Part XII: Putting it together

In December last, we were watching events closely in Afghanistan, as strong signals started emerging that the coalition forces were about to retake Musa Qala – vacated the previous year after a deal with the elders which ended up in the Taleban taking possession of the town.

Sure enough, the action did materialise culminating in news on 9 December that British, American and Afghan forces had taken possession of the town centre. By any measure, not least in the very light civilian casualty rate, this was a major success and one which we regarded as a turning point.

Someone else watching these events very closely was Barnett R. Rubin who, with Jake Sherman have written a report - to which we referred earlier. In their view, not only was this action a military success, it was a good example of how [properly] to integrate counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency – a sentiment with which we would agree.

The recovery followed, Rubin and Sherman wrote, "the pattern of putting access and security first, followed by interdiction and alternative livelihoods." They record:

The Afghan government and international forces carried out a joint political-military operation, gaining the support of a major Taleban commander (Mullah Abdul Salaam) and then defeating the remaining insurgents. Once in occupation of the district, government and international forces seized about $25 million worth of narcotics and destroyed over 60 heroin laboratories.

Confiscating products from the upper end of the value chain depended on regaining control of the territory. Had the government and international community engaged in forced eradication in Musa Qala before launching the operation, Mullah Abdul Salaam might not have changed sides, the local people might not have supported the government or remained neutral, and the district might have remained under Taleban control.

If eradication had destroyed locally produced raw opium, the Taleban-supported heroin laboratories could have purchased opium from other sources. Having first undertaken political and military measures to establish security in Musa Qala, however, Afghan and international forces were able to interdict high-value illicit products without harming rural communities. They now can help communities break their dependence on the drug trade.

It was interesting to note that, following the recapture, genuine attempts have been made to carry out reconstruction, led by the repair and upgrading of the road. There was also an undertaking given that the current crop of poppies would not be touched, even after the coalition forces moved in. Security has also been maintained with the positioning of a forward operations base with a permanent presence of British troops and a detachment of the Afghan National Army.

Shortly afterwards, British forces, bolstered by a substantial detachment of US Marines, were able to clear the Taleban from Garmsir. Again reconstruction is in progress, with a permanent troop presence.

Whether these situation can be maintained, however, remains to be seen. But, as Rubin and Sherman note, "Winning consent for counter-narcotics requires providing greater licit economy opportunities, and providing security for people to benefit from those opportunities," underlining the importance of holding the ground until the new economy takes root. However, they also add:

Scarce resources for coercion should be reserved for targeting political opponents at the high end of the value chain, rather than farmers and flowers.

If "take and hold" forms the first part of the strategy, then this offers the direction for the follow-up. Rather than chasing the farmers, the emphasis switches to finding and destroying the processing laboratories, intercepting the smuggling routes and disrupting the trade in opium and the heroin. This has the merit of drying up the flow of money which fuels the insurgency, without damaging the agricultural economy.

That said, the "take and hold" process itself requires "boots on the ground" and, once again in early July, we heard a familiar call, this one from Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, saying, "We have the ability in almost every single case to win from the combat standpoint … But we don't have enough troops there to hold. That is key to the future of being able to succeed in Afghanistan."

On the other hand, in the same week, we got US Gen. John Craddock, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, making his own declaration. The key to success, he said, was not winning by military means but focusing on development and governance.

Therein lies the essential dichotomy in the battle for Afghanistan. The military cannot win without "development and governance" but both require security on the ground before they can take root. On the other hand, the presence of foreign troops and the international aid effort themselves interfere with establishment of governance, if they undermine or replace existing structures. Once again, we seem to be going round in circles, creating the foundations for a no-win situation. We need to go back to basics.

Here, the report of an "Afghan citizen" on the Salem News website is highly instructive. In respect of the 2006 campaign, he (presumably) notes:

Many terrorists can easily get logistical support and places to hide themselves in Helmand, which local government security officials are believed to be linked to. In March 2007 Governor Wafa reported that approximately 700 terrorists from different countries like Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and etc., are in Sangin district. Now where did these terrorists come from and how did they arrive in Sangin?

He then observes:

Sangin district does not have any border with neighbouring countries, so if they have entered Afghanistan from Spin Boldak on the Kandahar border they have certainly crossed through many villages before they have arrived in Sangin, or if they entered from the southern district of Dishu in Helmand they have certainly crossed through Dishu, Khanishin, and Garamseir districts before they could get to Sangin.

These people are entering Afghanistan unknown across a border which the Afghan government claims is not secured, but the local districts and villages are under the control of the Afghan Government, so when these terrorists from different nationalities were crossing so many districts where was Afghan intelligence, the ANP and ANA? It is completely impossible that unknown people should cross so many villages and that the government which has intelligence, national police, and national army, should not be aware of it!

During the fighting in Kandahar during the summer of 2006, the Taleban fired an estimated 400,000 rounds of ammunition, 2,000 rocket-propelled grenades, and 1,000 mortar shells. These had arrived in Panjwai, a district in Kandahar province, from Qetta over the spring months. Ammunition dumps unearthed after the battle showed that the Taleban had stocked over one million rounds in Panjwai. Nato estimated the cost of Taleban ammunition stocks alone at around $5 million. "There is no way the Taleban could have done this on their own…", the Salem News correspondent writes.

Arguably, had the coalition forces known of these movements, they could have acted against them – and not necessarily with ground forces. The capabilities of Reaper and other UAVs armed with Hellfire missiles is well known, these assets providing excellent weapons against small, dispersed groups of men.

But, in the first instance, the coalition forces need to find out this information. The most cost-effective, if sometimes the least reliable source of that is known as HUMINT, human intelligence from local communities. The question is why they should give that information to forces which are seen to be propping up a government which has done nothing for them, and which threatens their economic survival.

Arguably, then, two issues arise. Firstly, in the absence of good intelligence from local communities, the coalition forces must generate their own. Secondly, the coalition forces must direct their activities at measures which create real growth in economic wealth for the populations in the areas in which they operate, in order promote a flow of intelligence.

This is not so much building trust or any sort of relationships between the forces, on the conventional "hearts and minds" basis. Rather, it is the more tangible process of demonstrating to local communities that their economic interests are aligned more closely with the government forces than they are the insurgents. As far as the military is involved, the activities, in the main, amount to road-building, the restoration of power supplies and then assuring the security of the road system – plus ensuring the protection of key economic assets.

As to direct intelligence gathering, the coalition forces have a considerable number of technical aids to assist them – everything from satellites, surveillance aircraft such as the Nimrod R1 and Rivet Joint, plus UAVs. The UAVs, in particular, have been introduced late into theatre and in insufficient numbers. Not for nothing did Craddock recently call for more UAVs, as well as more surveillance aircraft.

However, there is also great merit in the Winterton/Harding thesis (discussed in Part I) – based on the Rhodesian experience. This requires the use of small, long range patrols backed by their own organic air power in the form of light assault helicopters – which gather intelligence on insurgent movements and guide other forces (whether air power, heli-borne or ground forces) to engineer their destruction.

While one must acknowledge that the coalition forces do already carry out a considerable amount of intelligence-gathering, they have been notoriously reluctant to employ light helicopters, or to consider allocating these resources to deep reconnaissance units. Given the success in Rhodesia arising from their use, the case for them is unarguable. The Taleban and their supporters cannot be allowed to feel that there is any territory within Afghanistan that they can consider safe enough to operate openly.

Putting this all together, we can now – at last – begin to think of a coherent force structure, and start thinking of the equipment mix to match.

Taking it, if you like, in the order in which events will unfold (and have been unfolding), the first and most obvious priority is for "conventional" assault forces to retake areas which have been seized by the Taleban. However, with the recapture of both Musa Qala and Garmsir, and with no notable towns currently held by the Taleban, the need for such forces is limited.

Secondly, there is a need for engineers to construct forward operations bases for "garrison" troops, in which to maintain a presence in retaken territories, their purpose primarily to deny their use to the insurgents. Such activities are already well established in the coalition campaign, and therefore need little further exploration – other than to say that the use of Warrior MICVs has proved invaluable and, bearing in mind the Canadian experience on Operation Medusa, we could benefit from having a medium tank on the inventory.

From here, the primary tactic which seems to have been adopted by the British forces is then to extend the radius of the occupied perimeter, launching patrols and armed sweeps into hostile territory, the aim being to bring the Taleban to battle and then, gradually to pacify the area. The idea then – as with Laskar Gah, is that the centre can then be left free of coalition forces - relatively pacified area in which development can then take place.

It is our contention, however, that this strategy is not always the most effective. Extending the "perimeter" is time consuming and dangerous, and manpower intensive. As the area expands, the demand for troops then increases and the coalition forces find they need more and more troops just to keep the ground they hold. This is the problem highlighted by Admiral Michael Mullen. And, in the meantime, the Taleban move in behind to undertake asymmetric warfare, undermining the security of the areas and thus delaying (or preventing) reconstruction.

We would aver, therefore, that this strategy should not be attempted. As we have explored in earlier parts, the military should focus on the "reconstruction" programme. This, however, should be radically curtailed, basically focusing on three things – the building of a cohesive network of roads, developing and improving electrical power, and, in the central areas, building storage and distribution hubs, with an administrative and support base for agricultural officials and technologists – all directed at facilitating the export of high value produce.

The road programme should be published, signalled clearly in advance and either executed by the Army or managed by it and under its direct protection. Crucially, it should then be carried out, irrespective of the security situation. If the Taleban choose to interfere, and have the resources so to do, then that serves the purpose of bringing them to battle and weakening them.

Here, Gen. Petreus, in his counterinsurgency manual is very clear about the principles involved. The first is about managing expectations – the second is one of delivery. The coalition forces should not promise more than they can deliver but, having made promises, they should be kept, come what may.

In this context, the building of schools, community centres, mosques, and even wells and other civil works – not directly and immediately focused on generating wealth - should not be carried out by coalition forces or international agencies. Instead, communities should be encouraged to define their own improvements and to seek financing from their own government, either at local, regional or central level.

On the other hand, at political level, aid funds should be ring-fenced for such projects and perhaps paid after completion, on a reimbursement or match-funding basis. Alternatively, the National Solidarity Programme seems to have promise and could usefully be extended.

As to and when roads are completed and/or upgraded, coalition forces should then seek to assure security of transit along them and over the rest of the network. This may include preventing intervention by local police seeking to extract bribes and informal taxes. If necessary, the coalition forces should provide transport – or manage transport contracts – to ensure that communications are maintained.

Outside the hubs, one then sees a number of independent, free-roaming reconnaissance and interdiction forces – one (of two) of their objectives being to seek out organised Taleban formations and to destroy them. Numbers are not wholly the issue here – it is more a question of equipment and structure. As Craddock observed: "An infantry battalion in Afghanistan without tactical mobility, without intelligence support, surveillance capability, reconnaissance, is very limited".

The second objective needs to be more on police lines of tracing and intercepting the flow of money, opium processing, and the smuggling of drugs and guns. Inasmuch as these activities are carried out – or protected by – armed gangs, often with the support of the Taleban, it is difficult always to separate them from military action.

However, John Sullivan recently wrote an interesting paper on "Expeditionary Law Enforcement", where he advocated a "third force" in between the military and the civilian police, along the lines of European gendarme forces. This has interesting possibilities and could relieve some of the pressure on the military, while making up for some of the inadequacies of the Afghan civil police.

So, putting it all together, we believe, in summary, that the following changes must be implemented (or at least, considered and only rejected if proved unsound).

Firstly, the whole provision of aid should be reprioritised. By far the bulk should be directed towards rural reconstruction, specifically and tightly focused on generating high value agricultural exports. Aid to other activities should be curtailed and given only where necessary for the most basic functions of government to continue – with one exception. A major programme should be developed to set up and administer a taxation system which will allow the various levels of government to fund it activities from its own population.

Secondly, in contested areas – at the very least - where the military are directly engaged with the Taleban or other anti-government elements, the aid programme should be further curtailed, to the provision of vital reconstruction of the economic infrastructure, and then executed or managed directly by the military.

Third, in areas retaken from the Teleban and generally where there is a risk from armed intervention, resources should be directed at securing the communications network, enforcing security and ensuring the safe flow of traffic.

Fourthly, the military surveillance and reconnaissance capability should be greatly enhanced, while the Taleban should be harried and destroyed wherever it operates, by highly mobile independent teams, operating with their own organic air assets.

There is, of course, then the question of the "safe havens" for insurgent in both Iran and Pakistan, and the larger question of intervention by ideologically-driven foreigners who are using Afghanistan as an opportunity to confront and weaken (mainly) American and other coalition forces.

Here, we would argue that, while ideology is a factor in this current insurgency, a drive for economic prosperity amongst the rural communities – with real evidence of delivery – would do much to weaken the insurgency, and isolate the ideologues. The road to victory, as Petraeus would have it, is the battle to convince the population to "accept the legitimacy of the government mounting COIN and stop actively and passively supporting the insurgents."

A former US president put it more succinctly: "It's the economy, stupid". Economic regeneration is not an optional extra in counter insurgency, and nor is it something separate from, or subordinate to military action. It is an integral part of the whole. The military have to learn to deploy economic weapons with the same skill and dedication as they do their martial arts. Otherwise, all their skill and bravery will be for nothing. As Petreus warned, "lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain."

COMMENT THREAD

Minister defends "Snatch" (badly)

A report by The Guardian has the government defending the continued use of "Snatch" Land Rovers in Afghanistan.

This is taken from the Defence procurement debate this morning (link to follow) where the "Snatch" came under heavy criticism for its lack of protection against roadside bombs, and armed forces minister Bob Ainsworth defended the vehicle.

The alternative, better protected vehicles like Mastiff could not go to certain places or do certain things. Even the Ridgeback, which will be "will be more capable than Mastiff - smaller and able to go to places that Mastiff cannot - will be considerably larger than a Land Rover-based vehicle." Thus, commanders, he said, needed a range of vehicles for different terrain and operations.

"Whether or not we are going to be able to take away these small platforms without taking away a whole area of capability is something that will need to be thought of very seriously," he added.

The Daily Telegraph, however, also runs a story, but its headline signals a different focus, with: "Fears of more Afghanistan deaths as 'inadequate' vehicle blamed for latest fatalities."

Defence correspondent Thomas Harding tells us that "more soldiers could die unnecessarily in Afghanistan because replacements for their 'totally inadequate' vehicles will not be ready for months", noting that the "Snatch" has been withdrawn from use in Iraq because it offers so little protection against mines.

He goes on to write that campaigners are saying that Cpl Sarah Bryant, 26 (pictured above), of the Intelligence Corps, and special forces soldiers Cpl Sean Robert Reeve, 28, L/cpl Richard Larkin, 39, and Paul Stout, 31 – the four who were killed in this latest outrage - would still be alive if they had been in an armoured vehicle.

Almost one in eight of all fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan – 34 out of 282 – have now been caused by roadside bombs targeting "Snatch" Land Rovers, and of the last 23 deaths in Afghanistan, 18 have been caused by roadside bombs.

Cited is Rose Gentle, a founding member of Military Families Against the War, whose 19-year-old son Gordon died in Iraq. She says: "How many more deaths are we going to have? The public are sick of turning the television on to hear more soldiers have been killed for not having the right equipment."

Sue Smith, whose son Phillip Hewett was killed in a "Snatch" in Iraq, said: "I don't understand why they didn't see this coming. We still haven't learnt from Iraq. "When Phillip died three years ago we knew then that Snatch was no good but we have still continued to use them."

Also cited is Patrick Mercer, who intervened heavily in procurement debate – where he recommended the much wider use of helicopters to transport troops and carry out routine patrols. His view of the "Snatch" was that it was simply "packaging our troops as compact targets". Colonel Tim Collins also comes in, declaring: "It is now either a question that we stop patrolling because we don't have the right vehicles or we take a chance."

The MoD we are then told, has justified the use of "Snatch" in Afghanistan by saying that the threat from roadside bombs there was not as sophisticated as in the Iran-sponsored insurgency in Iraq, but Harding then adds that there are already a number of armoured vehicles being used by other countries that are far superior to the "Snatch".

The Americans and Canadian forces, for instance, are equipped with South African made RG31 mine protection vehicle that can withstand a blast of 14 kilos under a wheel, the equivalent of two large mines.

Finally, of the citations, this blog author says that the: "Snatch was never designed to deal with counter-insurgency where the threat is from mines and bombs. It is totally inadequate for that purpose."

Part of the problem, according to Harding is that the vast majority of the Army's armoured vehicles, including its entire fleet of Bulldog armoured personnel carriers and the Ridgeback is not due in service for some months. But even than, an MoD spokesman counters saying that whilst safety was the "prime concern" in operations, sometimes the "agility and low profile" of 'Snatch' meant it was the most suitable vehicle available.

Here, the anonymous spokesman is being a tad disingenuous, as indeed was Ainsworth, when he told MPs that both the Mastiff and the Ridgeback were too big for some functions. We are back, after all this time, to the “too big for Basra” argument, transferred to a new locale.

When it comes to these two vehicles, these after all were the choice of the MoD – and they alone selected what must be two of the largest MRAP vehicles available. The RG31 – selected by the US and Canadian forces, is a smaller vehicle, and widely used by both for routine patrols. And, for something even smaller, there is the Force Protection Cheetah, a purpose-built protected patrol vehicle – a mere half an inch wider than the HUMVEE.

Ironically, this six-seat vehicle has been considered by the MoD for the protected patrol vehicle programme and rejected. Only after questioning by Ann Winterton (here and here) did it emerge that the capacity was considered insufficient.

Thus, we have a situation where the MoD insists that its existing protected vehicles are too large for some functions. This thus justifies the use of "Snatch" Land Rovers, but then rejects a smaller vehicle on the basis that it is, effectively, er … too small – even though its capacity is greater than the Land Rover.

Somewhere there has to be some logic in this although we have to admit that we are having a little difficulty discovering where.

COMMENT THREAD

Stupid, malign fools

Another four British soldiers killed in Afghanistan, one believed to be a woman – the first to be killed in this theatre. A fifth soldier was wounded and is in a stable condition.

There is a brief report on the MoD website, a longer one on The Daily Telegraph site and the news is carried by many other media sources.

It is the DT, however, that tells us that the soldiers were killed by a "roadside bomb" (The BBC says it was a mine) while travelling in a "Snatch" Land Rover, "a vehicle originally designed for use in Northern Ireland."

Such vehicles, says the paper, have been repeatedly criticised for the poor defence they offer against roadside bombs compared to more heavily armoured alternatives. It adds: "It is thought they may have been using the vulnerable vehicle to keep a low profile and that the woman soldier, who was serving with the Intelligence Corps, may have been taken along in case female suspects had to be searched." However, the BBC reports that that the patrol was setting up a vehicle checkpoint.

For weeks now, diverse newspapers (and the BBC) have been reporting on how the Taleban were changing their tactics, resorting more to IEDs and mines, something that was reported over a year ago and predicted by us in June 2006 – almost two years to the day.

As to the "Snatch" Land Rover, yesterday when we received the reports of the deaths was the second anniversary of our post, pointing out the dangerous vulnerability of these vehicles.

There is, therefore, no excuse, no excuse at all. For two years (well over, in fact), the MoD and the Army have known that "Snatch" Land Rovers are entirely unsuitable for counterinsurgency operations, and they have had two years warning that the Taleban were going to adopt ambush tactics using bombs and mines.

The answer was then and is now, what have come to be known as MRAPs – Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. At the Eurosatory exhibition yesterday, it was clear that militaries throughout the world have got the message … a small sample of MRAPs seen yesterday follows (and yes, one is a "Panther - even that is better than a "Snatch" if used as an ordinary patrol vehicle).

That we have not enough of them, and are still using "Snatch" Land Rovers, is inexcusable. The people, at all levels, who were involved – by act of default – in failing properly to equip our Army are in part responsible for sending these four soldiers to their deaths. They are stupid, malign fools.










COMMENT THREAD

The rise and fall of Gen. Dannatt

There is always a price to pay and it looks like the CGS is paying it. Mick Smith of The Sunday Times is telling us that Gordon Brown has blocked General Sir Richard Dannatt from being promoted to lead the armed forces "because of his repeated calls for better pay and conditions for servicemen."

This is from another of Smith's "senior Whitehall sources", but he's picked up enough to discover that Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the current chief of the defence staff (CDS), will now have his tenure extended for a year, ensuring there is no vacancy for Dannatt before his retirement.

Another of the sources Smith cites claims: "It was Gordon’s decision … Dannatt has made a lot of enemies among the senior reaches of the Labour party," adding: "They want him gone sooner rather than later."

Actually, the decision was not taken by Brown alone, and it is not just the Labour Party which has been in despair of this turbulent CGS - a man who needed to remember that he who lives by the media also dies by it. Grandstanding brings its own rewards.

And, as Smith reminds us, Dannatt has caused problems for government from the start. Within weeks of taking over, he said that British troops needed to leave Iraq "sometime soon" because their presence was exac-erbating the situation. Although Blair publicly backed Dannatt’s comments, privately cabinet ministers were furious. "It is not his job to criticise government policy," one said. "He needs to get back in his box and shut up. His next mistake will be his last."

Dannatt was appointed CGS in August 2006, so his three-year tenure is due to expire in August next year. With Stirrup was due to leave next April, Dannatt was certainly a possible candidate for his replacement – it being the Army's turn to take up the position. Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy is mentioned by Smith – but two RAF officers running would have upset the apple cart, especially as there is increasing sentiment that, since the Army is doing the brunt of the fighting, the next CDS appointment should reflect that.

Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, the first sea lord, was also a possibility but, after the debacle of the Iranian hostages his star is definitely on the wane.

However, it seems that Stirrup – who is currently the only one of the chiefs with counterinsurgency experience – has been asked to stay on so that all the current service chiefs have been replaced by the time he has finished his term.

A "senior army officer," cited by Smith, observes: "By cleaning house and putting a new team under Stirrup, the PM gets a new group of senior officers who will be too busy trying to climb the greasy pole to rock the boat."

That is a somewhat ungenerous construction. Professionally, some regard Dannatt as a disappointment and his grasp of the very particular needs of counterinsurgency operations has not been that evident. Instead, we have seen strong advocacy for the FRES programme. Very little in the way of innovation has come from his office.

Thus, as have Robert Gates and Gen. Petreus been cleaning out the stables of the DoD and US Army – replacing some of the obstacles to progress to developing effective COIN tactics - so too would the British military establishment benefit from a clean sweep, starting at the top.

One possible replacement slated for Dannatt is General Sir David Richards, veteran of Northern Ireland, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan – someone less inclined to be mesmerised by shiny toys and more in tune with the realities of actual warfare than the mythical "future wars" with which Dannatt seems to be obsessed.

How he will then get on with a future Conservative government is, of course, another matter.

COMMENT THREAD

The Ridgeback takes shape

Almost as if it was ashamed of them, the MoD seems to have been remarkably reluctant to publicise its newly-ordered Ridgeback protected vehicles.

This now has been remedied on the MoD website, which tells us that, "British troops in the urban environments of Afghanistan and Iraq are set to benefit from greater protection as the first 'Cougar' vehicles begin their transformation into 'Ridgebacks'".

From what is written, it now seems that the Cougar base vehicles have arrived in the UK, and are now being upgraded with integrated additional protection, weapons, communications systems and specialist electronic counter-measures equipment.

Although no photographs are yet available, we are offered an artist's impression. This shows the familiar additional side armour – first seen on the Mastiff – plus the slatted (or "bar") armour to protect from RPG rounds. From the look of it, the slatted armour is fitted tighter in to the vehicle body, conforming with the wheel arches, thus not adding to its overall width.

This reflects a need for a vehicle which, as the MoD site says, "will provide greater protected accessibility in urban environments," where the size of the Mastiff precludes its use. This leaves the Mastiff to "continue to operate in the urban fringe and rural environments."

With the emergence of Taleban ambush tactics in Afghanistan, these vehicles cannot reach theatre too soon.

COMMENT THREAD

It's the balance, stoopid!

Yesterday morning, without fanfare, Lady Winterton brought "Next-War-itis" to the House of Commons.

This was the theme of the recent speech by US defence secretary Robert Gates in which he called for the US military to focus "more on winning in Iraq and preparing to fight other insurgencies and less on possible big wars with other countries".

And, if much of the US defence establishment was obsessed with future conflicts, neglecting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so too was the British establishment – or so it was charged.

Of course, the MoD claims it has had the vaccination against this dreaded disease, telling us recently that, "We are determined to do more to support our people here and on the front line…", pledging then to "better prioritise our spending plans".

But Anne Winterton was not convinced. We do not know in which direction the military is looking, she said. But we get some clue from this month's Soldier magazine. There, Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt purrs about his new toys, telling us that the Piranha V heralds the "start of a new era" for the Army.

This said Dannatt, "maintains the progress of the FRES programme, which is my highest priority after support to operations." It will, he adds, form the backbone of the Army’s future armoured vehicle requirements. Mastiffs are all very well, but this beast will allow the Army "to conduct a wider range of operations in an uncertain and changing world."

To Ann, this was the proverbial red rag to the bull. Let us have it spelled out exactly what sort of operations we are expecting in the future, she demanded - or is this a case of next-war-itis?

There lies the problem. FRES is not designed for counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan – the subject of this debate in Westminster Hall. But the brass are saying that the FRES vehicle, for which Piranha V has been provisionally chosen, has a dual role. It can be used for high-intensity warfare and counter-insurgency.

Ladies of Ann Winterton's breeding do not say "b*****ks!" But, well she might.

As to supporting our people in the front line, in Afghanistan – the insurgents as she predicted – have resorted to "various explosive devices". To counter them, the MoD has 282 Mastiffs in use or ordered. Some 157 Ridgebacks and 24 Bushmasters are also on order. Thus, we have 463 mine/IED proofed vehicles, specifically designed for counter-insurgency warfare.

Against that, we have 169 Pinzgauer Vectors - not designed to protect soldiers from mines or IEDs. There are 180 M-WMIKs (otherwise known as Jackals) and the Army wants 2,000 Piranha Vs – as yet still a paper vehicle, not off the drawing board – another vehicle which is not well protected against mines and IEDs.

"With the best will in the world," she says, "one could hardly say that that is a very balanced mixture, bearing it in mind that the whole future Army structure is geared to the latter type." This was not, she added pointedly, "making present operations the top priority".

As we are likely to be in Afghanistan for the long term, that could realistically be at least 20 years down the road. How many more conflicts of that nature will the UK be engaged in or have been engaged in by then, with 2,349 vehicles that are not particularly suited to purpose, compared with 463 vehicles that have a proven track record in counter-insurgency operations?

At this point, Conservative MP, Philip Hollobone, intervened to remind us that the "percentage of fatalities of UK service personnel resulting from IEDs or mines is 27 percent in Afghanistan and 28 percent in Iraq." Kevan Jones from the dark side (Labour) then also intervened to say that, the last time he had been in Basra, he had seen a Mastiff vehicle that had driven over an IED. The crew had survived. The Mastiff, he said, was good news and had clearly led to a reduction in casualties from IEDs.

This is where it started getting messy. The minister for the Armed Forces (Bob Ainsworth) then got stuck in, saying that Anne had put only three vehicles "on the right side of the line" and all the rest on the wrong side. "We cannot conduct effective operations in Afghanistan with only those three vehicles. No commander can do that," he protested.

It was a question of balance, Ann countered: 463 vehicles designed specifically for blast protection, with their V-shaped hulls, against 2,349 which were not. And, when it came to the Piranha V, there were all sorts of problems with this machine, not least that it was "incredibly expensive". Being designed to fulfil the original concept of FRES – a network-enabled system of vehicles that would engage the enemy at a distance – it is not best suited for the kind of warfare that our troops are encountering now. The enemy is not at a distance and is often indistinguishable from the local population. The danger is all around them.

Thus, she contend that UK troops need considerably more of the type of vehicles of which we have 463, and perhaps considerably fewer of the others, if they are to be successful in future with minimum loss of life. Why are the vehicles of which we are to have 2,349 are so numerous, when others are more suited to present day warfare?

Intervention from Kevan Jones there came again, with a charge that commanders needed "a range of vehicles, including lightly armoured vehicles". Yes, I know that said Winterton – or words to that effect – it's the balance stoopid … 463 against 2,349. The insurgents aim to send as many troops home in body bags as possible – we need more vehicles designed to keep them alive.

Thus batted down – although Jones was to rise again, the stake not yet driven through his heart – Ann switched tack.

In order to defeat any insurgency, she said, it is necessary to train the host country's own military forces so that they can deal with the problem and protect their own people. That is happening successfully in Iraq and Afghanistan; their armies are doing a great job and allowing our forces gradually to be withdrawn.

However, it was also important to have a certain amount of parity between our equipment and that of the host country – seen in Iraq where the Army has the same or better vehicles than ours. But, when we come to the Royal Air Force, the contrast is extreme. The situation is nothing less than an unmitigated disaster.

For Afghanistan to succeed after the withdrawal of UK and other troops (in fact, in order to allow us to withdraw), it must have sufficient air power. Yet could the Afghan air force ever use the Eurofighter? We need turbo-prop aircraft, which the host country's pilots can be trained to use alongside our own pilots, the famous Tucano option – with all the added advantage that we get from that type of machine.

Equally, she said, reconnaissance operations should have their own aircraft, such as the Pilatus Porter PC-6, which can operate with the patrol being able to land and take off within very short distances indeed, acting as an evacuation carrier and a general supply vehicle. These aircraft should be operated by other ranks within the Army, and we should learn the lessons from other successful counter-insurgency forces such as the Rhodesians.

Then Anne turned to the economics. There is a constant shortage of helicopters, yet the Merlin is a very good, if extremely expensive, helicopter. The RAF's Mk 3 Merlins cost £19 million each. The six Danish ones cost £29.3 million each and £34,000 an hour to run. She had to repeat that figure to Patrick Mercer, who seemed stunned by the figure,

The attitude in the UK seems to be that the we need the best to cover every eventuality, Ann continued, and therefore the nation will cough up the funds for that. But the military are not living in the real world if they believe that they can have anything at any price. That is one of the reasons why the UK is short of what it actually needs. Rather, we need simple, robust platforms that will last in the long term. They must also carry the latest technology, but at the same time they must be as simple as possible to maintain.

So it came to finish off the speech. Her closing themes were "finance and the benefit to the nation of a sound defence policy."

Whichever party wins the next general election, she warned, some very large financial commitments have been made by this Government that will come into effect during the period from 2010 to 2015. If the military believe that they will get more money out of a Conservative government, I think that they are deluding themselves. That extra money is not likely to be forthcoming, bearing it in mind that the country will probably be broke by then.

Thus she said: "The mantra that our armed forces are underfunded is often repeated—indeed, there is some truth in it - but how the money for our forces is spent also needs to be challenged and I believe that it is a pertinent issue. I have pointed out in previous debates that the wastage in the defence budget has been enormous, mainly due to unclear or ulterior motives and objectives."

If we are funding "next war-itis", present operations will either be starved of cash or denied the most suitable platforms in sufficient quantities at the time when they are most needed. The MOD, she added, is doing its best to learn from recent hard lessons, but it has not been much helped by certain factions within the military.

We rely on our armed services for the defence of the nation but it is highly unlikely that any force will directly attack our shores. Instead, the threat to us now is far more subtle and difficult to counter. The enemy is within and around us, and we cannot always differentiate between friend and foe. Terrorism is the greatest evil and we have to be better prepared to defeat it, not least because the United Kingdom needs a stable world for trade, which is the lifeblood of our economic survival.

So, said Ann, I share the belief of Robert Gates that the top military and political priority should be the success of COIN operations, to ensure that the breeding grounds of instability in the world, which are the greatest danger to our people, are neutralised. It is within that sector that British forces could excel and, indeed, are excelling against the odds. It is up to the military to explain where their priorities will lie in future, from a basis of the Government of the day giving clear directional leadership.

The United Kingdom is no longer a global power and, unlike the Americans, we cannot afford two armies — one for counter-insurgency and the other for conventional warfare involving large-scale manoeuvres. I believe that we should concentrate on undertaking counter-insurgency and similar operations exceptionally well, rather than diluting our efforts and resources. We should face facts and recognise that the United Kingdom can no longer fulfil all its aspirations as far as defence is concerned. Stretched resources and manpower will limit what we can achieve in the future.

In Part II of this post, I will deal with the response to this speech.

COMMENT THREAD

Not good enough!

We learn from The Daily Telegraph that British troops in Afghanistan "are angry that the hard fighting they are doing is not fully appreciated by the public." "We are doing our part out here defeating terrorism so it does no come back to our shores," they say, "but while American troops are welcomed home as heroes, their own sacrifices often go unacknowledged."

The troops have every right to be angry, yet this is hardly the first time we have heard this lament. But, never fear! Work, we are told, is now under way across Whitehall to improve the efforts to "sell" the conflict to the British people. "If you have nearly 8,000 people in Afghanistan, fighting and sometimes dying, you have a responsibility to do more to explain why they are there and what they are doing," a Government source said.

Indeed you do have a responsibility, Mr Government source. But what is taking you so long to live up to that responsibility? The lamentable activities of the MoD PR machine – not least the wholly inadequate website - have long been catalogued on this blog, there has been a debate in the House of Commons, endless discussion has taken place and a top level admission of failure. So far though, we have had precious little to show for all the activity.

For a long time, we have asserted that there are three parallel wars being fought in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. There is the shooting war, the economic war and the war on the home front, of which PR is an essential component. We have to take the military's word for it that the shooting war is being won but, on current evidence, the wars on the economic and home fronts are being lost.

Part of the reason for this, we believe, is the total inability to recognise the importance of the "other wars". There is a failure to understand that fighting and winning these "wars" is not an optional extra. It is an integral part of the war effort. This means that decisions are taken without any of the necessary urgency. There has been no shortage of ideas and advice given, but there has been little visible action.

What we really need is a Churchillian "action this day" directive, to cut through the reams of red tape and factional bickering that hampers MoD efforts. Work "under way" is not good enough. At this rate, none of us are going to live long enough to see the end result.

COMMENT THREAD

The grim magic of numbers

It was inevitable that the sad event of the 100th soldier to be killed in Afghanistan should trigger a torrent of coverage from the media, much of it derivative from newspapers which, in the normal run of things, express very little interest in the campaign in Afghanistan – and even less in southern Iraq.

This blog too expresses its regrets but it would be presumptive of us to offer condolences to the relatives and loved ones – to people we do not know and who do not know us – where we hold no formal position and represent no one but ourselves.

That is best left to the Ministers, the senior officers of the Services and others in high positions, who have uttered the necessary words – which we entirely endorse.

Nor are we going to indulge in the same sort of recriminations or introspection that is the stock-in-place of many journalists and commentators, ready at a moment's notice to deliver the requisite yardage of extruded verbal material to fill the spaces or occupy to airtime necessary to mark what has been called "this grim milestone".

Instead, we simply reiterate our position that we support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and believe they are necessary. Our objectives in this context are twofold: to contribute – as far as we can – to the better prosecution of those wars and, at the same time, to pressure (and influence) those who are in a position to take actions which will lead directly or indirectly to a reduction in the number of deaths and injuries arising from this unpleasant but necessary activity.

If that is also presumptuous – or arrogant – so be it. We set out our stall in this piece and stand by it. At least, in our self-appointed task, we are making an effort, taking an interest in the welfare of our troops and pushing for their success.

Misguided we may be in some of our comments, ignorant we so often are but, also, in our estimation, had the powers-that-be taken note of some of our posts, we would not now be lamenting the death of the 100th soldier. Furthermore – and take this any way you wish – we believe that, but for our intervention, we would have been lamenting the 100th death that bit earlier than we have.

Given that we are clearly in for the long haul in Afghanistan, it is a matter of inevitably that, should the tempo of operations continue, we will in due course be seeing headlines marking the death of the next hundred soldiers. If there is anything we can do to make that event as distant as possible, we will do it. If we achieve nothing, at least we will have tried.

COMMENT THREAD

More on that turbulent CGS

It looks like the Mail on Sunday is climbing on the speeding bandwagon of soldiers' pay, selectively offering quotes from a speech given by defence secretary Des Browne, dating back from last year.

Headed, "Our troops aren't fit for jobs in civvy street, says the man who's meant to be fighting their corner," by Matthew Hickley, the usual tired formulas are applied, with the strap: "Defence Secretary Des Browne faced fresh anger over soldiers' pay last night after suggesting their low wages are justified because many would fail to get better-paid jobs outside the Army."

The speech was at the Royal British Legion's Scottish annual conference last June, when Browne posed the rhetorical question: "Why don't we pay servicemen and women in a comparative rate to uniformed organisations in civilian street?"

Answering himself, he said: "I have to say the honest answer to that, for a number of young people, particularly those who join the Army, before they join the Army, they would not have been accepted by any of these organisations. But, because of the formative experiences the services have been for you, as a result of what you have gone through, you can bet your bottom dollar that when you come out of the Forces, you will be acceptable."

The point itself is quite fair. The Army does take in large numbers of young recruits – especially in Scotland, where Browne was speaking – who lack qualifications, and even basic skills like reading. These youngsters would, under any circumstances, find it difficult to gain employment. The skills and experience – and the discipline – they gain undoubtedly make them more employable and, after leaving the Army, many of them go on to make successful second careers which would have been unreachable had they not joined up.

Nevertheless, the MoS calls in aid the Royal British Legion – which did not comment on Browne's remarks at the time but now finds them "deeply offensive", claiming they portrayed troops as "too dim"” to work as traffic wardens, police or firemen (notwithstanding that many discharged soldiers go on to do those jobs). Thus, we are told, a spokesman for the Royal British Legion Scotland now has it that: "Mr Browne's comments are deeply offensive and could hardly be more insulting."

A much more level approach come from the leader in The Times yesterday – which has actually done quite well on this issue.

It notes that soldiers do not enlist primarily for money: "Challenge, excitement, training, the chance to serve: these are all more powerful reasons for joining up than pay." It also notes that the Army is about 3,500 below strength and has been for years, yet an attempt to boost intake with a generous pay settlement in the past two years has not solved this problem.

Thus, it concludes that the state's failure to honour the service of soldiers is "not in the modesty of pay". Its view is that "the inadequacy of equipment, and the shabbiness of conditions" have a greater impact.

To an extent, that is indeed the case, but there are more fundamental problems. Essentially, the Army – but also the other Services to a lesser extent – are engaged in two demanding counter-insurgency operations, for which none are properly equipped nor structured. This means that the "teeth" arms such as the infantry, are particularly stretched, and in some cases misused. This contributes a great deal to the stresses experienced by individuals.

It is here, interestingly, that the CGS, Richard Dannatt must bear a great deal of responsibility. While his predecessor, Mike Jackson reorganised the Army, eliminating the "arms plot" system, this has not been an unqualified success and the reorganisation was certainly not devised with counter-insurgency operations in mind.

There has been an expectation, therefore, that in his tenure as CGS, Dannatt would come up with a new package, dealing with some of the pressure points, which would also address retention and recruitment issues. Without that, there is very little sense in pushing for simplistic "quick fixes" such as a wage hike – or even mounting a major recruitment campaign.

The problem is that, so far, Dannatt and his staff have so far failed to come up with a convincing plan – or indeed any serious proposals which would merit the description of a plan – which means that inertia grips the Army and small problems are being allowed to escalate.

There is some suspicion, therefore, that Dannatt's latest outburst is more of a diversionary tactic, or a smokescreen to cover up the internal failures of the brass to address the more deep-seated problems afflicting the Army. By going for such a populist and easily understood issue like pay, Dannatt can at one reinforce his easy popularity with junior ranks and establish himself as their champion – in so doing insulating himself from criticism of his own failures.

Crucially, in this sense, Dannatt's current intervention is particularly ill-timed, as the Forces have only just received their last (generous) pay award and consideration of the next is not due for some time. Now, therefore, is not a particularly good time to be lobbying on pay.

This points up what is seen as another defect in Dannatt. Although the CGS is a serving officer, the role is one of a politician in uniform. But Dannatt is very bad a playing the Whitehall game and is largely out of his depth, unable to build the alliances which are necessary for him to promote his (the Army's) agenda. Unable to prevail internally, therefore, he resorts to playing the "media card", unaware (or unwilling to admit) that this ultimately damages rather than advances his cause.

Given our (largely) venal and superficial media, however, he can always rely on a few cheap headlines to bolster his position – temporarily. But the tragedy is that his grandstanding is obscuring the more fundamental problems and the lack of progress in fixing them. Had we a more diligent media, this would become evident but, as long as they too are only interested in cheap headlines, a rather inadequate CGS can find a ready audience.

But, make no mistake, for all the plaudits, Dannat, the "Forces' Champion" is not doing his people any favours – and neither is he serving the nation's interests.

COMMENT THREAD

Who will rid me of this turbulent Chief of Staff?

Once again, the Chief of General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, seems to be intent on putting his foot in it. According to The Sun, he is calling for a pay rise for soldiers after "discovering" traffic wardens get paid more than those on the frontline.

He is thus cited as saying, "You look to see how much a traffic warden is paid and compare that against what a private soldier gets paid." This is picked up uncritically by other hacks such as Lucy Cockroft of The Daily Telegraph, who cheerfully copies out the The Sun's figures, telling us that, "The lowest paid soldiers are on just £12,572 a year while traffic wardens receive a basic salary of £17,000."

Er… no! Pay scales for qualified soldiers start at level one (of seven), with Privates getting £16,226.76 a year. On operations, they get an additional £2,320 tax free operational allowance (annualised). Paras – who are currently on operations - get an additional £1,898 for parachute pay.

The operational allowance, paid at a rate of £375 per month, is entirely additional to existing allowances and funded out of the reserve, rather than the defence budget – a payment which, incidentally, was opposed by Dannatt.

On the other hand, soldiers pay £3.89 charges for meals each day and for accommodation they pay £14 per week for Grade one standard (single, en suite room - illustrated) or £4.76 for Grade 4 (less than a packet of cigarettes). They do not pay for meals or accommodation when on operations. They have no travel costs and get free uniforms (right down to their underpants).

The "lowest paid soldiers" are trainees, who currently receive £13,012.80. This goes up to £16,226.76 the moment they qualify – which they must do in order to go on operations. The £12,572 a year figure cited by The Sun is out of date.

Furthermore, soldiers are on a salary spine which guarantees them annual increments, bringing their pay to £25,181.88 annually after seven years – with additional qualifications. They are also in a hierarchical system where there are good opportunities for promotion. Potentially, they can earn as much as £44,587.80 a year as a WO1, assuming they do not go for a commission, which many do.

Whatever else, soldiers are not badly paid. Taking into account their deductions, they are much better off than many occupations and, at the end of their service, they qualify for a non-contributory final salary pension scheme, plus resettlement bonuses, which is the envy of the private sector.

By contrast, The Sun is being more than a little ingenuous about traffic warden pay. The pay rate of £17,000 cited applies only to officals in London Boroughs - as here - to those with experience, or to supervisors. More typically, the pay rate is £7 per hour - less than £14,000 a year - and some are on the minimum wage. One job, here, in Burnley, is advertised for £5.84 - equivalent to £11,539 a year.

One can, of course, expect crap research out of The Sun and other hacks - and you also expect other brain-dead commentators to pile in, but one would expect Dannatt to know better. What does he think he is playing at?

COMMENT THREAD

Mischief-making

The media are in full flow today, condemning the scandal of the eight RAF Chinooks "lying idle in hangars in the Wiltshire countryside", when they are so urgently needed in Afghanistan.

This has previously been described as "one of the most incompetent procurements of all time" - which indeed it is. But the issue has been rehearsed many times, not least in 2005 when the details first became public, and more recently.

What brings it again to the fore is a report by the National Audit Office (NAO) published yesterday, which disclosed that work ordered by the MoD to make the aircraft capable of flying combat missions had taken the overall cost of the project to £422 million "and rising".

In the media reports, though, there is more than a little element of mischief. Much of the media take 2001 as their timescale, when, as The Times puts it, "eight Chinook Mk3s, [were] bought from Boeing in 2001". It thus puts the "cock-up" – as it has been described by Edward Leigh, chairman of the Commons Public Accounts Committee - firmly in the bailiwick of the current administration.

Leigh may well have contributed to this impression, as he is cited in the Daily Telegraph, saying: "The Ministry of Defence's programme to make airworthy the eight Chinook Mk3 helicopters which it acquired in 2001 for special operations work has been a gold standard cock-up."

However, the 2001 date refers only to the date when the machines were delivered to the MoD (they were actually delivered between July 2001 and May 2002) but the saga dates back to 1995. It was then that the MoD ordered 14 Chinook Mk2a helicopters from Boeing. Six were retained as Mk2a - and have flown satisfactorily – while eight were scheduled for conversion to a Mk3 standard, specially adapted for special forces uses.

In fact, the decision to upgrade the machines was made in July 1995, with a then forecast in-service date of November 1998. The work proceeded apace, but with some slippage so that, in March 1998 - after the Labour government had won the election in 1997 - the in-service date was redefined and set for January 2002.

This means that the crucial decisions which led to the current debacle stem firmly from the Conservative administration. Moreover, the decisions were made just at the time of a reshuffle when Malcolm Rifkind was replaced as secretary of state for defence by Michael Portillo – possibly the worst time for major decisions to be made. Mr Portillo, it will be recalled, later went on to make the decision to procure the troubled Nimrod MR4A.

And, when Mr Leigh's committee looked at this issue in 2005, it observed that, "The Department had considerable experience of identifying lessons from procuring equipment but failed to learn from this experience when acquiring the Chinook Mk3."

The point to emerge from this is that the media is picking at old wounds. The actual focus of the current NAO report is the refit being undertaken to make the aircraft operational. Here, the costs have risen by 70 percent from £53 million to £90 million – bad enough but small cheese compared with the overall losses of the project.

In terms, this is relatively minor issue and, in fact, does not compare with the overspend on projects such as the Nimrod or the Type 45 destroyers. It makes the headlines only because the overall losses are so high but, in being framed they way they are, the stories do not do justice to what is a complex and long-running issue.

With the original decisions having been on the Conservatives' watch, though, this brings home the anomalies in defence procurement, where the timespan of contracts so often carry over to different administrations. What one government orders may have to be paid for by another, of a different colour, while errors in the process come back to haunt successive administrations, even though they may have had little (or no) control over events which led to them.

This is something Edward Leigh, a Conservative MP, should perhaps reflect upon. He may enjoy the temporary discomfort of the government but, in the fullness of time, a new Conservative government may find itself being lambasted for decisions over which it too had no control.

COMMENT THREAD

Tell it to the Marines!

"Afghan insurgents 'on brink of defeat'" was the headline in The Daily Telegraph yesterday, meriting not only a front-page squib, but also a more detailed story inside the book.

That is probably too bullish a construction on the situation in Afghanistan, even if (or especially as) it is conveyed to us by Thomas Harding, the paper's defence correspondent, who was in Lashkar Gah – the provincial capital of Helmand – at the time of filing. A more sober assessment comes from defence secretary Des Browne, who finds "progress and optimism".

Thus notwithstanding, the piece attributes the "success" to "missions by special forces and air strikes by unmanned drones" which have "decapitated" the Taliban and brought the war in Afghanistan to a "tipping point".

This, we are told, is according to the commander of British forces in Helmand, Brig Mark Carleton-Smith. He is cited as saying that the new "precise, surgical" tactics have killed scores of insurgent leaders and made it extremely difficult for Pakistan-based Taliban leaders to prosecute the campaign.

In the past two years an estimated 7,000 Taliban have been killed, the majority in southern and eastern Afghanistan. But it is the "very effective targeted decapitation operations" that have removed "several echelons of commanders". It is this that has left the insurgents on the brink of defeat, we are told. "The tide is clearly ebbing not flowing for them. Their chain of command is disrupted and they are short of weapons and ammunition."

While we have no reason to doubt the effect of these operations, what makes the piece remarkable is that the activities of the US forces have been "airbrushed" out of the account.

Yet it was, after all, elements of the US 82nd Airborne Division which were pivotal in the re-taking of Musa Qala at the end of last year – with the help of considerable US air support assets.

And, for all the apparent triumphalism, this was an "opportunistic" operation which had not been scheduled by the British command and, for which – it appears – they were unprepared, with the normal leave rotation in process amongst the battle groups.

Further, after two years of unsuccessful attempts by British troops, it was the US 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit which, in late April, took Garmsir in southern Helmand.

With fighting continuing - almost entirely unreported by the British MSM - Col. Pete Petronzio, US Marine commander, describes the current action as "… attempting to put a stopper in the bottle," claiming that his troops are, "having an extremely positive effect on their [the Taleban's] south-to-north flow".

That might just be partially responsible for the shortage of weapons and ammunition described by Harding, but we are not allowed to know that.

At this stage, it must be noted that the copy which was filed by Harding is not necessarily the same that appeared in the newspaper. It is not unknown for material submitted to be substantially altered by the London desk, reflecting the prevailing editorial bias. Correspondents have been known to disown the final versions of stories submitted by them, as unrecognisable from the original.

Wherever the fault lies, the omission of any reference to the Americans cannot be accidental. There are numerous references to US activity, including a long descriptive piece in The New York Times published only a few days ago, as well as reports in the Canadian Media.

In the UK, the tendency of Hollywood to portray US forces as having won World War II single-handed is the stuff of legend but now, it seems we are seeing the reverse effect, played out for real in the pages of the British media.

Such coverage of Afghanistan as there is in the British media – and there is very little – is determinedly Anglo-centric. There seems very little recognition or understanding that the war is being conducted by a multi-national coalition, in which the UK is second to the Americans, currently fielding fewer troops even in its primary area of responsibility, Helmand province.

On the basis of current US activity in the province, it would be very easy to make the case that the Marines are covering for the earlier failures of the British (with a similar case being made for Musa Qala), but the Americans make no such claims.

Col. Petronzio, in fact, is generous about British involvement. Against suggestions to the contrary, he says of the Marines' activities in Garmsir, "Absolutely not have we come to anyone's rescue … It was an incredibly tough place to be. With the forces they had available, they [the British] did a great job."

It would only be equitable – and courteous – if The Daily Telegraph and the rest of the British media could return the compliment. We are fighting as part of a coalition and there is no shame in relying on support from our allies. But, rather than tell us how appreciative we are, perhaps our media might do the really decent thing and tell it to the Marines.

Not to do so cheapens our effort, and diminishes us all.

See update HERE.

COMMENT THREAD

Problems stacking up …

Mick Smith of The Sunday Times offers an interesting, if superficial report today on the ongoing struggle to balance the MoD budget.

He tells us that Gordon Brown has overruled services chiefs and told them to delay replacing "ageing weapons, vehicles and aircraft" to plug the infamous "£2 billion black hole in the defence budget".

Smith has it that the heads of the armed forces had suggested cancelling two programmes outright to preserve the rest of their replacements from "salami-slicing", the prime minister having been "understood" to have vetoed individual large-scale cuts for fear of negative publicity.

Smith may be right about the delay, but his sources may be misleading him about the provenance of the opposition to the "cuts". It rather depends from whom he has taken his "briefing" in the MoD, notoriously ridden with competing factions. Our understanding is that the prime minister's office was in fact seeking cancellations, rather than subjecting the Services to death by a thousand (salami) cuts.

Anyhow, we learn that "at least eight programmes" will now be delayed (or so it is claimed), with FRES being the highest-profile postponement. This now seems to have acquired the general and misleading description of "a new generation of armoured vehicles", which Smith seems to think was "due to come into service next year".

In the dreams of some, this may have been true, but has not been on the cards for some years. When we first reported on FRES in 2004, it was very clear then that the projected in-service date was not going to be met.

What we have learned not to expect, however, is any deeper analysis from defence (or any) correspondents. After the MoD announcement in May, when the provisional winner of the FRES competition was revealed, it looked like the generals were going to get their way, buying a fleet of unnecessary and hugely expensive armoured vehicles.

If that project is to be delayed, is good rather than bad news, especially if – as is suggested – it will save £800m from the 2008-11 budget. Interestingly though, if true, it parks the problem fairly and squarely in the Conservatives' domain, should they get elected in 2010. Then, one of their first big decisions may well have to be whether to reactivate the programme, or face the approbation of a high profile cancellation, right at the beginning of their term.

The political implications here are getting quite interesting. The Conservatives have publicly supported FRES and are promoting themselves as supporting the Armed Forces. Yet they are going to have every bit as big a problem as the current government in seeking to fund all the planned procurement projects. Their best hope in this respect was that Brown wielded the sword, saving the new government from the embarrassment of having to do the dirty deed.

As it is, Smith is telling us that "procurement chiefs" are expecting the budget crisis to get even worse, citing – as usual – an unnamed defence source”, who claims that, "The service chiefs are in 'survival mode', trying to avoid making any decisions to kill off programmes in the vague hope Gordon might go."

This seems to contradict what Smith has to say in respect of the "cuts" coming from Downing Street, but it is nevertheless the dynamic to which we alluded in an earlier post. There, we cited Allan Mallinson who then opined: "…all the service chiefs can then trust to is an incoming Tory government brave enough to make an overall adjustment to public spending, thus finding the extra money to reinstate the long-term projects."

Given David Cameron's refusal to commit to additional spending, and the likelihood that the public coffers will be empty by the time the Conservatives take office, it looks like the service chiefs may be disappointed.

Furthermore, FRES is not the only programme slated for delay. Others include the Integrated Soldier Technology (Fist) programme – although, after US experiences with a similar programme, this is also probably no bad thing – especially as postponing this programme will push £100m of spending three years into the future.

There is also a software upgrade designed to give the army's Bowman communications system a battlefield tracking system to avoid friendly-fire attacks. This has been delayed indefinitely, Smith claiming that it will push back more than £300m. Again, this is probably no bad thing – such a system is only really needed in the free flowing conditions of manoeuvre battles, and has less importance in COIN operations. A delay would allow the technology to mature and to take account of the developments made by our allies, the Americans, with whom interoperability is essential.

More worryingly, the RAF will receive no replacements for the three Hercules transport aircraft lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the nine scrapped over the past year due to fatigue problems. This will saving £600m, but leaves the RAF airlift capability dangerously stretched until the Airbus A400M programme comes on stream. Oddly enough, though, Smith does not mention the Super Lynx, which is a primary candidate for the chop.

The Royal Navy, though, seems to have survived virtually untouched, being forced only to accept that it will now only get six Astute submarines instead of the 12 (Smith says nine) originally planned and six new Type 45 destroyers, also instead of the original 12 (Smith gets this wrong as well, citing seven). But both these cuts were already accepted in return for the carriers, we are told, but no questions are asked about how a mere six Type 45s can provide adequate coverage for two carrier groups.

Most of all though, in common with most of the journalist fraternity, Smith does not seem to have understood the significance of the MoD’s non-review, even though the clue is in his own report.

"We have recently concluded our planning round which prioritises across the defence programme," says the MoD. "Some decisions will be put on hold while the examination of the equipment programme is carried out."

In other words, everything is to play for. Nothing is cast in stone and we may simply be seeing the expected round of manoeuvring and leaks public briefing, in order to influence the outcome of the non-review. Either way though, problems are definitely stacking up for the Conservative Party.

COMMENT THREAD