Government baaaaad

On 14 June 2006, under the by-line of Michael Evans, defence editor, The Times ran a story about the death of Captain James Philippson, the first British soldier to be killed in southern Afghanistan.

In a narrative attributed to "senior military sources", we were told that Philippson had "died while trying to rescue a wounded colleague under enemy fire," the paper then retailing a lengthy derring-do account of his exploits.

The following February, a factual and largely unchallenged account of the events leading to Philippson's death was published as part of a Board of Inquiry report. So different was this account that it became manifestly clear that Evans's original was a work of pure, unmitigated fiction.

To my knowledge, Evans has never published a retraction or correction of his story – the MSM never feels the need to apologise. In fact, an even more lurid account of these fictional events found its way into Sean Rayment's book, "Into the killing zone", albeit lacking source attribution.

A year after the Board of Inquiry report, the events came before assistant coroner Andrew Walker. He chose to ignore the substantive findings of the Board and instead focused on what were tangential issues which had not materially affected the outcome of events – specifically a shortage of equipment and in particular night-vision goggles.

On the basis of his narrow and partial perspective, Walker was thus able to launch into a strident attack on the government, accusing it of causing an "unforgivable and inexcusable breach of trust" with the Armed Forces by sending soldiers into combat with "totally inadequate" equipment.

Outside the court, Tony Philippson, the understandably aggrieved father, was given free rein to declare that it was a disgrace that troops had been sent to fight terrorists without sufficient kit. "I hold the MoD responsible for my son's death but in turn they were starved of cash", he said, accusing the then "parsimonious" chancellor Gordon Brown of not spending money and "risking soldiers' lives".

Never knowingly missing an opportunity to score a cheap political point, shadow defence secretary Liam Fox then weighed in, declaring that the Coroner's findings were "a damning indictment on Labour's treatment of our Armed Forces". "The Government were willing to do the one thing which is unforgivable which is to commit troops to battle without due protection," he said.

So it was that the "Philippson affair" became and has remained a political football, the precise events of the Captain's death buried in a welter of acrimony and accusation, the mythology unchallenged.

What has been challenged, though, is the original finding of the Board of Inquiry which considered that Cpt Philippson had been killed as a result of "poor tactical decision-making, a lack of SOPs (standard operational procedures) and a lack of equipment." In particular, the unit's commanding officer, Major Jonny Bristow came in for some criticism.

We now learn from The Sunday Times that, following assiduous lobbying from Tony Philippson, the Board is to revisit its findings whence it is "anticipated" that it will dismiss the original criticisms that the rescue mission in which Philippson died was an "ill-prepared rush", asserting that soldiers were properly briefed and overall preparation was adequate given the need to deploy the soldiers rapidly.

However, such is the strength of the prevailing narrative (government baaaaad, Army goooood) that, on the basis of these "anticipated" revised findings, current defence secretary Bob Ainsworth is accused of a "cover-up" over the death of Philippson.

The charge rests on an interview just hours after last year's inquest when Ainsworth, then the armed forces minister, confronted with the coroner's comments about inadequate equipment, "attempted to shift the blame onto Bristow", referring to the Board which had also found there were a "lack of standard procedures and tactical errors too".

This, of course, was no more or less an accurate reflection on the Board's views, but now says Philippson senior, the "anticipated" revised findings "will prove Bob Ainsworth was trying to cover-up the real reason for James's death. He was trying to shift blame away from the lack of equipment for which the MoD was responsible and negligent." "James was a friend of Major Bristow and the suggestion that he played a part in my son's death is despicable," he adds.

Whatever sympathy one might have for a bereaved father, it has to be said that this chain of logic is tortuous at best, if not tendentious. But it is nevertheless sufficient to permit The Sunday Times to run as its page-lead the headline: "Bob Ainsworth in 'cover-up' over soldier's death."

Tony Philippson, though – unwittingly or not – is in tune with the media narrative and is thus allowed to say: "Bob Ainsworth is not fit to be secretary of state and lead the armed forces. Blaming a commanding officer for the MoD's failings is outrageous. He should resign his post with immediate effect."

There may, in fact, be many reasons why Bob Ainsworth is not fit to be secretary of state but, in fairness, this is not one of them. Whatever the new board of inquiry might find – and its report is many months away – it can hardly change the basic facts of the narrative account. Any sober assessment of that narrative can only lead to the conclusion that the events which led to the death of Cpt Philippson did not represent the Army's finest hour.

But, as long as the prevailing narrative remains in force, we will not find in the media any suggestion that the military can in any way be at fault, even in the smallest of ways. Government baaaaad, Army goooood is what we are told, and that is what we must believe.

COMMENT THREAD

They didn't have to die

For anyone wishing to explore the substantive issues on defence, and maintain a sensible debate, the last few weeks have been dreadful.

No sooner are we through the hystérie du jour on Prince Harry then the media goes overboard on the wearing of military uniforms in public. The only thing we felt, under the circumstances, was to walk away for a short while, lest utter frustration get the better of us.

What brings us back is the headline in The Sun yesterday, which we reproduce above – in which the newspaper belatedly visits an issue which this blog has been pursuing doggedly for nearly two years.

Its topical hook for a thesis that 35 soldiers "might be alive today - if only they had been given the right KIT" - was the death of an SAS soldier, killed when his parachute failed to open during training, the inquest for whom has just started.

Also picked up by The Daily Telegraph and others, as well as more coverage from the Sun, this refers to Captain Daniel Wright of the Queen's Gurkha Signal Corps. He died at RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire after plummeting 2,500ft on 17 November 2005 and The Sun has obtained documents "that reveal Captain Wright is the latest victim of shocking penny-pinching."

According to The Sun's sources, the 25-year-old plummeted 3,000ft to his death - after pleas for a vital two-way radio were ignored to save £50. Apparently, his main parachute failed to open and he delayed opening his reserve – through inexperience, we are told – but might have acted quicker had he been equipped with a two-way radio enabling instructors on the ground at the parachute school to talk him out of trouble.

The MoD is reserving comment on this until the inquest verdict had been given, so we too must do likewise. But the broader significance of the paper's original piece was that it uses Captain Wright's death to assert that it brings to THIRTY-FIVE (the paper's emphasis) the number of "brave soldiers whose deaths are blamed on not being given proper equipment."

Amongst that number, it included ten personnel killed in January 2005 when a Hercules transport was shot down near Baghdad, the lack of a fire suppressant system in the fuel tanks being a contributory factor in the tragedy.

Also included was the death of Major Matthew Bacon, killed in a "Snatch" Land-Rover after the Lynx helicopter due to fly him from base to base broke down. The paper then adds Lt Tom Mildinhall, Lance Corporal Paul Farrelly and Corporal Gordon Pritchard, also killed on 11 June 2006 in a Land Rover, Captain Jim Philippson, "shot dead in Afghanistan after being sent into battle without crucial night vision goggles, grenade launchers or machine guns" and the 14 deaths arising from the crash of the Nimrod in November 2006.

Also listed is Corporal Mark Wright, who "bled to death because rescue helicopters had no winches" and, finally, the paper cites the deaths of Sergeant Chris Casey and Lance Corporal Kirk Redpath, killed in a "Snatch" Land Rover by a roadside bomb in Iraq, "because of a shortage of Mastiff armoured trucks".

There are several points here, not least that to attribute some all the deaths cited to lack of proper equipment is tendentious, not least the demise of Captain Philippson and Corporal Mark Wright.

However, the substantive point is the reference to 35 deaths attributable to the failure to provide the right kit. Yet, when we first addressed the Land Rover issue in June 2006, we identified 23 deaths which could be attributed – in part – to the lack of suitable armoured protection.

Nearly two years on, if we take in deaths arising in WIMIK Land Rovers (example pictured), Pinzgauers and the additional toll from "Snatch" Land Rovers – including that in Afghanistan - the number dead from inadequate protection in vehicles is closer to 50. Add to that the Hercules and Nimrod incidents, which The Sun points up, and that brings the actual casualties attributable to lack of the right kit to 74, more than double the number cited by the paper.

This brings us back into the area we explored last month, where we complained that our increasingly ill-informed media lacked focus in its criticism of military issues.

Here, we have to say that we do not and cannot object to The Sun or any other newspaper taking up cudgels on behalf of our troops. Simply, the ill-focused criticism in many cases hinders rather than assists the cause, diverting attention from the substantive issues and enabling those responsible to escape scrutiny.

Thus, in the case of The Sun, while we would agree entirely with the paper's central thesis that troops are being killed through lack of suitable kit, not only does it understate the problem but it is so general in the nature of its complaint that its political impact is slight. Real continuing issues, like the weaknesses of the Pinzgauer and the WIMIK go unaddressed.

In this context, think how long Pinzgauer Vectors would survive in theatre if the The Sun mounted a full-bodied campaign against these "coffins on wheels". That is the measure of the inadequacy of the newspaper – it is not so much what it does, but what it does not do.

That criticism could (and should) also be levied at other newspapers, and a more subtle example of this failure can be seen in last weekend's Sunday Times.

This paper's focus was on the story of a "British soldier awarded the Military Cross for fighting off 150 Taliban", written by defence correspondent Michael Smith. It is about the heroism of Fusilier Damien Hields who used a "grenade machinegun" mounted on his WIMIK Land Rover to destroy seven Taliban positions before himself being wounded.

At one level, the story is entirely commendable – and there is every reason why the heroism of Fusilier Damien Hields should be celebrated. But The Sunday Times is supposedly a serious newspaper, with a reputation for campaigning, yet it deals with the events in a breathless Boys' Own style, complete with graphics (illustrated) which are so amateurish as to be laughable.

It is in fact worth noting these graphics. The author of the piece, Mike Smith, will have had no control over them but they nevertheless are part of the piece. They represent the output of the Sunday Times and convey a message about the gravitas and accuracy of the corporate body.


The pictorial narrative offered (see above) is of a WIMIK Land Rover (although it is not identified as a WIMIK) leading a fifty-man convoy being blown up by a mine and flipped over. In loving detail, the windscreen of the vehicle is shown, complete with finely-drawn windscreen wipers. The only problem is the WIMIK does not have a windscreen – but it does have a GMPG in the front passenger position, which is not shown.

The second frame is even more laughable, purporting to show a Taleban fighter firing a rocket propelled grenade yet actually shows what looks uncannily like a Stinger anti-aircraft missile launcher (pictured).

Pedantry this might be – but was there no one on the entire editorial staff who had enough knowledge to recognise such obvious visual howlers? What does it say about a newspaper that lets them through?

Anyhow, back to the narrative which recounts how Fusilier Hields bravely assisting the convoy in fighting off a force far larger, as it was stalled behind the blown-up, inverted WIMIK. The obvious point which occurs, however, is that had the vehicle been effectively mine-protected, not only would it not have been overturned, but it could – like other such vehicles – have been able to drive clear of the "killing zone" (below), thereby avoiding the uneven match.

Further, given the size of the force – 150 or so – could it not have been detected before the convoy arrived, had there been effective aerial reconnaissance, perhaps by a UAV running ahead to look out for traps?

And then, with the 50 beleaguered British troops fighting for their lives, where was the air support? With such a large investment in men and materiel, could not the Army have ensured it was better protected by insisting that it had air cover?

There may, of course, be adequate answers to these questions – but they are not asked by The Sunday Times. If explored, they could have painted a completely different picture, one of a large number of troops to a very great extent rescued from disaster by the conspicuous heroism of one man.

Wholly admirable that may be but any Army which has to rely on such heroism is one that is seriously deficient. The next time there is a disaster, the hero might not be to hand. Or he might not be so lucky and be killed in the opening moments of the fight.

Returning briefly to the Sun's story, we see the tail end of the piece with an almost obligatory quote from an opposition spokesman, this time "Tory defence spokesman Gerald Howarth" who brands the "skimping" on equipment "a true scandal". He is allowed to say: "I intend to take this further in the House of Commons."

That phrasing gives the perhaps unfortunate impression that Howarth has just woken up to the problem – which is not exactly true. But it is worth looking at his record and working out how many of the 942 questions he has tabled actually deal specifically with equipment issues. Compare and contrast those with the careful probing of Ann Winterton and you might come away with the impression that The Sun's quote from its choice of spokesman is a ritualistic filler.

Be that as it may, when it comes to looking in detail at where equipment inadequacies lie, the media are not even beginning to get to grip with the subject. They are picking up only those issues presented to them on a plate. This is cheap, derivative journalism that exploits rather than serves our Armed Forces – it is playing with peoples' lives.

COMMENT THREAD

No one to blame!

In a classic example of how opinion, rather than facts, drive the media agenda, just over two weeks – on 6 February - a Derby coroner's court held an inquest into the death of Drummer Thomas Wright, from the Worcestershire and Sherwood Foresters.

He had died in Helmand province on 22 June 2007 when his "Snatch" Land Rover had been caught in the blast from a roadside bomb while escorting a military team surveying the site for a new road project linking several Afghan villages in the Babaji area.

At the conclusion of the inquest, Wright's mother gave a statement saying "We are confident that everything possible was done for Tom and the only people we blame for the death are those who planted and detonated the roadside device."

Coroner Robert Hunter was equally measured, confining his remarks to the Taleban, whom he said, "blatantly disregarded human rights". The bombing of the convoy in which Pte Wright was travelling was a "wicked and despicable act", he added.


With such comments, the story made the local news on the BBC, with the local website offering the headline, "Soldier's mother blames no one". It then got reported by a gaggle of local press (such as here) but it went no further.

Compare and contrast this with the two coroners' inquiries ten days later, one dealing with the death of Captain Philippson and the other with the deaths of Lance Sergeant Casey and Lance Corporal Redpath, who had died in a "Snatch" Land Rover, because a better protected Mastiff had not been available.


The difference here was that, in both these cases, the coroners were prepared to make specific charges against the MoD, in terms of inadequate equipment, and there were grieving relatives who were prepared to back up the charges with their own statements.

It can be no coincidence that these stories went nation-wide, featured as the lead item on the BBC and on the front pages of many national newspapers, then to be quoted widely by diverse columnists and bloggers, all uncritically following the "line" set for them by initial reports.

In the Philippson incident, however, the absence of equipment played, at best, a marginal role in the Captain's death yet, with a grandstanding coroner prepared to elevate it to the primary cause, using lurid terms such as "betrayal", this got the lion's share of the media attention.

Perversely, where the equipment issue was absolutely clear-cut, as it was in the case of Lance Sergeant Casey and Lance Corporal Redpath, the publicity was considerably less, often no more than down-pages references attached to the Philippson reports.

Yet, between this latter incident and the death of Drummer Thomas Wright, there were huge and very obvious parallels. In both incidents, the deaths arose in "Snatch" Land Rovers and, in both incidents, Mastiffs were in theatre but there had not been enough to go round.

In terms of the technical details, Drummer Wright's "Snatch" succumbed to a 10Kg roadside bomb, a level of explosive that the Mastiff is well equipped to deal with. Thus, it is fair to speculate that, had he been riding in a Mastiff, he would most certainly have survived – especially as he was in the "top cover" position and his fatal injuries were occasioned by the force of the explosion turning the vehicle over, crushing the unfortunate soldier to death.

What differed in this latter case, therefore, was not the facts but the coroner's and the mother's reactions to them, those making sure the national media ignored the story. The legend, "Soldier's mother blames no one", effectively killed it, with not a single journalist prepared to look beyond the headline at the actual issues.

This dynamic, of course, is not new – but it is a salutary reminder to those who slavishly follow the news agenda that the media is less concerned with facts than with those who have opinions on them. So it is that perceptions are shaped by those whom the media select to convey their narratives.

COMMENT THREAD

A lack of focus

It was last Friday when we learned of the results of the inquest of Captain James Philippson yet, on that same day, there was also another inquest result –almost totally swamped by the media focus on Philippson.

Barely reported in The Daily Telegraph and given scant coverage elsewhere, this second inquest dealt with the deaths of Lance Sergeant Casey and Lance Corporal Redpath who died when their "Snatch" Land Rover was hit north of the Rumaylah oilfields last August.

In what was a devastating indictment of MoD procurement strategies, this inquest heard that the platoon commander had asked for Mastiff vehicles to be used that day but they were all being used elsewhere. Thus, the two soldiers were condemned to their untimely deaths, by being forced to ride in a "Snatch" which offered them no protection from the blast. As we pointed out at the time:

There can, after all this time, be absolutely no excuse for sending troops out in highly vulnerable vehicles when a suitable alternative exists. But, of course, with the delays, lethargy, bureaucracy and everything else that typifies the MoD and the upper echelons of the Army, there are not enough Mastiffs to go round.

The scandal here is not only that these deaths were undoubtedly preventable and arose directly from a lack of suitable equipment, but that the media also chose to focus on the Philippson incident, where the equipment issue was marginal at best, and stemmed more from military incompetence than anything else – something which the media chose to ignore.

The lack of focus on the shortage of protected vehicles is more than an academic issue as, while incompetence will always be with us, deaths arising from lack of protection are eminently preventable, and by no means enough is being done to ensure that the right equipment is made available.

Even now, we still are waiting to hear when a formal order will be lodged with Force Protection for the 140 Mastiffs promised in October. Five months down the line, these could have been delivered by now and, once the modifications had been completed in the UK, could have been on their way to theatre.

Equally, we have heard nothing more about the Ridgebacks, announced personally by Gordon Brown in December. In the absence of further news, and the lack of progress on the Mastiff front, we can only fear the worst.

These are issues which, of course, the media could influence and, to that extent, as much as the failings in procurement policy are costing lives, so is the indifference and lack of focus in the media.

Today, for instance, we get the almost ritual article, this time from The Daily Telegraph, reporting about "defence cuts", the "news" being that "defence chiefs are facing a £3 billion hole in their budget with officials having to reduce major projects to save money."

As so often, space is given to rent-a-mouth Patrick Mercer, who is allowed to say that the budgetary problems showed "a complete lack of long-term co-ordination" between the MoD and its political masters. But it is left to a small voice in the letters column, a Mr Sandy King, to point out that:

It is easy to blame the Government for the shocking state of affairs in the Armed Forces and there can be little doubt that the defence budget has, in real terms, been steadily eroded. However, a proportion of the blame should also be taken by the chiefs of staff, who have mismanaged the defence budget over many years.

A schoolboy-style rivalry between the three Services, and the determination of each to protect its own image and resources, has resulted in millions of pounds being squandered, money that should have been spent on the front line.

More than 20 years ago, the late Wing Commander Tim Gauvain wrote a paper for the forward planning and policy division of the MoD, in which he said that it was time for the generals, admirals and air marshals to "put their sacred cows into the market place". It is tragic that his words were not heeded.

The level of sophistication in that argument is clearly beyond the media, which is locked into the narrative that the Armed Forces are perpetually short of cash and cannot see beyond their own narrow, self-imposed frame of reference.

But, as we have pointed out ad nauseum on this blog, many of the problems relating to defence spending arise from buying unnecessarily expensive or simply unnecessary equipment, much of it bought as a result of rivalry between the different branches of the Services.

What Mr King could also have pointed out, though, was that there remains as much rivalry within each of the Services, and it is the conflict within the Army – specifically as to whether to proceed with FRES or invest in protected vehicles more suitable for COIN operations.

But, if such details evade the media, they are also beyond the comprehension of some MPs, even if the demands for more money are getting short-shrift from shadow defence secretary Liam Fox who has repeatedly refused to commit a future Conservative government to more defence spending.

In one sense, he is right to do so as, without dealing with the structural problems in the Armed Forces, more money could possibly do more harm than good, especially if it means buying more expensive "toys", the upkeep of which then drained future budgets. Buying the equipment is often only the down payment. Through-life costs are often a factor of several times the initial purchase price.

However, what is needed from Fox is some idea that he in any way understands the problems facing the MoD and our forces, of which there is no more sign than there is from the media.

Thus, while lack of focus fails to identify any of the key issues – and fails equally to bring the MoD to account on the things that really matter – men like Lance Sergeant Casey and Lance Corporal Redpath will continue to die needlessly. And, if they are very lucky, their passing might merit a brief passing not in our increasingly ill-informed media.

COMMENT THREAD

A dangerous "puff"

Not a few of our readers brought to our attention the long piece by Andrew English in the motoring section of The Daily Telegraph yesterday, about the Panther FCLV – badged as the Iveco LMV. With so much time taken with analysing the Philippson incident, however, we did not have enough time to review it until today.

Andrew English is an experienced journalist, an expert in road-testing cars and, in a past career, was directly involved in developing Army off-road vehicles. Furthermore, he has quoted myself, Defence of the Realm and Christopher Booker – as well as Ann Winterton – so we cannot be too rude about him.

Inasmuch as he has also supplied a great deal of information about the Panther, which we did not know, English has also done us a service. And he is not entirely unsympathetic to our view of this machine although, unfortunately, his overall view of the machine is positive, making it something of a dangerous "puff" for Iveco.

Strangely though, the main area in which he shares our view is criticising it for insufficient payload and seating capacity. Nominally a five-seater, English tells us, the Panther will have four, or even three, seats depending on their role. This restricted seating and the relatively low payload of 2,866lb/1,300kg is pretty meagre, he writes. Indeed it is pretty meagre for a vehicle weighing in at over seven tons.

But, while lauding the protection the vehicle gives, English does not make the connection when he writes that "the special shape of the chassis means a 1,322lb (600kg) V-shaped mine plate can be fitted underneath to protect the occupants, without seriously affecting the off-road capability."

But it is one of the pictures (right) accompanying the piece that demonstrate how the Panther design is fundamentally flawed – accounting for much of the weight. In that picture, we see a more or less conventional ladder-frame chassis, on which is mounted a "safety cell", and under which is bolted the 600kg or armour.

In a more advanced design – such as that adopted by the RG-31 and the Cougar – however, a monocoque structure is adopted, the v-shaped armoured shell also serving as the load-bearing structure to which the transmission and running gear are fixed.

It is this design which gives the exception strength and protection afforded by these vehicles, while offering huge weight-savings, and enables the RG-31 to come in at a similar weight to the Panther while offering better protection and more carrying capacity.

English makes much of the off-road performance of the vehicle, and its ability to climb a concrete ramp in the dry, with a nicely roughened surface (below, left), allowing him to declare that, "what is unassailable, in our view, is that the LMV is a thoroughly modern vehicle that will go to places even Land Rovers would be hard pressed to reach while protecting its passengers during a modern insurgent war."

In the protection stakes, English recounts how the Panther is tested against a standard Russian anti-tank mine, a video of which he is shown:

The LMV rears up in the air like stricken horse, its bumper rising about 10 feet and pointing skywards at an angle of 45 degrees. It twists to one side and lands with a shocking crash as pieces of scenery and vehicle continue to cascade down like hail some five seconds after the detonation. Although the wheels are still attached, the plastic bonnet has disappeared and wires and pipes hang out of the engine bay like the entrails of a dead animal, but the passenger safety cell is undamaged.

However, that is one mine, while the Taleban have been known to use two or more stacked mines, or have augmented the explosive power with the addition of a couple of mortar rounds – a technique widely used in Rhodesia. What is shocking is the description of the vehicle rearing up so high, demonstrating that little in the way of deflection technology has been used. Nor, with the wheels still attached, does it suggest that the most has been made of using sacrificial components which can be blown off by an explosion, thus absorbing energy.

The test itself, while impressing English, though, suggests that the Panther is at its limit being challenged with a single mine and has no potential to resist more – as against the RG-31 which can resist two stacked mines under any wheel without injury to the crew, and the Cougar which successfully resisted a 300 lb IED, from which all the crew walked away with superficial injuries. Yet Iveco talk about their vehicle's ability to resist a 50kg IED, as if that was something very special.

Nevertheless, English suggests that the vehicle – with 120 delivered so far to the British Army – should be deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan as soon as possible, although he evades the question as to the use to which it should be put.

Armed with only a 7.62mm GPMG on an "Enforcer" unstabilised remote weapon station mount – which cannot deliver accurate fire while the vehicle is on the move - it cannot replace the Land Rover WIMIK, with its .50 cal M2 machine gun as well as the GPMG. Nor, with a seating capacity of three, can it be used as an adequate substitute for the "Snatch" which, in its patrol/personnel role can carry up to six troops.

For sure, it can be used as a command vehicle, replacing either the WIMIK or the Snatch (or even the Pinzgauer) when used on that specific role, but that raises the spectre of commanders riding in a better protected vehicle than the troops they will be commanding.

Conversely, should a Panther be used to accompany Mastiffs, the reverse will apply, the commander potentially being driven in the least protected vehicle in a convoy, and flagged up as an obviously high value target at the same time.

Another issue of concern, which English himself flags up, is the basic instability of the vehicle, with several "roll-overs" having been reported while in the hands of expert Army testers. Given that, with the Land Rover in the hands of inexperienced, testosterone-driven soldiers, there have been a distressing number of roll-overs, the incidence with this vehicle, if widely introduced, might well increase.

In a way, though, it was inevitable that English should have written his piece in the way that he did. He is, after all – despite his background – a motoring correspondent, and was there to write up the test as he found it. He could not reasonably be asked to carry out comparative analyses or assess the limitations of the vehicle in its projected roles.

What he does point out though is that it was ordered in 2003 and is still not yet in service. Had an alternative like the RG-31 been bought, it could have been in service now for several years, saving lives rather than keeping Iveco in business selling a fundamentally flawed and overpriced vehicle with very little real tactical value.

COMMENT THREAD

"An ill-prepared rush"

One instinctively distrusts Andrew Walker, the Oxford coroner widely quoted in today's media in connection with his verdict on the tragic death of Captain James Philippson during the evening of 11 June 2006 in Helmand province, Afghanistan.

This coroner has a history of grandstanding, and seems to revel in his reputation as the scourge of the MoD – his florid use of language out of keeping with the dignity of his office.

Thus do we get from Walker the accusation that the MoD betrayed soldiers' trust by sending troops to Afghanistan without basic equipment. He is widely cited as saying that, "totally inadequate" resources led to them being "outgunned by a bunch of renegades".

"The soldiers were defeated not by the terrorists but by the lack of basic equipment," Walker says. "To send soldiers into a combat zone without basic equipment is unforgivable, inexcusable and a breach of trust between the soldiers and those who govern them."

Unsurprisingly, the media have leapt upon these quotes with relish, but one wonders how many of the journalists and the many commentators, adding their penny-worth, had actually read the Board of Inquiry (BOI) report into the incident.

To set the scene, Phillippson had been part of a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) which had volunteered to come to the aid of a patrol which had been ordered to investigate a report that an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle had crashed in the vicinity of its base. The patrol had not found the UAV and, on its journey back to its base, had been ambushed by the Taleban.

As to Phillippson’s death, this was occasioned by a gunshot wound to the head from an AK-47 but the BOI came to the conclusion that he had been killed:

…as a result of poor tactical decision-making, a lack of SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) and lack of equipment.

The Board further concludes that the decision to retrieve the downed UAV might be question, "given its relatively low value, low security classification and the late hour at which the initial patrol deployed", had the patrol not been ordered to recover the UAV, "it is unlikely that the incident would have occurred".

From behind these stark findings, clear even from the measured tones of the BOI report and its caveats about "hindsight", emerges a story that can best be described as a "shambles".

In the first instance, the QRF was a composite force, comprised of 30 British Army personnel from 13 different Arms, who had never worked as a fighting team, plus four US personnel. As support, they had a detachment of Afghani soldiers who had not completed their training. Although a "formed infantry unit" would have been preferable, this was not available as ministers had put a cap on the number of troops which could be deployed to Afghanistan and the infantry units were deployed elsewhere.

To that extent, there attaches some political blame for the decision initially to send so few but, that aside, all soldiers are trained to fight and must expect to do so on occasions.

Where the rot started, though, was that despite the disparate nature of the force, its commanding officer – Major Jonathon Bristow – issued no SOPs, carried out no rehearsals for the various contingencies that might arise and, when the contact report came in on the fateful day, did not brief his patrol on the proposed route or any tactical procedures to be adopted. By his own admission, Major Bristow "had little idea about how he was going to conduct the link-up" and some members of the patrol deployed out of the base "without any idea where they were going".

In fact, the preparations had been so rushed that the patrol, nominally of nine vehicles, left the base six minutes after the contact report, leaving behind vital Bowman radios and two of its number, as the drivers could not find their ignition keys. These were in the pocket of an occupant of another of the patrol vehicles, that vehicle getting snarled up in barbed wire on its departure from the base. After some delay, it returned and the remainder of the vehicles followed on, meaning that the QRF had been split into two components.

As to the speed of response, the Board found that, to be ready in six minutes "represents either a very well rehearsed drill or an ill-prepared rush". Given that "no rehearsals had been conducted previously for this or any other contingency", the Board concluded it was "the latter".

Once on the road, without any clear idea of the route it was going to take, the first part of the QRF found itself on a narrow track which became too narrow to pass with the vehicles. Major Bristow, therefore, ordered the troops to dismount and proceed on foot. By so doing, the Board observed, he "significantly reduced the firepower at his disposal".

Crucially, without Bowman radios, the commanders was not in touch with his base. Had they been so equipped, the Board found, they would have been informed that the patrol he was seeking to "rescue" was no longer in contact with the enemy and "might have decided to abandon the foot patrol" and get back to the base.

Fatefully, though, the patrol continued. It was as the dismounted soldiers were well into the patrol that they came into contact with "between 12 and 15 people … with what looked like small-arms weapons" that there was an exchange of fire and Captain Philippson received his fatal gunshot wound.

Here, the lack of night vision goggles may have been as the 20 or so men in the patrol had been equipped only with three sets. The relevance comes when the armed men were first detected, when Major Bristow, leading the patrol, first spotted the enemy. He was equipped with night vision equipment, and shouted a warning to the rest of the patrol. However, his equipment was not mounted on his helmet which meant he could not observe and fire his rifle concurrently.

The narratives are confused, but one account has it that, after a short pause, Bristow fired "two or three rounds" in the enemy's direction, whence the Taleban returned fire, one of their shots killing Captain Philippson. The Board observed that, "if there was a lull between Major Bristow shouting the warning and then firing 2-3 rounds (occasioned by the type of night sight he was using) then it may have given the enemy enough time to react aggressively".

On the other hand, though, the Board also observes that Bristow should not have been leading the patrol as point, and was thus not in the best position to command his troops or deal with the tactical action that followed. "At the very least", it stated, he should have been behind his patrol sergeant who did have a rifle fitted with a night sight, and had observed the Taleban "moments before" the Major.

On such slender grounds does the coroner allege "betrayal" and the media makes much of the fact that he also asked Major Bristow if his troops could have matched their attackers if they been supplied with Minimi machine guns and under-slung grenade launchers. Bristow told the court: "It would have made a hell of a difference. We lost the initiative through a lack of firepower and thus the Taliban had a greater weight of firepower."

The Board agrees that the patrol did lose the initiative, but only after the death of Captain Philippson. Then, for five minutes, there was widespread confusion – but the Board also concludes that the firepower available "was sufficient for dealing with the enemy action".

The patrol, in fact, did, have one General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) detached from one of the WIMIKs in the mounted force. Had the QRF not become split, there would have been two such weapons available. But more firepower – whether Minimi machine guns or GPMGs - says the Board, would only "have allowed a swifter extraction from the killing area".

So, the truth of this matter was that this patrol was ill-prepared, badly led and disorganised to the point almost of being shambolic. Had any number of events been different – not least the ill-advised and unnecessary attempt to recover the UAV - the tragic outcome could have avoided. And in this toxic mix, the role of equipment – and any inadequacies in its supply – were marginal and of lesser importance. In truth, an "ill-prepared rush" led to a gallant soldier being killed.

To be fair to the troops involved and their commanders, the BOI concludes that the patrol "was being ordered ... to conduct independent manoeuvre operations beyond its capability and capacity at that time". It adds that, in future, the mission should be given to a "formed infantry unit" well rehearsed in the procedures relevant to "conducting full-spectrum operations within a counter-insurgency context".

That, if anything, was where the fundamental failure lay but, once again, the media – with the aid of a grandstanding coroner - have distorted the truth.

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Time to go back to basics

The big defence news of yesterday was the dire tale of the theft of a laptop holding the personal details of some 600,000 people who had expressed an interest in joining the Armed Forces.

The laptop had, apparently, been stolen from the car of a Royal Navy officer, who had left the machine in the car overnight. The MoD is taking some heat: the loss is claimed to present a security risk as the data were not encrypted. That apart, it can surely only be someone with cloth for brains that leaves such valuable property in a car overnight. These people are responsible for our defence?

In addition to that story though, the Telegraph found space for a story headed, "Kit shortages put troops' lives at risk". It tells us that thousands of troops had their lives endangered when they were sent to Afghanistan without essential equipment.

This, we are also told, was due to "government dithering", a claim relying on a document which forms part of the Board of Inquiry report into the death of paratrooper Captain James Philippson of 7 Para, Royal Horse Artillery.

He was the first soldier to be killed in southern Afghanistan and the circumstances of his death were briefly carried in The Times on 14 June 2006, its story headed, "British soldier died as he saved comrade in Taleban ambush".

As part of a quick-reaction force, Philippson had gone to the rescue of British troops who had been ambushed while on patrol in the Sangin district. The force arrived, we are told, in armoured Land Rovers to find a convoy of British vehicles pinned down by Taleban fighters who were firing from nearby buildings.

Philippson and his men jumped from their vehicles, firing their SA80 rifles as they ran to protect the convoy and to reach the wounded soldier. The injured man was successfully removed under fire, but while he was being pulled to safety a burst of Taleban gunfire hit Philippson and the other member of the quick-reaction force, killing the Captain and severely wounded the other soldier.

Returning to the Board of Inquiry document, the inference offered by The Telegraph seems to be that in some way Philippson’s death was in part attributable to the shortage of "vital kit" such as body armour, heavy machine guns, night vision goggles and ballistic matting for Land Rovers. One would like to see more of this report but, since Philippson seems to have been dismounted when he was hit, it may (or may not) be a lack of body armour that was partly responsible for his death.

This will, no doubt, come out in the inquest so we must reserve judgement and, for now, simply lament the death of a brave soldier. However, the combination of the Times account, which tells us that Land Rovers were being used, and the current Telegraph story, which reports a shortage of "ballistic matting", highlights a completely different issue.

The ballistic matting is the armour used to protect Land Rover crews from small arms fire and some would aver that it is more important to soldiers' safety than mine protection, the fire from the Teleban being regarded as the greater threat. The issue then is why Land Rovers are being used as fighting vehicles which are so unprotected that they need the addition of ballistic matting in order to improve safety.

Here, it is instructive take a historical perspective on the use of armoured vehicles in combat, which goes back over 100 years. In fact, the French lay claim to have built the first ever production armoured car - in 1905 - called the Charron (pictured top left). As with many of the designs which were to follow, it was a normal commercial vehicle to which armour had been added. With the additional of a machine gun, this made for a package which is still in use with armies to this day.

The British were relatively late on the scene, producing the Rolls Royce armoured car in 1914, a design which, with modifications, was still in use in the North African desert in 1940 (pictured left). By then, though, the concept of the armoured car had been well proven and the wartime Army was equipped with a succession of purpose-built vehicles, most notably the Humber and Daimler armoured cars, which continued in use after the war.

The Daimler (pictured right) and others were replaced in the 1950s – although the Daimler continued in use in Territorial units until the 1960s - by the heavier Saladin, equipped with a 76mm gun, and the lighter Ferret (below left). These two were then replaced by the Fox, introduced in 1973, a machine equipped with the potent 30mm Rarden cannon and a co-axial 7.62mm machine gun. It continued in service until 1993 in Territorial units.

Since then, the Army has not had a purpose designed armoured car. The roles which the armoured car fulfilled, however, remain and, to fill the gaps, the Land Rover Defender has been used. This is a light/medium utility truck which itself derives from a 1946 design but, to equip it specifically for the fighting role, a special derivant of the Defender 110 series was produced. This is known as the Weapons Mount Installation Kit (WIMIK) Land Rover.

The WIMIK has some armour on the engine bulkhead and under the floor, and is fitted with roll bars, additional stowage and mounts for a 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) and a .50 calibre M-2 heavy machine gun. To give added protection against small arms, the front compartment and the gunner's bay in the rear are now fitted with Kevlar ballistic matting.

It is a testament to the original design of the basic Land Rover, which weighs about two tons and would normally carry a payload of two tons, that – in its latest form known as the E-WIMIK ("e" for "enhanced") – it now weighs five and a half tons fully loaded. As such, it is heavier than the four-ton Ferret armoured car it replaces, with considerably less power, and only a ton and a half short of the much better armed Fox.

The central point, though, is that we seem to have gone full circle. From 1905 when armoured cars were produced by adding armour and weapons to existing commercial vehicles, we moved on to produce purpose-built vehicles and now, over a hundred years later, the British Army is back in the same territory. It is adding armour and weapons to a production vehicle to produce an armoured car in all but name.

Quite why the purpose-built armoured car should have fallen out of favour is surely a story that needs to be told, although it is now returning in a different form, called by the UK a "protected patrol vehicle" and by the Americans a "mine resistant ambush protected" (MRAP) vehicle.

What the larger of these vehicles lack, though is the essential mobility and flexibility of the vehicles like the Ferret, which has advocates of the WIMIK arguing for its superiority. Its small size allows it to be driven down the narrow streets and alleys of the Afghan villages, while its larger, better protected cousins are stranded on the outside.

Even the Americans have begun to realise this. With an extra 3,200 troops about to be sent to Afghanistan, they are to be accompanied by some 500 MRAPs. But, rather than sending the over-large Cougars, which form the basis of the British Mastiff, the US government has ordered 500 RG-31 models, cited as the lightest MRAP on the US inventory, recognising the need for more manoeuvrability.

However, press reports cite this vehicle as weighing 11.6 tons, while the current manufacturers specifications state a basic weight of seven. The mystery is explained by the latest development, the RG-31 Mark 6 (pictured right). An already large vehicle has morphed into an even larger armoured truck, adding four tons in the process. Although fitted with a turret and machine gun mount, it is very different from the armoured cars of history.

The military mind, it seems, cannot resist the temptation to take a basic concept and add weight to it, with more capability and protection. But, in so doing, they seem to lose sight of the original need for speed and manoeuvrability, resulting, bizarrely, in troops riding around in WIMIKs, less protected than any time since before the Second World War.

It is time, it seems, to go back to basics.

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