And the big news is?

The surreal disengagement of the MoD and our media continues with the latest round of non-reporting on Afghanistan. The event of the moment – from US sources – is a disturbing development, where the Taleban has fielded two heavy anti-aircraft weapons capable of taking out a Chinook or other British helicopter.

Both were Soviet-made ZPU-1s (pictured), loaded and ready for use, mounted on the back of pick-up trucks. They were located in the Nad Ali district, close to Lashkar Gah, where British troops are stationed.

Fortunately – in an encouraging testament to the ground work done by coalition forces - the villagers spotted the first gun and reported it to the authorities. Shortly thereafter, it was given the undivided attention of a brace of US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs. According to the dry, descriptive prose of the official bulletin, the aircraft "engaged" the enemy truck, using their 30mm Avenger cannons "to destroy the truck and the machine gun."

Less than 12 hours later, villagers reported that the Taleban in Nad Ali had obtained another ZPU-1, which they had been firing in the vicinity of the local bazaar. Coalition forces used a precision strike successfully to destroy this gun as well.

Although the ZPU-1 is 70s-era equipment and obsolete, with a 14.5mm calibre, it is a potent anti-aircraft weapon and could have made short work of any helicopter it hit. The rapid intervention of the US Air Force, said a coalition forces spokesman, "without a doubt saved the lives of Afghan and coalition forces".

Nor were these the only interventions. Yesterday saw a continuation of the high level of air activity with 76 missions flown, including in Lashkar Gah itself where a US Navy F/A-18C Hornet flew a show of force and expended flares to deter enemy suicide bombers after a source had warned coalition forces of enemy preparations.

However, such tedious, low-grade stuff cannot even begin to compare with the MoD's "take" on the top news story. From this source, we learn that a British soldier deployed to Afghanistan has become the talk of his local town after he started sending regular letters back to his local pub describing daily life on the "front line".

This, incidentally, is Colour Sergeant Michael Saunders, Platoon Quartermaster Sergeant for the Combat Infantry Signals Platoon, who spends most of his time in a signals cabin in Camp Tombstone. With the story happily retailed by the BBC, it really is good to know that the powers that be have such a good grasp of what is really important and are keeping us so well-informed.

COMMENT THREAD

On the ball … as always

Mr Gerald Howarth, shadow defence procurement minister, was displaying his usual excellent grasp of military equipment yesterday during a House of Commons defence debate. Says Mr Howarth:

Mention has been made of the inconsistency between the Ministry of Defence's core programme and the urgent operational requirements, which I accept are essential if we are to protect the lives of our servicemen and women. But where is the strategy for Land Systems to replace a fleet of 35 to 40-year-old CVRT armoured fighting vehicles? I haven't a clue what CVRT stands for. I think that it is —

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. If the hon. Gentleman is not sure, I am sure that the House is mystified—and those outside the House even more so. Perhaps he can seek advice.

Hon. Members: Come on, Gerald, what are you going to do?

Mr. Howarth: I think I am going to phone a friend, actually. I am looking around for my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Mr. Blunt), who might bail me out. CVRT? I know that the "T" bit is "Tracked". Forgive me; I am sorry about this failure. Anyway, they are armoured fighting vehicles that are 35 to 40 years old, and I believe that the Department needs a strategy. The Minister mentioned new "dog" - type equipment—further to confuse us all — that is being introduced: Coyotes, Wolfhounds and goodness knows what. I do not believe that this is a substitute for a strategy; it is a strategy that we need.

Just to help you out, Gerald, CVR(T) stands for Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked). But then, you knew that really, didn't you? You were just testing us. That was all part of your own strategy. (The piccy is a Scimitar, by the way, one of the CVR(T) family – but then you knew that as well!)

We are in such good hands.

COMMENT THREAD

Something very wrong

We did the story yesterday, reporting on how there were major changes taking place in Helmand with the hand over of British military responsibilities in the southern part of the province to US forces.

This is now confirmed by another report in the Canadian media.

While it cannot be said that this is an earth-shattering story that should go right to the top of every front page, this is of some importance. Furthermore, it would be of some interest to many readers of what used to be our "broadsheet" newspapers. So far, though, there has not been a single word published on this development – as far as we are aware.

This seems to me to be more that just a question of news values. If the British media is unaware of this development, or thinks that it is not worth publishing details of it, then there is something very, very wrong.

COMMENT THREAD

Cut and be damned

Public spending should be cut by £30 billion says the think tank, Reform, as retailed by The Daily Telegraph. Both main political parties, it goes on to say, should stop the "conspiracy of silence" which is ensuring state spending remains high.

The detail is in its report and, with good cause, one of its targets for cuts is defence procurement. "Inappropriate" defence projects, says the think tank, should be ended, these including the future carriers, Eurofighter Tranche 3, A400M and Nimrod MRA4. They, we are gravely informed, "do not contribute to the UK's modern defence requirements."

Notionally, this would save £2.7 billion in 2010-2011 and the savings thus gained would act as an effective platform for further reform of defence procurement. Says Reform, if necessary, some of these programmes could be replaced with relevant off-the-shelf purchases at a lower cost. This would come at a cost to the Exchequer which would reduce the savings identified

However, while one cannot begin to disagree with the general thrust of the Reform thesis, their offering does little more than illustrate the huge difficulty in making sensible decisions on the purchase of military equipment.

Taking the list from the top, it is strongly arguable whether the carriers could be regarded as not contributing to the UK's "modern defence requirements," but it is not an issue I would care to argue and be confident of winning either way. Of course, the savings would be substantial, but the greater saving would be in not buying the Joint Strike Fighter to equip the carriers. Yet, Reform has nothing to say on this.

But, if the saving, to say the very least, is controversial, the Eurofighter Tranche 3 is equally so. This saga is one of long-standing and such is the nature of the contractual arrangements that, to cut the order now would possibly cost as much in compensation as would buying the aircraft. There is, though, something of an end in sight.

The idea is that we should split the tranche of 88 and commit to just 40 aircraft immediately, then allowing the 24 sold to the Saudis to be included in that number. That would leave 16 aircraft to be paid for but, with each airframe at £88 million, that still leaves us £1.4 billion to find. Like it or not, this is probably the best deal we can hope for. Reform's idea of savings here are probably illusory.

Turning to the A400M, there are no savings there to be made at all. With or without – and preferably without – this aircraft, we still need the airlift capacity. Thus, if the aircraft is cancelled, the same amount of money will have to be spent on C-17s or C-130Js, or a combination of the two.

The Nimrod MR4, however, is another matter. It is probably fair to say that if the clock was wound back, this aircraft would not have been ordered. But, with such a huge investment already made, should it now be cancelled the loss would be enormous. And there would remain a need for a high performance maritime surveillance platform, which could hardly be cheap, and could hardly be off-the-shelf.

Looking at the Reform proposals in the round, therefore, it is very hard to see how their ideas could yield their projected – or any – savings. The bigger point, though, is that waving a magic wand, making arbitrary cuts, is not the way to contain defence costs.

Equipment requirements, as we have so often observed, should stem from strategic requirements and then the doctrines that emerge from them. We then look for best value amongst the equipment needed to fulfil the needs. It is not an exercise for bean counters and for Reform to enter the fray is unwise.

COMMENT THREAD

While the children play

For a nation at war, with blood and treasure draining into the sands of Helmand, our ignorance of the current military situation in Afghanistan is matched only by the scale of public indifference - and the media's infantile treatment of the campaign.

Thus we see today the heart-warming story of the "lucky British Tommy", replicated ad nauseam in the popular media, who cheated death by 2mm when a bullet penetrated his helmet.

As a story, it has the fingerprints of the MoD "spin" machine all over it, a classic of the genre that represents both the extent and the style of coverage of the Afghan campaign, part of a deliberate media strategy promoted by the MoD.

It is attempting to shore up domestic support for the war, with a succession of "feel-good" stories, while strenuously avoiding any discussion of the strategic situation that might cause us to wonder what we are doing there and whether we are succeeding.

Given that the British media has all but abandoned any serious attempt at reporting the Afghan campaign, it is hardly surprising that it so readily falls in with this vacuous strategy. Thus it is to the Canadian press that we must turn for the latest slender clues as to what is going on. That, in itself, tells you all you need to know.

Even then the Canadian report has to be clothed in a "human interest" framing, although that in itself is revealing. It tells us that British troops in Helmand are largely unaware of the activities of their Canadian allies, fighting 40 miles away in the neighbouring Kandahar province, as indeed are most Canadians ignorant of the British efforts.

The vital pieces of intelligence, however, are buried in the report, from which we learn that the Canadians are about to hand over the largely unpopulated northeastern and southeastern half of Kandahar to a US Army Stryker Brigade, while the British are transferring the largely unpopulated southern half of Helmand to a US Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

That there has been considerable USMC activity in the southern part of Helmand is not news, their activities in Garmsir last year having been charted by us, but the fact that there is to be a formal hand-over of responsibility of part of Helmand to the US most certainly is news. Furthermore, it represents a major change in status – and presumably strategic direction – for British forces, about which we have been told absolutely nothing.

However, we learn from this Canadian report that the Brits and the Canadians have embraced the growing American presence and have adopted nearly identical strategies to try to win Afghans over. They are using provincial reconstruction teams comprised of civilians and soldiers that are "as joined at the hip as an organisation can be," says Col Greville Bibby, the British contingent's deputy commander.

This, we are then told, is part of a security bubble strategy, with Bibby enthusiastically endorsing it, telling the Canadian audience that it "works". It is absolutely fantastic to see, gushes the brave Colonel. "It is all about them doing it. I can tell you that if we pulled out, the locals would be very angry. They are really hungry for this."

One would be slightly more impressed but for Bibby trying to justify the British strategy of sending men out in poorly protected vehicles, as he tells us: "If you've got the enemy within, laying bombs and attacking with small pockets of men, there are not many scenarios in this small zone for armour." The populated terrain in this province (Helmand) was not practical for heavy vehicles, he says.

"Our experience in Northern Ireland is that you can't influence the people from behind 10 inches of armour. You can't do it whizzing past with armour, pushing them off the road," he then adds, apparently entirely unconscious of the fact that it was this dismal line of thought that cost the Army the campaign in Iraq.

If we get the impression that the British Army has learned very little from its experience in Iraq, at least we can be assured that the USMC is using armour in Helmand – and a great deal of air power. Whether that is or will be effective in the longer term is anyone's guess and, as far as this blog goes, it will be a guess – our masters are not rushing to do anything so rash as to keep us informed.

That, therefore, still leaves unexplained the strategic context of the USMC activity in Now Zad. So far, this has been completely unreported by the MoD and ignored by the British media.

One thus further wonders about Bibby. He retails, with other soldiers at Lashkar Gah, his "frustration" with their own (British) journalists for seldom wanting to report on the non-military war. "The British media focus on the kinetic stuff," says Sgt Paul Crawford, a Royal Engineer who has served previously in Iraq and Afghanistan. "They want to film firefights. But the majority of what we do is stability and construction."

As in Canada, we are told, there is a war to be won at home. While hugely supportive of their troops, many Britons remain sceptical about the mission. "My impression is that there is a lack of understanding as to why we are here," Bibby says. "Like so many things political, the media use this to discuss political implications, rather than what is actually happening on the ground."

But hey! The media doesn't do politics any more. And as for "a lack of understanding as to why we are here," that is mainly because the MoD and this current government is so heavily inspired by mushroom management that it dominates its public information strategy.

Thus, when it comes to what is happening on the ground, Bibby can hardly be unaware of the fact that not only is the media absent, so is the MoD. The brave Colonel only has to look at his own organisation's website to discover that. He will see that it is filled with inconsequential "feel good" PR puffs which do everything short of actually telling us what is going on. He should also know that the media is actively discouraged from coherent reporting – not that this presents much of a problem.

Nevertheless, a grown-up media would, by now, be champing at the bit, demanding to know more, and taking on the "spin merchants" in the MoD. But, as long as it can fill up its pages with tat and political soap opera, and our opposition politicians seem equally unconcerned about what is happening, absolutely nothing is going to change.

Thus are we left in a fog of ignorance and an impression that, whatever is happening, the MoD is extremely reluctant to enlighten us. That can only invoke grave suspicions and maximise distrust, purely on the basis that if the MoD is acting as if it had something to hide, then it is a reasonable assumption that it is indeed hiding something.

But, as long as the political children are content to play their own games, the MoD will get away with it, leaving the grown-ups struggling to work out whether the British activities in Afghanistan are as inept as we fear, or whether they are just being run at the normal level of incompetence.

Should the MoD deign to tell us otherwise – and put Bibby out to grass – we are all ears.

COMMENT THREAD

If we can't hack it …

What was once solely a British area of responsibility is no longer. In March 2006 British troops deployed to Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, with a view to imposing stability and bringing reconstruction.

Not only have they failed, the situation has become so tenuous that, increasingly, US troops are taking over, fighting for towns and territories that we have failed to capture or have lost.

Starting in December 2007, the US provided the bulk of the troops and most of the air assets to re-take Musa Qala. In April 2008, US Marines then re-took the town of Garmsir and now, having been effectively abandoned by the British in 2007, this month US Marines re-took the district town of Now Zad.

However, it says something of the paucity of information coming out of Afghanistan that the recent history of this small town is shrouded in obscurity, if not mystery.

Situated some 45 miles north of Gereshk and just under 40 miles due west of Kajaki, it was first occupied by British soldiers in June 2006, in response to a call for help from the governor of Now Zad. B Company, 3 Para, were flown out to the town. On arrival they found it calm but went ahead and helped shore up defences.

This had not been the first activity in the area. On 4 June, A Coy, 3 Para went on a mission codenamed Operation Mutay to a secure a suspected Taleban compound, close to Now Zad. They were supported by Patrols Coy, 3 Para, a platoon of Gurkhas and local police.

On their way to secure their objectives, the Gurkhas' Wimik convoy became involved in a heavy contact. Patrols Coy, also aboard WMIK Land Rovers, also had a heavy contact. Army Air Corps Apache gunships provided close air support.

A Coy were airlifted close to the target compounds by 2 RAF Chinooks, which came under heavy fire. A protracted fire fight ensued as A Coy fought their way into the compounds and then repelled counterattacks by determined Taliban forces. In addition to air support from AAC Apaches, US A-10s were also called in. Having secured and searched the compound, A Coy withdrew, fighting running battles with the Taleban, until they were eventually airlifted away.

The Paras in Now Zad were relieved by platoon from D Company of 2 Gurkha Rifles and then a Company from the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. From June to November 2006, in what was the longest defence of a static trench position in British Army history, the soldiers were holed up in the police compound in the centre of the town and, on occasion, came perilously close to being overrun.

In the course of just one month, July, the Gurkhas repulsed over two dozen attempts to overrun the compound, firing more than 30,000 rifle rounds and 17,000 machine-gun rounds. They killed an estimated 100 of their attackers, without losing a single man on their own side.

The Fusiliers then took over on 30 July, spending 107 days under attack before being relieved by 42 Commando Royal Marines in November 2006. The Marines then had as their mission "to provide stability for the local people during a period of ever decreasing security," something – through no fault of theirs – they singularly failed to do.

One of their number, Marine Richard Watson, was killed on 12 December 2006 as elements from his detachment were patrolling to the north of Now Zad. They came under attack from Taliban forces and Watson was hit by small arms fire and fatally wounded. The Commandos were replaced the spring of 2007 by 1st Battalion the Royal Anglian Regiment. They also lost a soldier, Pte Chris Gray, killed during a close-quarters firefight.

By July 2007, however – and possibly before - Now Zad seems to have been abandoned by the British, its population having deserted the town. It had, alongside Musa Qala, become occupied by the Taleban. We next hear of it again in December 2007, when US troops were engaged in a firefight in the outskirts during the operation to recover Musa Qala.

Then, on 15 June 2008, US Marines assigned to Foxtrot Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment mounted an attack on Taleban strongholds in Now Zad and, by the end of July seemed to have established a foothold.

Nothing much more was heard until September 2008 when the town was briefly mentioned after Royal Marines and US Marines of Foxtrot Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment were photographed sweeping the streets for improvised explosive devices.

By February 2009, however, the town was defined as a USMC area of operations and off-limits to journalists. Free-lance journalist David Tate was told by the Marines, "That's not the story we want to push."

Tate described the town as having been abandoned for three years, with the villagers living displaced to nearby village. The town's infrastructure was crumbling and it was a virtual "free fire" zone in the sense that the only people left in it were Taleban.

And so we come to 3 April this year, when we were told (yesterday) that a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force conducted a major combat operation against insurgent forces in Now Zad.

Marines of Company L, 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), the ground combat element, "struck well-known enemy locations identified within and near the insurgent-infested Now Zad District centre." "Now Zad's District center is kind of a unique place in Afghanistan because there is no local civilian population," said 1st Lt Mike H. Buonocore, the executive officer of Company L.

The Marines targeted positively identified enemy positions from which insurgent attacks had originated over the past several months. Other locations were identified with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets.

The two major components involved in the operation were a ground force and an aerial assault. Enemy targets were destroyed by combined fires from rocket artillery, aircraft, mortars and ground troops. "The mission took some enemy forces out of the fight and showed them how much force we have with us and what we can use against them," said Cpl Andrew C Conte, a squad leader with the ground assault element. "It really cleared out some of the areas we were having troubles in."

The ground scheme employed Company L as the main effort by conducting a raid on a known enemy position. Other Marines held blocking positions to ensure insurgent reinforcements were denied freedom of movement and the opportunity to engage the Marine forces.

Navy F/A-18C Hornet fighter-attack aircraft, an Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber, Marine AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, the Army's tactical missile system and Btry. D, 2/14's high mobility artillery rocket system set conditions for the operation by employing precision munitions on key insurgent targets. "Once the bombs started dropping there wasn't too much movement," said Conte. "With all the ground forces out there and everything we had overhead, it was calm because we knew nothing was going to touch us."

"We were able to engage some enemy targets before they engaged us," said Cpl Taylor E. Vogel, a forward observer with the 81 mm mortar platoon. "We were able to drop mortars on [enemy] fire teams that were moving in on [Marine] units. We definitely achieved what we wanted to. We destroyed the big targets that have been occupied by enemy forces."

Leading up to the operation, the Marines had "proactively conducted combat operations" in Now Zad's District centre daily in order to shape the battlefield by moving insurgents into disposable positions. Marines took precautions by using leaflet drops and radio broadcasts in the area to warn the population in nearby villages of the danger, which helped reduce collateral damage.

"Throughout the winter in Afghanistan, you hear about the [insurgent] spring offensive," said Conte. "We caught them before they caught us in the spring offensive, and we set the tone of it with showing how much [firepower] we have and what we can use."

Insurgents attempted to counter the Marines' strike with IEDs, mortars, small-arms fire and two rockets, with no success. Instead, the Marines positively identified and pursued their targets. "The operation was a tremendous success on all levels," said Buonocore. "The confirmed battle damage assessment is pretty significant. There were no civilian casualties, and nothing was hit that wasn't a target."

The Americans are to be congratulated for this "tremendous success", but it does show up our inability to step up to the plate and solve the problems we undertook to deal with. However, this is a coalition operation, and there is no shame in accepting the help of the better equipped and more numerous US forces.

What is disturbing though is the silence of the British media and, indeed, of our own MoD. Full of praise for the welcome, if modest achievements of British troops, it is grudging to the point of churlish about acknowledging the achievements of our allies.

If we can't hack it on our own, the very least we can do is express our appreciation to the Americans who – even if they are acting in their own interests – are doing the fighting (and sometimes the dying) which would otherwise fall to our troops.

An alliance is an alliance – we are not alone. We should behave accordingly.

COMMENT THREAD

A diet of mantras

Right on cue, we get another complaint about "overstretch" in the media, this one "inspired" by shadow defence secretary Liam Fox, on the basis of a parliamentary question answered on 30 April.

Fox asked for the average and highest number of days of detached duty for each RAF trade in the last 12 months and was given a comprehensive table which sets out the figures. This included details for pilots, who spend an average of 76 days on detached duty, with an unspecified number (which could be one) spending 315 days away. Medical staff (unspecified) average 161 days with a number spending 304 days away, while air traffic controllers are doing 106 days, some peaking at 360.

This is somehow translated into the legend that, "Overworked RAF faces manpower crisis". Then we learn that, "It is thought that the strain of continuous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for six years has meant that hundreds of RAF personnel have resigned fed up with time away from their families." Personnel, we are told, are supposed be away for no more than 140 days but figures obtained from the Ministry of Defence indicate that the "overstretch crisis" is so severe that the rules are being breached.

This is about the so-called harmony guidelines. For the RAF, the original aim was indeed for individuals to be away no more than 140 days in a 12-month period before breaching harmony. But breaches are by no means a new phenomenon. According to figures in 2007, some 6.7 percent of trained strength was deployed for periods in excess of that.

However, the guidelines have been revised and are now couched in terms of spending no more than 280 days in every 24 months away from the normal place of duty.

By this measure, we have a complex situation, where the problem is related to "pinch points" – shortages in specific specialities. Dentists, it seems, are not in breach, Chaplains are somewhat in demand with 10.8 percent in breach and personnel trainers (formerly admin training) suffer 14.3 percent. Second worst off are gunners, who are 18.4 percent in breach, against medical staff at 18.6.

Whether that amounts to a "crisis" is another matter. The situation has been with us a long time but, at the very least, has stabilised. Compared with 2007, the RAF establishment is roughly the same, at 96.3 percent of requirements. And last year trained outflow fell 15.2 percent, running at 3,820 compared with 4,500 in 2007.

As of December last, the shortfall on an establishment of 41,290 was 1,540 but, with the first quarter figures out soon, an improvement is expected as the recession bites. Thus, the RAF is forecast to reflect the broader trend which became apparent at the end of last year, when – according to the latest figures - 21,670 personnel joined the forces, compared with losses of 18,570 – a net gain of over 3,000.

To say that this is a classic "non-story", therefore, is to put it mildly. It is thus hard to accept Liam Fox's assertion that the figures prove that an "overstretch crisis" extends across the Armed Forces, or that "Labour's cuts to the RAF are now biting hard." Still less does this support his argument that, "This is why we need a Strategic Defence Review so that we can work out the future role of each service and ensure that their commitments are properly resourced."

Far from "cuts", when it comes to RAF spending, we see from this debate that the Labour government has been throwing money at the Harrier fleet, having spent something like £860 million on upgrades to improve its performance specifically for roles in Afghanistan.

To put this in perspective, this is £160 million more than is being spent on the entire armoured vehicle package for the Army, announced last October, and represents the purchase price of approximately 150 Super Tucanos.

As we pointed out two years ago, the costs of running the Harrier fleet are staggering, with official figures put at £37,000 per hour – exclusive of ordnance costs. For a capability which is, at best, highly suspect, this is little short of insanity, a wilful misallocation of resources that cries out for intelligent analysis.

It does not need a Strategic Defence Review to work out what is going wrong with current defence policy, and nor does repeating the mantras of "overstretch" or "Labour's cuts" take us any further. If Fox really wanted to relieve pressure on the budget, he would be pressing for the retirement of fast jets in Afghanistan, and their replacement with several squadrons of Super Tucanos, one of which - at the very least - would be in Afghan air force colours.

COMMENT THREAD

A misallocation of resources

We saw a piece over the weekend informing us that thousands of United States marines are to be deployed alongside British troops in southern Afghanistan within weeks after the "overstretched" British have fought to stalemate with the Taliban.

The fact is that US troops have been bearing the brunt of operations for some time in Helmand, which is now only nominally a British responsibility. But what has not been widely reported is the intensity of air effort deployed in support of British forces and generally, amounting to 60-70 combat sorties a day. Additionally, a significant number of surveillance and reconnaissance missions are being flown, comprising manned and unmanned aircraft.

We get some clues from the current reports (and here) as to the range of strikes, but what we do not get is any clear idea of how and under what circumstances airpower is actually used.

For that, though, we can turn to a remarkable book written by Capt Doug Beattie (with Philip Gomm) called An Ordinary Soldier, published in October last year. This is a detailed account of an attempt in September 2006 to retake the town of Garmsir after it had been over-run by the Taliban. Beattie was in charge of a detachment of six British soldiers, including himself, mentoring a group of Afghan National Police.

They, in concert with the Afghan National Army – also mentored by British soldiers – the total amounting to no more than about 200 men, were up against a ferocious enemy, seeking to do what it eventually took 2,400 US Marines to achieve some 18 months later.

But what comes over from the account is the extremely heavy reliance on airpower. On one day, the attack was supported by no less than nine aircraft, comprising F-18s, a B-1 bomber, Apache attack helicopters and Harriers. Without their intervention, it is quite possible that many coalition lives would have been lost and the gallant Capt Beattie would not have survived to write his excellent book.

What also comes over is how the absence of loiter capability in the support aircraft heavily affects the dynamics of the fighting. With the fast jets, their time over the targets is extremely limited and, because of the rules of engagement, they can only be called in once contact is made with the enemy.

Thus the tempo was set by the coalition forces advancing, making contact with the enemy, calling in air support and waiting for the aircraft to arrive. The pilots were then briefed on their targets by the JTAC (Joint Tactical Air Controller) and delivered their bombs (called "stores"). This was sometimes followed by strafing runs but the outcome was invariably that the enemy fire subsided. However, every time, the enemy regrouped and fighting resumed, whence more strikes were called in, and so on, with monotonous regularity. Thus did the battle proceed, day after day.

Contrasted with the small number of coalition forces actually committed to the battle, one is thus struck by the wholly disproportionate expenditure in manpower in supporting them. Apart from the pilot's time, for every hour flown, an F-18 needs nearly 17 hours routine maintenance. The Harrier is said to require nearly 60. Behind that is the infrastructure to keep the aircraft flying, right down to the cooks, clerks and bottle washers. In all, far more men (and women) were committed to supporting the ground forces than actually took part in the battle.

Furthermore, in terms of effect, the aircraft were most often being called in to target small packets of men – what might be called low-value targets – with sometimes 2,000lb bombs being delivered. Not only is this "overkill", causing massive collateral damage, the expense of the guided munitions is enormous.

On the other hand, in one episode – day five of the attack – Beattie resorted to using a 51mm mortar, in this case with devastating results, killing four men with one bomb. The effect was equal to or greater than some of the observed effects from the air strikes.

This was achieved with the lightest of the mortars in the British Army inventory. Heavier 81mm versions are also available. Able to fire 15 x 9lb bombs per minute with stunning accuracy, these are formidable weapons.

One cannot avoid speculating, therefore, whether the availability of one or more 81mm mortars – especially if they had been mounted on a mobile platform such as the FV432 APC – could have achieved exactly the same results as the airpower, but in a more timely and certainly more economic fashion, using considerably less manpower overall. Moreover, this technology is hardly new, with the Allies in WWII (and the Germans) using similar combinations - see picture.

However, with indirect fire, as in using mortars, targets are engaged which are out of direct line of sight – that being one of the advantages of the weapon. Thus, for accurate target designation and damage assessment, air spotting is highly advantageous.

Addressing this issue, coincidentally, I am also re-reading a book on the 1944 battle for Normandy and the contrast is striking. There, the air cover was continuous and reaction immediate, to the point where daytime movement in the German Army became impossible. When there were no strike aircraft immediately in the sky, there were always spotter aircraft aloft – usually Austers - ready to call in artillery or mortar strikes.

For continuous air cover, the current generation of fast jets is entirely unsuitable and we are back to the argument about the use of Tucanos (pictured above) or similar prop-jets, which can loiter for four hours or more over the battlefield. Able also to deliver their own ordnance, a very small number of these aircraft could provide a continuous overview of the battle, providing real-time intelligence, artillery spotting and air strikes.

And not only do they cost considerably less than the fast jets, the maintenance requirement is two man hours per hour flown. The case is powerfully argued here, with an estimate that replacing a high-end capability squadron of F-16s with cheaper turbo-props could save a half billion dollars per Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) rotation.

The experiences of Capt Beattie and his men, however, do not only suggest a more sanguine look at battlefield support. They also raise questions as to their basic equipment. His team of six men were fighting from two Wimiks and there is no question that their .50 cal machine guns and their GPMGs were powerful additions to the armoury. But there is also no question that their platforms – the unarmoured Land Rovers – were being used for exactly the role where previously armoured cars would have been used.

The tactical situation cried out either for such vehicles, or light tanks, which could have manoeuvred under fire when, instead, Beattie and his men were forced to take cover. After some incredibly near misses, it is only luck that they were not all killed.

Despite Beattie's heroism – he was later awarded the Military Cross – the action was only partially successful, the coalition forces maintaining a tenuous hold on the district centre and an eastern checkpoint, suffering daily attacks which continued well into 2007, before the town was fully secured by the USMC in 2008.

Arguably, had the intervention been more decisive earlier, preventing the Taliban building up its strength, the large number of troops which eventually had to be fielded would not have been necessary.

Thus, while we see the ritual complaints of "overstretch" in the current report, with the handmaiden complaint of "under-resourced", it is germane to ask whether indeed either complaint is valid. In purely financial terms, there is no shortage of resource being pumped into the fight against the Taleban, and the overall number of men and women deployed easily outmatch the enemy.

What we are seeing, therefore, may be more a question of a misallocation of resources – the concentration on high-tech equipment which is soaking up funds and manpower when more boots on the ground with better, but still basic equipment might achieve decisive results.

This makes the recent speech by Robert Gates all the more appropriate. But we are also reminded of a piece we wrote in March 2007 when we cited Ed E. Heinemann, designer of the B-26 Invader, the A-1 SkyRaider and the A-4 SkyHawk,

He declared: "The obstacles to any simplification may seem insurmountable, and the reasons for more complexity are many and powerful. But if we permit this Frankenstein of complexity to continue to work at its current plodding, insidious rate, it will slowly overwhelm us to impotency."

We were there, impotent, in September 2006. Currently – with 60-70 sorties a day being flown - nothing much seems to have changed.

COMMENT THREAD

Sacred cows to the abattoir

There were quite smiles of satisfaction in some offices in the darker reaches of Whitehall this week – and elsewhere. These were occasioned by an event in the United States which could mark a major turning point in a vicious battle that has been fought for fifteen years or more.

This is the battle for the future shape of our military, one that has barely been recognised outside a very narrow group of specialists. Unremarkably, therefore, it has been almost completely ignored or misunderstood by the media, most MPs and the entire political commentariat.

That, however, does not diminish its importance, with the putative turning point coming with the budget speech by Robert Gates, US Defense Secretary. Although in Washington, the battle over the future shape of the military has been led from across the Atlantic. Therefore, what happens there has a profound impact on British thinking - and actions.

The significance is that Gates has decided to bite the bullet and do the very thing which is needed over here, announcing that he is planning to "reshape the priorities of America's defense establishment." The aim is to "shift resources and institutional weight towards supporting the current wars and other potential irregular campaigns,"

If his proposals are approved by Congress, he says, they will "profoundly reform" how the Department of Defense does business. At the very heart of this is a rebalancing of his department's programmes in order, he says, to "institutionalise and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead". He will, however, also provide a "hedge" against other risks and contingencies.

To achieve this, Gates proposes to "reform how and what we buy," which means "a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting." Crucially, he tells us, his department must stop programmes that significantly exceed their budget or which spend limited tax dollars "to buy more capability than the nation needs".

In phrasing that will echo around Whitehall and find its way into British documents, Gates declares that conventional modernisation goals "should be tied to the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries – not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary given unlimited time and resources."

Thus, Gates is taking on the enemy in a full-frontal assault, the same enemy that we face here in the MoD, the "defence bureaucracies" which – here as in the US - "have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures".

The problem Gates identifies is that the defence establishment is a set of institutions largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern armies, navies, and air forces. Shifting that priority, he wants the department to be more people-centred, focused on programmes which directly support, protect, and care for the man or woman at the front.

In terms of hardware, his number one priority is to increase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support for the warfighter, adding $2 billion to the base budget.

This will include fielding 50 Predator-class UAVs, representing a 62 percent increase in capability over the current level and 127 percent from over a year ago, increasing manned ISR capabilities such as the turbo-prop aircraft deployed so successfully as part of "Task Force Odin" in Iraq, and initiating research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimised for today's battlefield.

Additionally, he aims to spend $500 million more on increasing the capacity to field and sustain more helicopters. The primary limitation on helicopter capacity, he tells us, is not airframes but shortages of maintenance crews and pilots. So the focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews.

Then, "to boost global partnership capacity efforts," Gates plans to increase funding by $500 million, to include training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counter terrorism and stability operations. He will also "grow" the special operations capabilities, increasing personnel by more than 2,800 or five percent and will buy more special forces-optimised lift, mobility, and refuelling aircraft.

On the broader front, Gates is closing down the F-22 programme and stepping up production of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, an interesting choice as this multi-role aircraft has a ground attack and surveillance capability not shared by the F-22 air superiority fighter. A number of other programmes are being cut or cancelled, the latter including the VH-71 presidential helicopter, which is vastly overspent.

"The perennial procurement and contracting cycle – going back many decades – of adding layer upon layer of cost and complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build," says Gates, "must come to an end."

In this context, the really significant news for us is that Gates is planning to ditch plans to procure vehicles for the US Army's Future Combat System (FCS) – the direct equivalent of the FRES "utility" vehicles, on which the outgoing CGS, General Dannatt, had set his heart.

Although Gates intends to retain and accelerate incremental development of the technology enhancements to all combat brigades, he states:

I have concluded that there are significant unanswered questions concerning the FCS vehicle design strategy. I am also concerned that, despite some adjustments, the FCS vehicles – where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency, and greater informational awareness are expected to compensate for less armor – do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This was precisely the conclusion that we had come to in 2004 when we first wrote about the subject. Five years on, and many more millions spent, we finally have a politician who is brave enough to slaughter the military's sacred cow.

Thus, an $87 billion programme bites the dust, made all the more delicious by Gates's noting that the current vehicle programme, developed nine years ago, "does not include a role for our recent $25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today's conflicts." He then adds: "An Army vehicle modernisation program designed to meet the needs of the full spectrum of conflict is essential." And, at $25 versus $87 billion, it is pretty obvious which way the wind is blowing.

Pre-empting criticism – of which there is already plenty - Gates concludes by saying that his "reform budget" reflects the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan – while also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world.

In the coming weeks, he says, we will hear a great deal about threats, and risk and danger – to our country and to our men and women in uniform – associated with different budget choices. He continues:

Some will say I am too focused on the wars we are in and not enough on future threats. The allocation of dollars in this budget definitely belies that claim. But, it is important to remember that every defense dollar spent to over-insure against a remote or diminishing risk – or, in effect, to "run up the score" in a capability where the United States is already dominant – is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I will not take.

We must, he says, "critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements – those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead."

Gates could have used another phrase, such as "opportunity cost". While the generals hanker after their toys, men and women die for want of the correct kit, and we lose our wars.

The US Defense Secretary has delivered a mortal blow to the "toy brigade" both across the Atlantic and here. With the US pulling out of FCS, there is no way the FRES fantasy can survive here – and there may be other sacred cows headed for the abattoir.

Gates has also seriously wounded our most deadly enemy, the MoD, with a hope that a change of direction in the United States may now lead to a similar movement here, saving billions of pounds and many lives. There is now an outside chance that our military will get the kit it needs, instead of the toys the generals – and the rest of the defence establishment – want.

COMMENT THREAD

For the front line …

So, we have the latest piece of hardware which those MoD geniuses have devised, proving once again that they are working for the enemy rather than our own forces.

This inspired creation is … wait for it … a dune buggy or, to be more specific, a whole fleet of them. And they must be real good because, at £7 million for 75 of them, that works out at close on £100,000 each (£93.3k to be precise). Are they gold-plated?

The vehicles are to be produced by Derbyshire-based Enhanced Protection Systems Ltd (EPS) and are called the Springer. And, continuing the long tradition of MoD spin, Dr Andrew Tyler,* Chief Operating Officer for MoD Defence Equipment and Support, proudly tells us:

This new vehicle will enable the delivery of vital equipment to front-line troops. It is designed specifically for rugged, desert conditions - which means it is well-matched to the operational environment in Afghanistan. The Springer dune buggy will be an added capability for troops at Forward Operating Bases in Afghanistan. This contract demonstrates that we're continuing to invest in vehicles for the front line.

The Springer will have a crew of two and the ability to carry a combat load of 1 ton. Its role, we are told, is specifically focused on moving combat supplies from helicopter landing sites into the forward operating bases.

In other words, this vehicle is intended for use at the sharp end, where there is the highest possibility of "contact" with the Taleban and where troops are most at risk.

Interestingly, the details published on the MoD website are also reproduced on a number of technical sites but, on the prestigious Defence Aerospace site, the editor was moved to add this comment:

Given the number of British soldiers that have been killed by improvised explosive devices while riding in unprotected vehicles, the procurement of modified dune buggies to support operations in Afghanistan is more than a little puzzling. The photograph above shows all too clearly the amount of protection available to the vehicle's crew. Indeed, on its face this announcement resembles more a belated April's Fool joke than a responsible ministerial procurement decision.

This is not an unreasonable comment. In June 2007, the Canadians were operating a very similar type of vehicle called the Gator, which was targeted by the Taleban, killing three men, an incident we recorded at the time. As a result, the Canadians banned their use "outside the wire", requiring protected vehicles to be used instead.

But, as we all know, our brilliant MoD knows best, which is why it has chosen this wonderful equipment. And that is why we are winning the war.

* Dr Tyler is a real expert in military vehicles. He was previously DE&S Director General Ships, where he was responsible for putting the Surface Fleet to sea and keeping it there. He was also the MoD Senior Responsible Owner for the Maritime Industrial Strategy, a key part of the overall Defence Industrial Strategy.

COMMENT THREAD

Operation Snakebite

Having in December 2007 followed the Musa Qala operation as best we could at the time, it is of more than usual interest that a book has been published, offering the first detailed account of what went on.

This is Operation Snakebite written by Sunday Times journalist Stephen Grey, described as "the explosive true story of an Afghan desert siege".

For those who enjoy the "war book" genre, this is a stonking good read. It is finely crafted, with a well-structured narrative and a good mixture of characterisation, description and fact to keep the reader turning the pages to the very end. It also provides a valuable historical account of an at times horrifying story – as the blurb puts it – "of a war which has gone largely unnoticed back home."

The reason it has gone "largely unnoticed", of course, is that the MoD not only avoided telling anyone about it, but put a security block on the official publication of details, which left the MoD website devoid of information, with journalists contacting the Taleban on their mobile telephones to get details of the operation.

Courtesy of Grey, we now know that there were several reasons for the MoD's reticence, one being the coincidental visit of Gordon Brown to Camp Bastion. With the largest operation then to have been mounted in Helmand Province and with the outcome far from certain, officials were concerned that news of the operation might detract from the prime minister's visit, especially if there were casualties.

But the major reason, Grey tells us, was that both the British and the Americans had decided that this was to be an I/O – an "information operation" – otherwise known as a propaganda exercise. The intention was to convey to the outside world that this was an operation led by the Afghanis, assisted by coalition forces.

As a result, we had the bizarre scene of the "capture" of the town centre being photographed by the MoD's Defence Combat Camera Team, showing jubilant Afghani troops raising their national flag. British and US forces who had fought their way into the town, after periods of intense combat, were forced to hide their vehicles and keep out of sight for the fiction to be perpetrated.

The fighting by the coalition forces, the lead up to the operation and the political background, are well-described by Grey, leaving the reader under no illusions that this major operation was almost entirely a coalition effort, made possible by the injection of massive US forces, including elements of the US 82nd Airborne Division, which paved the way for the assault with a daring, if risky, helicopter assault.

Behind this operation are the political machinations, both Afghani and military, which lends a conspiratorial overtone to the book, lifting it above the ordinary "war book", giving it more depth than would be expected from this genre.

With a highly informative account of the history of Helmand to open the book, this makes this a rounded narrative, which culminates in a short analytical chapter which tries to set the operation in the broader context of the counter-insurgency operation in Afghanistan.

Of special interest is Grey's detail of the number of mine strikes suffered by British forces, one of which he witnessed, giving a moving and personal edge to the account, which benefited from his presence as an embedded reporter and his personal knowledge and friendships with some of his subjects. He also notes that the King's Royal Hussars were equipped with Mastiffs, with the squadron taking fourteen IED hits, suffering no serious injuries – although does not link the two issues.

There is also a graphic and detailed account of the intervention of USAF AC-130H Spectres in the final stages of the assault on Musa Qala, a role which Grey describes as "decisive", confirming the utility of these airborne gunships as a battle-winning weapon - something of which British procurement officials should take note.

Despite its vibrancy as a book however and an amount of technical detail, Grey is obviously at the limit of his knowledge when it comes to Army equipment. At one point, he describes a Sultan APC as a "light tank" and an Afghani Army truck as a "Bedford" when it is an International 7400 truck. These and other minor points suggest that Grey is more of a "people" man and lacks a wider understanding of military issues.

That, to an extent, is also reflected in his analysis, which tends to be superficial and derivative. He perhaps over-reliant on the opinions of those he interviews – of which there are an impressive number, in excess of 200. Despite his access to top-ranking military officials, though, he makes very little use of them - and we thus do not see enough of Grey's own thoughts in terms of evaluating their responses.

This is not necessarily a weakness if your expectations are of a well-written historical narrative, in which Grey the journalist excels, aided by superb maps, illustrations and photographs. One important omission though is an index, which limits the utility of the book to serious students of the Afghani campaign.

That notwithstanding, for what it is, it is a valuable and important addition to the growing library of works beginning to emerge from the campaign and is an essential read for anyone who seeks a better understanding of what is indeed "a war which has gone largely unnoticed back home."

COMMENT THREAD

A crisis of indifference

There is too much happening in this damn world for any one individual even to be able to start giving a coherent picture. That makes our masthead statement rather forlorn, where we offer to "discuss issues related to the UK's position in Europe and the world".

Inevitably, therefore, choices have to be made and, with limited resources, we can do only so much. Thus when things are being covered elsewhere, we tend to leave them, unless we have something to say which we feel adds value. Instead, we often try to focus on issue we believe important which are not getting the coverage they should.

For that reason, we return again to the subject of Afghanistan. It is not the only important issue in the world or the UK, and it is not the most important. But it is fair to say that, relative to its actual importance – both internationally and domestically – the coverage of the issues is dangerously slight. In our own limited way, therefore, we feel the need to redress the balance.

Of particular concern is one issue pointed out on our forum, in relation to yesterday's Dispatches programme, and the comments by our soon to be Chief of the General Staff, Gen David Richards about our ability to admit our mistakes and learn from them.

Asked by Stephen Grey why Americans speak so candidly about things that go wrong, but in Britain "every operation... seems to be a success", Richards suggests that the Americans "have the confidence and resources, to correct the errors that they identify." In the British camp, however, Richards admits that he is "not certain we always feel that we're going to, so we tend to plug on and hope that we'll find a way through our problems."

This, from such a senior military officer is a startling admission which, with the other responses from Stirrup and Dannatt, suggest that there are institutional failings within the military which far transcend the individual errors that we have seen and reported.

One of the major problems here, though, is the contemporary media and political narrative, which positions the military as the "heroes", with the gallant generals – Dannatt in particular – standing up for "Our Boys" against the venal and incompetent politicians, who are also charged with "lacking military experience".

In the general context of personality politics, therefore, we have a scenario where every failing or shortcoming – real or perceived – is laid at the door of the politicians, and most often at the figurehead, prime minister Blair and now Gordon Brown.

We would not even begin to suggest that either and both of these did not bear a very great responsibility for the disasters we are experiencing. However, this one-dimensional narrative enables the Service Chiefs to float serenely above the fray. They can thus make blunder after blunder, in the certain knowledge that their political masters will take the flak, leaving them free to repeat the same mistakes or invent new ones – completely unchallenged.

One slight sign that perception is changing comes from, of all people, Con Couglin in his blog, not that you would not guess this from the title of the piece, which proclaims "Government incompetence is destroying the British Army's reputation." The sting is in the tail though, where Coughlin writes:

It's not just that we don't have enough "force enablers" - armoured vehicles and helicopters, the government has also failed to provide sufficient force levels to adequately secure the southern Afghan province. As a consequence the Americans - as happened in Iraq - are now having to send their own troops to help bail us out. As a result the proud reputation of our military for delivering results on the battlefield lies in tatters. All those responsible for this appalling state of affairs, whether in the government or the military, should hang their heads in shame.

It is that phrase, "whether in the government or the military" which is the key point. As many of the mistakes have been made in the military as in the government. And many that have been made by the government have not been corrected by the military or – as important – have not been disputed.

On the other hand, some of the things which the politicians have done have been in the teeth of military opposition, and have been the right things – the MRAP/protected vehicle programme being one of them. We keep having to say – and in the context of the Dispatches programme, this is all the more relevant – that the purchase of the Vector was a military decision. The procurement of the Mastiff was a political decision. And there is no doubt now as to which one was right.

Interestingly, exactly the same dynamics are happening across the Atlantic. In the US, it was Robert Gates's decision to kick-start the MRAP programme which rescued the Iraqi campaign and that was also a political decision, in the face of prevarication by the military, which had been sitting on the programme for ten years

This comes over in an important budget speech made by Gates, which we will review in detail later, but it is briefly reported in The Washington Post today, with the headline, "Gates proposal reveals his alienation from procurement system." In calling yesterday for "a dramatic change in the way we acquire military equipment," the report says:

… Gates showed his slow but palpable alienation from the so-called iron triangle of defense contractors, lawmakers and military service executives that has long promoted building the best weapons systems, no matter what the price. In the future, he said, weapons should be engineered to counter "the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries," not what a potential adversary might create with "unlimited time and resources."

Here in this country, we have the same issues and many more. But, as we remarked in our earlier piece, they are not being discussed.

This is the bigger problem. In days gone by, systemic weaknesses in our military, a procession of failures and the prospect of an even bigger failure as we lose the war in Afghanistan, would have been news. These would have been matters of concern, the subject of debate, issues to be resolved. Instead, there is near silence and a complete absence of debate. People – and especially the political claque – do not want to know.

What we have here is a crisis of indifference. And a nation that no longer cares deserves to lose – as indeed we have done before.

COMMENT THREAD

Mission impossible?

It was difficult not to be impressed by the "Mission Impossible?" Dispatches documentary on Channel 4 last night, not least for the galaxy of military "stars" that journalist Stephen Grey managed to interview – including Jock Stirrup, CDS, and Richard Dannatt, CGS.

However, as I suggested in my post on Sunday, such high-level access comes at a price, and the MoD would have driven a hard bargain to allow such prestigious interviews to have gone ahead.

This would not amount to anything as crude as an attempt to shape the editorial content of the programme, but the deal was undoubtedly in terms of what was left out, or left unsaid. That left Grey, rather cleverly I thought, to say on the Channel 4 website, "I will leave viewers to judge for themselves what these men have to say."

If we were intended to read between the lines, that was not difficult as they were far apart enough to drive a Challenger II between them. And, if there was a message to be read from that exercise, it was not a happy one. Certainly, what I took from it was an impression of uncertain objectives, lack of strategic direction, a confused chain of command, disastrous tactics, lack of resources and inadequate equipment.

Nor can we be assured that this is in the past, although it what there that the heavy hand of the MoD was probably at its most oppressive. We were allowed a backwards glimpse at the chaos, but there was very little analysis of where we stand at present, or what the future prospects might be.

Such was the detail, however, that we are going to have to come back to this for a more thorough analysis. But what was most striking of the early part of the programme was the rehashing of the story of the disastrous "platoon house" policy of 2006, the film centring on the events at Musa Qala, culminating in its retaking the year before last, largely by US forces.

We were also reminded that there were four such platoon houses, the other three at Sangin, Geresht, and Now Zad. We mentioned the latter briefly in February 2007, referring to the epic struggle of the Gurkhas at that site.

However, while we got the history of Musa Qala, nothing was said of Now Zad. But, yesterday evening we received the daily picture update from the DoD which, by complete coincidence, offered the photograph shown above, with the following narrative:

US Marines with 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment conduct an operation in Now Zad, Afghanistan, April 3, 2009. Residents have abandoned Now Zad, a village in the Helmand province of Afghanistan, because of the strong insurgent presence. The Marines, assigned to a ground combat element of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Afghanistan, are conducting operations to help the Afghans regain control of the area. (DoD photo by Gunnery Sgt. James A. Burks, U.S. Marine Corps/Released)

This actually reinforces the depth of British failure in Afghanistan for, not only has this village – once occupied by British troops – been abandoned, its recovery is being left to US forces with, it appears, no British involvement. This comes on the back of the recovery of Garmsir last year, almost entirely by US Marines.

But what is absolutely staggering is that, on the day that photograph was taken, the MoD ran a "puff" on its website, telling us that "British soldiers have been helping teach their Afghan Army counterparts English while at the same time developing their own Pashtu and Dari language skills to help improve understanding and the quality of training."

That was the sole extent of official British news from Afghanistan, yet from the official US site we get this:

In Afghanistan, an Air Force B-1B Lancer bomber destroyed an anti-Afghan forces staging area and several enemy positions in the area around Now Zad using guided bomb unit -31s and -38s. Enemy forces had targeted coalition units using heavy machine guns and automatic weapons prior to the bomber's arrival.

Coalition ground forces called in several Navy F/A-18C Hornets and F/A-18E Super Hornets to hit enemy targets in the vicinity of Kajaki Dam, including an enemy mortar position, observation posts, communication tunnels, and a spotter position in a walled compound. A variety of GBU-series precision weaponry was used to carry out the strike, which took place in response to anti-Afghan mortar fire.

An F/A-18C and a coalition aircraft used a GBU-12 and GBU-38, as well as a strafing pass to strike anti-Afghan forces spotted gathering in a staging area near Musa Qala. Enemy forces were engaged in readying rockets for launch against coalition units. The coalition aircraft struck a large group of enemy combatants, while the Hornet hit a series of pillboxes and bunkers in the area. The Hornet also attacked enemy targets in Now Zad following reports of enemy fire there.

The reference to Kajaki is also interesting, as last Saturday, a US soldier was killed there, while what were described as "joint forces" (i.e., US and Afghani) killed 15 militants during a raid on a compound reportedly used for making weapons and bombs.

Kajaki was also, until very recently, an area supposedly under British control yet, on 2 April we also saw an official report telling us that a Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet and an Air Force MQ-9A Reaper dropped guided bomb unit-12 and 38s on anti-Afghan compounds near Kajaki Dam.

Several enemy gunmen who had been firing rocket propelled grenades and assault rifles at a Coalition patrol from the structures, were killed in the strikes. The aircraft also provided overwatch to the convoy and provided tactical surveillance. Then …

During a second engagement taking place in the area around Kajaki Dam, Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles and A-10 Thunderbolt IIs dropped GBU-38s and performed strafes, targeting enemy personnel with RPGs and automatic weapons. The A-10 destroyed an enemy lookout tower with one of its bombs as an F-15E hit a gunman hiding behind the berm of a small irrigation water pool. Coalition ground forces followed up the airstrikes with a ground attack.

Additionally, near Lashkar Gah, still occupied by British forces, a US Air Force F-15E executed a show of force expending flares in order to help a coalition unit break away from enemy gunfire. When the enemy's shooting continued after the fly-over, the F-15E strafed the hostile forces with its guns. An F/A-18E also flew a show of force, suppressing enemy fire from another enemy position.

And, of the fabled Musa Qala, a Strike Eagle employed a GBU-38 to destroy an anti-Afghan forces bunker built inside a residential compound. Enemy personnel inside were shooting at coalition troops when the position was blown up.

There is a whole war going on out there, and not only are we being told nothing of it by our own government and media, it is one which is largely being fought by US forces in a region that was originally allocated to the British.

Instead of news, we were treated last night to a picture of squabbling, dysfunctional and clearly inept senior British officers. What Stephen Grey did for us, therefore, was explain why it is that US forces have largely taken over. This is Iraq all over again – another famous British "victory" in the making.

COMMENT THREAD

Boys and their toys

"With a barrage of ear-shattering bangs, the British Army showed off the full array of firepower it has at its disposal during a Land Combat Power Display on Salisbury Plain last week."

That is the current offering from the MoD website, under the heading: "Army shows off its firepower", describing in near lyrical terms how:

With Guns N' Roses music coming from loud speakers in the grandstand, out came the Armoured Fighting Vehicles. Skidding around in the gravel with their drivers encased within their heavily armoured bodies so that no human presence was visible, the vehicles looked like Transformers from another planet as their gun turrets menacingly surveyed the audience and the undercarriages danced around in a mechanical ballet.

The demonstration culminated in a display, "to the music of 80s TV show Airwolf", as:

… an Apache attack helicopter descended in front of the grandstand before most of the audience jumped out their skins as a Tornado jet screeched across the skies from behind, dropping its explosive payload onto the hills and sending shock waves heavenwards.

Thus we are told, "the combined use of all this equipment during the final live ammunition 'attack' on enemy compounds was ferocious and frightening, as well as deafening!" And, of course, this "attack" was completely successful, as they always are against a compliant, hypothetical enemy in front of an invited audience in Salisbury Plain.

Meanwhile, in the real world, the Taleban has unveiled its new bomb detonator, which is cunningly defeating all known counter-measures. It is constructed of string and a wooden clothes peg. This has US Gen Thomas Metz admitting frustration at being forced to build "million-dollar solutions to $100 problems." That's just isn't smart business, he fumes.

Back on Fantasy Island, the MoD has invoked that great military authority, Trooper James Hawley, to talk up the Jackal (only 18 plus destroyed so far). Hawley was deployed to Helmand last year where he went out on reconnaissance patrols for up to three weeks at a time using Jackal vehicles. He tells us, courtesy of the MoD spin machine:

The Jackal is an awesome bit of kit. The speed and ground you can cover makes it ideal for reconnaissance. You can only have so much protection before you loose manoeuvrability but they do offer a lot of protection.

Doubtless, next year, the MoD will be able to get another obedient Trooper to enthuse about the wonderful Husky, again telling us that "you can only have so much protection".

That MoD kit so often comes with free body parts, however, is something they are less keen to tell us. Still, if you play Guns N' Roses music loud enough, no one will hear the screams.

COMMENT THREAD

Oh dear!

We've run over a mine. That'll take at least two hours in the workshop. Lucky we're not British!

COMMENT THREAD

Our secret society - Part 1

Increasing government control of information – and its control of the agenda – has been almost the defining developments of the New Labour era, characterised by the oft-repeated accusations of "spin" levied at our masters.

But "spin" is only the most visible and obvious part of a huge government machine, which employs a vast range of subtle – and some not so subtle – tools to keep control. All government departments use these tools, from agriculture (DEFRA), through environment to defence and beyond.

Whenever you start probing government activities, you will come across the machine. Mostly though, at the receiving end, you will only see only tiny pieces of the jigsaw – or feel the effects. Most often, when you bump up against the restraints, so subtle are they that very few even recognise them for that they are.

However, while they do indeed affect the whole range of government activities, they are perhaps most visible (or detectable) in the defence establishment – not least because it has a valid reason for keeping some of its activities secret. But this also reflects that, of all the departments, it is one of the best practised and most developed in the art of dissimulation.

Nevertheless, in following the defence agenda – and latterly in writing the book Ministry of Defeat - I have become more aware of some of the techniques used. In what is going to have to be a series of posts, therefore, we thought it might be useful to identify some of them, used – with or without variations - in all departments of state to maintain our "secret society". In this post, we will look at some of the mechanisms for controlling the media.

Taking it from the top, the most obvious way of controlling the flow of information is to say nothing. This is still a standard technique. Even to this day, it is massively effective, to whit the events in the city of al Amarah in Maysan province, Iraq, in May through August 2004.

Throughout that period, there were a series of intense battles going on, amounting to all-out war between the British and the Mahdi Army, yet the massive scale of the conflict went completely unreported at the time – unreported because the MoD simply said nothing about it.

However, the truth – as they say – will always out. With such events, someone will always know something, and there will always be leaks. These cannot be prevented, so they must be contained. And it is here that the machine works at its most effective, with an increasingly subtle range of strategies employed.

The first and most effective tool is outright denial, close-coupled with the age-old device called "lying". Thus, when the fighting did break out in al Amarah, and word began to leak out, the first response of the MoD was simply to deny that there was heavy fighting, dismissing the fragmented reports as "isolated incidents", and downplaying their importance.

Here, choice of words become vital, as part of the overall technique. An attack on a convoy, for instance, becomes described as a "security incident", it is always an "isolated incident" and the duration limited. Thus, whenever the news leaks out – and however bad it was – the then current situation will always be described as being "calm and stable" or in similar terms.

One of the great advantages the MoD and the military have here is the control over access. In the al Amarah affair, with the city being in hostile territory some 200 miles or so north of Basra, journalists were totally reliant on the military for the physical means of getting there. And those journalists who asked to be taken to al Amarah were simply told there were no transport resources, or even more bluntly, simply "no".

For those journalists who persevere, the "big stick" can be used – and it is used. The first is the Official Secrets Act. Information will be classified and the journo will simply be told they cannot publish it or they will be in breach.

More often though – where the OSA cannot really be justified - a system called the "D-advisory" is used, the system which replaces the D-Notice system. journalists (or their editors) are "requested" not to publish certain information. Most editors will abide by this and, even if they do not, they will check out the options and that will often delay publication past the danger period and reduce the impact.

If a journalist still perseveres, the military can then invoke the "green book" which is "produced in consultation with editors and press and broadcasting organisations", where they can be required to "submit their material for security checking and to undertake not to publish any operationally sensitive material". And, of course, all journos are required to sign the declaration illustrated above.

It is here that the MoD has the ultimate sanction, as any breach of this "voluntary" agreement means that the journalist concerned will lose accreditation, whence all facilities are withdrawn. We will discuss this further in later posts, but it is something of a blunt instrument which itself can make a story, as the journalist then has nothing to lose.

More generally, therefore, other more subtle layers of controls come into play. One of these is the "trade", of which there are many variations. The most straightforward is to trade delay for detail. A journo may have only a small part of the story so the deal is that, if publication is held up, a "full" briefing will be given and the journo is then free to publish, on the basis of what they have been told.

Sometimes, this will be further sweetened by a promise of exclusivity, or a head start over the competition, so that the journo can break an "exclusive" days before his rivals.

The trade, however, often extends to content as well as timing. The exclusion of embarrassing rather than operationally sensitive material can be traded for access to high level contacts. Omission of a paragraph about a cock-up, for instance, can be swapped for a juicy "insider" quote from a field commander – or higher – on an exclusive basis.

For a journalist that is prepared to resist such blandishments, however, there are other techniques. One is pre-emptive publishing. Other journos may be given carefully tailored details early, which are withheld from the offender, allowing the rivals to go ahead with a sanitised version of the story, thus spiking the "scoop".

These, though, are only the more obvious controls. There are many more, and we will look at some of those in the next post.

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