reliant on their expert technical advisors.

However, had not the Tories decided to cut costs and taken the safer route of buying off-the shelf, none of this would have happened. To that extent, political blame does rest with Tory ministers. But as to the technical decisions made subsequently, these are not party political issues. The system failed, as it has done before and since, and will continue to fail until it is reformed.

To that extent, Labour and Conservatives have a problem in common – the MoD. It is, in effect, the common enemy, something that David Hughes, if he had any sense, would recognise.

COMMENT THREAD

Cutting corners

In March of this year, Ann Winterton asked the defence secretary (then John Hutton) how much it was going to cost to upgrade the Merlin fleet to theatre standard, to allow it to be used in Afghanistan. At that time he replied that the upgrade would cost "in the region of £50 million". This equated to an estimated average of £1.8 million per aircraft.

The same question asked in July, however, elicited a slightly different response. Then, the price for upgrading the 28 Merlin Mk3/3a helicopters had miraculously dropped to "the region of £42 million", equating to an average of £1.5 million per aircraft.

Defence secretary Bob Ainsworth explained this unusual as "due to improved maturity in our cost estimates following work undertaken in the intervening period." However, there may well be a different explanation – in part, at least.

According to Thomas Harding in The Daily Telegraph, in order to get the Merlins out to Afghanistan by the end of the year, Kevlar armour has been omitted from the load compartment – thus producing a saving of £100,000.

The armour, similar to that fitted to a Snatch Land Rover, protects troops from small calibre weapons and fragmentation from RPGs, and has been a requirement in operational helicopters ever since June 2003. Then, a Chinook attempting to land a relief force to aid embattled troops in the Iraqi town of Majar al-Kabir, took heavy gunfire which injured seven, some seriously.

Writes Harding, the lack of armour will severely restrict the operational use of these helicopters. Possibly, they will be restricted to "safe" areas (if there are any) and for the transport of supplies rather than personnel. At over £30 million each for the six ex-Danish Merlins, this would make them the most expensive delivery trucks in the world.

The one consolation (one must always look on the bright side) is that, without the armour, the Merlins will be able to carry considerably more supplies than they otherwise would and, when flying empty, the carbon footprint will be slightly reduced. Al Gore would be proud.

COMMENT THREAD

All you could ever want

It is revealing how, for all the resources and "skills" of the serried ranks of hacks, it takes a reader's letter to make the obvious suggestion to resolve the helicopter shortage in Afghanistan.

Thus does Huw Baumgartner write in the letters column of The Sunday Telegraph as follows:

There is a way to increase helicopter capacity in Afghanistan with relatively small expense. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of utility helicopters mothballed in the Arizona desert. If our American allies want greater support, they could reactivate a number of these and loan them to us.

Mr Baumgartner then goes on to write that there are probably sufficient serving and reserve military helicopter pilots to man a squadron for basic logistics flying. In the longer term, he says, more pilots could be trained on a basic, no-frills course, such as used to be run by the Army Air Corps.

Certainly, he is absolutely right about there being hundreds of mothballed airframes available but, whether they could be re-activated and brought to theatre standard at a reasonable cost is arguable. But the general point is sound, in that it would be perfectly possible to upgrade a number of airframes (from diverse sources) to relieve the shortages.

That, as we pointed out in March 2007 was precisely what the Iraqi Air Force was doing, the same option also being taken by the Canadians in July 2008, now almost exactly a year ago. It is even an option adopted by the cash-strapped Philippine Air Force.

What Mr Baumgartner does not realise, perhaps, is that if the Bell airframe was used, the training needs and support are considerably eased, as RAF pilots train on Bell 412s (and operate them in Cyprus) and the Army operated 212s in Belize and Brunei.

Furthermore, with the USMC operating alongside us in Helmand, and operating a similar type, it would be quite possible to tap into the Marines' logistic and maintenance programme, as indeed we do, informally and formally, with other kit in theatre.

What continues to make this an issue is that the despatch of six Merlins to theatre at the end of the year, with two or more additional Chinooks some time next year, plus the re-engined Lynxes, whenever they arrive, are not going to resolve the problem. For a fully mobile and flexible force, much more is needed.

What is doubly interesting is that the Armed forces suffered just as great a helicopter shortage in Iraq with similar devastating effect, this being discussed at great length in a debate in the Lords inJune 2006 but the issue gained no political traction and the media did not follow it up.

In my book, Ministry of Defeat, I make the point – with some force – that the lack of media engagement in the Iraqi campaign was in part responsible for the lack of resource. Had there been the same media frenzy over helicopters back in 2006, with strong political engagement, the government would undoubtedly have been forced to take some action then.

As it was, the totemic issue then was Snatch Land Rovers and, like the bear with a very little brain it is, the media could only handle one issue at a time. Then it was "protected vehicles". Now, with the need for more such vehicles just a pressing, helicopters are the dominant issue, with the vehicle problem being largely ignored. As for UAVs and surveillance systems, they are not even on the radar.

Even then, as Huw Baumgartner's letter illustrates, the media are addressing the helicopter issue at a dismally superficial level, "troops 'n' helicopters" acquiring much the same totemic significance as the "schools 'n' hospitals" mantra that has dominated the domestic political agenda.

Thus, we Christopher Leake wittering away in The Mail on Sunday about the Danish Merlins not being sent to Afghanistan two years after they have been bought. We did it better last week and comparison between the two versions readily demonstrates that Leake has only got half the story. He has little idea of what has really been going on.

To be fair, in-depth treatment is probably not the Mail's style. The issue cries out for the sort of investigative skills for which the Sunday Times used to be famous. In that paper today, however, we get a two-page spread on the experiences to two "blood brothers" in Afghanistan.

Short on detail but long on "human interest" it contributes nothing to the overall welfare of "Our Boys" or the more effective prosecution of the campaign. Without that greater significance, this is no more than cheap exploitation verging on voyeurism, no different from The Sun which forever lauds Our Brave Boys yet fails to use its considerable power to make their lives better and safer.

Would that they knew it, if the media really took the time out properly to research and understand the issues, and then went out of its way to inform their readers, then the traction so gained would go a long way towards forcing the government to take effective measures to resolve the real problems.

To that extent – and to my certain knowledge – many of those in power would actually welcome informed, well-directed criticism, not least because it would strengthen their hand against the vast ranks of vested interests which have their own agendas, in pursuit of which they expend vast capital in briefing an idle and gullible media.

One could avow that, had the media followed the helicopter issue from the start, had it picked up the game-playing and the internal politicking going on in the MoD and elsewhere, had it followed the Parliamentary debates and the many written questions on the issue, and had itself done its own research - and then undertaken a well-informed campaign - the current situation would be very different.

However, we remain with problems that are solvable but which are never addressed, simply because the media has vacated the field.

COMMENT THREAD

A dangerous self-indulgence?

Twice we've called "time" on the controversy over equipment for our troops in Afghanistan, yet it continues almost unabated. It was with more than some interest, therefore, that we watched author and analyst Michael Griffin on BBC News 24 yesterday, expressing similar puzzlement over the intensity of the "debate".

Viewed wholly objectively, with the focus narrowed down to whether troops have enough helicopters, there is nothing to sustain it. As it stands, there is no shortage of helicopters in theatre to support current operations. The prime minister is right on this.

That most of the helicopters are American is neither here nor there. But there are Dutch, Canadian and British as well, all "pooled" in a vast coalition fleet which is being used not for British or American operations, but for coalition operations, of which the national contingents are an integral part.

In that sense, complaining about the shortfall of British helicopters is about as rational as anyone arguing against the use of B-17s of the US 8th Army Air Force to extend the strategic bombing campaign against Germany in 1943. Allies work together, and harness their collective assets to the common cause. That is what we did then and that is what we are doing now.

In seeking to explain the furore, however, Griffin linked the campaign in Afghanistan with Iraq, suggesting that in the latter, the British Army had not performed well, to the disappointment of the Americans. And in Helmand too, its grasp of counter-insurgency had been maladroit, again leading to a less than admiring response from the Americans.

To an extent, ventured Griffin, the military were seeking to transfer the blame for their own poor performance onto the politicians. Similarly, he felt, the military had some considerable control over the types of helicopters purchased and their deployment. Problems could not be laid entirely at the doors of the politicians.

If that is one element which is driving the controversy, the other is clearly the Conservative Party, anxious to find yet another stick with which to beat the government. The attitude is summed up in the recent comment from Liam Fox, who declares: "It is abundantly clear that we are asking our troops to fight a war for which Labour has not properly equipped them."

Notice there, the use not of the word "government" but of "Labour", revealing an overt partisanship which puts the alleged default wholly in a political context. There is no room in Fox's kitbag for any equivocation or shared responsibility.

Gordon Brown, nevertheless, is playing his own political games, relating helicopter requirements to current operations, but the distinction between these and the "general campaign" is becoming clear, with an acknowledgement that, while troops are able to fulfil their tasks at the moment, there is an overall shortfall of helicopters. This, we are told, is to be redressed by the Merlins which will at last be despatched by the end of the year, by the re-engined Lynxes and, next year, by additions to the Chinook fleet.

That things could have been done quicker, better and considerably more cheaply is indisputable, but the fact is that issues are being addressed, further confirming the "totemic status" of helicopters. In other words, this controversy isn't really about helicopters at all – or even about equipment.

Returning to Griffin, at the end of the interview – to the evident discomfort of his BBC interrogator – he broke away from the script to express his concern over the exaggerated level of publicity about an issue which lacked that substance. He warned that the Taleban would be monitoring programmes such as these, and the furore would improve their morale considerably.

Therein does lie a huge trap, created by the concern over casualties and the focus on helicopters. We have alluded to this before, in that if the Taleban were successfully to bring down a Chinook laden with troops, it is very hard to see how continuing the campaign could be politically sustainable.

The problem is that the Taleban know that, and they will do everything possible to make it so, while seeking generally to maximise the British casualty rate. This much is being recognised, with Dannatt at last taking the IED threat seriously.

As to the remarkable controversy that we have been witnessing for the best part of three weeks, this – if Griffin is right – is a dangerous self-indulgence which we simply cannot afford, motivating the Taleban to greater efforts on the basis that the home front can be so weakened that British troops will have to be withdrawn. We are, unwittingly, sending them a message that there is everything to gain from killing British troops.

This is not a happy message, and one that is difficult to change, as these media storms tend to have a life of their own. But the military, the politicians and the media – and indeed this blog – need to think very hard about the message they are sending, and to whom.

COMMENT THREAD

That's journalism!

As another British soldier is reported killed in Afghanistan, two investigative sleuths from The Daily Mail, Tim Shipman and Matthew Hickley, breathlessly tell us that the announcement came "as Lt Col Richardson revealed that American, Dutch and even Australian helicopters are being used to launch British combat operations in Afghanistan." UK forces have used coalition aircraft to "seize areas of ground" from the Taliban, said the Colonel.

The Daily Telegraph goes one further as star reporter Rosa Prince scribes these immortal words:

The Daily Telegraph understands that American Chinooks were used for a combat mission as part of the Panther's Claw operation within the last month. Lieutenant Colonel Nick Richardson, spokesman for Task Force Helmand confirmed that UK forces were forced to rely on foreign helicopters.

These fearless hacks can however, shelve their dreams for nominations for the next Pulitzer prize for investigative reporting. The MoD Website for 23 June – nearly a month ago – blandly informs us that:

More than 350 soldiers from The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (3 SCOTS), have launched an airborne assault into one of the last Taliban strongholds.

Twelve Chinook helicopters, supported by 13 other aircraft including Apache and Black Hawk helicopter gunships, a Spectre gunship, Harrier jets and unmanned drones, dropped the British soldiers into Babaji, north of Lashkar Gah, just before midnight on Friday 19 June 2009.

Not only did we rely on helicopters (with the MoD thoughtfully providing a pic – see above), we were "forced" to rely on a USAF Spectre gunship, Harriers (USMC – ours have gone home) and probably US Predator UAVs. Since 90 percent – or thereabouts – close air support is provided by US assets, we are routinely "forced" to rely on F-15s, F-16s, B-1 Lancers, A-10s ...

And then, of course, on the ground, we are "forced" to rely on Danish Leopard II tanks, on their APCs, on Estonian APCs and even the Ex-MoD Mamba mine protected vehicles which we sold off for a song.

But Hey! This is a coalition effort. We are not alone ... and have not been for some time. But then, here's another "scoop". During WWII, the US stripped out the armour from its one and only armoured division and sent the Shermans to the 8th Army. To win the battle of el Alamein, we were "forced" to rely on foreign tanks.

Shock! Hold the front page!

COMMENT THREAD

Brown envelopes galore

When it was raised in Parliament yesterday by the redoubtable Ann Winterton - the ONLY MP who raised the embarrassing report of a British-chartered helicopter ferrying military supplies to a British base getting shot down by the Taliban, Miliband and Ainsworth did NOT want to talk about it. The full exchange is here.

Of course, there is every reason why they should not want to be up front. Not only was the prime contractor Skylink subcontracting the work to dodgy Moldovan gun-runners – in breach of the contract requirements – the Moldovans were subcontracting the operating of the aircraft to an equally dodgy Ukrainian outfit, which explains why six of their number were killed.

Moreover, as more details come in, it is now very clear that this was a deliberate Taleban ambush, mounted directly under the noses of the British, aimed at bringing down a Chinook – one of the main strategic aims of the Taleban. The unfortunate Mi-26 happened to wander along, in company with an Mi-8 MTV. Both took fire and the Mi-26 bought it. Bad luck on the Ukrainian crew and bad luck for the Taleban. They wanted an RAF Chinook, and will keep trying until they get one.

As for Skylink, this is an aviation company that has no aircraft. It specialises in supplying aircraft in war zones for the UN and other tranzies like the EU, for NGOs and any shady outfit that happens to be passing with a dodgy cargo it wants moved in a hurry. It buys contracts top dollar, with brown envelopes passing freely. It is so corrupt that even the UN blew it out, until it bought its way back into favour by greasing the right palms.

The company then subs out the work down the chain to dodgy Moldavans, Ukrainians and the rest, mostly operating clapped-out ex-Soviet hardware with safety certificates that owe more to photoshop than they do any certifying authority, their aircraft banned from any and all Western airspace. These outfits work as a group, sharing and swapping assets when they get outed, forming and reforming companies, appearing and disappearing, and cropping up with new names and the same aircraft just as frequently.

These are the people that are working for the MoD, the contract carefully laundered through Nato to give plausible deniability, thus avoiding a Tory and media uproar when it was learned that the MoD was hiring dodgy ex-Soviet choppers to make up for capacity shortfalls.

The trouble was that the original arrangement was that the aircraft should serve the transport hub between Kandahar and Bastion. They were not permitted to fly into FOBs – that is military airspace, from which they were to be excluded.

However, once there, the mission creep set in and, with the desperate shortage of lift, the brief was extended to the aircraft uplifting into the FOBs like Sangin. The Ukrainians, desperate for cash, were squared off with generous bonuses and thus agreed to fly into hot war zones, where even RAF Chinooks will only fly with Apache escorts.

The MoD was happy, being able to release Chinooks and Apaches for operations, Skylink was happy with the extra hours and the bonuses, and the Ukrainians at the sharp end needed the money anyway. And hey! They are expendable.

As long as the contract was piggy-backed off Nato, and thus totally deniable, no one had to be told and everyone kept schtum ... including the Tories. And now, no one wants to talk about it. Says Ainsworth: "I do not want to trespass on to operational details." You bet he doesn't.

As for the Tories, having decided to make "helicopters" their cause celebre, the last thing they want to know is that the Taleban are parking outside the gates of British bases, waiting for an opportunity to down a Chinook. Rather shoots the Fox - to coin a phrase - about more helicopters saving lives.

So goes the conspiracy of silence. The British media ... forget it. E-mails from special advisors? MPs' expenses? Dead safe ... nay problem. If you look too deep here, you don't live.

COMMENT THREAD

Playing politics with peoples' lives

Although ostensibly addressing a serious deficiency in our military capabilities which is affected the campaign in Afghanistan, there is something distinctly tawdry about the way the Defence Committee has today "rushed out" a report on helicopter lift.

The nuance would not be apparent to most but this is the same committee which has never seriously addressed the issue of mine/blast protected vehicles – and the management of the IED threat generally. Yet, a significant proportion of the current casualty rate stems demonstrably from inadequacies in the Army fleet of vehicles, and the lacklustre approach to controlling IEDs. The problem here is far more serious than the perceived shortage of helicopter lift.

On that basis, it is very hard to escape the conclusion that chairman James Arbuthnot is indulging in the not-unknown political sport of bandwagon-riding, hitching his star to an issue because it has – more for the sake of expediency than on its intrinsic merits – been catapulted into the public consciousness.

One cannot nevertheless gainsay all the Committee's findings or its primary conclusion that the lack of helicopters is "undermining operations". Even then, we could dispute its conclusion that this stems from a shortage of medium and heavy lift battlefield helicopters.

When one looks at the ponderous tactical deployment of British forces in the field, and the intrinsic vulnerabilities of such helicopters, there is at least an argument that the operational need would be better served (in part at least) by a larger number of smaller, tactical helicopters, on the lines of the Rhodesian "Fireforce" model which deployed multiple sticks of four soldiers from Allouette III helicopters, each machine armed with a 20mm cannon.

Arbuthnot and his merry men, however, do not even enter this territory, trapped as they are in an orthodoxy which rests with their oft' demonstrated inability to think outside the box – or draw evidence from outside the military-industrial complex.

Thus we see the Committee recommending the "pork barrel" route to enhancing capacity, going for the procurement of new helicopters, oblivious to alternatives and totally ignoring the cost implications. More seriously, given that the capacity shortfall needs addressing urgently, the MPs have opted for the slowest possible route, offering absolutely nothing that will fill immediate needs.

Then, although not given prominence in the Committee's press release, the
"bandwagon agenda" emerges in the media coverage of the report, as was surely the intention. Thus we have The Times currently reporting that, "The lack of helicopters available to British troops in Afghanistan is costing lives, MPs concluded today." Worryingly, we also see written, the assertion that:

Extra medium-lift support helicopters would cut down on the number of road convoys that have proved vulnerable to Taleban attacks. Twelve of the 15 deaths in Afghanistan over the past fortnight have been caused by roadside bombs.

This, possibly, is added in by the journalist Michael Evans, and relies in part from the populist (child-like, even) tendency to describe IEDs as "roadside bombs".

However, to make the link between these casualties and a shortage of helicopters is tendentious, to say the very least, if not downright dishonest. But, once the virus is in the system, never let it be said the British journalists will ignore it. This is now the narrative, and narrative it shall be.

As for cutting down the number of road convoys, thereby reducing the number of attacks, we have the news of the recent loss of the Mi-26 which was performing precisely the role of cutting down road convoys, yet neither Michael Evans nor the Defence Committee take this into account. One could take the cynical view that, because only six Ukrainians and an Afghani child died, this does not matter – as long as our "Brave Boys" are not killed.

But, as David Axe discusses, although civilian helicopters may not be as well protected from missile (MANPAD) threats as military hardware, this machine may have been brought down by an RPG – against which there is no protection other than tactical flying.

Yet, as one of our readers reminded us, not too long ago, an RAF Chinook was very nearly brought down by an RPG. Only exceptionally skilled flying – and luck - saved the day. And, if that is hazard enough, if the Taleban do manage successfully to deploy anti-aircraft guns, the machine they hit is toast. "Game over," as we said. It is unlikely that the momentum for withdrawal would be stoppable.

In his narrow pursuit of more helicopter lift, therefore, Arbuthnot and his committee may be pushing for a course of action which might increase risk, not reduce it – even without taking into account other factors, which we rehearsed in an earlier post.

The idea that transferring troops from the roads to helicopters very much stems from experience in Northern Ireland but, as we pointed out, the situation in Afghanistan is not the same. While in the earlier campaign, the troops were largely the targets of the terrorists, in Afghanistan, the Afghani security forces and the civilian population are also being killed. If we abandon the roads, in pursuit of the notional (but possibly ephemeral) safety of our own troops, we cede the game to the terrorists.

This is brought home by a recent, haunting piece in the New York Times which refers to the tendency of the coalition forces to look after their own, concerning themselves less with the safety of Afghan forces who work alongside them and who are taking far greater casualties.

Given that the strategic plan is eventually to hand over to Afghan forces, it is difficult to accept that these personnel will even begin to assume the burden as long as they see their better-equipped – and highly risk averse - "partners" using their resources to avoid the very hazards to which the indigenous forces are also exposed, with far greater consequences (pictured above – an ANP patrol vehicle destroyed by an IED which killed five, including a senior commander).

Support for the Afghanis, therefore, would suggest that we have to share the same threat environment, which means that countermeasures and protection must apply to all, not just the select few.

The answer there – in dealing with IEDs – is not for coalition forces to run away from the threat but to deal with it, using the many technical and other measures at their disposal, to ensure not only their safety (as far as that is possible) but also to protect Afghani forces and civilians.

While, thus, the Defence Committee is enjoying the ride on its new-found bandwagon, it is missing the point – perhaps deliberately – and playing with peoples' lives.

COMMENT THREAD

Was it British?

From here, speculation that ER-MCV was under contract to the MoD as an asset not declared to Nato. It may, therefore, have been working solely for the British.

The contract, according to this source, was for logistical resupply only. UK and Nato troops were not authorised to fly on the aircraft without ballistic protection and self protection suites. This asset strictly moved cargo, supplied largely by British Forces.

The asset and contract is said to have been managed in theatre by SkyLink Aviation. According to this presentation, the MoD has a charter arrangement for two Mi-8 MTVs and one Mi-26.

The caveat that troops were not authorised to fly on the helicopter(s) without protection suggests that troops may have been lifted on occasions and, therefore, this time it could have been a matter of luck that none were on board.

If this is true, the notoriously secretive MoD has struck again. When the Canadians decided to hire Mi-8 MTVs, they were completely open about the intent, thus answering critics about the shortfall of lift capacity.

Given the pressure Brown has been under – and still is – one further wonders why he did not declare the use of these machines which, cumulatively, add 28 tons to capacity, nearly equivalent to three Chinooks.

Of course, by Wednesday's PMQs, he would have known the fate of ER-MCV and the speculation that it had been shot down, plus the history of the machine and its primary operator, could have proved a tad embarrassing had the Tories raised it – given that they knew.

There is such a thing, however, as a "Privy Councillor's" briefing, where senior opposition members are briefed in confidence and given secret material, on the condition that it is not disclosed. Cameron could have known the background, therefore – although we should not bank on it – in which case he would have been constrained from raising it.

On the other hand, it is known (don't ask) that the Tories have been opposed to leasing civilian capacity in theatre, and it is quite possible that the MoD has been withholding information on this charter deal simply to avoid political controversy, not least fallout when (as now appears to have happened) a machine crashed. The Tory view is that all effort should be provided by the RAF with MoD-owned assets.

Either way, the information emerging seems to point to this being a British supply helicopter (in the sense that it was working for the British), which was shot down on its approach to a British base, possibly in circumstances that the Taleban were trying for an RAF Chinook.

That the Taleban presence was such that they were able to mount (an apparently successful) attack on a helicopter under the noses of the British suggests a degree of strength, one the one hand, and a degree of vulnerability on the other, that should inform the current debateon helicopter usage in Afghanistan.

But the questions also remain as to why the British were relying on an aircraft operated by a company which had been banned from flying in EU member state airspace on safety grounds, and which has been associated with arms trafficking.

COMMENT THREAD

The greater risk

A French regional paper has picked up the Mi-26 crash, it too reporting that the aircraft was under contract to Nato (Otan). Previously, the operator had supplied aircraft for EU military missions in Chad, supporting the Irish contingent. The paper goes on to say:

Ce qui est surprenant, toutefois, c'est que l’UE et l'Otan choisissent d'utiliser les services d'une société épinglée en juin 2007 par la Commission européenne. La Commission estimait que les autorités moldaves faisaient preuve d'un réel laxisme envers huit sociétés dont Pecotox Air qui ne respectait pas les consignes de sécurité et les réglementations. La Moldavie avait dû retirer leurs agréments à ces sociétés.

Surprising it is indeed, and even more so that there has not been a whisper of this in the British media ... except that we know why.
.
The line taken in most of the (very few) reports mentioning the crash suggest the aircraft was shot down by a missile, although a post on the pprune forum states that the Mi-26 was "accompanied by an MTV (Mi-8) that witnessed the tail boom shear from the aircraft." It is not clear at this stage, continues the post, "whether this was due to mechanical failure or the ground fire that both aircraft came under at the time."

Then we have the English edition of Tass citing a director of Pecotox Air, Leonid Tokorenk. He is sticking to the story that the aircraft was supplying "humanitarian aid". The picture above, however, shows the aircraft at the British base at Lashkah Gar a couple of months ago – evidently on a routine supply mission.

Nevertheless, Tokorenk has it that it brought food and water for the people of Sangin. "When the helicopter hovered in the air to throw the humanitarian cargo, it was unexpectedly brought down from a grenade launcher. The tail rotor was damaged and the helicopter crashed to caught fire," he claims.

The idea of a 50-ton helicopter, with its powerful downwash, hovering over the town to drop supplies is frankly laughable. That it should do so in an area where the Taleban are highly active, where five British troops were killed last week and even with the BBC present earlier yesterday, there was firing heard, is positively suicidal.

Thus, the best evidence suggests that the aircraft was taken out by the Taleban as it came to land at the British base. And, with initial reports having the Taleban claim that they had shot down a Chinook, that is quite possibly what they thought they were doing.

One is reminded of the three recent incidents where the Taliban had attempted to shoot down a British helicopter. This incident would suggest they are still trying – and had succeeded, albeit shooting down the "wrong" helicopter.

This would also explain the sensitivity of the British government and why it is suppressing reports of this incident. It has long been known that the Taleban have been looking for a "spectacular" and, after the public and media response to the last batch of casualties, it needs little imagination to gauge the reaction if a Chinook, fully-laden with troops, was downed.

The very evident danger also changes the context of the current debate over casualties. Many commentators have been arguing recently that more helicopters should be provided to transport troops, to reduce their exposure to IEDs. Not least is Sir Charles Guthrie the former CDS, who asserts that the lack of helicopters is putting their lives at risk.

And today, the House of Commons Defence Committee is to rush out a report which, according to The Guardian, "is likely to say" that the shortage of helicopters has increased the danger to British soldiers.

The real danger, it seems, is that with helicopters having been picked as the cause celebre, an issue on which – in particular – the Conservative opposition can make its mark, we are getting a highly distorted appreciation of the risks. If this continues, under strong political pressure, tactical judgement could also be distorted, with potentially tragic results.

Under certain circumstances, it could well be the case that ground transport is in fact safer than flying, more so if the right vehicles and tactics are employed. Further, where attacks on vehicles are successful, usually small numbers of soldiers are killed – which would not be the case if a Chinook (or even a Merlin) was downed.

However, with the protected vehicle debate having largely been submerged by the controversy over helicopters, this issue is not being fully addressed – or at all – which means that we could be rushing down a cul de sac where troops end up at even greater risk that they are now. Whatever else, as the downing of this Mi-26 could indicate, "helicopters" are not a panacea – they are an essential part of a force mix, but not a magic wand that will cure all problems.

COMMENT THREAD

In a class of its own

Tom Newton Dunn, writing in The Sun today has found out that the Army has given up the unequal struggle of trying to operate the Lynx helicopter in Afghanistan, and returned the entire fleet of six machines back to the UK.

This happened, according to Dunn, last May. They were "pulled out of the warzone because they cannot fly in the scorching Afghan heat."

This news is entirely unsurprising as the "hot and high" limitations of the Lynx have long been known, affecting operations in numerous overseas theatres where the British Army has been deployed. And not only were difficulties experienced in Iraq, when British forces had been sent to Helmand in 2006, the same difficulties were experienced there.

Thus, on 5 July 2006, The Independent was reporting that British forces were facing a supply crisis because nearly half of their helicopter transport fleet was unable to fly in daylight hours due to the searing Helmand heat.

Said the paper, with the 3,300 British reliant on six Chinook and four Lynx aircraft for all transport and supply, they were finding that "The extreme heat and thin, rising air of the Helmand desert has limited the Lynx ... to use between dusk and dawn, when temperatures fall to acceptable levels."

Shortly after that, on 27 July, a short report appeared on the forum of the Small Wars Journal Council, headed, "Hydarabad - Dawn Raid", describing an operation in Helmand. It makes for sober reading:

After three days in Panjawi the soldiers and equipment were sent to a staging area an hour to the east. This was to be the beginning of the biggest phase of Mountain Thrust, a joint operation of British, Canadian, American and Afghan soldiers. The British had already moved one of their units into place, to a northern point in the Helmund Province. The Canadians coordinated the move; American and Afghan units were under Canadian command.

The assembly area seemed like any other area of deserted landscape in this part of Helmund Province. Flat, dry, and littered with stones, life seemed to have left this place long ago, offering itself now as a parking lot for the columns of vehicles lined in a row.

We had left early to get here, with the instructions that we would move again in a few short hours. However, the British, in what was to become a recurring pattern during this phase of Mountain Thrust, had failed to plan, leaving their pre-positioned unit in the north without adequate supplies of water. With flights of their Lynx helicopters grounded due to its inability maintain aerodynamic stability in the hot atmosphere of the Afghan summer, the British had failed to provide effective resupply alternatives.

Complicating matters further was their lack of armored vehicles. Working from a military strategy that seemed to blend imperial arrogance with the tactics of the North African campaign under Montgomery, the British were under-equipped for the fight. Fielding open topped Land Rovers with two machine guns mounted forward and aft, it was not unlike viewing a scene from the series "Rat Patrol."

Thus, lacking the needed assets to move supplies or to ferry troops safely, the unit that had been pre-positioned to lead the attack, became the Achilles heal (sic). With only 67 bottles of water remaining amongst the 120 men, and with temperatures pressing above 120 degrees F., the entire operation was postponed while American and Canadian assets were coordinated to essentially, save the Queens arse...

We reported in detail on the unhappy experiences of the Lynx in April 2007, when we had discovered that, not only were the baseline costs per hour of operating Lynx Mk7s a staggering £23,000 but, because of its inherent fragility, additional costs were being incurred. These were, "as a result of the operational use and particular climatic conditions experienced in theatre." We wrote at that time:

These costs cover additional wear and tear, additional spares and additional equipment and are paid for by the Conflict Prevention Fund. A total of £11 million has been claimed against the fund in financial year 2006-07 for additional operating and capital costs for Lynx Mk7s operating in Iraq, of which six are believed to be in service.

At that time, we also discovered that, in order to deal with the "hot and high" conditions for its deployments in Belize and Brunei, the Army had leased Bell 212s, aircraft based on the Vietnam-era Huey. The type had been selected specifically because its "unique abilities include flying in hot and often humid conditions whilst also being able to carry considerable loads." That includes the ability to lift up to 13 troops.

Bizarrely, although the failed Lynx costs the Army £23,000 per hour, when it could actually fly, the cost per hour of operating the Bell 212 helicopter was a mere £2,000. According to official sources - six of these aircraft have been operated in these two theatres, since 1993 in Brunei and 2003 in Belize.

Similar types are operated by the US Marines and the Canadians in Afghanistan, the latter being the upgraded Bell 412, four models of which are also operated by the RAF in Cyprus, again because of the hot conditions experienced there.

As for availability, the world is awash with second-hand Hueys and, in March 2007, we noted that the nascent Iraqi Air Force had taken delivery of five "Huey" helicopters, the first of a batch of 16 donated by Jordan.

They had been refitted with modern avionics and new engines in the United States at a cost of $3.5 million each, funded by Washington. Fitted with Kevlar armour and missile defence systems, the full upgrade made them, effectively, new aircraft.

That option was available to the UK government, and for a modest outlay, the Army could have had effective Lynx replacements in Afghanistan from the very time it was deployed to Helmand. It is believed that this option was blocked because the Army preferred to wait for the upgraded Future Lynx – not due for delivery until 2014 – fearing that if a "good enough" solution had been found, the order would have been delayed or reduced.

As it is, the order has now gone through but, in desperation, the government made conditional on the order, the retro-fitting of the more powerful engine equipping the Future Lynx to 12 existing Mk 9 airframes. This was announced in December last year.

Although deliveries of the first four were originally scheduled for later this year, they will not arrive until April 2010, with the rest to follow later in the year. The ultimate scandal though is that the cost for the 12 upgrades is £70 million. At just under £6 million each, that is about £2 million more than it would have cost to procure refurbished Bell 412s.

In the annals of MoD incompetence, this saga must surely stand out in a class of its own.

COMMENT THREAD

Parity and more ...

Originally posted at 19:30 hrs Friday. Updated and reposted.


Sooner than we feared, another British soldier was reported killed in Afghanistan, bringing the number to three on the day and the total to 179.

Then, early in the afternoon, we began to get very strong rumours of many more in what was said to be a "major incident". By early evening, five more were said to have been killed, three seriously injured and three more less badly injured.

Early, unconfirmed reports said soldiers had sought cover from direct fire in a compound which was booby-trapped with an IED. Later reports suggested that troops had been ambushed after they had dismounted from their vehicle to investigate an explosion, and were hit by another IED and took casualties. More were killed and injured when the medevac Chinook arrived to pick up the original casualties. The tactics were said to be "sophisticated".

A different report, in The Daily Mail tells a different version, suggesting that after the first hit, "amid the chaos and appalling scenes, the Taleban is said to have opened fire with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades on the injured soldiers and those going to their aid."

Apache attack helicopters are then said to have been called in to strike at Taleban positions and provide cover as a rescue operation was launched with helicopters ferrying the wounded back to the field hospital at the main British base at Camp Bastion throughout the night.

The men, from the 2nd Bn, The Rifles, were reported to have been in the Sangin area - near Musa Qala. This is not part of the current Operation Panchai Palang (Panther's Claw), which is being carried out north of Lashkar Gah.

The official total for casualties since 2001 now rises to 184, exceeding the number 179, which was the death toll in Iraq. Predictably, The Guardian - commenting on the level when it reached 179 - said that the death was likely to intensify the debate about whether the Afghanistan operation is worthwhile.

The 179th reported killed was a soldier from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, said to have died in an explosion during an operation near Nad-e-Ali. He was from the same regiment as Trooper Joshua Hammond, who was killed last week in a Viking.

The AP report at that time was headed, "The Climbing toll raises British doubts on Afghanistan" and cited Conservative MP Adam Holloway, a defence committee member. He said, "The casualties should fix peoples' minds on the fact that we've let the soldiers down ... The death toll means we should do it properly or we shouldn't do it at all."

He added that Britain had never had the troop strength needed to hold ground there and had failed to provide the promised security or reconstruction, leading many Afghans to believe the Taleban militants will outlast Western forces. "We're in a mess," he said.

Guthrie, according to Channel 4 News blames Gordon Brown who, as chancellor when Britain went into Helmand, had given "as little money to defence" as the Treasury could get away with.

And, in The Daily Mail, Doug Beattie, retired recently after 27 years in the Army, said: "Whether it's the 179th or the 200th, the soldier will not think twice about that number. They're just numbers - but every number and every name has a story behind it."

He added: "No soldier serving in Afghanistan will say, 'that's 179', they will say, 'that's my friend, that's my roommate, that's my commanding officer'. Very soon we are going to hit the 200 mark. The likelihood is before we leave Afghanistan we are going to hit the 500 mark - maybe even the 1,000 mark. But they are all false landmarks."

"For the politicians and for the Ministry of Defence," he then said, "public perception of the loss is crucial. For the soldiers on the ground, it won't matter."

However, despite the growing list of British fatalities, troops are continuing to push the enemy back on operation Panthers Claw. This is seen as a "crucial" operation for the security of Helmand.

The fighting had been "exceptionally arduous" with the threat from the Taliban roadside bombs "enormous", Lt-Col Simon Banton tells The Daily Telegraph.

Gordon Brown, who was attending the G8 summit in L'Aquila in Italy, admitted that the troops faced "a very hard summer". He said that there was no question of Britain pulling out until the international community had finished its mission.

COMMENT THREAD

"Not designed for combat"

Currently running in Exeter is the inquest on the death of Pte Jack Sadler, which we covered last year, with the inquest proceedings attracting an interim report from The Daily Telegraph.

Jack, a TA volunteer in Honourable Artillery Company, was a Wimik gunner, attached to the Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) serving 52 Brigade in Afghanistan during Operation Herrick 7.

On 4 December 2007, the BRF, comprising a group of Wimiks, was scouting a route for an artillery convoy of made up of two Pinzgauers each pulling a 105mm light gun, plus DROPS trucks carrying the ammunition. They were on their way to a firing point close to Musa Qala to take part in the operation to recover the town.

Making pitifully slow progress over the rough ground, they had been observed by what they feared might have been Taleban "dickers" as they had skirted a village en route before then reaching a "problematic" steep-sided wadi which they had to cross, following a route they had taken the day before – the only one which the trucks could negotiate.

Because of the heavy trucks the Force was escorting, there were only a very limited number of points at which the wadi could be crossed. While scouting the route across, Jack's Wimik hit a mine, with him sustaining fatal injuries.

No mine clearance had been carried out as the convoy was static while the reconnaissance was carried out. It was a "sitting target" and an attack was feared if it remained in one place too long, so the pressure was on to get the convoy moving again. But, on the rocky ground, the Group commander did not suspect any danger. There were no "Combat Indicators" suggesting trouble and no one in the group "sensed" any danger.

Had there been enough helicopters, the two guns and their supplies of ammunition could easily have been transported by air – as underslung loads. This would be an easy job for a Chinook. But, with a major operation in the offing, there was no spare capacity and, therefore, the battery had to travel by road, with fatal results.

That then puts the focus on the Wimik, deployed in an area where the threat of mines and IEDs was ever-present. And, it emerges from the inquest that a report submitted to the coroner described it as "not designed to be used in a combat situation because of its lack of ballistic and munitions protection".

Needless to say, the Ministry of Defeat is represented at the inquest, with Col Charles Clee holding the line. He was quick to stress that Wimik has since been replaced with newer models fitted with better protection against mines and roadside bombs.

Clee, who is deputy head of urgent operational requirements at the MoD also stated that Wimiks were "valuable to commanders because of their flexibility." Their light weight meant they could operate on local roads. He also trotted out the familiar line that, it was up to commanders on the ground to choose which types of military vehicles to use for different tasks.

Indeed there was a choice ... Wimik, Wimik or Wimik. As for it being able to operate on local roads, as a convoy escort, the BRF was being tied to a predictable route which could only be negotiated by heavy trucks. It, not the convoy, was the "sitting target".

With the Viking in the news, and the past publicity on the Snatch Land Rover, the vulnerability of the Wimik has, by and large, passed under the media radar. Yet more have been killed in Wimiks in Afghanistan than any other vehicle, at least 15 as opposed to ten in the Snatch and Jackal and eight in the Viking.

The hearing continues tomorrow so it remains to be seen what the coroner will make of this, but there is not any great confidence that local coroners can see through the dissemination poured out by the MoD. The precedents are not good.

COMMENT THREAD

They should not have died

I am sorry if it offends – and it certainly does upset some of the military types, and the "consultants" and designers responsible for the Viking and the decision to deploy it to Afghanistan – but, on the basis of all the evidence we have, Booker and I both have come to the conclusion that Lieutenant-Colonel Rupert Thorneloe and Trooper Joshua Hammond should not have died.

That they did die is the greater offence and, while it must always be remembered that the proximate cause was a Taleban bomb, in a cold-blooded act of murder, the neglect of the MoD and all those involved with the deployment of this vehicle is a contributory factor. Thus does Booker in his column today point the finger squarely at the MoD.

From Mick Smith (and others) in The Sunday Times, we get the first published confirmation of that which we had already worked out, that Lt-Col Thorneloe was riding in the front passenger seat of the Viking. With his driver, they were in two of the most vulnerable positions in a dangerously vulnerable vehicle.

In other circumstances, writes Smith, Thorneloe would have travelled by helicopter; but it appears none was available. He notes, however, that the MoD declined to confirm or deny this.

Without this facility, and wanting to "get up among his boys at the first possible opportunity," Thorneloe found that, "A resupply convoy was going up there and he hitched a lift on that." As the Viking approached a canal crossing, it passed over a hidden IED which destroyed the front cab. Thorneloe and the driver, Hammond, died instantly.

The lack of helicopter notwithstanding, if Thorneloe had not been in the vehicle, someone else would have died. And the incident would already have been a footnote in the history of the campaign, blanked out by the operations being mounted, not least the big push by the US Marines further south.

As for the Viking, this was originally produced as an amphibious assault vehicle and delivered to the Royal Marines in 2001, for use in the Arctic Circle as a mobility platform when reinforcing the Nato northern flank, assisting the Norwegians against a Soviet invasion. It was a Cold War machine, designed for a different purpose.

In that role, the question of protection had been considered – and the machine was armoured against ballistic threats. However, within the "Littoral Manoeuvre" parameters set at the time, a decision was made deliberately to skimp on mine protection to save weight. This was to enable the machine to be lifted by a Chinook helicopter and to maintain the amphibious free board clearances.

Before deploying the machine to Afghanistan, the protection levels were reviewed but, despite the known mine threat, the "assumptions about the overall mobility benefits" were considered valid – the ability to swim and be lifted by a Chinook. With no Chinooks actually available to lift these machines, therefore, the Viking went in October 2006 to war dangerously unprotected, simply to maintain its ability to swim through the waters of landlocked Afghanistan.

The original protection level was specified as proof against an explosion of no greater than 500gm under the belly, with a higher resistance to a blast under the track. This was claimed to meet the technical standard known as STANAG 4569, to level 2a – resistant to a 6kg explosion and thus protection against a common Russian anti-tank mine, the TM-46, with a charge weight of 5kg.

However, also present in some numbers in Afghanistan is the Russian TM-62M, with a charge weight of 7kg and fuzes which enable these mines to be detonated against the belly of a vehicle, or by vibration rather than contact, as the vehicle passes over the mine without the wheels or tracks riding over it.


For that reason, the US mine and blast resistance standard – for an underbelly explosion - is set at 7kg, and it is this standard that the British mine protected Mastiff (pictured above) also meets and in fact exceeds a level equivalent to STANAG level 3b.

At that level of protection, no soldier has ever been killed in a Mastiff in either Iraq or Afghanistan, despite being hit by explosives considerably exceeding its stated protection level. Much of that is due not to the blast resistance, as such, but to the v-shaped hull design of the Mastiff, which the Viking also does not have. It is entirely reasonable to assert, therefore, that had Thorneloe and Hammond been riding in a vehicle similarly protected and designed, they would have survived the blast.

However, the reasons for the MoD's neglect in not providing suitable vehicles are complex. Originally, the Viking was Royal Marine equipment, sent to Afghanistan because that was their standard mobility platform, with which they had trained.

So short of high mobility platforms was the Army though, that when the Marines departed after their six-month tour, a decision was made to keep the Vikings in theatre. Had they been withdrawn then, the MoD might just have got away with it, because the Taleban had not yet worked out quite how vulnerable these formidable-looking machines were, and how easily they could be destroyed.

The shortage of vehicles was nothing to do with money – as Booker reminds us in his column. At £700,000 each, Vikings are far from cheap, and neither is their maintenance. What had happened since 2003 was that, in effect, the Army had frozen development or purchase of any new armoured vehicles, while it worked up plans for a £16 billion fleet of high-tech wheeled armoured personnel carriers and other armour to meet Blair's commitment to the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).

Although faced with a vicious insurgency in Iraq and then Afghanistan, the politicians and the Army were not prepared to spend on new specialist vehicles for these theatres, protecting instead the funding stream for the ERRF equipment.

Without that – had they given the time and attention to the needs of these real wars, instead of the imaginary wars of the future alongside our European "partners" - it would have been perfectly possible, even with limited funding, to have developed a high mobility platform for the Army, with the same protection levels of the Mastiff. That would have allowed the Marines to keep their Vikings for the role for which they were originally designed – amphibious assault.

That this has been the case has been hotly denied by the MoD, which is already facing legal cases over its deployment of the Snatch Land Rover. But the real story is told in Ministry of Defeat, an account "winning warm praise from various serving and former Army officers who recognise only too well what a disgraceful part the MoD has played in two awful military fiascos," writes Booker.

Already, we have been booted out of Iraq by prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, after we had so signally failed to carry out the task contracted to us there, and as our troops have been slaughtered in poorly protected vehicles in Afghanistan, on the altar of "European co-operation", it must surely be only a matter of time before we hand over completely to the better-equipped Americans – whose Marines have left their amphibious assault vehicles at home – declare another great "victory" and depart.

In the meantime, in the baking heat and dust of Afghanistan, more soldiers must die. Many more will be seriously injured.

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