The showdown cometh

We picked it up in February last and noted worrying signs earlier this month.

Now, the Kuwaiti newspaper Awan is reported as having been told by an anonymous source that security forces in Basra are preparing to launch a major military campaign. This is aimed at "cleansing" the city of criminals and illegal weapons.

Basra police chief, Hatem Khalaf, has told his officers in Basra that "our patience is running out, it is the time to clean the city from criminals, evil doers and weapons caches in the city," warning them to prepare for the decisive battle to demilitarise Basra.

The Weekly Ahram has picked up the same vibes, noting also that some factions of the Mahdi Army have relinquished their commitment to the ceasefire.

This is born out by the answer to a question asked by Nick Harvey which records that the rocket attack on the Contingency Operating Base (COB) in Basra have increased recently. From 12 in 2004, the number dropped to eight in 2005, rising to 75 in 2006 and then a stupendous 400 in 2007. After a quiet start to this year, however, 37 attacks have now been recorded.

Some of this is reported today by The Mail on Sunday which is telling us that the pull-out of British troops in Basra is "on hold" after the dramatic surge in rocket attacks.

The force was due to have been cut from 4,100 to 2,500 by the end of April, but this will no longer happen and the indications are that numbers may be held at their present levels.

The Sunday Mirror is also on the case, suggesting that "American military chiefs" are to urge Britain to carry out a US-style "surge" in Iraq to stem spiralling levels of violence and killings in Basra.

Commanders, says the paper, are growing increasingly "uneasy" that Iraq's second city is descending into anarchy after British forces pulled out. And such is their concern that the US is even considering offering thousands of US Marines to assist the British in what could be "a gruelling six-month operation".

Quoted is a "senior US military source" who says, "Three big militias are currently engaged in a particularly bloody battle in southern Iraq. US and Iraqi forces are involved in a huge operation to attack an al-Qaeda stronghold in Mosul. But after that the plan is to turn the Coalition's attention onto Basra and we will be urging the British to surge into the city. If they do not have enough troops then they will be offered US Marines to help out."

The feeling is that if southern Iraq is hugely unstable, it will affect the success of the surge in the north and destabilise the whole country, hence the need for action.

Inevitably, senior Whitehall defence sources are "highly reluctant" for British troops to go back into Basra due to the huge political pressure to withdraw troops. The hope is that there will be enough trained Iraqi Army recruits in the next year to cope with the violence.

The longest report, however, comes from The Independent which declares that the plan to reduce British forces has been put off "indefinitely", noting that Iraqi troops are preparing to take on militias.

This paper confirms that Major General Mohan al-Furayji, the Iraqi military commander, is planning a major operation this summer against the Shia militias. It reminds us that, under its agreement with the Iraqi government, Britain is obliged to provide support for what the general is calling "the final battle for Basra".

We are also told that the airport base "once again reverberates almost daily to sirens warning of incoming rocket fire and to the roar of Phalanx (C-RAM) anti-missile guns." New alarm systems have been installed, and soldiers now sleep in "Stonehenges", beds semi-encased in concrete and sandbags, defences which are said to have kept down the number of casualties. Soldiers have escaped serious injury, despite rockets landing inside accommodation blocks.

But we also hear that previously British troops would go into Basra city to counter the source of attacks. Senior Aircraftman (SAC) Harry McLeman is then cited, saying: "In the past we would go out there and dominate the ground. We can't do that now under the rules, and that does lead to a bit of frustration." The British authorities insist that going back into the city would only provoke the militias, and the current rate of rocket and mortar strikes continues to be lower than when the Basra Palace base was still manned.

Whether we can then rely on Major General Barney White-Spunner, the British commander in Basra, is moot. He offers the line that the situation inside the city is getting better. "No one is saying it is ideal," he adds. "But the indications are that the militias are losing some of their influence, and there are divisions appearing among them."

Invariably, British military commanders will play down the situation and they must all be hoping that the Iraqi forces can hold the line. Otherwise, with another 600 troops expected to be sent to Afghanistan, the Army is going to be hard put to fulfil a fighting commitment. And, if British troops are again committed to direct confrontation with the militias, we can see an unwelcome leap in the casualty rate.

The greater fear, though, must surely be that the Americans are forced to take over the combat role, demonstrating for once and for all that the claimed "tactical repositioning" of British troops was nothing of the sort, unless of course it is spelt r-e-t-r-e-a-t.

COMMENT THREAD

It needed to be said

Ever unfashionable – until sometimes years later the media wake up to the story and publish what he had already written about (usually without acknowledgement, even though we can sometimes see the exact same phrases used) - Booker takes on the self-aggrandising Mr Andrew Walker in his column today.

This man, as readers will recall, is a deputy assistant coroner for Oxfordshire who, for the last few years has created a major industry in providing lurid headlines for the media, on the backs of soldiers who have died in Iraq and elsewhere.

Having tried the patience of the Ministry of Defence beyond endurance, he has finally been taken to the High Court in an attempt to get him to obey the law by which he is bound, the man has been hailed as a "hero" by the media, the MoD action being characterised as an attempt to "gag" a man who has spoken up "powerfully" for the welfare of British troops in Iraq and elsewhere.

In our view, however, the man is a parasite, feeding off the notoriety that comes with giving a "drive-by media" exactly the headlines it wants, failing entirely to address issues which he could rightly have identified. Thus, far from protecting the welfare of our troops, he is part of the reason why, still, major failings in equipment and procedures continue unchecked.

It would be wrong, however, to single out Walker. Without the ignorance and laziness of the media, his voice would have little of its power. A critical, well informed press would not have taken his effluvia at face value and would have looked beyond the shallow, self-serving vanity of the man. In so doing, it would have perhaps realised that, rather than getting to the core of the cases he has dealt with, his high-profile denunciations tend to obscure rather than illuminate.

Behind this, though, is the more insidious and corrosive tendency of the media to reduce everything into a one-dimensional, "biff-bam" soap opera. Rather than make any attempt to understand the complexity of a department such as the MoD, with its hierarchical structures, its Byzantine procedures and the diffusion of responsibilities, it chooses then to personalise failures, attributing them to the single man nominally in charge, the current secretary of state for defence, Des Browne.

There is no more egregious a practitioner of this tendency than Steven Glover who, in his recent Daily Mail column, pins the blame for all ills on "a cowardly, weak, incompetent Secretary of State for Defence who should hang his head in shame."

Such talk is cheap, especially from the comfort of a desk, shrouded in the warm glow of smug self-rightousness. But it not only misses the point. It is an abnegation of the very core principles of journalism which, in a liberal democracy, plays a vital role in holding the executive to account. But, to be effective, it must be accurate, timely, and focus precisely on those issues which need addressing, pinpointing where possible, exactly where blame lies. Glover's criticism does none of those things. And neither, until Booker published his corrective, does the rest of the media.

Ironically, today The Sunday Times revisits the Thalidomide case, scenes of past glories for that newspaper when it established a global reputation for the tenacity of its investigative journalism.

So far have the mighty fallen though that it and its fellow travellers - in what used to be called "Fleet Street" - now rely on the handouts from a vainglorious provincial lawyer and call this news.

The pity of it all it that, like sheep, the bulk of the population follow. One only has to look at the comments on the various on-line articles lauding Mr Walker – and the few blogs that have recorded his mouthings. From that, it is possible to conclude that the media is very much a mirror. It is simply reflecting the prejudices and superficiality of many of its readers who – when all is said and done – are no more interested in the welfare of our troops than is Mr Walker.

COMMENT THREAD

An Army in denial

Given only a brief mention on the MoD website last July, The Daily Telegraph today gives fascinating insight into the less-publicised activities of the British Armed Forces in Afghanistan.

The paper's report recounts how a 16-man team Special Forces conducting a "snatch operation" to capture four Taliban leaders near Sangin were ambushed by a 70-strong force of Taleban as they attempted to extract from the area in their vehicles. They lost two of their number, Capt David Patten and Sgt Paul Bartlett, and another man was injured.

The Taleban destroyed one of the team's vehicles in the ambush, forcing the team then to flee the remaining vehicles, whence they became pinned down in an irrigation ditch. Capt David Patten was killed as the team tried to escape across the fields and the leader of the patrol was badly wounded by a bullet that went through his forearm. Sgt Paul Bartlett was shot dead as dawn broke, when he had made an attempt to get back to the vehicles.

All ended well, after a fashion, after the action of an unnamed member of the Special Boat Patrol who took charge and led the men in holding off the Taleban, manoeuvring himself into a position from where he could throw a grenade into the main enemy position. The thirteen fit men not only managed to hold off the Taleban until a Gurkha platoon arrived but killed dozens of the Taliban.

What is of remarkable about this incidents, from the view-point of this blog, is its similarity with the account recorded in The Sunday Times on 6 March. Then, a 50-man convoy had been ambushed and, once again, the modus operandi seems to have been similar, the Taleban destroying the lead vehicle and forcing the remainder (eventually) to flee their vehicles.

In both cases, the patrols were saved by the gallantry of one man – both, coincidentally who were awarded the Military Cross. But, as we remarked at the time, while this is wholly admirable, any Army which has to rely on such heroism is one that is seriously deficient.

The point, of course, is that in larger of the two incidents, the patrol was equipped with the desperately vulnerable WIMIKs and while the vehicle types in the second incident are not specified, most likely they were WIMIKs too, or even perhaps the "boy racer" M-WIMIKs, about which there has been some dialogue on the forum, particularly about the vulnerability of these vehicles to the Taleban ambush tactics.

With one poster arguing that:

WMIKs are used in the fire support group role, they do not even enter the villages, they remain on the outside, usually in positions which afford them a high vantage point so they can bring heavy weapons in support of troops on the ground …

We have coincidentally a picture accompanying another story in The Telegraph (above left) which is of a WIMIK. No doubt unwittingly, it show the vehicle on a narrow track, bounded on one side by an irrigation ditch and the other by what we can infer to be soft, tilled soil (evidenced by the state of the vehicle's tyres). Effectively, the WIMIK is confined to the track and thus potentially exposed to a buried mine.

Now, it may be that this is an old, stock photograph – not least the vehicle lacks the Kevlar strap-on armour seen in contemporary shots – but the other two photographs shown here are not.

Clearly, there are issues here about the vulnerability of the vehicles our Armed Forces choose to use especially as 16 Air Assault Brigade are poised to take over in Afghanistan for the forthcoming campaigning season, bringing with them a batch of M-WIMIKs. Things are not going to get better as long as the Army remains in denial about the consequences of its choices.

COMMENT THREAD

Thus are we so ill-served

One really does despair at the media and (with a few honourable exceptions) their journalists – but then you knew that.

The latest cause for despair is the effluvia produced by political editor Andrew Porter in The Daily Telegraph as he steps into defence territory under the headline, "Defence projects threatened by cash crisis".

Porter is reporting that, "a review of Britain's defence capabilities has begun amid a budget squeeze that could lead to major defence projects being shelved or delayed" and he then adds that, "A £1 billion programme for Lynx helicopters - vital for missions in Afghanistan - could be shelved. If the aircraft carrier project is delayed it would put at risk up to 1,400 jobs at Clyde, Rosyth and Portsmouth."

The "review" in fact has been going on for some months now but we can put that aside. Mere political editors would not know that.

Nor, it seems, does Porter know anything about the joint Army/Navy “Future Lynx” programme. If he did, he cannot possibly have asserted that the helicopters were “vital for missions in Afghanistan”.

These machines, at best, will not enter operational service with the Army until 2014 – some six years away – which makes their immediate impact on current operations rather irrelevant. In six year's time, anything could have happened, especially as the need is here and now.

Nor, really is Porter focusing on operational needs when he tells us that the "Future Lynx" project was signed with Agusta­Westland three years ago and was hailed for securing jobs in the company's Somerset plant. The plan, he writes, was to build 70 helicopters at the Anglo-Italian firm's Yeovil factory, which employs 3,000 staff – all of which suggests that he has been the subject of special pleading, either from within the MoD or from the contractors.

What completely escapes him is the price which, as we pointed out when the contract was actually announced in June 2006, works out at an average of £14.2 million each.

For sure the Army helicopter will cost less than this but the MoD is being extremely coy about the actual unit price but, compared with the cost of the US Army's Black Hawk helicopter at $5.9 million (£3 million), it is bound to be steep.

Therein lies the paradox. With the media screaming about shortage of cash for the MoD, this is a classic "pork barrel" project, aimed more at keeping jobs going in the Augusta Westland factory at Yeovil than it is providing our Armed Forces with the equipment they need.

And nor is the Lynx precisely what the Army needs. The airframe size is optimised for Royal Navy antisubmarine warfare operations from small frigates, which means it cannot carry a fully-equipped section yet is unnecessarily large and expensive for battlefield reconnaissance. The choice of a common airframe has been made primarily to enable the Navy to keep the costs down for their dedicated antisubmarine helicopter – and to keep the last British helicopter manufacturer in business.

By any measure, the cancellation of the "Future Lynx" would be good news for the Army, as long as it then meant that cheaper, off-the-shelf helicopters could be purchased and brought into use quickly – which is actually the intention.

The current Lynx helicopters have been an expensive disaster and, as we have pointed out, many times, the Army is urgently in need of a more capable replacement.

Equally, although the carrier project seems to be going ahead, a delay of a few years probably would do no great harm. The short take-off/vertical landing Joint Strike Fighter, which will equip the new carriers (maybe) are undergoing delays and cost over-runs which could, in the longer term call into question the carrier design itself. If an alternative aircraft has to be sought, then a major redesign will be needed.

Nevertheless, from this political editor, all we get is, "Military leaders have told the Prime Minister that the Treasury-driven cuts could handicap the fighting ability of the Armed Forces and they insisted that major projects be preserved."

The one good bit of good news, however, is that Porter tells us that, "Whitehall sources said that in order to make such major savings they could not simply 'salami slice' existing projects." With 80 projects being examined, this is a much more optimistic picture than we were painting a few weeks ago, and should be the cause of some relief, if the defence budget is to be rebalanced.

But, as always, The Daily Telegraph has its own narrative and is clearly incapable of sensible reporting or analysis. Thus are we so ill-served.

COMMENT THREAD

Shooting the messenger?

The Daily Mail chooses to wax indignant today at the MoD's attempts in the High Court to trim the sails of assistant deputy coroner Andrew Walker.

This was widely reported in yesterday's media, not least in The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The BBC, the Daily Mail and, of course, The Sun.

Needless to say, the media have couched the action in terms of the MoD attempting to "gag" this coroner, all the stories following a similar theme, to the effect that the Ministry is seeking to prevent details of soldiers’ deaths getting into the public domain.

Hence today does the Mail develop precisely that theme, asking: "Why does the MoD shoot the messenger?" Casting Walker as the "good guy" - and thus secretary of state for defence Des Browne as the man in the black hat – the paper tells us that, "Nobody has spoken up more powerfully than Oxfordshire coroner Andrew Walker for the welfare of British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan."

Again and again at his inquests, we are told, "he has refused to pull punches when he believes soldiers have died because of inadequate equipment or avoidable mistakes."

Having been cast as the villain, Des Browne is then painted as having been "stirred into action". Remarks the Mail:

So has he issued orders that henceforth no British soldier will be sent into battle without the right kit? … In a move that will anger and dismay millions, Mr Browne is seeking a High Court order to ban coroners from making critical comments about the MoD. How utterly, disgracefully typical of New Labour ministers: when they don't like the message, they try to shoot the messenger.

All the families want is for somebody to uncover the facts about their loved ones' deaths - a duty Mr Walker performs supremely well, the paper adds. "Does Mr Browne want lessons to be learnt from soldiers' deaths? Or is he interested only in protecting his own increasingly shabby reputation."

On the face of it, this paper – and the others which make the same points, directly or indirectly – might seem to have a reasonable argument. But then, they are far from impartial observers. For years now, they have fed off Mr Walker, faithfully transcribing his more lurid condemnations of the MoD into banner headlines.

But, when we first met Mr Walker, we viewed his verdict as "dishonest", remarking that what struck us was "the utter dishonesty and lack of partiality of the coroner". We were to meet Walker again, again, again and again, and what emerges is a pattern which amounts to a very specific narrative.

Mr Walker is entirely happy to find fault with the MoD (or the Americans) – especially where he believes there have been equipment shortages - and expresses himself in lurid language. But he seems to take great care to avoid getting to the bottom of issues, finding out what really went on, and where the problems lie.

However, despite this enthusiasm, he and his fellow professionals show a marked reluctance to come to grips with the "Snatch" Land Rover saga, evading the central issue as to why these notoriously vulnerable vehicles have been deployed – and are still in use in areas where they are manifestly unsuitable.

Here, far from being a man who "performs supremely well", therefore, Walker – and his colleagues have failed in their duty as set out in the Coroners' Courts Rules. The Rule 43 states, under the title: "Prevention of similar fatalities":

A coroner who believes that action should be taken to prevent the recurrence of fatalities similar to that in respect of which the inquest is being held may announce at the inquest that he is reporting the matter in writing to the person or authority who may have power to take such action and he may report the matter accordingly.

But, while they must also ascertain how, when and where the deceased came by his death (Rule 36), they are specifically barred from expressing "any opinion on any other matters". Rule 42 then tells them that: "No verdict shall be framed in such a way as to appear to determine any question of criminal liability on the part of a named person, or civil liability."

Here, Walker – seemingly concerned more with playing to the media gallery - has too often crossed the line. It is the job of the High Court to determine liability – not that of a coroner. The MoD is right to seek to restrain him from his excesses. Unfortunately, there is no similar remedy which can require him to do his job properly.

COMMENT THREAD

The Jeremy Clarkson syndrome

All it lacks are "go-faster" stripes down the sides but, short of that, it is every boy-racer's dream - a "Mad Max" monster machine that can tear around the countryside at the taxpayers' expense, all without a moment's thought about what it is supposed to achieve.

No matter that the thing is so dangerously vulnerable that the Taleban can probably scarce believe their luck. Simply give the supposedly hard-bitten hacks a chance to play with the new "toy" and their brains go gurgling out of their backsides. Instead, they are seized by an advanced attack of the Jeremy Clarkson syndrome, gibbering with delight at the thrills and spills.

No less than two such hacks have fallen prey to this syndrome this weekend, Rupert Hamer, defence correspondent for the Sunday Mirror and Sean Rayment, his counterpart on The Sunday Telegraph.

Interestingly, both claim "exclusives", obviously heedless of the fact that they have been recruited by the Army to deliver shameless "puffs" for its latest insanity, justifying a decision which beggars belief in its arrant stupidity.

Thus do we get Hamer burbling with child-like glee at "the British Army's latest lethal weapon - four tons of pure killing machine, capable of climbing mountains and swimming across rivers to hunt down Taliban fighters in Afghanistan." Sitting in the front passenger seat, he tells us, with unrestrained joy: "The Supercat (sic), dubbed 'Mad Max' and a 'Land Rover on steroids' by troops, lurches down a steep hill and smashes into a water-filled ditch…".

Rayment, for The Sunday Telegraph is similarly afflicted. With his story illustrated by a lurid graphic, he tells us that the object of his childhood fantasies is, "Fast, powerful and with a fearsome array of weaponry …". "It has already been named 'Pitbull' by the soldiers who will drive it deep behind enemy lines," he burbles.

Citing entirely uncritically, unnamed "senior officers", he allows them to say, "the vehicle will greatly enhance the fighting capability of their soldiers, and will save lives", adding that: "The vehicle and crew are protected against mines by reinforced armour plating but the military says its best defence is its manoeuvrability and speed."

The vehicles – as we know - are not protected against mines at all. Thus the value of this exercise (for the Army) is that when the body bags start coming home - which we know they must, the journalists will have been totally compromised. They will utter not a word of criticism of the vehicle when the death toll mounts.

This we have seen before with the Pinzgauer Vector, with Sean Rayment offering an apologia for the machine, so bland in its description that no ordinary person would begin to realise that something was badly amiss.


Interestingly – and very telling – we can recall none of these burbling boy racers offering similar eulogies for the Mastiff, or even querying the delays over the introduction of the Ridgeback. Yet, for all the glamour and excitement of the new "toy", the unsung Mastiff is proving itself perfectly adequate for many of the tasks which the Army require – as the above picture demonstrates. Extreme off-road performance is not always at a premium, nor even necessary on many occasions.

Going back to basics, this Supacat M-WMIK (now renamed Jackal - ed) was originally intended as a replacement for the "Pink Panther", the mobility platform for Special Forces. It was never intended a replacement for the WIMIK Land Rover, which itself is an unsatisfactory stop-gap, pressed into service to make up for the failure of the Army to get its act together and procure an updated armoured car.

Yet the one thing useful Rayment does is confirm our worst fears that this "four tons of pure killing machine" will replace "the ageing Land Rover WIMIKs." In this role though, it will indeed be a "killing machine" but it will be our own troops who do the dying.

There is something very wrong with a media which so lacks critical faculties that it falls so easily for Army "spin".

COMMENT THREAD

Pursuing their narratives

Andrew Walker, the assistant deputy coroner for Oxfordshire, has done it again. Recording a verdict on the unfortunate death of Captain Daniel Wright, he concluded that the officer "would not have died if he had been equipped with a radio".

Wright, who had exited from a Skyvan aircraft over Weston Green in only his second ever training jump, had suffered a rare malfunction to his main canopy. But, instead of "cutting it away" after four seconds, as the drill demanded, he made the fatal mistake of struggled to clear it, leaving it too late to deploy his reserve chute.

Had be been equipped with a two-way radio, the coroner held, ground instructors could have warned him to take the corrective action earlier, saving his life. Delivering his verdict, Walker's precise words were: "Captain Wright, on the balance of probability, would not have died had an operator on the ground at the drop zone been able to communicate with him using a radio."

What gives this verdict "legs" is that during the course of the evidence, it had been revealed that the CO of the jump school had requested radios for his students, some nine months before the incident, and had apparently been refused the equipment – costed at £50 per unit – "as funding was only available for essential items."

The story – before even the Coroner had delivered his verdict – had already been picked over by the media, The Daily Telegraph claiming that, "Captain Wright's death is one in a long line of fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan (sic) which have been blamed on equipment failures and shortages."

It was The Sun, however, which has made the biggest issue of the death, claiming, "Hero Dan and other troops might be alive today — if only they had been given the right KIT."

Predictably, the media now pick up on the verdict, the Press Association picking up on a quote from Wright's mother, Carol Wright, who claims that her son's death was due to, "MoD's penny-pinching".

Cited speaking outside the court, she said: "For the sake of a flipping radio they have lost a potential star among their ranks. We ask the MoD to accept their penny-pinching has resulted in a far greater use of public funds - for example, the cost of this court case."

Now, The Times has published the stroy, cementing it is as yet another case of MoD neglect, adding to the litany of failings attributed to this organisation.

However, for once, there is no agreement on the unofficial Army forum, the consensus of opinion being that training, not technology, is the most effective way of mitigating risk. One commentator argued that, "..you had to take responsibility for your own emergency drills - being second-guessed by radio would have diluted that vital sense of self-preservation."

We consulted our own expert on this, veteran of hundreds of jumps, who told us the following:

You are trained and trained and trained to count to four and then check your canopy is open. This is deeply ingrained. On one of my early malfunctions (the one that nearly killed me), I had the pilot chute wrapped around my ankle, I had a sleeve deployment, but that's where it stopped. I thought the lump of white I could see was OK, until I realised that the ground was still getting too close, too fast. It was a round canopy, so I didn't need to eject the main (with a square you have to or they wrap around one another), and luckily pulled my reserve at about 400 feet.

Any later, it would have been too late; a little earlier and the reserve would have been breathing (releasing the excess pressure from the initial opening) and I would still have hit the ground too fast to survive. The whole experience is so totally overwhelming that frankly I think a radio would have been a total waste of time.

Besides, I've seen a couple of friends "ride it all the way in"; the last at (deleted) where my friend (deleted) - a very experienced- jumper was jumping unfamiliar kit that he hadn't practised enough on and spent the last seconds fighting with the ejection system he thought he had (on his own kit) but wasn't there (on this borrowed kit). We watched him struggling, but with the best will in the world, the ground crew's a long way away and there's nothing meaningful they can say from that distance and even if they could. Time is so desperately short.

At that point, your window is only a couple of seconds (depending of course on what type of malfunction it is). With all respect to the pundits, and I'll be happy to be proved wrong, it sounds like an unfortunate student who f****d up and a radio would not have made the blindest bit of difference.

He then goes on to say:

Having been here, I can assure you that you are by then in a blind panic. The g forces are tremendous, the wind is still rushing past, the ground is spinning extremely fast ... the only thing that will save you is training.

It is very hard to say to a grieving mother that her son was the victim of an unfortunate accident, but it also has to be said that parachuting is an intrinsically dangerous occupation – especially for the novice.

Here, though, there is an issue which the coroner did not address, and that was the current practice of training special forces directly on high performance "square" parachutes.

Many experts would prefer students first to go through the basic parachute course, jumping with a conventional round parachute from a static line. This, it is held, allows students to experience in relative safety the "sensory overload" that occurs in the first few jumps, better equipping them to handle the more complex and demanding parachutes.

If there has been "penny pinching", perhaps it is in this direction that MoD critics should look, as there does seem to have been an element of trimming. And it is this that possibly led to the original request for two-way radios. Having accepted unduly truncated training, it is speculated that course managers were "covering their backs" by asking for extra kit.

Looking at this in the round, the coroner could possibly have provided a real service by exploring whether Captain Wright had been put in a position where he had been inadequately trained to deal with the emergency that confronted him, on what was only his second jump.

That, though, was not to be. Walker did, however, recommend that an automatically-deployed reserve parachute should be used in future for novice military parachutists – a provision that many experts would not agree with. He also suggests that they should jump from a higher altitude, like civilians. That may or may not have helped in this case, but it seems sensible – as would perhaps be a reserve static line (RSL), although that was not discussed.

What we have here, therefore, is coroner Andrew Walker offering a foil to the media without getting to the bottom of a problem – if it exists. In the pursuit of improved safety, the clinical analyses of reasons for failure are a vital to determining what precise measures should be taken to prevent recurrences. In this case, neither the coroner nor the media seem to have assisted in this process.

Instead, each seems to have pursued their own narratives, to the detriment of the people who deserve better of them.

COMMENT THREAD

More coffins for the troops

What looked like it could have been an extra £2 billion for defence, announced yesterday in the budget, has turned out to be nothing of the sort.

Instead, it is an initial indication for the costs of military operations in the coming financial year. Since these costs normally come from the Treasury reserve and, last year cost £3.297bn, the figure announced can only be as advertised – an "indication".

However, within that is an element of "real" money, £900 million which, according to the MoD "will be used to ensure that the UKs Armed Forces have the best possible equipment and protection while they are on operations."

Nevertheless, the apparent paucity of the sum has yielded a ritual condemnation from the United Kingdom National Defence Association (UKNDA) which claims that the £2bn is a "sticking plaster" and "is not enough to plug gaps left by years of chronic under-funding".

The Association is calling for an increase in the core defence budget - arguing for a 40 percent increase to bring spending on the armed forces up to three percent of GDP - an objective it shares with the likes of Conservative Home.

The intensity of calls for greater funding though has not been matched by any detail on how money should be spent on extra equipment. That absence provoked a comment from this blogger on the Conservative Home site:

What you have to realise is that the Armed Forces have an unlimited capacity for buying the wrong or overly expensive equipment. But the really important thing is that the through-life cost of equipment is very much higher than its procurement cost. Thus, the wrong equipment continues to exert a drag on the budget throughout its life (to say nothing of the opportunity costs).

…

If the Conservatives are to be credible on defence policy, therefore, they cannot just keep repeating the sterile mantra of "more expenditure" when the NHS provides the definitive evidence that more money does not necessarily mean better capability.

They must start identifying the very specific shortcomings in equipment and expenditure wastage and come up with sensible alternatives.

Perversely, what looks to be a classic example of this comes in the very announcement which the UKNDA has so roundly condemned. The MoD, we learn, intends to order additional M-WMIK vehicles (now called the Jackal - ed) for Afghanistan and this is included in the "indicated" operational spend.

This is in addition to the original 130 ordered last June when the vehicle was described in gushing terms as a Land Rover on steroids.

From The Sun we learn that another 72 of what it describes as the "new Mad Max-style troop carriers" will be ordered, at a cost of £40 million. That makes them over half a million each, nearly double the original cost of £230,000 per unit.

This completely passes by The Sun which "…told yesterday how an SAS officer died in a parachute jump because he did not have a £50 radio". Now it is "campaigning for ministers to ensure all UK forces have the kit they need." A newspaper which is making such issue of the death of an Army Captain through what it alleges is "penny pinching" is thus heedless of the fact that this vehicle is dangerously vulnerable both to mines and IEDs and to gunfire.

We have made our views abundantly clear on the dangers of these vehicles, not only here and here but particularly here, where we were able to illustrate the vulnerabilities.

The issue was extensively debated on the unofficial Army site, with a wide range of views expressed. If the case for the advocates of the vehicle can be summed up though, it is that the enhanced off-road performance gives it the ability to skirt danger areas, where mines might be laid, while its speed, manoeuvrability and firepower offers greater protection than can be achieved from a slower, armoured vehicle.

There seems to be some agreement in this context that the vehicle is fine for Special Forces and Special Forces Support Groups. These are often working in areas where they have the advantage of surprise and where there is some validity in providing high mobility to the exclusion of any protection.

However, the problem is that with the original purchase of 130 and now another 72, they look set to become a partial WIMIK Land Rover replacement, for "routine patrols" and other purposes for which they are entirely unsuited. As one poster to the Army forum put it, "…if it does get used for urban patrols or gets misused for other roles, then a lot of squaddies will not be coming home."

We have already seen a steady toll crews of Land Rover WIMIKs, Pinzgauers and even the occasional "Snatch", and there are many occasions where mobility affords little protection. A vehicle offering even less protection than the Land Rovers – which they seem set to replace – means we are indeed going to be seeing more body bags coming home.

Yet, as they pull the bodies from the wrecks of these vehicles – currently slated at over half-a-million each - not even The Sun will be able to complain of "penny pinching". And, if the Army was given yet more money, what then would it buy?

COMMENT THREAD

They didn't have to die

For anyone wishing to explore the substantive issues on defence, and maintain a sensible debate, the last few weeks have been dreadful.

No sooner are we through the hystérie du jour on Prince Harry then the media goes overboard on the wearing of military uniforms in public. The only thing we felt, under the circumstances, was to walk away for a short while, lest utter frustration get the better of us.

What brings us back is the headline in The Sun yesterday, which we reproduce above – in which the newspaper belatedly visits an issue which this blog has been pursuing doggedly for nearly two years.

Its topical hook for a thesis that 35 soldiers "might be alive today - if only they had been given the right KIT" - was the death of an SAS soldier, killed when his parachute failed to open during training, the inquest for whom has just started.

Also picked up by The Daily Telegraph and others, as well as more coverage from the Sun, this refers to Captain Daniel Wright of the Queen's Gurkha Signal Corps. He died at RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire after plummeting 2,500ft on 17 November 2005 and The Sun has obtained documents "that reveal Captain Wright is the latest victim of shocking penny-pinching."

According to The Sun's sources, the 25-year-old plummeted 3,000ft to his death - after pleas for a vital two-way radio were ignored to save £50. Apparently, his main parachute failed to open and he delayed opening his reserve – through inexperience, we are told – but might have acted quicker had he been equipped with a two-way radio enabling instructors on the ground at the parachute school to talk him out of trouble.

The MoD is reserving comment on this until the inquest verdict had been given, so we too must do likewise. But the broader significance of the paper's original piece was that it uses Captain Wright's death to assert that it brings to THIRTY-FIVE (the paper's emphasis) the number of "brave soldiers whose deaths are blamed on not being given proper equipment."

Amongst that number, it included ten personnel killed in January 2005 when a Hercules transport was shot down near Baghdad, the lack of a fire suppressant system in the fuel tanks being a contributory factor in the tragedy.

Also included was the death of Major Matthew Bacon, killed in a "Snatch" Land-Rover after the Lynx helicopter due to fly him from base to base broke down. The paper then adds Lt Tom Mildinhall, Lance Corporal Paul Farrelly and Corporal Gordon Pritchard, also killed on 11 June 2006 in a Land Rover, Captain Jim Philippson, "shot dead in Afghanistan after being sent into battle without crucial night vision goggles, grenade launchers or machine guns" and the 14 deaths arising from the crash of the Nimrod in November 2006.

Also listed is Corporal Mark Wright, who "bled to death because rescue helicopters had no winches" and, finally, the paper cites the deaths of Sergeant Chris Casey and Lance Corporal Kirk Redpath, killed in a "Snatch" Land Rover by a roadside bomb in Iraq, "because of a shortage of Mastiff armoured trucks".

There are several points here, not least that to attribute some all the deaths cited to lack of proper equipment is tendentious, not least the demise of Captain Philippson and Corporal Mark Wright.

However, the substantive point is the reference to 35 deaths attributable to the failure to provide the right kit. Yet, when we first addressed the Land Rover issue in June 2006, we identified 23 deaths which could be attributed – in part – to the lack of suitable armoured protection.

Nearly two years on, if we take in deaths arising in WIMIK Land Rovers (example pictured), Pinzgauers and the additional toll from "Snatch" Land Rovers – including that in Afghanistan - the number dead from inadequate protection in vehicles is closer to 50. Add to that the Hercules and Nimrod incidents, which The Sun points up, and that brings the actual casualties attributable to lack of the right kit to 74, more than double the number cited by the paper.

This brings us back into the area we explored last month, where we complained that our increasingly ill-informed media lacked focus in its criticism of military issues.

Here, we have to say that we do not and cannot object to The Sun or any other newspaper taking up cudgels on behalf of our troops. Simply, the ill-focused criticism in many cases hinders rather than assists the cause, diverting attention from the substantive issues and enabling those responsible to escape scrutiny.

Thus, in the case of The Sun, while we would agree entirely with the paper's central thesis that troops are being killed through lack of suitable kit, not only does it understate the problem but it is so general in the nature of its complaint that its political impact is slight. Real continuing issues, like the weaknesses of the Pinzgauer and the WIMIK go unaddressed.

In this context, think how long Pinzgauer Vectors would survive in theatre if the The Sun mounted a full-bodied campaign against these "coffins on wheels". That is the measure of the inadequacy of the newspaper – it is not so much what it does, but what it does not do.

That criticism could (and should) also be levied at other newspapers, and a more subtle example of this failure can be seen in last weekend's Sunday Times.

This paper's focus was on the story of a "British soldier awarded the Military Cross for fighting off 150 Taliban", written by defence correspondent Michael Smith. It is about the heroism of Fusilier Damien Hields who used a "grenade machinegun" mounted on his WIMIK Land Rover to destroy seven Taliban positions before himself being wounded.

At one level, the story is entirely commendable – and there is every reason why the heroism of Fusilier Damien Hields should be celebrated. But The Sunday Times is supposedly a serious newspaper, with a reputation for campaigning, yet it deals with the events in a breathless Boys' Own style, complete with graphics (illustrated) which are so amateurish as to be laughable.

It is in fact worth noting these graphics. The author of the piece, Mike Smith, will have had no control over them but they nevertheless are part of the piece. They represent the output of the Sunday Times and convey a message about the gravitas and accuracy of the corporate body.


The pictorial narrative offered (see above) is of a WIMIK Land Rover (although it is not identified as a WIMIK) leading a fifty-man convoy being blown up by a mine and flipped over. In loving detail, the windscreen of the vehicle is shown, complete with finely-drawn windscreen wipers. The only problem is the WIMIK does not have a windscreen – but it does have a GMPG in the front passenger position, which is not shown.

The second frame is even more laughable, purporting to show a Taleban fighter firing a rocket propelled grenade yet actually shows what looks uncannily like a Stinger anti-aircraft missile launcher (pictured).

Pedantry this might be – but was there no one on the entire editorial staff who had enough knowledge to recognise such obvious visual howlers? What does it say about a newspaper that lets them through?

Anyhow, back to the narrative which recounts how Fusilier Hields bravely assisting the convoy in fighting off a force far larger, as it was stalled behind the blown-up, inverted WIMIK. The obvious point which occurs, however, is that had the vehicle been effectively mine-protected, not only would it not have been overturned, but it could – like other such vehicles – have been able to drive clear of the "killing zone" (below), thereby avoiding the uneven match.

Further, given the size of the force – 150 or so – could it not have been detected before the convoy arrived, had there been effective aerial reconnaissance, perhaps by a UAV running ahead to look out for traps?

And then, with the 50 beleaguered British troops fighting for their lives, where was the air support? With such a large investment in men and materiel, could not the Army have ensured it was better protected by insisting that it had air cover?

There may, of course, be adequate answers to these questions – but they are not asked by The Sunday Times. If explored, they could have painted a completely different picture, one of a large number of troops to a very great extent rescued from disaster by the conspicuous heroism of one man.

Wholly admirable that may be but any Army which has to rely on such heroism is one that is seriously deficient. The next time there is a disaster, the hero might not be to hand. Or he might not be so lucky and be killed in the opening moments of the fight.

Returning briefly to the Sun's story, we see the tail end of the piece with an almost obligatory quote from an opposition spokesman, this time "Tory defence spokesman Gerald Howarth" who brands the "skimping" on equipment "a true scandal". He is allowed to say: "I intend to take this further in the House of Commons."

That phrasing gives the perhaps unfortunate impression that Howarth has just woken up to the problem – which is not exactly true. But it is worth looking at his record and working out how many of the 942 questions he has tabled actually deal specifically with equipment issues. Compare and contrast those with the careful probing of Ann Winterton and you might come away with the impression that The Sun's quote from its choice of spokesman is a ritualistic filler.

Be that as it may, when it comes to looking in detail at where equipment inadequacies lie, the media are not even beginning to get to grip with the subject. They are picking up only those issues presented to them on a plate. This is cheap, derivative journalism that exploits rather than serves our Armed Forces – it is playing with peoples' lives.

COMMENT THREAD

Valuable lessons have been learned

Both Wintertons were in evidence in Parliament today during defence questions, both asking their separate but related questions.

Ann Winterton went first, asking this:

Bearing in mind our military commitments in Iraq and elsewhere, and the Army’s lack of medium-weight vehicles, will the Secretary of State confirm that future rapid effect system vehicle design will be based on current and foreseeable future operational requirements, and that recent lessons regarding troop protection will not be forgotten?

She was answered directly by Des Browne, secretary of state for defence, who replied:

I give the hon. Lady that assurance with regard to the design of the FRES, particularly its hull, to which she alludes and which is most important. Valuable lessons have been learned, as can be seen in the improvement of the vehicles supplied over the past couple of years, and will be taken into account.

Nicholas Winterton then followed up with this question:

Will the appropriate Minister give an unequivocal commitment that future FRES vehicles, which have, of course, to be air-transportable, will have monocock (sic – Hansard transcription) V-shaped hulls, which deflect blasts, leaving the vehicle repairable after it has experienced an explosion? That is critical to the safety of our armed services personnel.

Again Des Browne answered:

I fully understand how important the hon. Gentleman's point is - and he knows why. In answer to an earlier question, I made it clear that I would expect the design of the hull to take account of our learning experience over the past two years in particular. I am not in a position to give the hon. Gentleman at the Dispatch Box the unequivocal undertaking he seeks, but he can rest assured that I consider the shape of the hull to be extremely important to the safety of the vehicle.

For Kremlin (aka MoD) watchers, these answers are intriguing. They could be taken to suggest that none of the three vehicles currently under consideration for the FRES utility vehicle contract are going to fit the bill.

On lessons learned, though, it would be helpful if lessons were not forgotten as well. The illustration shows a factory-built conversion of a standard Bedford RL 3 tonner, with what was called a "mine cab". It was used in the mid ’60s in Aden and also in Cyprus with the British UN detachment.

The embryonic "V-shaped" hull is there – not quite, but the idea of deflecting blast is clearly evident. What happened to the "lessons learned" then?

COMMENT THREAD

Without further details …

For once I agree with Mick Smith, whose current blog posting declares: "That's quite enough about Harry". With well over 5,000 media stories recorded by Google News on the experiences of 2nd Lt. Harry Wales in Afghanistan – and related matters – this is a graphic example of media overkill.

Perhaps the only important information that came out of the torrent of coverage was that typified by the piece in The Sunday Times which recounted how the aircraft returning the Prince to the UK diverted to Birmingham International Airport to allow the two soldiers seriously wounded in a landmine explosion to be taken to the military ward at the city's Selly Oak hospital.

From this story, we learn that: "There were two injured guys who came back on the plane with us who were essentially comatose throughout the whole way," he said. "One had lost two limbs – a left arm and a right leg – and another guy who was saved by his mate's body being in the way but took shrapnel to the neck."

The importance of this, of course, is but for the coincidence of the Prince being on the aircraft and under such enormous media scrutiny, we would never have known that yet another two soldiers had succumbed to a mine strike. It remains MoD policy to give details of casualties only when personnel are killed. Otherwise, we get nothing more than monthly lists of the injured which tell us nothing at all about the circumstances in which the injuries were occasioned.

Yet such information is of more than of academic interest. Those of us who are directly concerned with the welfare of our troops – in the context of calling the Military Brass, the MoD and the politicians to account for their failings in their "duty of care" need to know this information, better to understand whether that duty is being properly discharged.

And we are long past the stage where we can rely on any of these institutions properly to do their jobs, or take the appropriate or reasonable measures to safeguard our people. The experiences of the "Snatch" Land Rovers and the Pinzgauers demonstrate clearly that casualty prevention is not given anything like the priority it deserves.

Thus we see once again, more casualties from a mine strike. Without further details, we cannot comment further, but it adds to our very limited reservoir of knowledge that reinforces our concerns that the Army is not taking the mine threat seriously enough. We know through diverse means that many others have been injured – but not killed – through mine strikes, and thus the toll is significant.

Similarly, in The Sunday Telegraph yesterday, we got a piece from Sean Rayment, writing what claims to be, "Basra's last battle: the untold story".

The title is presumptuous, in that it does not tell us anything in general terms that we did not already know – having pieced together the story on this blog – but it has its uses in offering small details which again add to our reservoir of knowledge.

This time it is the detail of Rifleman Stephen Vause, badly injured in an insurgent mortar attack and medics inside the besieged base in the centre of Basra, who had to be rescued by some courageous flying on the part of a Merlin pilot. Rifleman Vause survived and, because he did so, until now, no details of that injury have entered the public domain.

Without further details, we cannot comment further, but it adds to our very limited reservoir of knowledge that reinforces our concerns that the Army was not taking the mortar (and indirect fire) threat seriously enough. This was an issue about which we have written about continuously (for instance, see here), and is one of those great scandals for which both the Army and the MoD have yet to be held properly to account.

We also now know that indirect fire protection at the Contingency Operating Base (COB) in Basra has improved immeasurably – at considerable cost to the MoD, and it is worrying therefore that we get news of the latest casualty in Basra, Sergeant Duane "Baz" Barwood, attached to 903 Expeditionary Air Wing, Royal Air Force, who died as a result of a rocket attack on the COB.

Since December last, after the "truce" with the Mehdi Army, that attacks on the base had fallen off considerably, but that – from a variety our sources – the frequency of attacks has increased recently. Thus, the defences had not, up until now, been seriously tested. Now that they are beginning to be challenged, we have reported the death of Sgt Barwood. What we don't know is how many personnel, like Rifleman Stephen Vause, have been badly injured.

Without further details, we cannot comment further, but it adds to our very limited reservoir of knowledge that alerts us to the possibility that the COB defences may not be sufficient to provide adequate protection to military personnel based there.

To an extent, we know this to be true. Although a great deal of money has been spent on diverse fortifications, and the C-RAM guns (pictured below), passive defence alone can never provide complete protection.

Aggressive patrolling, the use of quick-reaction heli-borne troops, counter-mortar radar, UAVs and conventional air power – as well as good local intelligence from all sources, and “hearts and minds” activities - are all measures which have, from time to time been employed against the indirect fire threat.

Perversely, aggressive patrolling itself would probably provoke a hostile reaction and could, in the shorter term, lead to higher casualties, with troops and their vehicles exposed to IEDs, sniper fire and ambushes. And, as far as security outside the base goes, this in any event, is the responsibility of the Iraqi security forces.

Thus, without further details, we cannot comment further. To an extent, we could have those further details if the media were not so besotted with the offshoot to the Princess Diana "industry" – the activities of one of her sons. That was adequately demonstrated last week by The Observer, but any more news has been subsumed by the soap opera.

That is worth thinking about when we read (and hear) about how much the media is concerned about the safety of our personnel.

COMMENT THREAD

An overstated threat?

By the end of last year, fears were being expressed that resurgent military spending in Russia posed a "new challenge to west", raising the spectre of another Cold War. But these fears may be unfounded.

Pinning down the source of the anxiety, the most immediate concern is that, in 2007, Russia spent $31bn on hardware, in a major modernisation programme - almost four times the amount spent in 2001. And, although that spending was still well below that of the mid-1980s Soviet Union, and only a 20th of the US's current military budget, the threat seemed real enough for some British military strategists.

This, amongst other things, bolstered the case for the "future war" advocates and the retention of "conventional" military capabilities, rather than concentrating on equipping to fight asymmetric wars.

However, the current round of modernisation starts from a very low base. From the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the Russian military has decayed to an extent that few Western analysts fully realise, to the point of virtual ineffectiveness. And, even if the situation is improving slowly, there is still no comprehensive plan for bring the Russian Forces up to a degree of operational efficiency which would permit major operations.

And just how far the rot has spread has been revealed recently by no less that Sergei Ivanov, Russia's first deputy prime minister and defence minister. Last week, he declared that the fleet of military transport aircraft had become dangerously obsolete. Without dramatic intervention, Russia could be left without military cargo planes by 2015, he says.

The Russian Air Force, according to various sources, operates has only about 300 usable transport aircraft, including the An-12 Cub, An-72 Coaler, An-124 Condor and Il-76 Candid planes (pictured). But most entered service in the 1960s and 1970s and even those still flying are considered unsafe according to modern safety requirements. Comprehensive upgrading may extend their service life until 2020-25 but a large number of replacement are also necessary.

Considering how vital an efficient air transport fleet is to modern military operations, the deficiencies in the current fleet would suggest that any Russian military threat is rather modest. It does not seem urgently necessary to factor any such threat into our own immediate budgetary calculations.

COMMENT THREAD

Pics galore!

We have stumbled on a remarkable collection of photographs of British Forces activities in Afghanistan, including a very high proportion of military vehicles (mostly Land Rovers) in various situations. This is the sort of high quality material that should be seen much more widely, posted by an anonymous "Mick". He is to be congratulated for making the material accessible, putting the MoD to shame.

A sample of the collection is shown above. For those who have any interest at all in the activities of our Forces, this is a must. You can see the whole collection of 340 photographs here.

A powder keg waiting to blow?

The way Basra and the activities of British forces in southern Iraq have disappeared from the media agenda should be remarkable, but it is not. That is the way the media work. When a subject is "on diary", the media crawl over it and then, when it is all done, the caravan packs its bags and moves on, deserting the issue which so preoccupied it, as if it had never existed.

We must be grateful, therefore, to The Observer yesterday, for giving us an insight into what is going on in what, for journalists (as well as British troops) is still a very dangerous place.

Not least, Reuters reports that the head of Iraq's national journalists' union was seriously wounded when gunmen opened fire on his car on Saturday, relatives and colleagues said. Shihab al-Tamimi, 74 (pictured), was shot in the face, chest and shoulder in the Baghdad attack.

What The Observer is telling us – under a headline: "Hopes of UK troop cuts in Basra dashed," is that plans to reduce the level British forces in Iraq still further have been shelved as security forces fear final showdown. A final all-out battle for Basra, we are told, is seen as 'inevitable' as persistent violence looks set to keep British troops mired in southern Iraq longer than was expected.

We already knew that the situation was unstable and the paper reminds us that an uneasy truce has been maintained between Iraqi security forces and Shia militia groups since Britain handed over control last December. We are also reminded that Gordon Brown announced that the number of troops in Iraq would be cut from 4,700 to 2,500 by spring. But, says the paper, "that timetable appears increasingly optimistic."

Certainly, we get the odd whiff that the violence is continuing. Last week, four British soldiers were injured, one seriously, by a roadside bomb during a night patrol – something about which the MoD have been somewhat less than forthcoming.

We also learn that three contractors, two Indian and one Sri Lankan, died on the British base after it was hit by 19 rockets in 24 hours. Two private security company staff were injured after a visit to the Basra Children's Hospital. And negotiations for the release of a kidnapped British photojournalist continue without a breakthrough.

It is, of course, a measure of the parochialism of the British press that, had the three dead been British, it would have been all over the papers, but since they were Indian and Sri Lankan, that does not merit a separate story – merely a passing reference in a longer piece. But, that the base is under continued – and what seem to be escalating – attack is significant.

The Observer offers "an unusually frank analysis", from Colonel Richard Iron, military mentor to the Iraqi commander General Mohan al-Furayji. Iron says:

There's an uneasy peace between the Iraqi Security Forces [ISF] on the one hand and the militias on the other. There is a sense in the ISF that confrontation is inevitable. They are training and preparing for the battle ahead. General Mohan says that the US won the battle for Baghdad, the US is going win the battle for Mosul, but Iraqis will have to win the battle for Basra.

Asked who runs the city now, Iron, who has been in Basra since December, says: "There's no one in charge. The unwritten rules of the game are there are areas where the army can and can't go and areas where JAM can and can't take weapons."

He added that General Mohan was keen to maintain the British presence. "Mohan's view is that having this force here - the tanks, helicopters, aircraft and so on - gives him power downtown. If there were no coalition forces here, his political power would be hugely damaged. If he is going to fight or face down JAM, he needs this back-up."

We also get a picture (which the MoD has not supplied) of how far the Basra base is being developed and fortified. Far from being dismantled, the 15 square mile base is getting a £12m military hospital and five rocket-proof dining facilities are under construction. A £4m barrier dubbed the "Great Wall of Basra", made of 13ft high concrete blocks each weighing 6 ton, will soon stretch five miles around the base.

What the paper calls a "siege mentality" is underlined by accommodation where beds are shoehorned between sandbags and 7.5-inch thick concrete blocks. Body armour and helmets are worn or within reach at all times.

One gets the sense – how accurate, it is impossible to tell – that Basra is a tinderkeg, ready to explode at any moment, although there will no doubt be some local signs of a building crisis.

Given our media's reluctance to keep us informed, we will be the last to know but, if the situation deteriorates badly and British troops are called upon to intervene, the government may find itself having to bring in reinforcements in a hurry. Perhaps also it will find that our troops sustain a casualty rate which brings the Iraqi war sharply back into focus.

Taken in the round, this surely must have an effect on our deployments in Afghanistan. Several media reports over the weekend suggested British troop levels there were to rise to 8,000, with suggestions that the Taleban were to be pursued into the hills, where they are finding temporary refuge.

What is not reported clearly is the increasing engagement of US forces in the British Helmand sector. The taking of Musa Qala in December was only achieved with the intervention of heli-borne troops from the élite US 82nd Airborne Division. Now we learn that 2,200 US Marines being deployed to southern Afghanistan next month, where they will fight alongside British forces.

The primary target is reported as Garmsir, the scene in January 2007 of what we dubbed an "heroic failure" when British troops failed to recover the southernmost regional centre of the Taleban.

What is going to be interesting, therefore, is the interplay between the Iraqi and Afghani theatres, especially later in the spring when it is possible that British forces could find themselves heavily engaged simultaneously, with little in the way of reserves. From the current situation where media reports are thin on the ground, we may find an altogether different scenario.

COMMENT THREAD