Use them and lose them

The trouble with aircraft is that they wear out. Each airframe has a design life, measured in flying hours and, when reached, the aircraft has to be towed away and scrapped or given fantastically expensive "life extension" upgrades to keep them in the air. The new Eurofighters, for instance, have a design life of about 6,000 hours.

However, high performance combat aircraft are so expensive that they are also expected to last a long time and, as replacements are taking ever longer to come into service, their chronological lives are extending into decades. The Eurofighter will be expected to last about 35 years, allowing an average of about 14 hours a month flying time throughout their careers.

To get maximum chronological life, therefore, it makes sense to fly the aircraft only for the minimum number of hours possible, just sufficient to maintain pilot proficiency and no more. Even then, much of the practice and training can be done on increasingly sophisticated simulators, cutting air time down even further.

That leaves the aircraft available for what they were designed for – an insurance policy in the event of hostile action, when they can be used to ward off or destroy an enemy. A military aircraft may go through its whole career without ever seeing action, its sole purpose having been to provide that all-important insurance.

Unfortunately, contemporary politicians – imbued with the doctrine of "liberal intervention" – are finding ever more reasons for using their inventories of aircraft, often for purposes for which they were not intended.

The RAF Tornado bombers are a good example. Designed for long-range interdiction against Warsaw Pact forces in northern Europe, they are now providing close air support in the gruelling conditions of Afghanistan, having already served in the Gulf War, Kosovo, the Invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation.

The first models were delivered to the RAF in 1979 and production ended in 1998 yet the ground attack version is expected to remain in service until 2025 – the type in service just short of 50 years, with the youngest of the aircraft around 30 years old.

However, so enthusiastic have our politicians been that the current GR4/4A fleet is wearing out too fast, forcing the MoD to devise a mid-life fatigue programme in a bid to see it through to its planned out-of-service date in 2025.

One aircraft will be modified on a trial basis, taking about three years to complete, at a cost of £28 million. If this is successful, work will proceed to the next phase and, if that works, modifications could be made to 40 aircraft at a cost of about £207m - £5 million per airframe.

Needless to say, this problem is not confined to the RAF. Recently, the USAF had to ground part of its F-15 fleet after structural failure caused one machine to break up in mid air. These aircraft, with an extended design life of 8,000 hours, are piling on the hours in Afghanistan and many of these are running out of "life".

Now stung by the massive costs of the replacement F-22s, at about $350 million each, even the United States is beginning to look seriously at cost-saving measures which will reduce the load on the high value inventory and keep them flying for longer.

And so advanced is the thinking that even the popular magazine Time is reporting that the USAF is seeking "a cheaper way to fly and fight". The magazine has picked up on recent reports on what is now called the Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft, with the Hawker Beechcraft T-6 (pictured) and Brazil's Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano under consideration.

Its main champion is defense secretary Robert Gates and the magazine cites General Norton Schwartz, the Air Force chief of staff saying that this low-tech approach "is really consistent with Secretary Gates' thinking" in favour of simple weapons that can be bought quickly and perform more than one mission.

A rugged and simple warplane that can be flown against insurgents by US pilots who also train foreign pilots in their own language "is a very attractive way to approach this problem," he says.

Air Force Secretary Michael Donley concurs. He believes that such an aircraft "will help build up the security capabilities of partners facing counterterrorist operations, counterinsurgency operations." Nations like Afghanistan and Iraq "are not going to be able to — and do not have a need to — operate at that higher end of the conflict spectrum," he adds. And nor can they afford to. The $350 million used to buy each of the 187 F-22s on the US inventory would pay for a fleet of about 50 of these aircraft.

No one is going to pretend, however, that such aircraft can replace the full spectrum of capabilities of fast jets such as the Tornado. But if their use can reduce utilisation of the more expensive jets by even ten percent, then their initial cost is a worthwhile investment, with huge savings accruing through reduced operational costs.

As so often though, while there is now a vibrant public debate on this issue in the US, even vast expenditure by the MoD on life-extension programmes goes unremarked and, despite extensive public and media concern about defence budget shortfalls, there is no media discussion about this promising development.

Short on detail and long on rhetoric, it seems our media – and indeed our politicians and military – would rather complain about shortfalls than do something constructive about them.

COMMENT THREAD

Gaining momentum

From a minority obsession, the deployment of light turboprop strike reconnaissance aircraft to aid the conflict in Afghanistan has achieved the status of an idea whose time has come.

The latest writing on the wall came with a Pentagon briefing reported on 23 July, when Michael Vickers, the acknowledged guru on special operations and low intensity conflict told a small group of defence reporters that upcoming Quadrennial Defence Review (QRD) would be looking at creating "irregular warfare air units" to beef up the US counterinsurgency capability.

The US Navy is SEALs are, of course, already ahead of the game. They are testing leased an EMB-314 Super Tucano aircraft in the desert ranges in California, under a year-long project codenamed "Imminent Fury", picked up recently by Strategy Page.

But now we learn from Flight Global that the US Air Force has issued a "request for information" (RFI) to identify sources that can supply 100 new aircraft to perform light attack and armed reconnaissance.

This is from Air Combat Command, issued on 27 July, calling for aircraft deliveries to start in 2012 and the first operational squadron to activate a year later.

The requirements call for a two-seat turboprop capable of flying up to 30,000ft and equipped with zero-altitude/zero-airspeed ejection seats, full motion video camera, data link, infrared suppressor, radar warning receiver and armoured cockpit. Weapons must include a gun, two 500-lb bombs, 2.75-inch rockets and rail-launched munitions.

The known for competitors for the requirement include the Air Tractor AT-802U, Embraer Super Tucano, Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B Texan II and Pilatus PC-9.

The thinking is based on a summary study that concludes that, "As far as can be determined without actual operational testing, the use of light aircraft is suitable, feasible and acceptable", reinforced by a study last year that concluded that a light attack aircraft could save the USAF billions.

This study, conducted by Col Gary Crowder, commander of the Middle East-based Combined Air and Space Operations Centre, complains that there has not been a "substantial ... intellectual investment" into air-ground integration in the 21st Century.

Crowder argues that a platform like the AT-6 could dramatically reduce the number of fighter jets deployed, provide a light observation utility, save thousands of flying hours on the fighter fleet and extend the life of fighter and attack platforms while saving money.

"At the end of five years, you not only have a suitable force that is ... capable of doing counterinsurgency, stability support and peacekeeping operations, you've also saved thousands of flying hours on your F-16s," he says.


But strike/reconnaissance aircraft are not the only options being considered. A week earlier the USAF issued an RFI for as many as 60 light mobility aircraft (LiMA) to airlift up to six passengers or small loads of cargo from austere or unimproved surfaces.

This goes back to our thinking on the utility of such aircraft as the Pilatus Porter. But the concept of using light STOL transport aircraft goes much further back, to the use by British forces in the 1950s and 60s of the Scottish Aviation Twin Pioneer (pictured above) the Single Pioneer and even the Beaver.

In fact the idea of fixed-wing re-supply aircraft for mobile formations was exploited during the Second World War, using single-engined Waco biplanes to support the LRDG.

Nor indeed is the idea foreign to the US. During Vietnam, extensive use was made of the DHC-4 Caribou (and other air forces – pictured RMAF, right). The type was operated by the US Army until 1966 when the aircraft were traded to the USAF, under the Johnson-McConnell agreement, in exchange for an end to restrictions on Army helicopter operations.

Therein, actually lie much of the current doctrinal difficulties where, in the UK also, there is an unofficial agreement with the RAF restricting the use of fixed wing aircraft in the Army.

While the issues are being thrashed out in the United States, if there is a debate in the UK about restoring light, fixed wing aviation to the battlefield, it is being carried out in private, with little indication that the Service Chiefs are taking it seriously.

One of the problems, it seems, is that fixed wing aircraft are not seen as a 100 percent answer, providing only supplemental capacity to helicopters on the one hand and fast jets on the other.

As the argument has matured in the US, however, the economic benefits have come to the fore and, as Crowder observes, even if light aircraft take some of the load off existing assets, the overall savings could run into billions.

Certainly, in UK terms, where the media (and political) focus has been on increasing helicopter capacity, much of the capability could be achieved by light, fixed wing assets, at considerably less cost. Where Apaches are currently used to escort Chinooks, for instance (in which role they struggle to keep up with the faster transport helicopters) aircraft such as the Tucano could do the job better.

Equally, STOL transport aircraft could deliver to FOBs – even parachuting supplies in – and support mobile formations, delivering supplies, transferring personnel and even evacuating casualties - as well as radio relay and reconnaissance. They have a possible additional role as a light gunship.

It is a measure of the paucity of the UK scene, therefore, that such ideas are not being openly discussed, or that the Armed Forces themselves are not initiating a debate as a cost-effective way of relieving some of the pressure on air assets in Afghanistan. The debate needs to move on from capacity to capability.

Nevertheless, the rediscovery of light aviation is gaining momentum and, one supposes, three or four years hence, the British media will suddenly wake up to the idea, unless there happens to be a journalist out there who can actually kick-start our military into action. We live in hope.

COMMENT THREAD

We were not wrong

Very nearly two years ago, I wrote a piece about the Tucano headed: We are not wrong. This is how the piece started:

When, like this blog, we are so often far out on a limb, discussing ideas that no one else seems to be looking at – with critics lining up to pick holes in the arguments or tell us we've simply got it wrong (as they did when we advocated better armoured vehicles for our troops in Iraq), the sheer weight of contrary opinion, combined with the isolation, does make you seriously question your own arguments (and even your own sanity).

Anyhow, further down the line, it looks as if the Navy SEALS agree with us. We were not wrong.

Furthermore, if DIFID and the FCO could get their fingers out, and paid the Army to build some roads – instead of funding Ferris wheels - these aircraft could be even more useful. What they need to do is emulate the South Africans in their own bush wars. Then, they built lengths of road – and bridges – in such a way that they could be used as temporary landing strips (take the sign away in the pic and you get the drift).

A flight of aircraft could land on any one of these strips, accompanied by a STOL transport carrying supplies – or meeting a supply convoy – fuel and re-arm and then wait, close to the action, until needed. Pilots often lived out in the bush with their aircraft. And, with so many strips available, there was no way the nasties could predict where they would land. There was never any need to use the same strip more than once in any operation.

With a little bit of imagination and determination, there are very few problems that cannot be solved, and light turbo-props are a cheap and effective way of enhancing the force mix. But, these days, it's much easier to find excuses for not doing something – and then spending billions on not solving the problem.

COMMENT THREAD

Let battle commence

Recalling the recent defence debate in the Commons, when, at one time there were only twelve MPs in the chamber of which only one was a Labour backbencher, it is encouraging to note that the much-needed debate on our defence capabilities is nevertheless under way.

In this respect, The Daily Telegraph is to be applauded for leading the way, with a long feature by Thomas Harding, responding to the speech by General Sir David Richards at RUSI this week.

With defence affairs on the cusp, and the campaign in Afghanistan very much in the balance, a wide-ranging debate is both timely and necessary, rendering the contribution of the incoming CGS of considerable importance. It is of some significance, therefore, that The Telegraph remains the only newspaper of substance to take on board and develop his views. And, taking the political blogs at their own estimation of their value, their silence on this intensely political issue should not escape attention.

That is not to say that the media as a whole is silent on defence issues, with The Times also offering a lengthy opinion piece today. Unfortunately, this paper has chosen for its author Patrick Mercer, former infantry officer and currently Conservative MP for Newark & Retford.

In writing on defence issues, Mercer tends to be a one-trick horse, beating the drum for more resources and more "boots on the ground". His arguments tend to be one-dimensional, lacking the depth of strategic thinking that we see, for instance, in Richards' recent speech. It is a measure of the poverty of the general debate, therefore, that The Times believes his views are worth publishing.

Similarly, The Guardian has an offering, this one by Simon Jenkins , one of such unremitting negativity that it encompasses just one idea – that the US and British forces should quit Afghanistan.

In the real world, however, we are committed to Afghanistan and will remain so for the foreseeable future. And since the best outcome is to succeed in creating a stable, prosperous nation, capable of governing itself without external intervention, then the task at hand is to determine how we can achieve this, with minimum cost and bloodshed, all within the constraints of our own budgetary limitations and broader defence requirements. The debate, therefore, should be on how to win – an issue neither Mercer nor Jenkins address.

It is here that Harding, in his Telegraph piece is actually different and welcome. Whatever its limitations – and nothing short of a lengthy book could ever do justice to the topic – the theme is that the nature of modern conflict means our Armed Forces urgently need a major overhaul.

Harding thus "anticipates a battle in which the Army must triumph." There is a campaign that needs to be fought, he writes, not against the Taliban, but between the dinosaurs and Young Turks in the military. The outcome will determine whether the Armed Forces are left burnt out in the wadis of Helmand or evolve into a sharpened and highly effective tool to fight the wars of the future.

As a healthy antidote to the leaden mantras of "overstretch" and “under-resourcing" that have so far dominated the defence debate, the piece starts with a recognition of the reality: "It is becoming clear that there is simply not enough money available to fulfill the separate aspirations of all three Services." This relies on the views of Gen Richards, who articulates that reality, paraphrased as "we can do many things inadequately or a few things well, but to try both will end in failure."

Thus has Richards "adroitly opened the debate on the future of our Armed Forces", this occurring at a time when both major political parties appear bankrupt of defence policies. And, in getting to this point, he has gathered around him some of the most dynamic military thinkers (and not just from the Army) to thrash out the immediate future of defence. They know that its experience in Iraq has left the Army shattered in body and mind and that Afghanistan could prove more burdensome still.

It is no exaggeration to suggest that we are, in dealing with the counter-insurgency battles of the kind being fought in Afghanistan, facing that "horse and tank moment, where it is clearly evident that existing structures, strategy, tactics and equipment are not working. We need a revolution in our thinking, the seeds of which, writes Harding, first appeared in the US earlier this year.

This was the famous episode when US defence secretary Robert Gates announced that the modernisation of non-nuclear forces "should be tied to the capabilities of known future adversaries – not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary, given unlimited time and resources".

The message to the Pentagon was clear: fight today's war, not one against some imaginary enemy of the future and, if the speech was poorly reported over here, it has nonetheless lodged heavily in the thoughts of some strategic thinkers, Richards amongst them.

This, of course, opens up the tri-service debate, where each of the Services have their own views of what is necessary for the defence of the realm, a taste of which is to be found in the letters column of The Daily Telegraph, and in particular from Major-General Julian Thompson, victor of the Falklands. He writes:

Britain is an island, reliant on importing goods by sea. With fewer warships (report, June 25), our trade would be vulnerable to the type of attacks being mounted by pirates in the Indian Ocean. The war in Afghanistan is important, but the bottom line is that after only a few weeks without imported oil supplies and food, we would starve.

Richards, in fact, addresses that issue noting that any future operations of any significance are going to be conducted as part of an alliance – not least in dealing with piracy in the Indian Ocean, where we have operated as part of a combined Nato force and (unfortunately) within an EU detachment.

Here we confront that other reality. The UK is no longer a global power and the Royal Navy does not rule the seas. In the Far East, where the Navy once maintained a powerful fleet, the US Navy roams free while Australia and India are important regional powers, developing substantial navies of their own. We protect our interests now not by flying the White Ensign but by diplomacy and forging alliances, as partners rather than rulers. Thus, while opinions vary – and there are strongly-held views on such matters – inconvenient questions must be asked and honest answers given.

But, writes Harding, where does this new mindset leave the three Services in Britain? Unfortunately, with a limited pool of cash the laws of survival apply, and the Services have reverted to unhelpful tribalism. The RAF will not give up its attachment to strategic bombing and the Royal Navy ardently clings to its aircraft carriers, advanced destroyers and fighter wing. There are many unglamorous parts of the Air Force that quietly go about achieving a great deal – from air transport to helicopters and surveillance. But those leading the RAF are fighter pilots who are loath to yield to the realities in front of them.

Then we address some of the detail. It's a big ask, adds Harding, but the idea of putting fighter pilots in a single engine, turbo-prop aircraft such as the Super Tucano has to be contemplated. Aircraft like the Tucano are cheap, low-tech and highly effective, as many South American drug barons have discovered. They provide surveillance, along with an armament of bombs and machine guns and an ability to loiter overhead for a long time, and they are also easy to maintain.

It will take courage for someone in the RAF hierarchy to advocate using the Tucano (cost £6 million) over the Eurofighter Typhoon (cost £65 million) but it is the type of thinking now required. The problem today is the RAF's attachment to fast jets. Either it goes for the Typhoon or for the US-made Joint Strike Fighter, but the defence budget cannot sustain both.

Harding raises many other such issues – very many of them having been discussed on this blog - and while neither he nor I could pretend to have explored them fully, much less come up with definitive answers, the very fact that they are being discussed is an advance on the previous sterility of the defence debate.

The ultimate problem though, which Harding identifies, is the "bed blockers" at the top of the MoD and in the military establishment, who do not seem to recognise the need for change. Perhaps more optimistically than we would allow for, Harding concludes that, "once they are removed and once a new government is persuaded that the Ministry of Defence is aiming to fight the wars of today, we are likely to see major changes in the configuration of our Armed Forces."

We hope that is the case. The current paradigm cannot continue and now is the time to face reality and decide honestly, clearly and with candour, what it is we want our Armed Forces to do, and then to make the changes necessary to ensure that they can succeed in what we ask of them.

COMMENT THREAD

A diet of mantras

Right on cue, we get another complaint about "overstretch" in the media, this one "inspired" by shadow defence secretary Liam Fox, on the basis of a parliamentary question answered on 30 April.

Fox asked for the average and highest number of days of detached duty for each RAF trade in the last 12 months and was given a comprehensive table which sets out the figures. This included details for pilots, who spend an average of 76 days on detached duty, with an unspecified number (which could be one) spending 315 days away. Medical staff (unspecified) average 161 days with a number spending 304 days away, while air traffic controllers are doing 106 days, some peaking at 360.

This is somehow translated into the legend that, "Overworked RAF faces manpower crisis". Then we learn that, "It is thought that the strain of continuous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for six years has meant that hundreds of RAF personnel have resigned fed up with time away from their families." Personnel, we are told, are supposed be away for no more than 140 days but figures obtained from the Ministry of Defence indicate that the "overstretch crisis" is so severe that the rules are being breached.

This is about the so-called harmony guidelines. For the RAF, the original aim was indeed for individuals to be away no more than 140 days in a 12-month period before breaching harmony. But breaches are by no means a new phenomenon. According to figures in 2007, some 6.7 percent of trained strength was deployed for periods in excess of that.

However, the guidelines have been revised and are now couched in terms of spending no more than 280 days in every 24 months away from the normal place of duty.

By this measure, we have a complex situation, where the problem is related to "pinch points" – shortages in specific specialities. Dentists, it seems, are not in breach, Chaplains are somewhat in demand with 10.8 percent in breach and personnel trainers (formerly admin training) suffer 14.3 percent. Second worst off are gunners, who are 18.4 percent in breach, against medical staff at 18.6.

Whether that amounts to a "crisis" is another matter. The situation has been with us a long time but, at the very least, has stabilised. Compared with 2007, the RAF establishment is roughly the same, at 96.3 percent of requirements. And last year trained outflow fell 15.2 percent, running at 3,820 compared with 4,500 in 2007.

As of December last, the shortfall on an establishment of 41,290 was 1,540 but, with the first quarter figures out soon, an improvement is expected as the recession bites. Thus, the RAF is forecast to reflect the broader trend which became apparent at the end of last year, when – according to the latest figures - 21,670 personnel joined the forces, compared with losses of 18,570 – a net gain of over 3,000.

To say that this is a classic "non-story", therefore, is to put it mildly. It is thus hard to accept Liam Fox's assertion that the figures prove that an "overstretch crisis" extends across the Armed Forces, or that "Labour's cuts to the RAF are now biting hard." Still less does this support his argument that, "This is why we need a Strategic Defence Review so that we can work out the future role of each service and ensure that their commitments are properly resourced."

Far from "cuts", when it comes to RAF spending, we see from this debate that the Labour government has been throwing money at the Harrier fleet, having spent something like £860 million on upgrades to improve its performance specifically for roles in Afghanistan.

To put this in perspective, this is £160 million more than is being spent on the entire armoured vehicle package for the Army, announced last October, and represents the purchase price of approximately 150 Super Tucanos.

As we pointed out two years ago, the costs of running the Harrier fleet are staggering, with official figures put at £37,000 per hour – exclusive of ordnance costs. For a capability which is, at best, highly suspect, this is little short of insanity, a wilful misallocation of resources that cries out for intelligent analysis.

It does not need a Strategic Defence Review to work out what is going wrong with current defence policy, and nor does repeating the mantras of "overstretch" or "Labour's cuts" take us any further. If Fox really wanted to relieve pressure on the budget, he would be pressing for the retirement of fast jets in Afghanistan, and their replacement with several squadrons of Super Tucanos, one of which - at the very least - would be in Afghan air force colours.

COMMENT THREAD

A misallocation of resources

We saw a piece over the weekend informing us that thousands of United States marines are to be deployed alongside British troops in southern Afghanistan within weeks after the "overstretched" British have fought to stalemate with the Taliban.

The fact is that US troops have been bearing the brunt of operations for some time in Helmand, which is now only nominally a British responsibility. But what has not been widely reported is the intensity of air effort deployed in support of British forces and generally, amounting to 60-70 combat sorties a day. Additionally, a significant number of surveillance and reconnaissance missions are being flown, comprising manned and unmanned aircraft.

We get some clues from the current reports (and here) as to the range of strikes, but what we do not get is any clear idea of how and under what circumstances airpower is actually used.

For that, though, we can turn to a remarkable book written by Capt Doug Beattie (with Philip Gomm) called An Ordinary Soldier, published in October last year. This is a detailed account of an attempt in September 2006 to retake the town of Garmsir after it had been over-run by the Taliban. Beattie was in charge of a detachment of six British soldiers, including himself, mentoring a group of Afghan National Police.

They, in concert with the Afghan National Army – also mentored by British soldiers – the total amounting to no more than about 200 men, were up against a ferocious enemy, seeking to do what it eventually took 2,400 US Marines to achieve some 18 months later.

But what comes over from the account is the extremely heavy reliance on airpower. On one day, the attack was supported by no less than nine aircraft, comprising F-18s, a B-1 bomber, Apache attack helicopters and Harriers. Without their intervention, it is quite possible that many coalition lives would have been lost and the gallant Capt Beattie would not have survived to write his excellent book.

What also comes over is how the absence of loiter capability in the support aircraft heavily affects the dynamics of the fighting. With the fast jets, their time over the targets is extremely limited and, because of the rules of engagement, they can only be called in once contact is made with the enemy.

Thus the tempo was set by the coalition forces advancing, making contact with the enemy, calling in air support and waiting for the aircraft to arrive. The pilots were then briefed on their targets by the JTAC (Joint Tactical Air Controller) and delivered their bombs (called "stores"). This was sometimes followed by strafing runs but the outcome was invariably that the enemy fire subsided. However, every time, the enemy regrouped and fighting resumed, whence more strikes were called in, and so on, with monotonous regularity. Thus did the battle proceed, day after day.

Contrasted with the small number of coalition forces actually committed to the battle, one is thus struck by the wholly disproportionate expenditure in manpower in supporting them. Apart from the pilot's time, for every hour flown, an F-18 needs nearly 17 hours routine maintenance. The Harrier is said to require nearly 60. Behind that is the infrastructure to keep the aircraft flying, right down to the cooks, clerks and bottle washers. In all, far more men (and women) were committed to supporting the ground forces than actually took part in the battle.

Furthermore, in terms of effect, the aircraft were most often being called in to target small packets of men – what might be called low-value targets – with sometimes 2,000lb bombs being delivered. Not only is this "overkill", causing massive collateral damage, the expense of the guided munitions is enormous.

On the other hand, in one episode – day five of the attack – Beattie resorted to using a 51mm mortar, in this case with devastating results, killing four men with one bomb. The effect was equal to or greater than some of the observed effects from the air strikes.

This was achieved with the lightest of the mortars in the British Army inventory. Heavier 81mm versions are also available. Able to fire 15 x 9lb bombs per minute with stunning accuracy, these are formidable weapons.

One cannot avoid speculating, therefore, whether the availability of one or more 81mm mortars – especially if they had been mounted on a mobile platform such as the FV432 APC – could have achieved exactly the same results as the airpower, but in a more timely and certainly more economic fashion, using considerably less manpower overall. Moreover, this technology is hardly new, with the Allies in WWII (and the Germans) using similar combinations - see picture.

However, with indirect fire, as in using mortars, targets are engaged which are out of direct line of sight – that being one of the advantages of the weapon. Thus, for accurate target designation and damage assessment, air spotting is highly advantageous.

Addressing this issue, coincidentally, I am also re-reading a book on the 1944 battle for Normandy and the contrast is striking. There, the air cover was continuous and reaction immediate, to the point where daytime movement in the German Army became impossible. When there were no strike aircraft immediately in the sky, there were always spotter aircraft aloft – usually Austers - ready to call in artillery or mortar strikes.

For continuous air cover, the current generation of fast jets is entirely unsuitable and we are back to the argument about the use of Tucanos (pictured above) or similar prop-jets, which can loiter for four hours or more over the battlefield. Able also to deliver their own ordnance, a very small number of these aircraft could provide a continuous overview of the battle, providing real-time intelligence, artillery spotting and air strikes.

And not only do they cost considerably less than the fast jets, the maintenance requirement is two man hours per hour flown. The case is powerfully argued here, with an estimate that replacing a high-end capability squadron of F-16s with cheaper turbo-props could save a half billion dollars per Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotation.

The experiences of Capt Beattie and his men, however, do not only suggest a more sanguine look at battlefield support. They also raise questions as to their basic equipment. His team of six men were fighting from two Wimiks and there is no question that their .50 cal machine guns and their GPMGs were powerful additions to the armoury. But there is also no question that their platforms – the unarmoured Land Rovers – were being used for exactly the role where previously armoured cars would have been used.

The tactical situation cried out either for such vehicles, or light tanks, which could have manoeuvred under fire when, instead, Beattie and his men were forced to take cover. After some incredibly near misses, it is only luck that they were not all killed.

Despite Beattie's heroism – he was later awarded the Military Cross – the action was only partially successful, the coalition forces maintaining a tenuous hold on the district centre and an eastern checkpoint, suffering daily attacks which continued well into 2007, before the town was fully secured by the USMC in 2008.

Arguably, had the intervention been more decisive earlier, preventing the Taliban building up its strength, the large number of troops which eventually had to be fielded would not have been necessary.

Thus, while we see the ritual complaints of "overstretch" in the current report, with the handmaiden complaint of "under-resourced", it is germane to ask whether indeed either complaint is valid. In purely financial terms, there is no shortage of resource being pumped into the fight against the Taleban, and the overall number of men and women deployed easily outmatch the enemy.

What we are seeing, therefore, may be more a question of a misallocation of resources – the concentration on high-tech equipment which is soaking up funds and manpower when more boots on the ground with better, but still basic equipment might achieve decisive results.

This makes the recent speech by Robert Gates all the more appropriate. But we are also reminded of a piece we wrote in March 2007 when we cited Ed E. Heinemann, designer of the B-26 Invader, the A-1 SkyRaider and the A-4 SkyHawk,

He declared: "The obstacles to any simplification may seem insurmountable, and the reasons for more complexity are many and powerful. But if we permit this Frankenstein of complexity to continue to work at its current plodding, insidious rate, it will slowly overwhelm us to impotency."

We were there, impotent, in September 2006. Currently – with 60-70 sorties a day being flown - nothing much seems to have changed.

COMMENT THREAD

It's the balance, stoopid!

Yesterday morning, without fanfare, Lady Winterton brought "Next-War-itis" to the House of Commons.

This was the theme of the recent speech by US defence secretary Robert Gates in which he called for the US military to focus "more on winning in Iraq and preparing to fight other insurgencies and less on possible big wars with other countries".

And, if much of the US defence establishment was obsessed with future conflicts, neglecting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so too was the British establishment – or so it was charged.

Of course, the MoD claims it has had the vaccination against this dreaded disease, telling us recently that, "We are determined to do more to support our people here and on the front line…", pledging then to "better prioritise our spending plans".

But Anne Winterton was not convinced. We do not know in which direction the military is looking, she said. But we get some clue from this month's Soldier magazine. There, Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt purrs about his new toys, telling us that the Piranha V heralds the "start of a new era" for the Army.

This said Dannatt, "maintains the progress of the FRES programme, which is my highest priority after support to operations." It will, he adds, form the backbone of the Army’s future armoured vehicle requirements. Mastiffs are all very well, but this beast will allow the Army "to conduct a wider range of operations in an uncertain and changing world."

To Ann, this was the proverbial red rag to the bull. Let us have it spelled out exactly what sort of operations we are expecting in the future, she demanded - or is this a case of next-war-itis?

There lies the problem. FRES is not designed for counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan – the subject of this debate in Westminster Hall. But the brass are saying that the FRES vehicle, for which Piranha V has been provisionally chosen, has a dual role. It can be used for high-intensity warfare and counter-insurgency.

Ladies of Ann Winterton's breeding do not say "b*****ks!" But, well she might.

As to supporting our people in the front line, in Afghanistan – the insurgents as she predicted – have resorted to "various explosive devices". To counter them, the MoD has 282 Mastiffs in use or ordered. Some 157 Ridgebacks and 24 Bushmasters are also on order. Thus, we have 463 mine/IED proofed vehicles, specifically designed for counter-insurgency warfare.

Against that, we have 169 Pinzgauer Vectors - not designed to protect soldiers from mines or IEDs. There are 180 M-WMIKs (otherwise known as Jackals) and the Army wants 2,000 Piranha Vs – as yet still a paper vehicle, not off the drawing board – another vehicle which is not well protected against mines and IEDs.

"With the best will in the world," she says, "one could hardly say that that is a very balanced mixture, bearing it in mind that the whole future Army structure is geared to the latter type." This was not, she added pointedly, "making present operations the top priority".

As we are likely to be in Afghanistan for the long term, that could realistically be at least 20 years down the road. How many more conflicts of that nature will the UK be engaged in or have been engaged in by then, with 2,349 vehicles that are not particularly suited to purpose, compared with 463 vehicles that have a proven track record in counter-insurgency operations?

At this point, Conservative MP, Philip Hollobone, intervened to remind us that the "percentage of fatalities of UK service personnel resulting from IEDs or mines is 27 percent in Afghanistan and 28 percent in Iraq." Kevan Jones from the dark side (Labour) then also intervened to say that, the last time he had been in Basra, he had seen a Mastiff vehicle that had driven over an IED. The crew had survived. The Mastiff, he said, was good news and had clearly led to a reduction in casualties from IEDs.

This is where it started getting messy. The minister for the Armed Forces (Bob Ainsworth) then got stuck in, saying that Anne had put only three vehicles "on the right side of the line" and all the rest on the wrong side. "We cannot conduct effective operations in Afghanistan with only those three vehicles. No commander can do that," he protested.

It was a question of balance, Ann countered: 463 vehicles designed specifically for blast protection, with their V-shaped hulls, against 2,349 which were not. And, when it came to the Piranha V, there were all sorts of problems with this machine, not least that it was "incredibly expensive". Being designed to fulfil the original concept of FRES – a network-enabled system of vehicles that would engage the enemy at a distance – it is not best suited for the kind of warfare that our troops are encountering now. The enemy is not at a distance and is often indistinguishable from the local population. The danger is all around them.

Thus, she contend that UK troops need considerably more of the type of vehicles of which we have 463, and perhaps considerably fewer of the others, if they are to be successful in future with minimum loss of life. Why are the vehicles of which we are to have 2,349 are so numerous, when others are more suited to present day warfare?

Intervention from Kevan Jones there came again, with a charge that commanders needed "a range of vehicles, including lightly armoured vehicles". Yes, I know that said Winterton – or words to that effect – it's the balance stoopid … 463 against 2,349. The insurgents aim to send as many troops home in body bags as possible – we need more vehicles designed to keep them alive.

Thus batted down – although Jones was to rise again, the stake not yet driven through his heart – Ann switched tack.

In order to defeat any insurgency, she said, it is necessary to train the host country's own military forces so that they can deal with the problem and protect their own people. That is happening successfully in Iraq and Afghanistan; their armies are doing a great job and allowing our forces gradually to be withdrawn.

However, it was also important to have a certain amount of parity between our equipment and that of the host country – seen in Iraq where the Army has the same or better vehicles than ours. But, when we come to the Royal Air Force, the contrast is extreme. The situation is nothing less than an unmitigated disaster.

For Afghanistan to succeed after the withdrawal of UK and other troops (in fact, in order to allow us to withdraw), it must have sufficient air power. Yet could the Afghan air force ever use the Eurofighter? We need turbo-prop aircraft, which the host country's pilots can be trained to use alongside our own pilots, the famous Tucano option – with all the added advantage that we get from that type of machine.

Equally, she said, reconnaissance operations should have their own aircraft, such as the Pilatus Porter PC-6, which can operate with the patrol being able to land and take off within very short distances indeed, acting as an evacuation carrier and a general supply vehicle. These aircraft should be operated by other ranks within the Army, and we should learn the lessons from other successful counter-insurgency forces such as the Rhodesians.

Then Anne turned to the economics. There is a constant shortage of helicopters, yet the Merlin is a very good, if extremely expensive, helicopter. The RAF's Mk 3 Merlins cost £19 million each. The six Danish ones cost £29.3 million each and £34,000 an hour to run. She had to repeat that figure to Patrick Mercer, who seemed stunned by the figure,

The attitude in the UK seems to be that the we need the best to cover every eventuality, Ann continued, and therefore the nation will cough up the funds for that. But the military are not living in the real world if they believe that they can have anything at any price. That is one of the reasons why the UK is short of what it actually needs. Rather, we need simple, robust platforms that will last in the long term. They must also carry the latest technology, but at the same time they must be as simple as possible to maintain.

So it came to finish off the speech. Her closing themes were "finance and the benefit to the nation of a sound defence policy."

Whichever party wins the next general election, she warned, some very large financial commitments have been made by this Government that will come into effect during the period from 2010 to 2015. If the military believe that they will get more money out of a Conservative government, I think that they are deluding themselves. That extra money is not likely to be forthcoming, bearing it in mind that the country will probably be broke by then.

Thus she said: "The mantra that our armed forces are underfunded is often repeated—indeed, there is some truth in it - but how the money for our forces is spent also needs to be challenged and I believe that it is a pertinent issue. I have pointed out in previous debates that the wastage in the defence budget has been enormous, mainly due to unclear or ulterior motives and objectives."

If we are funding "next war-itis", present operations will either be starved of cash or denied the most suitable platforms in sufficient quantities at the time when they are most needed. The MOD, she added, is doing its best to learn from recent hard lessons, but it has not been much helped by certain factions within the military.

We rely on our armed services for the defence of the nation but it is highly unlikely that any force will directly attack our shores. Instead, the threat to us now is far more subtle and difficult to counter. The enemy is within and around us, and we cannot always differentiate between friend and foe. Terrorism is the greatest evil and we have to be better prepared to defeat it, not least because the United Kingdom needs a stable world for trade, which is the lifeblood of our economic survival.

So, said Ann, I share the belief of Robert Gates that the top military and political priority should be the success of COIN operations, to ensure that the breeding grounds of instability in the world, which are the greatest danger to our people, are neutralised. It is within that sector that British forces could excel and, indeed, are excelling against the odds. It is up to the military to explain where their priorities will lie in future, from a basis of the Government of the day giving clear directional leadership.

The United Kingdom is no longer a global power and, unlike the Americans, we cannot afford two armies — one for counter-insurgency and the other for conventional warfare involving large-scale manoeuvres. I believe that we should concentrate on undertaking counter-insurgency and similar operations exceptionally well, rather than diluting our efforts and resources. We should face facts and recognise that the United Kingdom can no longer fulfil all its aspirations as far as defence is concerned. Stretched resources and manpower will limit what we can achieve in the future.

In Part II of this post, I will deal with the response to this speech.

COMMENT THREAD

Like pulling teeth

This is Robert Gates, US defence secretary, observing how difficult it is to get the USAF "old guard" to change its ways, and address the realities of fighting counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. We know how he feels.

Reported by Reuters and others, he was addressing officers at the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, telling them that the US military needed more UAVs and equipment to collect intelligence and conduct surveillance in Iraq despite a big boost in those capabilities since 2001.

But, he said, he had hit resistance from inside the Pentagon, bumping up against the pilots' mafia (not his words). What he did say was that the Air Force's desire to use pilots for its missions has kept the Defence Department from employing more effective and lower cost unmanned aircraft.

"I've been wrestling for months to get more intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets into the theatre," Gates complained, but … "Because people were stuck in old ways of doing business, it's been like pulling teeth. While we've doubled this capability in recent months, it is still not good enough."

The defence secretary had last week formed a task force in an attempt more quickly to find new ways to get those capabilities to Iraq and Afghanistan. Already, his group's findings, he says, may force the Air Force to replace pilots with unmanned aircraft on some missions.

Interestingly, he added that it may also force the Air Force to reconsider the type of aircraft it needs. "All this may require rethinking long-standing service assumptions and priorities about which missions require certified pilots and which do not," he told the group. He went on:

For those missions that still require manned missions, we have to think hard about whether we have the right platforms, whether for example low-cost, low-tech alternatives exist to do basic reconnaissance and close air support in an environment where we have total control of the skies.

The "low-cost, low-tech alternatives exist to do … close air support" was given less prominence in the various media reports but, with the US already funding the purchase of Super Tucanos for the Iraqi Air Force, one wonders if he has these – or something like it – in mind for the USAF.

What does come over though is that Gates (or his task force) is doing some sky blue thinking. He compares his new task force to the one that studied the military's need for more bomb-resistant vehicles, which led to the Pentagon's $20 billion program to speed mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles to Iraq last year.

On this, while no one can argue that the military is not staffed by a high proportion of skilled, dedicated and highly courageous personnel, there is always room for fresh thinking, especially as – almost by definition – the military hierarchy tends to be somewhat conservative.

That Gates is pushing new thinking can only be good, and his support for additional UAVs (and low-cost platforms) could lead to some welcome changes. As the man says, "Today we now have more than 5,000 UAVs, a 25-fold increase since 2001 … But in my view we can do and we should do more to meet the needs of men and women fighting in the current conflicts while their outcome may still be in doubt."

Very often, immersed in service politics, chiefs are more concerned with the standing and ambitions of their own particular services, rather than the specific needs to the personnel engaged in operations. It can thus take an outsider – like a politician – to remind them that the job comes first. Gates may have done just that.

Can we please see something similar this side of the pond?

COMMENT THREAD

Per ardua ad exitum

A report carried by Defence Talk tells us that the Afghan army air corps is going through rapid growth, but it will take eight years for the force to be self-sustaining and independent.

This is from Brig Gen Jay H Lindell, commander of the Combined Air Power Transition Force in Kabul, who told reporters via video-teleconference that the air corps has doubled its capability since October and that he expects it to double again in the next six months.

He has 133 US military personnel helping the Afghan National Army establish the air corps. Ultimately, he says, the force will have 112 aircraft and 7,400 members. It now has 1,950 members, about 180 of them pilots.

This is the good news, but the bad news is that the priority is being given to building the “air mobility aspect” of the air corps, concentrating on acquiring and integrating Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters (strangely because these are "Hind" attack helicopters), Antonov transports and C-27A Spartan transport aircraft. There is no mention and apparently no intention of developing an offensive capability, such as the provision of aircraft capable of close air support for ground operations, which is currently the domain of coalition forces.

In a recent paper produced from a seminar held by the (US) Air Force University, however (frustratingly, we can no longer find the link), the role of "host nations" in counter-insurgency was explored. The conclusion was that the quickest way for the USAF (and the United States in general) to extract itself from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan was to build up host nation air power, so that indigenous air forces could take the load from the foreign powers.

Recognising that the high-tech fast jets currently used by developed nations for CAS were too complex for host nation air forces to operate, the authors went on to suggest that the USAF should operate low-tech (relatively) CAS squadrons for use in COIN. These could encourage the host nations to acquire a similar capability, they would provide a reservoir of expertise in the USAF which could be passed on, and would provide a training resource into which the host nations could tap.

This line of reasoning makes such eminent sense that we can only wonder why it has not been articulated before (redolent as it is of the US "Vietnamisation" policy during the VietNam conflict). It is also the best possible argument for coalition air forces acquiring fixed wing aircraft such as the Super Tucano, which are already on order for the Iraqi Air Force.

Putting this in the national perspective, although the Harrier squadron in Afghanistan is undoubtedly doing sterling work – soon to be augmented by a Eurofighter detachment – the RAF offensive effort is doing very little to develop the Afghan national capabilities, unlike the Army which is not only providing mentors for ANA forces but also integrating its formations into their own.

It does add "legs" to the argument for Super Tucanos, therefore, if it is suggested that the RAF should operate a squadron of these machines, into which Afghan pilots could be integrated, thus acquiring experience under controlled conditions, before moving over to form their own independent squadrons which could gradually take the load off the coalition forces.

If it is going to take eight years for the Afghan army air corps just to develop its "air mobility" capability, and the USAF thinkers are right that we will never be able to leave until the Afghanis have developed their own offensive forces, then we are going to be there an awful long time unless we do start thinking how to speed up the process. Per ardua ad exitum, as they say.

COMMENT THREAD

Money down the drain!

In response to questions raised by the redoubtable Ann Winterton MP, on the costs of operating military aircraft, we have received from the MoD figures which are truly mind-blowing.

Lady Winterton asked for the hourly operating cost including crew time of the Nimrod MR2, the Chinook, the Apache attack helicopter (operated by the Army Air Corps) and the Tornado GR4 aircraft. (Link to follow).

The reply from defence minister Bob Ainsworth, was that the total cost per funded flying hour for the Nimrod was £30,000 per hour, the Tornado £33,000 and the Chinook a relatively modest (by comparison) £24,000. But the absolute mind-blowing figure is the Apache which costs out at a staggering £46,000 per hour.

I had to do a double-take on this: £46,000 per hour. Fly 20 hours and that is the best part of a million blown out of the window.

And yeah, yeah, it is a valuable theatre asset, providing essential air support for out troops, etc, etc. But £46,000 per hour! For that price, you could have nine, yes NINE Super Tucano ground attack aircraft in operation – pilots included. Nobody, but nobody is going to convince me that one Apache is worth nine Tucanos.

At the costs involved in using Apaches, instead of spraying bullets at the Taliban from this overpriced piece of kit (I was going to use another word, which rhymes) it would be cheaper to shovel out bundles of fivers from the back of a Land Rover – with probably greater effect.

Of course, we have already bought and paid for the Apaches, and the cost of purchase factors hugely in the hourly operating costs, but this is still real money. Flying these helicopters uses them up and, once worn out, they are not available for other purposes.

The primary purpose of the Apache is a high-tech tank killer – not rooting out an enemy with assets valued at less that the price of the bullets used, much less the Hellfire missiles at God knows how much. It would be cheaper to put the damn things in mothballs and save them for the tasks for which they were intended, and use low-cost platforms for Afghanistan.

Therein, we have the heart of the defence spending problem – massive amounts of over-priced hi-tech toys, bleeding the Army of resources when assets at a fraction of the price could do a cheaper and often better job. And that brings me to the Nimrod, but that will have to wait for another post.

COMMENT THREAD

A humourless post

Some readers may have noticed that we don't do "lightweight tat" on this site, and such humour as accidentally finds its way into our posts is largely of the dry, sardonic variety. Mostly, though, we tend to write serious, heavy stuff which is not to everyone's taste.

But, if our (and certainly my) posts are weighty and lack humour, it is because – and here I'd better speak for myself – I find very little amusement in the current dire state of politics. And, as there is much that is neglected by an increasingly frivolous and inconsequential media, I felt it needed a corrective, which is why we set up the blog in the first place. There is plenty of lightweight, humorous tat in the marketplace already and I saw no point in replicating it, even if it was the route to easy popularity.

No more so was – and is - this needed in the defence field, where a fundamentally unserious media has consistently failed to take an adult interest in the issues, or spent even a fraction of its resources on exploring where the real stresses and problems lie in our Armed Forces.

But, from sporadic and ill-informed commentary, over the last weeks and months, building to a crescendo over the last couple of days, we have seen an intensity of criticism of defence policy, the thrust of the complaints directed at the mantras of "overstretch" and "underspending". And, in the vanguard is former CDS Charles Guthrie, yesterday given space in The Daily Telegraph to peddle his creed.

Nowhere in his pronouncements, however – nor anywhere in the torrent of media coverage – does he or any other commentator descend into the detail of spending arrangements in the Armed Forces and tell us why it is that defence is underfunded and where, particularly, the alleged shortages lie. Yet, it is the appreciation of the detail that the argument must stand or fall.

Now, to turn to just one small detail – which we will go on to explore for its wider implications – at the end of last month we reported the remarkable escape of a Canadian soldier whose Husky vehicle was hit by a massive buried bomb as he patrolled a route in Afghanistan – with no more inconvenience than a spilled water bottle. Now, courtesy of the Canadian Guardian we have a picture of the damaged vehicle, from which the soldier emerged (above left).

At this point, we descend into "toy" territory and the lofty political bloggers, to say nothing of the oh-so-grand political commentators depart the scene. They occupy the high ground, and such detail is of absolutely no interest to them. The Armed Forces are underfunded and soldiers are dying as a result. Charles Guthrie and four of his mates say so, and that is all they need to know.

But, in that small picture lies one of the central issues in the whole debate, and perhaps the key to what is going on.

First, looking at the vehicle (an intact example is shown right) one can see several design principles at play. The front wheels have been blown off completely – which is exactly as intended. They are "sacrificial" parts, which can easily and cheaply be replaced.

Then, you will see the lengthy engine compartment, in front of the driver, distancing the man from the expected point of explosion, improving his survivability. Add to that, the v-shaped profile of the hull, which deflects blast away from the driver, and the armoured cell which forms the cab, and you have a protection package which enables personnel to walk away from all but the largest of explosions.

The crucial points for the general argument though are that these attributes are achieved by design. They cannot be bolted on to an existing vehicle to achieve the same effect. Secondly, they give the vehicle a profile which is entirely unsuitable for what is known as "high end" conventional warfighting, where low profile to aid concealment is at a premium. Thirdly, this technology is relatively cheap, this type of vehicle costing a fraction of the more sophisticated "high end" war machine that, in these types of circumstances, actually offer less protection.

With these points in mind – be they ever so boring or not – let us now turn our gaze to the "bigger picture" so beloved of the grand polemicists – starting with the proximate cause of the Army's current problems.

In fact, the rot started with in St. Malo in 1998, with Tony Blair's historic agreement with Jacques Chirac to dedicate the bulk of our Armed Forces to what was to become the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).

Despite constant denials, this led to a Europeanisation of defence policy which, by our calculations, added at least £8.8 billion to our procurement costs to date. As we wrote at the time we did the calculations, that would buy a ridiculous 35,000 RG-31 mine protected vehicles or 350 Chinook helicopters – additions to our forces which would transform the situation.

However, when it comes to Charles Guthrie, who now complains so volubly about "underspending", it was he as Chief of the Defence Staff, together with then secretary of state Geoff Hoon, and the Chief of the General Staff Mike Jackson who drove the Euro Army agenda, re-shaping the British Army to fit in with the ERRF concept.

An essential component of ERRF was, of course, FRES – this being the only way armour could be air-portable and thus become part of a "rapid reaction" force.

The triumvirate was so protective of the plan that this was indeed the reason why new equipment which did not fit the scheme was actively blocked. The trio was looking over at the US and its equivalent Future Combat System (FCS) programme, noting that funds were being siphoned off to pay for the war in Iraq.

Guthrie, Hoon and Jackson thus reasoned that if theatre-specific equipment was bought for Iraq, then FRES would suffer. This, we aver, was one of the main reasons Jackson put "Snatch" Land Rovers into Iraq, rather than dedicated MRAPs. This was also the reason why the Army (now under Richard Dannatt – also a firm proponent of FRES) initially resisted the purchase of Mastiff protected vehicles, until it received assurances that the cost would be borne from the Reserve and not met from the Army budget.

Until recently, the status quo held but, in October, the MoD ordered a further 140 Mastiff protected vehicles (with a promise of 250 more MRAP-type vehicles), this time the funding coming from the Army's agreed equipment budget.

This, we noted, signalled a new realism in the MoD, that the current operations had to be supplied with theatre-specific equipment and not rely – as they had been doing – on existing inventories.

On the other hand, this must have sounded alarm bells with Guthrie and his fellow travellers, which must have intensified when rumours of cuts in one or more of the major spending programmes began to emerge, on top of indications that Gordon Brown was unenthusiastic about pursuing Blair's ambitions for greater European defence cooperation, and was pulling back from the project.

It was shortly afterwards that the screaming started in earnest and it cannot have been a coincidence that it did. The Euro-army supporters, with Guthrie at their head, must have realised that FRES was the most likely candidate for any cuts in the equipment programme, and with its demise went any prospect of the Army playing a leading role in the ERRF.

So it is that Guthrie's campaign is not about the welfare of the Armed Forces, or its current capabilities, but an attempt to preserve plans to develop future capabilities within the framework of the ERRF. Yet, so opaque is his agenda, and so lacking in knowledge and understanding is the commentariat that his claims are taken at face value.

It would be misleading, however, to position Guthrie's campaign solely in terms of the European agenda. There is within the MoD and defence planning circles, creative tension over the balancing resources between current operations and the need to prepare to the "future war".

Inasmuch as the Europeans are not significantly committed to current operations, their thinking is also focused on the future war scenario. The future war proponents in the UK, therefore, have a common interest with the Europeans and thereby have formed a natural alliance with them, even though their overall ambitions may not be the same.

Thus, Guthrie is able to attract a far more powerful lobby under his tent than merely his Europhile "colleagues" could muster.

This, in a roundabout way brings us back to the Canadian soldier and his remarkable escape. To prosecute their "future war" the advocates want their FRES vehicles (example pictured above) which are set to cost – most likely – in excess of £10 million each. Being custom-built and extremely complex, they will also cost a small fortune to maintain.

Yet the optimal equivalent vehicle to fight the current campaigns is the state of the art, superbly equipped Mastiff protected vehicle, based on exactly the same design philosophy as the Husky. And, despite being specifically designed for counter-insurgency operations, it costs a relatively modest £600,000. Based on a commercial truck chassis, it is supremely reliable and durable and, using commercial parts, maintenance is cheap and simple.

This is a microcosm of the general situation. Single engined Super Tucanos (below), used for ground attack, cost less than £5 million apiece, but the RAF spurns them in favour of Tranche 3 Eurofighters, at £80 million each - not because the Tucano cannot to the job (it can, better than the Eurofighter) but because it cannot operate in "high intensity warfare" of the nature projected for the "future war".

What this boils down to is that, if the need to finance the "future war" is removed (or modified), the budgetary problems disappear. In that context, we are actually faced with two modest (in military terms) overseas operations (not even a division in each theatre) which absorbs less than ten percent of the manpower of the Armed Forces. Where else could there be a situation where any other organisation can scream "overstretch" and "lack of resources" when it has less than ten percent of its strength committed to doing the job for which it is paid?

The problem, therefore, is not operations, per se, but the enormous resource put to other tasks - the main one of which is preparing and training for the "future war". This is akin to a situation in World War II of holding back the bulk of the forces to train for the next war, while also devoting the bulk of the budget to equipping for that war.

This, though, is only one part of the phenomenon we are seeing. When it comes to defence issues, one of the many things that drags the debate down is the inability to discriminate between the various factions within the overarching organisation of the MoD, and to separate political from military influence.

One of the simplistic fictions of modern politics is the belief that the Secretary of State is actually in charge of his department and thereby has absolute powers to control it.

This is hardly the case and less so in the MoD, where there is an uneasy "alliance" (conflict would be a better word) between the politicians and their advisors, the officials and then the three separate services (with huge meddling by defence contractors), all overlaid by dealings with the common enemy (the Treasury) and the even more dangerous enemy, the Foreign Office. Furthermore, there is not only bitter inter-service rivalry, there is also intra-service rivalry (gunners versus tanker versus infantry, etc), which makes for a turbulent, foetid broth of intrigue and back-stabbing.

Add to that the length of the procurement cycle (procurement taking 40 percent of the budget) where decisions are made which have a direct financial impact decades after they are taken (the Eurofighter was agreed over 25 years ago but only now is the MoD having to find the bulk of funds for it) and the secretary of state's freedom of action is massively circumscribed. He is at best a referee, with a rule book that is constantly changing (without him being told), with his decisions being overruled off-field, all in the context that he cannot see (or control) most of the players (or even the ball).

Looking at the bigger picture, the military has an infinite capacity for spending money and, as a general rule, the more they are given, the more they will spend - but much of it will be spent unwisely and wasted. Throwing money at public services is not the answer to improved efficiency, if there are underlying structural problems. That applies to the military as much as any other service. Give more money to a wasteful organisation and it will simply waste more money.

What is troubling, though, is all it takes is a few military men to stand up and scream that their men are dying for want of funds (rather than from military incompetence) and otherwise sensible people put their critical faculties on hold and believe everything they are told.

So, I will continue banging on in my own humourless way, leaving others to do the funnies, in the hope that wiser counsels will prevail.

COMMENT THREAD

Can we have a sensible debate?

Today, the Sunday Times magazine carries a story on "The faces of the fallen" resorting to that cheapest of journalistic tricks of publishing a photo-montage of the 250 service personnel killed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Then, the front page of the magazine, pushing the story, has a graphic illustration (see left) of a burnt-out armoured vehicle, with a line of poppies in the form of a "river of blood", representing the "thick red line" – the blood spilled by those who have "paid the price on the war on terror".

Now, it may be a small point, but when you take a look at the armoured vehicle, you find it is a Russian-built Iraqi MT-LB multi-purpose armoured vehicle (see below right). Taken at face value, therefore, the graphic representation of the spilt blood signifies not British but Iraqi blood.

You would think that, with all the hours that must have been lavished on the graphic manipulation, someone in the organisation would have queried the original picture but, perhaps, the choice of an Iraqi military vehicle is symbolic. It illustrates the appalling ignorance of things military in the modern media.

But, if that is but a small, if symbolic, example, the greater ignorance can be found in The Sunday Telegraph under the headline, "£1bn defence shortfall 'will cripple MoD'".

This claims – citing unnamed "defence experts" - that "Troops will be left short of crucial weapons and equipment by a £1 billion black hole in the defence budget." This "shortfall", we are told, "will leave servicemen without Apache gunships, Land Rovers and Chinook transport helicopters", the piece breathlessly adding: "Future weapons projects, including the new generation of Astute nuclear submarines and even the Eurofighter, are also at risk."

Whether this is true or not, we shall leave to one side for the moment: what counts in the context of this piece is the evidence offered as to why there is a shortfall.

For that, we get a "rent-a-quote" from everybody's favourite military commentator, Tory MP Patrick Mercer. He is allowed to say that: "In peace time the new defence settlement would actually look generous. Now, it's starting to become clear that it is horrendously inadequate at a time when Britain is fighting a war on two fronts."

This is backed up by "military experts" who say the new defence budget is inadequate because it "fails to take account of how much more expensive it is to feed, water and arm troops while they are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan compared with when they are based in the UK" and because of the "soaring prices of military hardware". We are thus told that, "The cost of machine gun bullets, grenades and flares has risen particularly sharply in recent years."

The problem here is that Mercer and the unnamed "experts" are talking rubbish. As has been made abundantly clear, on innumerable occasions, not least to the Defence Committee, the expenditure on the Armed Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, "… is funded from the Treasury Reserve. In other words, it is money that is new to MoD: the cost of operations is funded by the Treasury." It does not come from the Defence budget.

Further evidence that the newspaper is flying by the seat of its pants comes when it tries to support its thesis of a budget shortfall with the extraordinary assertion that, "Just 16 out of 96 new armoured vehicles needed by the British soldiers in Helmund arrived last summer."

This undoubtedly refers to the Mastiff protected patrol vehicles which, as we know, were purchased from the Treasury Reserve and thus the cost did not fall on the Defence budget. Furthermore, the reason why Afghanistan only got 16 is because the bulk of the order went to Iraq where, it was judged, the need was greater.

From this, and other points raised, it is clear that the evidence adduced by the paper does not support its own claim. One further give away is the mention of projects such as the Eurofighter being "at risk". This is the so-called Tranche 3 ground attack version and, if the MoD were able to cancel this order, it would be a blessing. Thus do we see our old friend "special pleading" at work, using the gullible media to keep the funds flowing, mainly for the benefit of defence contractors rather than the Armed Forces.

That is not to say, of course, that there are not funding issues with the MoD. There always are. But here we turn to another story, this one by Mike Smith, picking up the reports on the Nimrod fuel leaks, carried in many of yesterday's papers.

But, while Smith has been extraordinarily diligent in covering this story, what he has consistently failed to do is see the bigger picture, the germ of which is contained in his latest report. Writes Smith:

… pressure to deploy the aircraft, one of only six capable of sending real-time video to commanders, was so intense that it was immediately sent out to Oman, where Nimrods flying over Afghanistan are based. The need to fix the seven remaining leaks was put off until January 2007, by which time the aircraft would have finished its tour.

Jimmy Jones, a former RAF engineer who worked on the original Nimrod trials in the 1960s, said there had been time for only one "shakedown" flight to check for faults before the plane was deployed.

"They said, 'We need this aircraft out there', pushed it through and deferred those leaks until after XV230's tour was over," said Jones. "Here's an aircraft staggering out of servicing and they pushed it out straight away. They were desperate to get this aircraft flying and they just pushed it out with those defects."

The singular question, in this context, that Smith does not ask, is why it was necessary to use these huge, expensive machines to field exactly the same equipment that can be carried by a single-engined club trainer (pictured: see the black globe behind the nosewheel - an Iraqi Air Force Sama 2000).

In fact, the role carried out by the Nimrods could just as easily have been done by BN Defenders or, perhaps even better, by Super Tucanos (each of which can be or are fitted with the MX-15) - at a fraction of the cost. When it comes to funding issues, therefore, compare and contrast the huge expense of maintaining six Nimrods, operating out of distant Oman, compared with, say, a squadron of Super Tucanos or locally-based Defenders.

However, this is not just an issue of funding, but of capability. Back with The Sunday Telegraph, we see a long piece headed, "Basra fight pointless, says British commander", an admission from the Army that they have lost the battle in southern Iraq.

This is no more or less than what we were writing in August and in September (and here), but what is particularly revealing (about the state of the media) is a throw-away comment in the follow-up leader. It blandly states of our troops that, "They are risking their lives in the searing heat, badly paid and often kitted out with inadequate equipment."

It is the reference there to "often kitted out with inadequate equipment," which is the telling point – the fact that this is just thrown in as an incidental detail. In fact, what we have seen throughout the campaign in Iraq is an army – largely equipped for a conventional armoured battle - thrown in at the deep end to fight a vicious insurgency, for which it was wholly ill-equipped. Far from being incidental, the "inadequate equipment" - such as "Snatch" Land Rovers (but much else) - has been central to the failure of the Army to prevail in the region.

Here we come to our central point, one which we have seen so many times before, the disconnect between procurement and other military issues – whether it be costs, funding or performance.

And, in today’s coverage of the issues, we see not one whit of understanding about how these issues interconnect. Each story is treated as a separate, distinct report with no common thread, right down to the Sunday Times shedding crocodile tears over "over 250 British military personnel" having lost their lives, then illustrating their plight with a blown-up Iraqi vehicle.

Clearly, if we are ever to get a better understanding of military issues, it is not going to come from the media.

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