And then there were ten

So embedded is the nine-to-five culture at the MoD, it seems, that the website has yet to be updated with details of the latest British casualty in Afghanistan, a Welsh guardsman who, according to diverse news agencies, was killed on Friday morning while on a routine patrol near Lashkar Gah.

Details from the agencies, based on an MoD press release, are sparse. We learn little from them other then he was yet another soldier killed by an IED, bringing the overall death toll of British service personnel in Afghanistan to 169.

Mick Smith of The Sunday Times is on the case though, reporting that this is the tenth soldier to be killed in a Jackal, with the families of troops killed in this "controversial" vehicle set to challenge the MoD over its use.

The lightly armoured Jackal, writes Smith, was designed for open terrain but is increasingly being used on Afghanistan's roads, where it is highly vulnerable to bomb blasts. The Taliban has turned to the roadside bomb as its main weapon against Nato forces, with three quarters of the 32 British troops killed this year dying in explosions, the Jackal being a prime target.

That the vehicle was being targeted was highlighted by Thomas Harding in The Daily Telegraph on 1 June, when he reported that perhaps a quarter of the 100-strong fleet so far delivered to Afghanistan had been wrecked or badly damaged by Taleban attacks.

Smith tells us that the first of a series of inquests into the deaths of soldiers in Jackals in Afghanistan opens next month. Coroners and lawyers for the families expected to question the vehicle's use. Dianne, whose 25-year-old son, Rifleman Adrian Sheldon, was killed last month when his Jackal was blown up at Sangin in northern Helmand, says the family is hiring a lawyer.

Sheldon is saying that she wants to make sure the right people are there helping to ask the right questions to make sure "we get the right answers." She had heard about the issues surrounding the vehicle and asks: "Could its failings have contributed to my son's death?”

Ten is now the same number of soldiers who have been killed in Snatches in Afghanistan and, with families now suing the MoD over the Snatches, Tony McKibben, whose Royal Marine son Robert was one of two men who died when their Jackal was destroyed by an IED near Garmsir in November, said he did not want anyone else to lose a son the same way. He says, "If it doesn't do its job properly it needs to be looked at. If nobody stands up, nothing is done. I've lost my son but this could stop someone else losing theirs."

According to Smith, commanders say the Jackal is well suited to its original role of driving across rough terrain in a reconnaissance or attack role, but is not suitable for Afghanistan's roads. However, a lack of helicopters and the vulnerability of the two other light vehicles, the Snatch Land Rover and the lightly protected Vector troop carrier, forces the use of Jackals on the road.

This is exactly what we feared would happen when the vehicle was first introduced. Originally procured for the special forces, the lack of protection was justified for its specific role, where troops can rely on surprise and speed, but where they are being tied down to routine operations the dynamic changes.

Thus says Richard North, author of Ministry of Defeat, a new book on the MoD's failures, "The Jackal is fundamentally flawed ... The driver and commander are positioned over the front wheels, making them vulnerable to mines."

Needless to say, the MoD misses the point. "The Jackal's great strength is that it can go anywhere – across the most difficult terrain. It is a superb vehicle but could not do what it does were it laden down." The inference is that the vehicle should carry more armour. But, at seven tons, a vehicle of that weight – equivalent to the RG-31 – could be adequately protected if it had been designed properly.

Such is the mindset of the MoD, however, that protection equals weight rather than good design. Its idea of conferring protection is to bolt on armour – of which there are now over two tons on the Jackal – rather than get the design right in the first place.

Now troops are paying the price – as we predicted all along, first warning of this almost exactly two years ago. Perhaps now we will see yet another MoD procurement disaster exposed. But, so committed is the Army to this deathtrap that it will be some time before the Jackal goes the same way as the Vector and is taken out of service.

With ten dead already, though, it must surely only be a matter of time.

COMMENT THREAD

A question of accountability

Snatch Land Rovers are briefly back in the news with a fourth family joining the group that have signalled their intention to sue the MoD for deploying a vehicle which they say should never have been on the front line.

The latest recruits are Karla and Courtney Ellis, the sister and daughter of Private Lee Ellis. Private Ellis was killed in an IED attack near al Amarah in February 2006.

Inevitably, there are mixed responses to this action, with some hostility to the idea that families should go to court. But, to suggest that the case is not pursued, in the absence of any alternative, is also to suggest that the people who made the decisions to deploy and maintain the Snatches in place should not be held accountable for their actions.

Nominally, of course, the responsibility lies with the minister on whose watch the decision was made, but this constitutional fiction does not reflect the reality of power. Discussing this generally with an ex-defence minister recently, what comes over is not an impression of all-embracing power but precisely the reverse.

Confronted with an array of technical experts, military brass and defence contractors, all of whom are pressing for a course of action, it is very difficult for a "lay" minister to reject the advice he is given and make a decision that goes against the grain. In effect, the minister is a prisoner of his advisors.

In some respects, this rather confounds the doctrine of ministerial accountability. The real responsibility for many failures rests not with politicians who signed pieces of paper but with the ranks of officials, in uniform and out, who actually made the decisions.

The idea of ministerial responsibility is further confused by the time which usually elapses between a decision being made and the tenure of a minister. By the time consequences of decisions become apparent, ministers have usually moved on. In some cases, completely different governments have been elected. The idea then that the single man (or woman) actually in post at the time should be held responsible for failures made on their predecessors' watches is fraught.

The question thus arises as to how to hold to account those who actually make decisions and, if the normal constitutional fiction does not provide satisfaction, then some other mechanism must be found. So far, all other avenues have been blocked, other than now the recently announced Iraq inquiry, where there is no expectation of any thorough examination of the Snatch issue.

The courts are a far from perfect means of exploring highly complex issues and are very much the last resort. But if the system does not afford any other relief, then there does not seem to be any other option than to follow this route.

COMMENT THREAD

Road rage

Covered only briefly by the British media was an incident on Wednesday when three Danish soldiers were killed by an IED in Afghanistan.

As the 700-strong Danish contingent in the country is under British command, and operates closely with British forces, these could so easily have been British soldiers, in which case there would have been a great deal more attention given to this small tragedy.

Here, what is remarkable is that there are uncanny parallels between this incident and one which occurred on 25 February of this year. Then, three soldiers from the 1st Btn The Rifles were also killed by an IED. They were riding a Wimik near Gereshk, engaged on "routine escort duties" along the notorious Highway 1 when they were hit by a culvert bomb estimated at 250Kg.

As to the current incident, the Danish troops were reported to have been riding in a "lightly armoured jeep" – most probably a Mercedes G270 CDI (pictured) – which is a direct equivalent of a Wimik. They too were engaged on routine escort duties near Gereshk along the same Highway 1, and were also hit by a culvert bomb, this time estimated at 350Kg.

Highway 1 is the main artery in Afghanistan. It runs from the eastern Pakistani border through Kabul and Kandahar, onwards to Herat in the west, passing Camp Bastion, the main coalition base in Helmand province, and thence on to the Iranian border.

Unsurprisingly, given its strategic importance, it is a key target. And, as one of the few paved roads in the country, is difficult to mine. Therefore, the Taleban – as did the Iraqi militias and the IRA before them - have resorted to the tactic of using culvert bombs, taking advantage of culverts which number into the thousands in some provinces, spread out over hundreds of miles of road.

And, according to Time magazine, not only has the frequency of such attacks increased, the power of the bombs employed has gone "way up." Twenty-pound charges have been replaced by oil drums packed with hundreds of pounds of explosives, set off by trip wires and pressure plates, that are capable of destroying up-armored humvees.

In Northern Ireland – where the IRA used on occasions 1000lb bombs - to deal with such formidable weapons, the British Army were forced to abandon the roads altogether, resorting to helicopters and foot patrols, a decision which was taken shortly after a Saracen APC (pictured) was destroyed by a culvert bomb near Crossmaglen on 9 October 1975.


Unfortunately, the option of relying entirely on helicopters is not available to the coalition forces, and not entirely because there are insufficient helicopters. The roads – and in particular Highway 1 – are needed to move large quantities of supplies and are used heavily by Afghan security forces and civilians. To abandon those roads to an enemy which is indiscriminately slaughtering civilians as well as the security forces is also to abandon any attempt at winning "hearts and minds".

On the other hand, foot patrols and direct intervention is proving extremely hazardous. At the beginning of this week, a Canadian combat engineer died while trying to defuse an IED in a culvert beneath a roadway about 12 miles southwest of Kandahar City. Also killed in the blast was an Afghan policeman. An interpreter was injured and evacuated by helicopter.

Once again therefore, technology is having to provide the answers, one application of which is the mine protected vehicle. Despite the increased size of bombs, many still believe they are saving lives although no one pretends they are the complete answer.

Danish defence Chief of Staff Tim Sloth Jørgensen believes that more losses from IEDs are "unavoidable". "We're never going to find them all," he says. "There is no safe way to do so, and the enemy is always coming up with new tactics."

Others, offering arguments redolent of those we heard during the Snatch debate, defend the decision to transport troops in lightly armoured vehicles. Despite the incident in February, they cite the relatively safe conditions along Highway 1. They also point out that if soldiers began travelling in armoured personnel carriers, the Taleban would begin planting larger bombs.

This argument for "safety" is not shared by Time magazine, recording that the section of Highway 1 between Kabul and Kandahar is littered with "brutal evidence" of the Taliban's IED offensive.

The road is a showcase US-funded project, meant to connect two of the country's most vital commercial centres, but it is now an automotive graveyard, littered with burned-out carcasses of vehicles and disrupted by crumbled bridges.

One infamous stretch is lined with the wreckage of 40 transport trucks, the remains of a 90-minute enemy ambush dubbed the "jingle-truck massacre." (Afghans hang chains and coins from their truck bumpers, which create a jingling sound.) "Every few miles, craters of varying size pock the pavement, interspersed with suspicious patches of dirt that compel patrol convoys to make off-road detours or dismount to investigate before proceeding."

The problem, however, is not new. Similar conditions were experienced in Iraq and there US forces developed engineering solutions to reduce the risks. This included a programme of clearing road verges, compacting the road shoulders, replacing manhole covers to drainage systems and fixing grates on the ends of culverts.

Route clearance was also practised in Iraq, using equipment such as the Buffalo - although these will not be delivered to the British zone until next year at the earliest.


Other equipment which has been used are mast and aerostat-mounted surveillance cameras, which allow for the continuous observation of vulnerable sections of road which cannot be achieved with UAVs. This principle has been extended with the use of mast-mounted observation cameras and other sensors on vehicles (pictured above).

As much as anything, this is an engineers' war - a game of three-dimensional chess where technical expertise and innovation is as important as firepower. When it comes to "boots on the ground", therefore, more infantry are not necessarily the answer. We need more combat engineers.

COMMENT THREAD

A mountain to climb

Sometimes you get the feeling there is no hope. No sooner do we record Dannatt's plea to protect defence spending then up pops the answer to a parliamentary question from Ann Winterton on defence spending.

Specifically, this was a follow-up to our piece in late May when it was revealed that an additional £20 million had been spent on preparing the Panther command vehicle (pictured above) for operations in Afghanistan.

What we did not know then – but have now found out – is that this £20 million has been spent on a mere 67 of the fleet of 401 vehicles, equivalent to £298,507 for each vehicle.

That of course is the additional expenditure for a vehicle which, in the first instance, cost a ridiculous £413,000 each. That means that supplying 67 four-seater armoured patrol vehicles is costing nearly £50 million, or just over £710,000 each.

Readers will recall that, in May 2005 the Swedish Army bought the near-equivalent RG-32M for a cost of approximately £152,000 each. More recently, the Irish Army bought a batch, the price having increased to about £210,000 each for battle-ready vehicles.

Even at the higher rate, therefore, this vehicle costs less to buy than the cost of converting the Panther to operational status, each Panther costing in total more than three RG-32Ms.

If this profligacy was an exception, then it would be remarkable enough in itself but it is just another example of the most extraordinary wastefulness of the MoD, a ministry that has recently committed to spending over £93,000 each on the Springer "beach buggy" and over £600,000 each on the converted SUV called the Husky.

Time and time again we hear the mantra of how the armed forces are deprived of resources, the government accused of "underspending". But again and again we see these examples of egregious waste. Clearly, whatever problems the MoD and the military might have, cash is not one of them. All the evidence points to the singular fact that, the more they are given, the more they will waste.

To get anywhere near efficient operations, we have a huge mountain to climb. And mountaineers there are none.

COMMENT THREAD

It's started

Already, the media is second-guessing the Iraq inquiry, with The Times leading the fray.

Of four questions posed by defence editor Michael Evans, however, only one relates to the occupation, confirming that the media is going to be obsessed with the run-up to the war, rather than the occupation. And even then, the single question directed at the occupation is so limited in scope that it indicates nothing more than the narrowness of the perspective. Thus does Evans ask:

Why was the size of the British force in Iraq progressively reduced even though the troops there were coming under daily attack by an increasingly well-armed and well-trained extremist militia?

During 2005, 2006 and 2007 there were never enough troops to protect the Iraqi citizens living in Basra, and control of the city began to fall into the hands of the Iranian-backed Shia hardliners. By September 2007, the 500 remaining troops based inside the city were under such pressure that there was little alternative but to withdraw them to the relative safety of the airbase northwest of the city, leaving Basra to the mercy of the extremists.

What debate was going on in Whitehall at this time? Who, if anyone, was arguing that more, not fewer, troops were needed to safeguard the lives of Iraqis living in Basra, let alone the British soldiers themselves? Was anyone warning that the withdrawal of the last troops inside Basra might lead to a take-over by the Shia extremists and that this would be interpreted — by the Americans and by historians — as a defeatist move by the British, one which did no favours for the reputation of the British Army?

The questions, superficially, look sound enough, but they miss the point. In common with most of his contemporaries, Evans focuses unduly on Basra. Yet, any careful analysis of the campaign will suggest that the rot started not in Basra but with the desertion of al Amarah in August 2006. Arguably, had the base at Abu Naji been held, and the training and support of the 12th Division continued, Iraqi forces backed by the British could eventually have recovered the city.

For the British to have retained their foothold in the Abu Naji, however, two things were needed: the Army had to restore tactical mobility and then had to acquire the capability to deal with the indirect fire which was making that base untenable. Both were essentially equipment issues, reflecting procurement failures and High Command decisions rather than a lack of troops.

In this context, it is germane to note that, when the Iraqi Army subsequently recovered al Amarah in the operation called "promise of peace", starting in May 2008, it was heavily supported by US troops, without which the operation would not have been possible. The total commitment of US troops to Maysan province, however, never exceeded 2,500 – a fraction of the number of troops available to the British.

This demonstrates that troop numbers, although an issue in the early stages of the occupation, was not the decisive factor. What mattered was the equipment, the tactics and the timing, particularly in respect of the political developments which enabled prime minister Maliki to take on the Mahdi Army and defeat it.

You can, of course read the full story in Ministry of Defeat, without waiting for the outcome of the inquiry. This is the book that the media and the military are determined to bury.

Our publicist, appointed by the publisher and highly experienced in marketing books, has never before known such resistance to a book. And before committing his time an effort to the book, he made his own enquiries, sending copies to "senior ministry persons" for comment.

One told us that the book should be "compulsory reading" for all students at Sandhurst. They should be invited to state their reasons why the book was wrong, our source said, but they would find it very difficult to do. Most Army officers, he said, would agree in private with the thesis of the book, but none would admit it publicly. "There is a major cover-up going on," he added.

Although some details may be wrong, the book tells the substantive and hitherto untold story of the Iraqi occupation. That it should be told by an outsider is intolerable to the media, which comprehensively called it wrong, just as Evans is doing now. The inquiry is faced with a difficult job as there are many vested interests keen to see it get the wrong answers.

It will be interesting to see whether they prevail.

COMMENT THREAD

A leadership crisis

Tucked away at the very end of a piece in The Guardian is a short comment. It notes that the much-touted plans for an extra 2,000 British troops to be deployed to Helmand had been rejected by Gordon Brown, "partly because of Treasury concern about the cost, and partly, say Whitehall officials, because the plans were not convincing."

This is amplified slightly in Defence Management which tells us that it has "emerged" that Prime Minister Gordon Brown rejected plans for a permanent surge of 2,000 troops earlier this year because the proposal was "not convincing" enough. Downing Street, we are told, wanted to see a co-oordinated effort between combat and reconstruction efforts.

Had either or both read Defence of the Realm on 30 April, they would have read something very much to similar effect, where we were the only source stating unequivocally that there would be no permanent uplift in troop numbers in Afghanistan, the precise reason being that the military could not come up with a coherent plan for their employment.

We further amplified these issues later in the month and again in early June, but only now is the mainstream picking up the vibes, which were there more than a month ago but missed by the likes of Michael Smith of The Times, who chose to interpret events though the one-dimensional perspective of "Army versus Treasury.

This focus on cost limits imposed on the "gallant" Army – which, as legend would have it, could win the battle only if it was given enough "boots on the ground" – cropped up again recently, with the accusations from Ed Butler that there had been "tough financial constraints imposed on British troops" in the early days of the Afghani campaign, with the claim that Gordon Brown as Chancellor had demanded that only £1.3 billion could be spent on the operation in three years.

As it happens, actual spending from the Treasury reserve on Afghanistan – in addition to allocations from the Defence budget - was £0.75bn in 2006-07, £1.5bn in 2007-08 and £2.6bn in 2008-09. The forecast for 2009/10 is over 3bn. That puts additional expenditure in three years at close to £4.5 billion which suggests that either Gordon Brown was not as all-powerful as is often suggested, or that the "cap" is a figment of a number of over-heated imaginations.

While the legend, however, plays well to the crowd and can always be guaranteed to provoke foaming at the mouth from the claque and ritual denouncements from opposition politicians, it obscures (and quite deliberately on the part of some) the greater problem in theatre, at the heart of the reluctance to commit huge and growing sums of money in what amounts to giving the MoD a blank cheque.

Something of that was spelt out on the forum, noting that the military had long failed to make a coherent case the cash it has been demanding, and is still unable to do so.

In practical terms, this has been reflected in operations on the ground where, to an extent, the commanding officers of each roulement have had their own ideas about tactics and strategic priorities and have, perhaps been allowed more latitude that perhaps they should. One would not expect key strategic decisions to be made at this level, all of which we surmised, suggests a vacuum of leadership higher up the command chain.

If that is put together with recent events, one can only conclude that we are in a remarkable situation where the military high command has lost the confidence of the government it serves. There is also a feeling that this loss of confidence is reciprocated, and unlikely to be improved by the appointment of Bob Ainsworth to the post of Secretary of State for Defence.

Should this be the case – and the vibes are certainly there – this is an extremely worrying development, and one which perhaps merits more attention than it is getting. Even in this "dumbed-down" age, where soap opera politics prevail, a leadership crisis at the top of the military is of some importance.

COMMENT THREAD

The cover-up continues

In a poorly-reported Coroner's hearing yesterday, the death of Trooper Robert Pearson from the Queen's Royal Lancers Regiment was recorded. He was killed on 21 April last year in Helmand province while driving a Viking as part of the Armoured Support Company Royal Marines. The vehicle was hit by what are believed to be two stacked anti-tank mines and Trooper Pearson died instantly.

Pearson's group was providing security for a 120-vehicle convoy which had been carrying supplies from Camp Bastion to Sangin. The convoy had stopped overnight at forward operating base Robinson and was on its way back to Bastion when the Taleban struck. Insurgents had planted the anti-tank mines next to water holes used by villagers near the Dar-E-Mandah Wadi riverbed, which the convoy had to cross.

Despite this appalling and entirely preventable tragedy (a Mastiff or other suitably protected vehicle would have shrugged off such an attack), such media reports as have been published focus on Cleethorpes coroner Paul Kelly "welcoming" the MoD's decision to replace its Viking armoured vehicles in Afghanistan. This is as reported by The Daily Mail, although it has simply pasted in unattributed Press Association copy.

This tells us that the coroner "praised the MoD for identifying a problem with the vehicle and taking steps to solve it," recording also that Lt-Col Andy Teare had told the court that the Viking would soon be replaced by "the tougher Warthog armoured carrier."

The coroner's comments represent a victory for the MoD's spin machine which has been working assiduously in the background on its damage limitation programme, all aimed at deflecting criticism from yet another of its disastrous choices of armoured vehicles, this one having killed at least six soldiers and probably more.

The "front man" in this instance was Lt-Col Teare, described as belonging to the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME). He has been in action before, in January, when he was spinning furiously in front of the Plymouth coroner.

Dealing with the death of Corporal Damian "Dee" Mulvihill, who was also killed in a Viking, this time on 20 February last year, Teare managed to convince the court that the MoD was on the case, telling the coroner than six modified Vikings had been flown out to Afghanistan the very day he was giving evidence, "along with armour to adapt the 50 currently being used".

Teare had told the court that the Viking had been "initially designed to defend small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades and therefore most of the armour was on the top of the vehicle," not mentioning that it was going into a theatre with a known mine threat.

However, his performance was good enough to defuse any criticism, gaining the headline in the local press of "Death blast leads to new mine armour" – thus avoiding any outcry over why such a dangerously vulnerable vehicle had been fielded in the first place. And now that the additional protection that got him off the hoop in Plymouth has failed, he is now relying on the replacement programme to get him and his employers off the hook.

What was not said was that Lt-Col Andy Teare is the MoD's, "Light Armoured Systems APC team leader", working for the Defence Equipment and Support Agency. He is therefore one of the officials responsible for selecting the range of armoured vehicles which have caused so much grief in Iraq and Afghanistan.

By no measure could Teare regarded as an independent witness – more a man with a vested interest in supporting his employer in covering up the truth. It can be no coincidence that he prefers in the court context to be described as "REME" rather than his more appropriate designation.

He is also a man happy to receive awards on behalf of DE&S, most recently for the Bulldog, which makes his current reticence all the more interesting.

As to the Daily Mail, rather than its lame "cut and paste" job, it could have made an issue of the Viking, except that it too is compromised. When the Viking was deployed to theatre in October 2006, its Sunday edition published an uncritical "puff" (pictured) and has since avoided any criticism of the machine.

Most often, like The Sun the media is content to laud the deaths of "Our Boys", but is rarely prepared to exert itself when it comes to trying to prevent further deaths.

One might have thought that, since this is the second reported failure of Army vehicles, this might be of some interest to the media. Certainly, Defence Management has been quick to point this out, but so far the bulk of the media have shown little overt interest.

Some of this, though, may be due to the strenuous efforts of the MoD to keep its own failures out of the news. The Ministry makes a considerable investment in coroners' courts, supplying "liaison officers" whose task it is to "assist" inexperienced coroners in reaching the "right" verdict, helpfully supplying MoD documents and witnesses, while ensuring that hostile evidence is kept at bay.

The MoD is also quick to employ the Defence Advisory System, first classifying information on its equipment – although much of it already in the public domain – so that it can invoke prohibitions on the publication of "design details, technical specifications and materials" that "could enable potential enemies or terrorists to devise effective counter-measures more quickly". The detail that the Viking was only built to STANAG 4569 Level 1, therefore, is unlikely to be found in any newspaper.

Then there is the whole range of rewards and sanctions which the MoD can employ, some of which we described earlier, all of which are used to ensure that the "message" is controlled.

The worst of this is that the replacement vehicle, the Warthog, although better than the Viking, is not much better. It shares the same design flaws which, as even the Cleethorpes coroner Paul Kelly notes – doubtless advised by Lt-Col Teare - "would not minimise the possible impact of double or triple-layered explosives."

That much was reported by the Grimsby Telegraph which then failed to put two and two together. By that very measure, the Warhog will fail to protect against the very type of attack which killed its own "local hero" Robert Pearson.

Cynically, an MoD official claimed yesterday said that they will "learn lessons" from Pearson's death. Unfortunately, the MoD has already learned a more profound lesson. It is easier to cover up a problem than to do something about it.

COMMENT THREAD

Looking behind the headlines

Three pieces on Brigadier Ed Butler's evidence to the defence select committee all tell the same story. You get the Coffee House Blog, The Times and The Daily Telegraph.

The basic narrative is that, in the early days of the current Afghani campaign in Helmand province in 2006, "there were tough financial constraints imposed on British troops". As a result, British forces were hamstrung from the start by the Treasury, with Gordon Brown as Chancellor demanding that only £1.3 billion could be spent on the operation in three years.

All of this sounds terribly familiar and depressing, inviting swift condemnation and recriminations.

However, nothing is ever quite what it seems. At the very least, you have to look at the rank of the man who is making these charges. Although a Brigadier is high up in the operational pecking order, within the political framework of the MoD, this is only one level up from the tea boy, where full Colonels are two a penny.

Whatever Ed Butler says, it does not stem from first hand experience. Decisions were taken much higher up the food chain. He knows only what he was told, from people who may well have had their own axes to grind.

Secondly, in the early stages of the campaign, it is a matter of record that the Army went in badly prepared, with poor intelligence, little in the way of a coherent plan and, in the event, ended up undertaking a number of high-intensity operations – such as the platoon houses – of dubious strategic merit, which were never factored into the original planning.

Thirdly, we have seen from the Iraqi campaign – which has filtered through into Afghanistan - a lack of high-level strategic planing (and leadership), evident not least in the failure of the High Command to deliver a revised counter-insurgency document. Thus, we have seen marked shifts in strategy with every roulement, the actual planning being determined at a lower level of command than one might otherwise expect.

All of this, plus acknowledged weaknesses in MoD financial planning and the fact that the Army also had other agendas - which it was playing off against its commitment in Afghanistan – suggests that we are getting a very partial picture from Butler. This may not be an accurate representation of what was going on at the time. One might even suggest that there is a certain amount of back-covering going on.

Certainly, no responsible historian or commentator would ever rely on one source for the final word on such contentious issues, in what was clearly a complex and multi-faceted situation, involving high politics and different agendas. What makes for good headlines on the day does not always represent the whole truth, and it is unlikely that we are seeing anything approaching it from the account of Brig Butler.

COMMENT THREAD

Can do … can't do

Through the many years we have campaigned for improved protected vehicles for British forces, what has been most remarkable has been the negativity of the response, not least from the military.

Far from embracing the idea, we find most commonly that commentators go out of their way to dredge up reasons why better vehicles cannot be used and, when we address their arguments, we so often find that detractors simply come back with more and different reasons.

Not least of the reasons offered is the relatively poor off-road performance, a hardly surprising deficiency when the current generation of MRAPs was primarily designed for road use. If anything, the surprise has been how well they have performed when they are used way beyond their original design specifications.

Nevertheless, when the Mastiff was exposed to the rugged terrain of Afghanistan, it suffered considerable problems, with breakage of axles and springs (and problems acquiring sufficient spares).

This led to the production of the Mastiff 2 with improved axles and suspension. Although this resolves the immediate reliability problems, it does little to enhance off-road performance.

In sharp contrast to the whingeing Brits, however, US forces have displayed an altogether more robust response to the problem. Currently in progress is a DoD partnership with Force Protection Inc and the Oshkosh Truck Corp to modify Cougars, adding new independent suspension and central tyre inflation systems.

This virtually eliminates the same reliability problems experienced with the Mastiff but will also greatly improve mobility. It is also anticipated that the conversion will reduce roll-over incidents dangers because the suspension eliminates stress concentrated in one area and distributes the weight more evenly.

Conversion takes approximately six to seven days and the first batch is being used also to teach military mechanics the process so that modifications can be carried out in the field. And such is the "can do" attitude of the Americans that by the end of the year, 700 modified MRAP vehicles will be despatched to Afghanistan, Kuwait and Iraq.

Meanwhile, our newly appointed defence secretary will, no doubt, be extolling the virtues of the Jackal and repeating the mantra about the need for high mobility at the expense of protection – a further step down the road towards becoming a can't do nation.

COMMENT THREAD

A sense of proportion

"I find it so distressing to hear lavish praise being heaped upon the procurement of vehicles that are potential death-traps and to listen later to expressions of condolence to the families of those who have perished in them."

Thus said Ann Winterton on Thursday (pictured below right), to a near-deserted Commons debating chamber, addressing on the government benches the minister of state for defence, Bob Ainsworth (below left).

Spoken from the heart, with more than a hint of anger, that went entirely unrecorded by the MSM which 24 hours later was to be engulfed in a "day of drama", precipitated by the sudden resignation of James Purnell. Little did we know that, by the end of that day, John Hutton would have resigned and been replaced by Ainsworth as the new secretary of state for defence.

Why Hutton should have resigned so suddenly is not known. He claims "family reasons" but nothing is that simple in politics and, with only eight months in office, he had barely begun to make his mark. For him to leave at what is a crucial moment in the Afghani campaign, however, can hardly help matters. Unsurprisingly, it has been described by Field Marshal Lord Bramall, former CDS, as a " dereliction of duty ".

Back on the Thursday, Ann could hardly have guessed that she was addressing that man soon-to-be-king, when she complained to Ainsworth about the all-important "protected vehicle fleet" in Afghanistan, using General Dannatt's word to describe it as "unbalanced".

There were, she said far too many other vehicles in service (or about to arrive) without the basic mine protection afforded by the "v-shaped hull", those including the Coyote, Viking, Tellar and Warthog - and the Jackal (pictured above, being driven by John Hutton).

It augers ill that Ainsworth, now in the dominant position, did not get the point. The hon Lady, he said, "must accept that we cannot put all our people into the same kind of vehicles. We have to give them a range of different vehicles of different sizes."

There is no way that Ann was arguing thus. Simply that all military vehicles in a part of the world where mine strikes and IED blasts are tragically common should be suitably protected. It is not part of the case that the choice should be restricted to that which are – the point being that better vehicles are required to supplement the range.

Ainsworth, though, ploughed on regardless, heedless of this point, picking up the points Ann had made about the Jackal which, she averred, "highlighted the failed concept of bolting on armour, as proved by the American Humvee vehicle."

Repeating the tired and discredited mantra which he had been fed by his advisors, Ainsworth launched into its defence, declaring: "We have to try to mitigate the effect of using a smaller vehicle and that can be done only to a degree. The main protection of the Jackal is its massive manoeuvrability; it does not have to go down the well-trodden path. If the hon. Lady goes to theatre, she will know that it is a very well thought of vehicle among all ranks."

This invited the obvious retort from Ann: "I would not like to hazard a guess as to how many young men have been killed in it unnecessarily," she told Ainsworth. But the now defence secretary would not leave it there. "The hon. Lady is suggesting that there is some easy alternative that would give our people the capability that they need to do the job and yet remove if not the entire risk, a lot of the risk associated with the Jackal. I do not believe that she is correct."

Ann showed her anger once more. "I hope that the right hon. Gentleman does not think I was born yesterday," she responded. "War is bloody and people get killed in it, but what is desperate is the fact that this country has not supported its soldiers in conflict with the right kind of vehicles, which can be obtained, and has instead made major mistakes in procurement."

While we would not attempt to argue that the recent events have not been important, the "drama" embraced so enthusiastically compares poorly with the real-life struggle that lies out of sight and out of mind, ignored by an indifferent media and uncaring politicians – the real world where men and women are dying needlessly because of mistakes made in London by people who should know better – mistakes to which Ann was seeking to draw attention.

The stark peril facing those men and women is underlined by an article in The Daily Telegraph today, but as no more than a curiosity, detached from the political process.

Written by the paper's stringer, Ben Farmer, he records that troops in Afghanistan "are facing a major increase in the number of roadside bomb attacks as a surge of reinforcements has forced insurgents to shun direct attacks".

This is based on a Nato report that the incidence of IEDs has jumped 80 percent and last year killed 172 international troops. Hundreds more Afghan police, soldiers and civilians have been killed and maimed. Then cited is Gen Richard Blanchette, spokesman for the Nato-led forces, who says: "This is very serious business for us."

He adds that the increase was prompted by insurgents changing tactics and an influx of international troops patrolling on the ground, telling us that, "They are using this as a last measure".

The piece also tells us that armies including the British have been forced to abandon lightly armoured "patrol jeeps" and Snatch Land Rovers, and spend hundreds of millions of pounds on heavier, more cumbersome armoured protection. Yet, it then continues, "despite these efforts, casualties have still dramatically risen", with this year 28 British troops having been killed, 21 by bombs.

Had the paper tied in this piece with last Thursday's debate, the issue would really have come to life, as Ann Winterton told of the wasted money, the poor designs and those procurement mistakes, all explaining why the "efforts" in Afghanistan have not met with complete success.

Perhaps, like this blog, Ann was "too strident" and "too sanctimonious", or perhaps she is simply too detached from the real "drama" of politics. After all, how can the unnecessary deaths of soldiers begin to compare with the "tumultuous" events – as they have been described – of the last 24 hours?

One must, after all, keep a sense of proportion.

COMMENT THREAD

Ministry of Defeat

The Army is in "denial" over Iraq, claims Richard North, author of Ministry of Defeat, a startling new book published today, the first comprehensive history of the British occupation of southern Iraq.

Charting the progress of the occupation, relying on "open source" material, the extensive official and Arab media coverage, and high level sources, he finds that the military made many serious blunders which led to an irrecoverable position. This eventually forced the retreat into a single base in Basra, leaving the city and its surrounds to fundamentalist Islamic milita.

Although under-resourced and without clear political objectives, the Army nevertheless failed in early-mid 2003 to recognise the signs that a full-scale insurgency was developing. The military then treated the growing disorder around Basra and other provinces primarily as a "public order" issue, similar to that which they had faced in Northern Ireland.

This led to the fatal decision to deploy second-hand Snatch Land Rovers imported from Belfast, and the failure properly to equip for the vicious battles which were to follow.

When a full-blown insurgency developed in 2004, however, the militias mistakenly confronted the Army head on – and lost. This in turn led to a false sense of security in the Army, where military commanders believed the insurgent strength was broken.

However, the militias adopted classic guerrilla war tactics, using sophisticated bombs against which the Army, with its vulnerable Snatches, was ill prepared. The new tactics forced the Army onto the defensive, giving time for the militias to rebuild their strength.

Faced with the prospect of a long-drawn-out campaign which it was not equipped to fight, the Army decided to pull out and then made the mistake of revealing to the militias its intention to withdraw altogether. It thus gave the militias a signal that all they had to do was maintain the pressure and they would prevail.

Having lost the initiative, the two major cities of al Amarah and Basra descended into chaos, ruled by the fundamentalist militias, with the Army losing control. This led to the major strategic error in 2006 of abandoning the key city of al Amarah, which became the insurgents' bomb factory and armoury, feeding the insurgency in Basra and Baghdad. Without interference from the British, bombs were being manufactured on an industrial scale.

Against the increasingly well-equipped and aggressive militias, the Army made a last-ditch bid at the end of 2006 to regain the initiative in Basra, amid growing violence and disorder. When this failed, it adopted a policy of progressive retreat, leaving the militias in virtually complete control of the city. This culminated in the Army being permitted by the militias to beat a peaceful but ignominious retreat to the comparative safety of Basra airport.

It then took the Americans and the Iraqi government to transform the situation in southern Iraq, during which time the Iraqi Army successfully recovered first Basra and then al Amarah. During this period, through 2007, the US forces committed less than half the troop numbers than the British yet, working with Iraqi divisions, managed to defeat the militias.

Although the military were badly let down by the politicians, says North, the campaign could have been won with the resources available, had the right tactics and equipment been adopted. Contrary to popular belief, the Army was not overstretched. Rather, it failed to utilise the Iraqi Army properly and lacked the right equipment to support the campaign.

In the equipment stakes, the Army was the victim of successive procurement failures. But, relying on high level sources, North found that the Army contributed to its own problems, resisting the introduction of equipment needed to fight the insurgency because it feared that ambitious plans for future, high-tech equipment might be scrapped. It traded its capability to fight the insurgency for a promise of future capability, says North.

The Army, as a corporate body, let down men and women on the ground, who performed admirably, fighting a vicious and unprincipled enemy. They were handicapped by poor strategy, inadequate equipment and insufficient resources. Without their perseverance, their skills and in some cases quite extraordinary courage, things might have been far worse.

The sad fact though is that the Army failed. More dangerously, it is refusing to acknowledge that failure and risks making the same mistakes in Afghanistan, particularly in terms of equipment procurement, where it is clear that lessons have not been learned.

In researching the book, North visited the MoD's luxurious office block in Whitehall. Despite the vast expense on its refurbishment, he says, it boasts an atrium that has the look and feel of a public lavatory. This is not inappropriate, considering what it does with much of the public money entrusted to it, he reflects. And, while the politicians bear their share of the blame for the defeat in Iraq, the finger must also point at the Ministry of Defence, which North has renamed the Ministry of Defeat.

COMMENT THREAD

Another humiliation

Despite the military and political attempts to keep secret the fact that British forces have been kicked out of Iraq, today has seen yet another humiliation delivered by an Iraqi government determined to eradicate every trace of British presence from their country.

This is according to The Times which, with others, reports that that Britain's final military mission in Iraq is in disarray. The mission in question is a Royal Navy detachment which was supposed to be training and mentoring the Iraqi Navy, with upwards of 400 service personnel remaining after the 31 July deadline when the bulk of British forces are required to quit Iraq.

But, as Deborah Haynes, defence correspondent, tells us, there has been a failure to seal the agreement with the Baghdad government, which was supposed to have been concluded by the end of last month. This has forced two British ships to leave and scores of Royal Navy trainers have had to suspend work.

The only progress made to date is a "draft accord" which has been approved by Iraqi ministers, but this must still go before parliament, and Iraqi MPs have a reputation for dragging their heels on legislation. Even then, far from authorising the full contingent, the draft only permits less than 100 British personnel to remain, and then only for year after the Iraqi parliament gives its approval. Furthermore, there is no military immunity and all personnel remaining will be subject to all Iraqi laws.

To add to the humiliation, a separate detachment of 200 British troops in Baghdad will be required to leave, along with Lt-Gen Chris Brown, deputy commander of coalition forces since March. He had hoped to stay in Iraq for a year but will now be returning home at the end of July, along with all the other British officers in Baghdad. He and the other British officers will be replaced by US officers.

This outcome is very different from that expected by the British government, which has been putting a great deal of effort into securing the face-saving concession of keeping the Royal Navy and Baghdad detachments in place.

Detailed negotiations began in September 2008. Brown set out his expectations in December backed up by heavyweight lobbying by First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, who visited the Iraqi Naval Base at Umm Qasr in the same month.

In January, Gordon Brown, accompanied by the Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, made an unannounced visit "to see first-hand the Iraqi Navy's progress".

By mid April 2009, the MoD seemed to think that an agreement was secure, reporting that the Iraqi Government had asked for the Royal Navy-led training team to stay in the country. However, at the end of April, when British land forces formally ceased operations, discussions were still "underway" on the precise scope of future British military activity. At that stage, though, it was anticipated that "up to 400 UK military personnel" would remain. It was not to be.

Nevertheless, Liam Fox, Tory shadow defence secretary, seems to have misunderstood what is going on. "It is hard to believe," he days, "that this situation could not have been sorted out through diplomatic channels in time and avoided. But there must be a suspicion that the government is so consumed with their internal problems that they have overlooked this."

Nothing could be further from the truth than his last "suspicion". Behind the scenes, British officials have been working flat out to reach a successful resolution, deemed essential for Britain to retain even the last vestiges of "face”. But Maliki, still deeply resentful at the way the British walked away from confronting the militias in southern Iraq, was having none of it.

When the mandate of the British forces was not renewed last December, we described it as the "last humiliation". In that, we were wrong. Maliki had another up his sleeve. He has just delivered it.

COMMENT THREAD

An invisible scandal

Given the professed concern for "Our Boys" and the outpourings of regrets when soldiers are killed, it is rather remarkable that so little attention is being given to their equipment, particularly the growing list of vehicles failures which have accounted for more than 40 deaths in Afghanistan.

Even then, it is quite remarkable that the only journal to notice the comments on the Vector last Monday by Quentin Davies at Defence Questions was Defence Management.

It noted Davies saying that, "When purchasing a number of armoured vehicles, failure was bound to occur in some areas," this (rightly) being interpreted as the defence minister attempting to justify the withdrawal of the Vector.

The journal then goes on to state: "Despite lessons learned from the Iraq insurgency, when the MoD bought a new fleet of 100 Vectors in 2006, it failed to ensure that they had v-shaped hulls or armour strong enough to withstand IEDs and landmines. At least five personnel have died in the vehicles since 2007". Despite spending £100m on the Vector, Davies did not appear willing to admit that the process was a failure, it added.

That failure has cost £100 million, the deaths of at least five soldiers and the serious injury of many more, and one would have thought that the very obvious refusal of Quentin Davies to admit error on the part of his ministry might warrant a mention in the MSM, not least because it indicates that the MoD has yet to learn any lessons from its failures.

At least on another egregious failure – the Jackal - The Daily Telegraph did publish a story on it. With only five pages for general news, however, while the paper concentrates on MPs' expenses, only a tiny amount of space was allocated to the story in the print edition. No other newspaper or media outlet seems to have touched the issue.

With two soldiers being killed in the Jackal, in the Musa Qala area, the story would have been even more powerful had a piece published yesterday in the Oxford Mail been available. This also dealt with a bomb attack on a vehicle in the Musa Qala area – this one on 17 May - but the headline tells of a different outcome. It reports: "Bicester troops survive Afghan bomb explosion."

Four soldiers were involved in this incident, from 23 Pioneer Regiment of the Royal Logistic Corps (pictured), but they were in a Mastiff and were unscathed after a Taleban bomb exploded under their vehicle.

Vehicle commander Capt Gordon Fletcher is cited as saying: "After the initial shock of the explosion and the dust cloud in the vehicle had subsided, our first reaction was one of disorientation, trying to take in the severity of the event that had just happened, followed by what felt like minutes, but most probably seconds, of almost silence."

Fletcher then tells us: "Due to the size of the explosion we were unsure of the extent of the damage to the vehicle. On further examination, the vehicle was able to drive on its own out of the contact area."

The contrast between the fate of the crew in the Jackal, compared with this happy affair, tells its own story, but Fletcher goes on to say that "The Mastiff armoured vehicle affords us great mobility across the desert terrain of Afghanistan, despite its size and weight, giving us unrivalled protection." He adds, "In our opinion the Mastiff saved our lives and is an excellent asset."

The rationale for the Jackal, of course, is its superb off-road mobility and, although the Mastiff has actually performed better than expected, it cannot compete with the Jackal in that department.

However, even here one is struck by the inertia and lack of imagination of the MoD, which relies on its "mobility" and "agility" mantras to justify fielding a machine which has now accounted for nine deaths and many more injuries.

Yet, when it comes to off-road performance, there is one option which could dramatically improve the Mastiff's capability. That same option was adopted by the Wehrmacht on the eastern front, after the 1941 campaign when its supply trucks bogged down in the mud of the Russian steppes.

Taking the standard three-tonner, the Opel Blitz, the vehicles were adapted to take the Panzerkampfwagen I track assemblies, turning them into highly capable half-tracks known as the Maultier. The modifications were not complicated and could be undertaken by field workshops. And, when the trucks returned to better terrain, some were converted back to fully-wheeled standard.

Nor has technology stood still in this area. Recently, a Dutch company has pioneered half-track conversion kits which can be fitted to a range of commercial trucks – most notably the Iveco Hovertrack (pictured below).

The rig, which doubtless could be fitted to a Mastiff, confers stunning off-road performance and could considerably expand the performance envelope of this vehicle.

Furthermore, when it comes to the smaller 4x4 version, the Ridgeback, again the Opel Blitz provides a model. Some of these were converted to fully-tracked vehicles. Applying the same thinking, modified Ridgebacks could perhaps take the place of the failed Viking, which has also proved to be a killer of men.

That this is a Second World War solution reminds us that, during that period of hostilities, we saw a great deal of technical innovation, driven by the need to provide solutions to pressing problems. The half-track was one of those solutions, and it was also adopted by US forces as a way of providing enhanced off-road mobility.

Thus the White Scout Car was adapted to become the ubiquitous M3 Half Track, which was still in operational use thirty years after WWII ended. Some 41,000 were built.

Currently, the lack of innovation and the rigid thinking also tells a story, reflecting an Army and the MoD which still has not come to terms with being at war. That, more than anything, is what is handicapping our armed forces, constituting a major hidden scandal. The Army, it would seem, would rather stick to its mantras than provide solutions to problems, inviting the suspicion that it is not up to the job.

COMMENT THREAD

Failure is not an option

In June 2006, Gerald Howarth, shadow defence procurement minister, posted on his own website: "We welcome the Government's announcement that the Vector vehicle will enter service next year." He did, however, add: "It is more manoeuvrable but, according to the Secretary of State, is not much more armoured than the Snatch Land Rovers."

Not quite a year later, we reported that the same Gerald Howarth was praising the Pinzguaer Vector, even to the extent of appearing on the company's website (now defunct), giving it his endorsement.

However, to be scrupulously fair – something for which we are not famous – Gerald did later complain that the vehicle was not suitable for Afghanistan, and he did draw attention to then procurement minister Lord Drayson that the driver was exposed by sitting over the front wheel.

Now fast forward to yesterday and we see Gerald in Defence Questions asking: "Does the Minister agree with the former Secretary of State, who described the Pinzgauer Vector as 'an excellent solution to our soldiers' requirements', or does he now accept that, at a cost of more than £100 million, it was a massive defence acquisition fiasco".

And, to give credit where it is due, Gerald also recognised the role of Ann Winterton in drawing attention to the defects in this vehicle, then asking what had been done "to improve the technical evaluation process to restore our troops’ confidence in the acquisition process".

This is real politics, the opposition challenging the executive on a very specific issue, bringing attention to a serious defect which needs addressing and without remedy will cost lives. We would have preferred earlier intervention but at least the system is now working.

As for the government response, this came from Quentin Davies. It can be said that he did not acquit himself with honour – this being his reply:

The hon. Gentleman should wake up a bit, get with it and start to look at the realities of life. The fact of the matter is that those who invest in a portfolio of armoured vehicles, as we are doing - or, indeed, in a range of equipment for any purpose in this world - will want to ensure that they have the best, in terms of meeting different requirements in terms of mobility, capability, fire power, protection and so forth. We will inevitably have some vehicles that are less effective than others; we will inevitably have some successes and some failures; that is what a portfolio policy is all about, by the way. Vector was not a success and it is being withdrawn. Its problem has been its "operationability": it has great difficulty carrying some of the loads that it is required to carry on the Afghan terrain. It has not been able to live up to expectations there, and we will be replacing it with the new tactical support vehicles that we have ordered - the Coyote, the Husky and the Wolfhound -which I have mentioned in the House in different contexts. That is one more example of this steady process of flexibility, improvement and enhancement, which is the policy to which we are committed.

It would take far too much space in this post to deconstruct, word for word, Davies's statement but there are three points which can be dealt with. Firstly, the MoD is in denial about the Vector, refusing to admit that the vehicle failed primarily because of its lack of protection. Its load-carrying problems came with the stupidity of adding a great weight of armour in an unsuccessful attempt to improve that protection.

The second point is that Gerald is quite right in drawing attention to the "technical evaluation process". There is clearly something drastically wrong with the process, as a result of which the MoD is consistently – at ever-increasing expense – making the wrong choices on vehicles.

Contrary to perceived wisdom, mine protection and off road-performance are not mutually incompatible. The mistake has been - as with the Vector - to take an existing, non-protected vehicle and then to try to add protection by means of "bolt-on" armour. This can never succeed and degrades the original vehicle with the addition of weight.

The MoD is thus working to the wrong paradigm - to optimise protection without prejudicing performance, the protection must be designed in, not added on.

From that stems the third point. The same false paradigm is being applied to the successor vehicles, not least the Coyote and the Husky. That these are actually Vector replacements come as no surprise. Particularly with the Husky, with a ton and a half load space, this was never a credible support vehicle. It is, in effect, the new Snatch.

As to the effect of this flawed approach, the figures are stark. Approximate figures for deaths in unsound vehicles are: ten in Snatches, fifteen in Wimiks, at least six in Vikings, nine in Jackals and five in Vectors. At 45 deaths, these account for one in four of the total of 165 troop deaths in Afghanistan, almost all of them preventable.

Thomas Harding in The Daily Telegraph points out the hazards of the Jackal, estimating that, in addition to the deaths, at least of quarter of the 100 Jackal fleet in Afghanistan has been severely damaged or destroyed by enemy action. By contrast, in an earlier post, we showed a picture of a Mastiff which had taken a serious explosive strike. Yet, despite the damage, it was easily repairable – not so the Jackals, each costing close on to £400,000. We are thus dealing with a serious equipment issue, as well as the death and injury rate.

Clearly, neither the MoD nor its ministers are up to the job of sorting these problems out. The long-stop is Parliament, and it is beginning to stir. This is the only hope of keeping people alive. We need this system to work – failure cannot be allowed to be an option.

COMMENT THREAD

The shadow of Iraq

In a piece written by Kim Sengupta, the paper's defence correspondent, The Independent has picked up a fragment on the ongoing "dialogue" between the Army and its political masters over the enhancement of troop levels in Afghanistan.

Under the heading, "Army fury at refusal to bolster Afghan campaign", with the strap, "Senior commanders warn British strategic alliance with United States is being put at risk", we are told that Britain's "most senior military commanders" have warned Gordon Brown that unless he sends more troops to Afghanistan, Britain will lose credibility with its American allies.

This has been going on since April (and before) when we learned that prime minister Gordon Brown had refused to sanction additional troops for the theatre, but it has now evolved into a "warning" that the reputation of the armed forces will suffer in the eyes of senior American commanders unless an autumn surge is authorised. Our "senior commanders" are saying that such a surge would signal Britain's intent to "pull its weight".

To add to the pressure, Gen Sir Richard Dannatt has also intervened in a speech to Chatham House, declaring that: "Britain's calculation has long been that maintaining military strategic 'partner-of-choice' status with the United States offers a degree of influence and security that has been pivotal to our foreign and defence policy. But this relationship can only be sustained if it is founded on a certain 'military credibility threshold'."

He went on to say: "Credibility with the US is earned by being an ally that can be relied on to state clearly what it will do and then does it effectively. And credibility is also linked to the vital currency of reputation." He added that "unfairly or not" British performance in Iraq and Afghanistan has already been called into question by some in the US administration.

"In this respect there is recognition that our national and military reputation and credibility, unfairly or not, have been called into question at several levels in the eyes of our most important ally as a result of some aspects of the Iraq campaign," he said. "Taking steps to restore this credibility will be pivotal, and Afghanistan provides an opportunity."

That, of course, is the real issue. This is not a question that the Army might lose credibility in Afghanistan. It has already lost credibility, through its failures in Iraq and is now looking to recover the situation by beefing up its weight, to match the current and expected US input of 10,000 troops in Helmand province.

As always though, there is more to this than meets the eye. When the level of US troops is at the planned level, they will significantly outnumber the British forces. Already, US forces are taking over most of the contested areas and, with better, more capable equipment, the risk – as the "senior military commanders" see it – the Americans will start calling the shots in Helmand, reducing the British to the status of supporting elements, conforming to US strategy and direction.

The call for more troops, therefore, is as much a ploy to enable our own "senior military commanders" to maintain an element of autonomy in the province, and with it freedom to dictate their own strategic direction, independently of the Americans. The give-away is the argument that reinforcements are essential to maintain the "British footprint" on the ground.

Perversely, it is their very insistence on seeking to retain operational autonomy that is giving rise to the reluctance to commit more troops. At a political level, the campaign is seen more clearly as a coalition effort, with an awareness that, to be effective, all the disparate forces must work to a single, coherent plan rather than plough their own national furrows.

So far, all the "senior military commanders" have been able to do is make the case for retaining national autonomy, without offering any very clear ideas for their employment. To that extent, the additional troops are being seen more as a means of bolstering military egos than adding real capability.

Furthermore, given what happened last time the British were given complete autonomy – in southern Iraq – there is strong resistance to giving the British their head, especially as Gen David Petraeus is keen to give his own strategy an airing. Against all that, the credibility of Gen Dannatt and his merry little band of commanders is not considered of vital importance.

As always, therefore, the Army is "briefing" in public, hoping to force the issue through media pressure, knowing that if the right buttons are pressed, the very real strategic reservations can be turned into the usual shallow pastiche of that nasty Mr Brown not giving the Army what it needs. Things may change after Gen Sir David Richards takes over as CGS in August – and comes up with a coherent plan that meshes with US operations - but, for the time being, the shadow of Iraq looms. Dannatt looks like being disappointed.

COMMENT THREAD

Boy Racer procurement syndrome "killing soldiers"

Recent deaths of soldiers in military vehicles in Afghanistan are the result of poor procurement choices, influenced more by looks and performance than operational needs claims Richard North, author of Ministry of Defeat published later this week. Many of the vehicles pressed into service in Iraq and Afghanistan would be more at home amongst the middle aged boy racers on Jeremy Clarkson's Top Gear programme or tearing round city centres late at night than on a modern battlefield.

The Army policy appears to be to buy vehicles for their looks, "uparmour" them at great cost but still leave them as effective as chocolate fireguards against the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) – the insurgency weapon of choice in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

One of the worst examples is the Army's new Jackal high mobility gun platform, described as a "Land Rover on steroids" and dubbed the "Mad Max monster machine" when it was unveiled by the Army in June 2007.

Hugely popular with troops for its speed, manoeuvrability and comfortable ride, it's nonetheless lethal! Including the two soldiers tragically killed on Saturday May 30th in Helmand Province, already eight soldiers have since been killed in these £400,000 machines, many more have been seriously injured and over 20 vehicles have been written off after mine strikes or roadside bomb damage.

The loss rate is not surprising says North. The vehicle was originally designed as a high mobility truck and gun tractor and has since been converted into a "weapons platform" with the addition of two machine guns. First introduced into Afghanistan without armour, it has since been "uparmoured" twice, each time because it could not withstand Taleban attacks.

Modern protected vehicles are custom-designed and can withstand bombs as large as 300lb, something which converted vehicles can never do. In the Army's dedicated mine protected vehicle, the Mastiff, no lives have been lost, despite it being in service in two years longer than the Jackal.

An even worse example is the recently ordered Husky "support vehicle". It is based on the US-built International MXT pickup, a civilian competitor to the Hummer. Launched in 2004, it was decribed by the manufacturers as a "sleek and dominant truck geared for the 'image' truck market, a growing niche of truck owners who want to make a powerful statement about who they are."

With 200 ordered by the MoD in April this year, at a cost of £120 million, the Husky has been converted for military use with "bolt-on" armour. The same version was offered to the US Army for a procurement competition for an off-road mine protected vehicle to serve in Afghanistan. But, in the same week of the MoD order, it was learned that the US Army had failed the vehicle during its compulsory mine protection test and had been ruled our of the competition.

Again, North is unsurprised. Without what is known as a "v-shaped hull" as a basic part of the design, it is difficult to protect vehicles properly. Yet, with the right design, even light vehicles can withstand blasts that cripple tanks ten times their weight.

The Army, he says, is regressing in its approach to armoured vehicle design. The first ever production armoured car was built by the French in 1904. It was a commercial vehicle with bolt-on armour. After the Second World War, new technologies and experience enabled far more effective vehicles to be built, incorporating the armour into the basic structure. Now, the Army is going back to pre-war technology – pre First World War. And men are dying as a result.

Ironically, the British were the pioneers in mine protected vehicles, building army trucks in 1966 for the Aden campaign. The technology was further developed by the Rhodesians for their Bush War in the 1970s and then by South Africans. It has since been adopted by the US which is currently running a competition for a high-mobility mine protected vehicle.

It was in this competition that the Husky failed which means that the MoD is buying vehicles rejected by the Americans. But, with its chunky, macho looks, on the Top Gear show, it would win every time.

COMMENT THREAD