Even more complicated

An article in The Sunday Times by the peripatetic Stephen Grey gives much food for thought, and some considerable cause for alarm.

Grey is back in Afghanistan, not in Musa Qala where he was last time, but much further south with the US Marines in Khan Neshin, sometimes called Khanashin. The town, if it can be called that, is a ramshackle linear development, set back from the lower reaches of the Helmand River, in what is locally known as the "fish hook", a curve in the river as it arches west towards Iran, eventually to disappear in the salt marshes of Seistan and lake Hamun.

And Khan Neshin, according to Grey, is giving the US Marine problems, so much so that his article is entitled "Morale dips for American marines in Afghanistan", with the strap telling us that "troops are dismayed by the ambivalence of locals and a sense that the Taliban can outlast them."

The town was occupied in July 2009, as part of the US operation Khanjar (Strike of the Sword), when Marines from the 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion established the first sustained presence of coalition forces – the furthest south coalition forces have so far ventured. It has since become a test-bed for McChrystal's "take-hold-build" policy.

However, despite the Marines' good intentions, Stephen Grey reports that the local tribal chief, in a recent meeting, was openly hostile. "The Americans threaten our economy and take our land for bases. They promise much and deliver nothing," he said.

The chief goes by the name of Haji Khan, a man "who rules like a medieval baron". He adds: "People here regard the American troops as occupiers," then telling the Americans that: "Young people are turning against them and in time will fight them."

There is already significant fighting in the area which – on the face of it – could be attributed to Pashtuns coming into the area, either up from Pakistan in the south, or from other areas of Afghanistan.

The platoon left to hold the ground knows there are at least 20 booby-trapped IEDs on the high ground around their base. More than half the men have already been caught in blasts. One marine explosive expert was killed; others suffered broken legs and amputated feet. Three have survived two explosions and come back to fight again.

Furthermore, Grey reports that villagers "are rarely willing to express a simple opinion, let alone inform soldiers where the enemy is hiding." One marine described the way the Taleban blended with the population as "unbelievably frustrating".

That much is par for the course, in this long-running battle against the Taleban but what has the alarm bells ringing is that Haji Khan and his tribe are not Pashtuns, who form the backbone of the insurgency, but Baluchi. They are a different ethnic group, of which one million live in the part of the Khanate of Baluchistan which was annexed by Afghanistan – and whom comprise at least 60 percent of the population of Khan Neshin.

And, according to US military sources, most of the Taleban they have been fighting in Khan Neshin are most definitely Baluchi. When one Baluchi Taleban leader was killed as he was plotting a major conventional attack, his elimination dramatically improved security in the area.

This is an important development. Historically, the Taleban have been almost entirely Pashtun, drawn mainly from the second largest tribal group, the Ghazai, their "insurgency" essentially amounting to a Pashtun nationalist uprising. Previously, the Baluchi have been no part of it, and nor have they had reason to be.

They, themselves – or, at least, elements – have been fighting their own liberation campaign against the annexation of the main part of their territory by Pakistan in 1948, which drove thousands of refugees into Afghanistan in the '70s. Caught up in the Soviet invasion, they were attacked by the Mujahideen, driven - it has been claimed - by the Pakistani ISI, which was then supporting the anti-Soviet resistance.

Nevertheless, the Baluchi independence campaign has continued, with signs of it strengthening, gaining increasing popular support. There is also a guerrilla force actively conducting operations since 2003, hitting infrastructure and paralysing the ability of the central authorities to take advantage of Balochistan's rich mineral resources.

This has put the Baluchis at odds with the Pakistan government, especially as some of the independence groups are rumoured to be supported by India, issues we rehearsed in an earlier piece. This has prompted the Pakistani government to exploit historical Pushtun-Baluch rivalries, also using its "proxy" Taleban forces, in the classic "divide and rule" ploy.

On the other hand, there has been much turmoil within the Baluchi community itself. Unlike the Pashtuns, the Baluchi society is stratified and has been characterised as "feudal militarism," the tribal groups being led by sadars (chiefs), with far more power than their Pashtun equivalents. But the Pakistani Balouchi sadars have been condemned for being far too close to Pervez Musharraf and less interested in supporting independence for their people.

With population movements, the disruption from the wars and an accelerating pace of social change, there has emerged a large body of "disaffected youth", rebelling against the traditional order, drawn towards the independence movement.

In a development that is not seen as a coincidence, earlier this year there emerged news of a newly formed Baluchi-Taleban alliance called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan (TTB).

According to some Baluchi activists, this has been created by the ISI, to soak up the youth faction, enjoining young Baluchis to reject "tribalism and narrow nationalism" – the latter supported by India, against the interests of the Muslim "brotherhood" - and to think "for Pakistan and broader Muslim Ummah."

Whether this is true or not, there is now good evidence that the Taleban is widening its appeal, and recruiting factions outside its traditional Pashtun constituency.

There may also be another layer to the alliance, as the Baluchi are heavily involved in the opium industry, both as growers and traders. Baluchistan is said to be at the crossroads of Afghan opiates trafficking, but it is also a major supply route for the Taleban. Haji Khan, the chief in Khan Neshin, is also an opium grower and the military believes him to have a "working relationship with the Taleban".

Into this complex mix, there are also claims of another element, with the recruitment of Iranian Baluchis to the jihadist cause, supportive of the Taleban. This may be an al Qaeda initiative, although details are sketchy. But even a hint of the Taleban taking on a wider international dimension is of some concern.

This brings us back to our previous piece, which also explored concerns about the transformation of the Taleban from a local insurgency to a part of the global jihad, with a wider international dimension, through al Qaeda and leaders such as Haqqani, who have their own cross-border links.

Although this has not emerged suddenly, the Afghan insurgency is now looking considerably more complicated and dangerous than it looked even a few weeks ago. The strategic implications are profound.

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Knowing your enemy?

With the Afghan strategy debate ranging between the two extremes of opting for a "counter-insurgency" or "counter-terrorism" approach, never more has it been necessary to know the nature of the "enemy" with which we are dealing, its structures, organisation, affiliations and, crucially, its mindset.

Getting that right determines whether counter-insurgency is a practical proposition. This is a strategy where the people is the "prize", requiring a structured attempt to alter the mindset of the population, and win support for the established government. But, if it is to succeed, then we need to know whether the target populations are amenable to change, what is required to make them change and then, crucially, whether those changes are self-sustaining.

Clearly, much depends on whether the "insurgency" in Afghanistan is localised and can be contained. If that is the case, a counter-insurgency strategy is appropriate, the aim being is to detach the less committed fighters and "turn" them. By this means, the hard core "irreconcilables" are isolated, who can then be either killed, captured or driven out, bringing security to the region.

This is essentially the core of the McChrystal plan, as opposed to the Biden/Obama preference of concentrating on the al Qaeda "terrorist" element, an option which relieves the president of the burden of providing more troops and escalating the war. That strategy would only be more appropriate, though, if the insurgency has a major trans-border element, with the bulk of its fighters "hard core", committed to a global jihad and, therefore, beyond redemption.

Rather conveniently, one might think, we are now beginning to see a series of articles in the US media, the latest an AP report, stating that "US officials face a tough challenge in dissecting the structure and leanings of the militant organisations on both sides of the often indiscernible Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and understanding their murky and evolving ties to al-Qaeda."

From this we learn that "senior al-Qaeda leaders" are forging deeper relationships with Pakistani "militants" and often operating from their camps inside the Pakistan border. This would support suggestions that the so-called Taleban and al Qaeda are merging to form a single entity, with wider objectives than a local insurgency, giving credence to a counter-terrorism strategy.

This follows the line being presented by the Obama-supporting New York Times, which has given considerable prominence given to their correspondent David Rohde who had spent seven months in "Taleban" captivity. He was amongst the first to suggest that the ties between the "Taleban" and al Qaeda might be stronger than at first thought.

However, Rohde was the "guest" of a faction known as the "Haqqani Network" (HQN), rated by McChrystal as second in importance, in terms of threat, after the Qetta Sura Taleban, led by Mullah Mohammed Omar. But it is the Haqqani Network group, as much as anything, which illustrates the complexity of the "insurgency" and the kaleidoscopic structures of the players.

The Network is led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, a member of the Jadran, a Ghilzai sub-tribe from Paktia province in Afghanistan. According to Roche, though, its "main stronghold" is in Miranshah, administrative capital of North Waziristan, on the Pakistani side of the Durand line.

The tribe itself, even by Pashtun standards, is considered "warlike" and its members are regarded as great warriors. It was one of the first Pashtun tribes to rebel against Amin's Communist regime, after the harvest of the summer of 1979, before the Soviet invasion. In a major confrontation with government forces in September and October of that year, the tribe inflicted a major defeat on Amin's forces, which was one of the factors which led to the invasion.

It was very active in fighting against the Soviets from the beginning of the mujahidin movement, in which Sirajuddin's father, Jalaluddin Haqqani, emerged as a prominent leader, attracting the support of the CIA and the Pakistani ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence). To that extent, Jalaluddin was considered a western "client", but also an associate of Osama Bin Laden whom he helped build his own militia to fight the Soviets.

Jalaluddin was not originally a member of the Taleban, switching to them in 1995, just prior to their occupation of Kabul. In 1996-97, he served as a Taliban military commander north of Kabul, when he was accused of ethnic cleansing against local Tajik populations. He then served as the Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs in the Taleban government, and governor of his home province, Paktia.

In October, 2001, after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre, Jalaluddin was named the Taleban's military commander and may have had a role in expediting the escape of Osama Bin Laden. With his base in Khost under repeated American air attack, it is believed he crossed the border into Waziristan in the November or December.

Attempts were made to get Jalaluddin to switch sides and join the Karzai government in Kabul but, instead, he consolidated his base in Waziristan, launching attacks into Afghanistan.

In 2004, though, when the Pakistani Army stepped up its search for al-Qaeda members in the mountains of North Waziristan, armed resistance by local tribesmen escalated into a two-year conflict, culminating in March 2006, when Miranshah was supposedly cleared of Taleban by the Pakistani Army, after two days of fighting.

Following that, the North Waziristan Accord was signed between the government of Pakistan and the tribes, agreeing a mutual cessation of hostilities in the district, in exchange for an undertaking that cross-border activities in Afghanistan would end and foreign jihadists would leave the area.

Nevertheless, Jalaluddin's network continued its attacks into Afghanistan and, despite US airstrikes against him personally, has remained free and is thought to have been the organiser of a number of high-profile suicide attacks in Kabul.

His forces have been accused by the coalition forces of carrying out the late-December 2008 bombing in Kabul, at an elementary school near an Afghan barracks that killed several schoolchildren, an Afghan soldier, and an Afghan guard. Meanwhile, his son Sirajuddin seems to have taken over day-to-day leadership of the Network.

The Haqqani Network is categorised as part of the "Afghanistan Taleban", distinct from the "Pakistani Taleban", and it is unclear as to how the two are related, and whether they work together. "The complexity of all this is hard enough for experts to understand," says Paul R. Pillar, a former CIA analyst. "It's not surprising if it baffles a lot of ordinary people."

According to Jason Burke, writing in The Observer on 14 October 2007, little is known about Sirajuddin Haqqani, although it is believed he is the "dominant figure among the warlords hacking out their fiefdoms in the tribal areas." He is also thought to be the only one powerful enough to challenge Mullah Omar.

It was he who in the September of 2007 "brought three different warlords together to provide a big enough force to take on the Pakistani army around Mir Ali" – an action in North Waziristan which took place between 7-10 October 2007, starting with an attack on a Pakistani convoy and ending with nearly 200 dead.

His influence, wrote Burke, stretches across eastern Afghanistan as far as Ghazni and even into Uruzgan and, while the Afghan Pashtun tribes do not unconditionally obey one commander:

... Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son have been able to draw together a complex web of links of allegiance, some based on tribal loyalty, others inspired by religious devotion to the senior Deobandi cleric that Haqqani is (or was), still more by a quasi-national response to what is perceived to be a "foreign" invasion and occupation that threatens to change Afghan society for ever.

From this narrative, it would seem that any distinction between the "Pakistani" and the "Afghan" Taleban is more imagined that real, reinforced by Rohde reporting that the Haqqanis and their allies (supposedly "Afghan" Taleban) had held him "in territory they control in North and South Waziristan" - part of Pakistan, spanning multiple tribal domains.

Thus, while the Pakistani Army is attacking the "Pakistani" Taleban, it would seem that it is being opposed also by the "Afghan" Taleban – of which the Haqqanis are part - yet, bizarrely, Rohde claims to have been learnt from American officials, via his colleagues, that the ISI provides money, supplies and strategic planning to the Haqqanis and other "Afghan" Taleban groups.

Significantly, Rohde is also told that the contacts were part of a strategy to maintain influence in Afghanistan to prevent India from gaining a foothold. One Pakistani official called the Taleban "proxy forces to preserve our interests."

By all accounts, though, the Haqqani dynasty does need to rely on Pakistan's ISI for its support. His network has acquired considerable wealth from smuggling opium, weapons and timber out of Afghanistan as well as from quasi-legitimate businesses. It also comes in direct donations from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia backers, and from indirect donations via Islamic charities.

Furthermore, until 2001, Jalaluddin was a frequent visitor to the Gulf and one of his wives is from a wealthy family in the United Arab Emirates. This gives him access to the highest counsels in Gulf society, and a wide network of influence - of which al-Qaeda is part.

Thus says Vahid Brown, a researcher at the Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, "You cannot meaningfully distinguish between al-Qaeda and the co-linked (militant) networks — either in terms of understanding the landscape or crafting a policy response."

This then raises the question of whether anyone can meaningfully distinguish anything which would help resolve the ongoing debate. We are confronting an enemy of which we know next to nothing.

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Protection money

The easy assumptions made by so many commentators that the opium crop is the prime source of Taleban income – or, indeed, that eliminating opium would rob the Taleban of funds – are given another knock by a long feature article by Aryn Baker in Time Magazine.

It opens with an account of on IED attack in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz, which destroyed a US Humvee, killing four soldiers, their interpreter and a bystander. The makeshift bomb was assembled with goods from the local bazaar. The man who placed it was probably paid the going rate of $750 but, writes Baker, the cash very likely came from money donated by the international community to rebuild Afghanistan's roads, bridges, clinics and schools.

The narrative builds on our earlier piece, developing a strong evidential base to support the thesis that a major element of Taleban funding comes from protection rackets.

In respect of the IED explosion which Baker describes, he recounts how, a week before the incident, a local businessman subcontracted by a local firm working for the German government to build a road in Kunduz, handed some $15,000 in cash to a Taleban middleman to ensure that his project would not be attacked.

This is but one example of how substantial amounts of aid money from many countries - including the US - have made its way, directly or indirectly, into the Taleban's coffers. "Here we have internationals and Afghans turning a blind eye to the fact that we are paying off the very Taleban that we claim to be fighting," says an adviser to the Afghan Ministry of Interior. "It becomes a self-sustaining war, a self-licking ice cream."

Therein lies the rub. While the escalating costs of the war are straining the taxpayers of the coalition and donor countries, a Western official estimates that the Taleban is making more than it is spending, "and I don't want to even think about where the rest of that money is going." And as long as the money continues to flow, the war will go on.

Baker takes on what amounts to the "myth" that the bulk Taleban funding derives from opium, citing David Cohen, the Treasury's assistant secretary for terrorist financing. "The Taliban obtains revenue from a variety of sources, including extortion of funds from both legitimate and unlawful activity," he says.

Maj-Gen Michael Flynn, senior military intelligence official at ISAF stresses Mafia-like activities such as extortion and kidnapping for ransom. He notes: "I would say that there is more money going into the pockets of local leaders [of the insurgency] from criminal activities than there is from narcotics money."

Drug money, says Flynn, is more likely to go to national leaders of the insurgency, like Mullah Omar, who provide guidance and training for local groups. Local commanders, on the other hand, "absolutely raise their own funds through criminal activities to pay for food, IEDs, weapons and salaries" says Flynn. The billions of dollars spent on reconstruction projects are far too tempting a target to pass up.

Then we have Ahmad Nader Nadery of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. He asserts that the nexus between the Taliban and crime is becoming dangerously entrenched in Afghan society. "The Taliban are acting like a broad network of criminal gangs that enables them to utilize different sources of income," he says.

The consequences of not paying protection – or paying the wrong people – are expensive. Baker tells us that the contractor who paid the $15,000 to the Taleban still lost a bulldozer and 12 trucks, torched by the Taleban. Two of his drivers were held for ransom. What probably happened, says Abdul Wahid Omerkhil, district governor of Char Dara, is that the contractor paid off the wrong people. "It usually happens like that. You pay one group and you don't pay the other, and they will burn you."

However, it is not just the big foreign-aid projects that get hit. Local businesses are victims too. Baker tells us of a businessman in Kandahar who builds towers for mobile-phone transmitters, he estimates that 20-30 percent of total costs go to protection payments. The going rate to protect a transmitter tower runs about $2,000 a month, he says. "You have no choice but to pay these guys. You don't want to do it, but there is no government in these areas, no security, so you have to do what you can to protect your business."

Sargon Heinrich, a Kabul-based US businessman in construction and service industries, attests that some 16 percent of his gross revenue goes to "facilitation fees," mostly to protect shipments of valuable equipment coming from the border. "That is all revenue that will ultimately be shared by the Taleban," he says.

US and Afghan government officials, Baker says, are fully aware of the scale of the rackets. Afghan Deputy Minister of Public Works Mohammad Rasooli Wali freely admits that the contractors hired to help build the multibillion-dollar ring road around Afghanistan - funded by the World Bank, USAID and other nations' development programs - probably pay off the Taliban to protect their sites and equipment.

Col Thomas O'Donovan, the departing head of the Army Corps of Engineers in Afghanistan, which is responsible for about $4 billion worth of US government contracts a year, admits that there is little the Corps can do to stop subcontractors from paying the Taleban. "If we catch them, then they are done. But how do you catch them? It's not like the Taliban give receipts."

As to dealing with the rackets, Flynn thinks the laissez-faire attitude toward protection money has got to change. One answer is seen as providing a secure environment in which contractors can work, and so far neither coalition forces not the Afghan security agencies have been able to do this.

Flynn's solution is to encourage local participation. "If you want a school, then make the locals build the school. You want a road, bring in local labour. It might be more convenient to pay off the Taleban, and it might be faster. But the community will protect what the community has built."

That may also be a tad optimistic as the Taleban are capable of intimidating local communities and if they are freely able to "tax" local enterprises, then skimming off funds from community projects should not present them with insurmountable problems.

Baker thus opts out. He relies on a weak conclusion, saying that a thriving - and legal - local economy will turn off the Taliban's faucet. To bring him to this point, he cites a US Treasury official who tells him: "If you have people making more money in a criminal organisation than they can [make] working for the government or in the private sector, it is an indication that we need to do a lot more to create a viable Afghan economy."

Correct, says Baker, adding, "and sadly, not something likely to be put right anytime soon." But what he does not add is that, in the short term, if the contractors and businesses cannot be protected and must therefore pay protection to the Taleban, then the war continues and the Afghan economy fails to prosper.

He cannot see the obvious answer – that the coalition military, as the only forces immune to Taleban threats, must do the primary development themselves.

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