That's torn it

Despite the jibes about the performance of German troops in Afghanistan, they have not been having a particularly easy time of it in Kundus province. And now, clearly, they have had enough of being "Mr Nice Fritz".

According to Bild, German troops have clashed with the Taleban in heavy fighting in northern Afghanistan. A spokesman from the German ministry of defence had confirmed that units supported an attack by Afghan and Nato troops in the Kundus region.

According to the military, Marder "tanks" (MICVs actually - pictured) and mortars were deployed. Just a few days ago the army deployed heavy artillery for the first time. Last Sunday 120 mm mortars and fighter jets bombed Taleban positions in lengthy skirmishes. At least five Taliban were killed, two injured and seven arrested.

Soft though they may appear to be, it was always a mistake to under-estimate the Germans. For the Taleban though, it looks as if they have had to find that out the hard way.

Mind, the Swedes are also in the firing line. Having skulked up in the north-west corner of Afghanistan as part of the ISAF, and apart from one attack on a soft skin vehicle (two killed, one seriously injured) they have not suffered any casualties.

However, with things hotting up, there have now been several attacks on Swedish troops. Then, with the death of German soldiers patrolling in the same area as the Swedish forces, politicians, the officer corps, etc., are suddenly clamouring for better protected vehicles.

And their vehicle of choice? Er ... the RG-32M, one of the vehicles we turned down in favour of the Panther. And even then, the natives are complaining (machine translation). Just as well they do not have our MoD, or they would still be be using Snatches.

COMMENT THREAD

We need more helicopters

"Army bomb expert killed trying to clear the way for vital supplies" is the headline under which Nicholas Cecil, chief political correspondent for The Evening Standard writes today.

Captain Daniel Shepherd died instantly when the makeshift bomb he was trying to defuse exploded in the Nad-e Ali District in Helmand province, southern Afghanistan. A member of his team suffered minor injuries. Capt Shepherd, 28, from 11 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Regiment, The Royal Logistic Corps, was leading a team trying to clear a route for a convoy to re-supply Nato troops and the local population.

This raises serious questions. There is a whole raft of kit available for this task. Why wasn't it available?

The job starts with the Buffalo (pictured above). It can expose an IED and the claw apparatus can be used to rip away any command wires, if that is the method of triggering employed. The manual disturbance will trigger any motion-sensitive booby trap.

If the bomb is still live, it can be investigated by a remote robot (pictured below). A shotgun fitted to the robot can be used to blast the detonator and thus disable it. Failing that, the robot can be used to place an explosive charge on the device, blowing it up and thereby neutralising it. Damage to roads and other structures can then be dealt with by armoured engineering vehicles.

Only in extreme cases, where there is imminent risk of loss of life without intervention, should an attempt be made by a bomb disposal officer personally to disarm a device. There are no indications that this was the case here.

However, as to the kit, therein lies the tale. Kit such as the Buffalo is not yet in theatre. The US forces have them, the Canadians have them and the French also have them. But, despite a call for them to be provided in 2005 – the MoD did not think they were necessary. They were not ordered, therefore, until last October and will not arrive until next year.


We do have robots – the British were pioneers in this technology. However, they are transported in the unarmoured "Tellar" EOD vehicles, which are themselves highly vulnerable to IEDs. They require an armed escort and route clearance to get them onto site. All too often, they cannot be used.

But our Mastiff EOD vehicles were not ordered until last October and will not arrive until next year – despite the equivalent JERRVs having been used by US forces since 2003.

Then, there is a shortage of armoured engineering equipment. What we have is being sold off at knockdown prices, and the new kit was not ordered until last October. It will not arrive in theatre until next year.

Of course, if we follow the media and political narrative, this incident clearly demonstrates that we need more helicopters. Every casualty is being used to reinforce that argument.

But what it could also demonstrate is that the MoD and the Army seriously under-estimated the IED threat and failed utterly to prepare for it. Such issues, however, will not even begin to be explored by the media. The solution is obvious – we need more helicopters. Everybody knows that.

COMMENT THREAD

Brave new world

There is a lot more going on in the world than the "war" in Afghanistan and, having divined a slackening off in media interest, I had resolved to pay a little more attention to other matters – albeit keeping an eye on the developing situation.

Contrary to expectations, however, the media are just not leaving the subject alone. A lead item in The Times today tells us of the tragic episode of Harry Parker, the son of British general, losing leg in a Taleban blast – as a precursor to a fairly comprehensive review of current developments.

In The Daily Telegraph, we also see a lead item, this one asserting that Lord Malloch-Brown has become the first senior government minister to admit that British troops need more helicopters in Afghanistan.

The man is leaving the government at the end of this week, and is also "admitting" that the public were not warned sufficiently about Britain and the US going on the offensive in Helmand before the recent rise in casualties. "We didn't do a good job a month ago of warning the British public that we and the Americans were going on the offensive in Helmand," he says. "This is a new operation; the whole purpose is to win control. These deaths have happened ... after we chose to go on the offensive."

This is as maybe, but what Malloch-Brown is not saying is that the five soldiers killed in the single ambush were in Sangin – where offensive operations are not being carried out. And so was the latest casualty, the 187th, a bomb disposal expert killed by an IED. That brings, says The Daily Mail, the number of British soldiers killed by IEDs this year to 40.

But, if British troops are now experiencing their worst month of the war, with four US soldiers killed over the last few days by IEDs, the Americans too have suffered their worst month. Yet, the British narrative, as we see with the Telegraph, is still focussed on helicopter shortages as the cause of our casualties, unable to develop beyond that single point and look at the bigger picture.

The same dynamic is seen with the Daily Mail which is foaming at Lord Faulkes – a "notorious establishment toady" – who had the temerity to attack "Sir Richard Dannatt and Sir Jock Stirrup", asking "Labour frontbencher Lady Taylor to "consider gently reminding these gentlemen of the importance of loyalty, particularly when we are engaged in a very difficult war where victory is essential for the future safety of this country."

Casting aspersions against the Mail's darling was clearly the wrong thing to do, and even arms dealer Lord Guthrie is wheeled on to denounce Lord Foulkes's comments as "cheap". With the "narrative" to the fore, he says General Dannatt had been driven to speak out by Labour's failure to fund the forces. We are not allowed to consider any other motivation. Dannatt, meanwhile, will look back over his shoulder "with no regrets at three years as chief of the general staff."

It is interesting thus to make the comparison between the media "Punch and Judy" and our own forum, where we have had a far greater intensity of debate and far better informed comment, with many experts pointing out some of the complexities. This rather illustrates how superficial and one-dimensional the fourth estate really is.

What emerges from the wider debate – the one in which our media takes no part – is quite how seriously the US is taking the IED threat. Even if it has come into theatre not much better prepared than the British, it is making up for lost time.

We thus had our attention drawn to a piece a while back where the USAF is considering bringing back the OV-10 Bronco turboprop (pictured), a Vietnam-era light attack and observation aircraft last produced in 1976.

The manufacturers, Boeing, have confirmed that the aircraft could be offered as either a light attack or intra-theatre light cargo aircraft. Amazingly, four countries still operate the aircraft: Colombia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Venezuela, with a weapons load at least equivalent to the Bell AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter – currently used by the US Marines.

The primary function of the OV-10, though, is surveillance, and it is that function to which Gen Dannatt referred recently, as a major shortfall. No prizes for anyone who predicts that the British debate will remain in the same narrow rut, pointing to a possible repeat of the Iraq experience, where the US again leave us standing, while our own military draft increasingly unconvincing press releases about how they are winning the war.

With our media, though, no one will ever realise that we have lost, as indeed is the case where, in just over a week, the last British troops will scuttle away from Iraq, with the MoD declaring the final stage in our "great victory" there.

At this rate, when this current war is all over, we need never fight another. We can do it all with press releases, and the media will lap it up without the first idea of what is happening, merely obliging the military by calling for whatever toys it has then decided are in fashion. It is not George Orwell we should be re-reading, but Aldous Huxley.

COMMENT THREAD

We were not wrong

Very nearly two years ago, I wrote a piece about the Tucano headed: We are not wrong. This is how the piece started:

When, like this blog, we are so often far out on a limb, discussing ideas that no one else seems to be looking at – with critics lining up to pick holes in the arguments or tell us we've simply got it wrong (as they did when we advocated better armoured vehicles for our troops in Iraq), the sheer weight of contrary opinion, combined with the isolation, does make you seriously question your own arguments (and even your own sanity).

Anyhow, further down the line, it looks as if the Navy SEALS agree with us. We were not wrong.

Furthermore, if DIFID and the FCO could get their fingers out, and paid the Army to build some roads – instead of funding Ferris wheels - these aircraft could be even more useful. What they need to do is emulate the South Africans in their own bush wars. Then, they built lengths of road – and bridges – in such a way that they could be used as temporary landing strips (take the sign away in the pic and you get the drift).

A flight of aircraft could land on any one of these strips, accompanied by a STOL transport carrying supplies – or meeting a supply convoy – fuel and re-arm and then wait, close to the action, until needed. Pilots often lived out in the bush with their aircraft. And, with so many strips available, there was no way the nasties could predict where they would land. There was never any need to use the same strip more than once in any operation.

With a little bit of imagination and determination, there are very few problems that cannot be solved, and light turbo-props are a cheap and effective way of enhancing the force mix. But, these days, it's much easier to find excuses for not doing something – and then spending billions on not solving the problem.

COMMENT THREAD

The trouble with armoured vehicles

Originally published by Defence Management
Wednesday, July 08, 2009

Several of the MoD's newest armoured vehicles already have major design flaws according to defence author Richard North. The old way of thinking has to change.

The MoD and Armed Forces are unable to learn from their mistakes or admit erroneous decisions in the design and procurement of armoured vehicles resulting in a string of inadequate vehicles being sent to the frontlines of Afghanistan and tragically as a result, large numbers of casualties, a prominent defence author has said.

The death of Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe last week in a Viking armoured vehicle brought a renewed focus to the MoD's armoured fighting vehicle strategy. Although IEDs and landmines have proven to be an effective weapon utilised by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MoD has only been partially successful in buying better protected vehicles. .

Richard North, author of the book "Ministry of Defeat" and the editor of the Defence of the Realm blog, outlined to Defencemanagement.com a series of poor procurement decisions and strategies that have resulted in a widely ineffective fleet of armoured vehicles coming up against IEDs and landmines.

"The concept of risk has been ignored," North said in an interview. As a result this premise is "eroding the ability to field certain vehicles."

The vehicle protection problems faced by British troops today in Afghanistan can be traced back to various campaigns during the Cold War era including in Rhodesia. The effectiveness of using IEDs on vehicles became clear yet military planners in the US and Britain for the most part ignored the new threats. Heavier armoured vehicles have to be transferred by ship because they are too heavy to fly. Military planners felt that this negated the advantages that an expeditionary force would have.

Even after the use of IEDs became a prevalent tool of the insurgency in Iraq, procurement officials in Britain continued to buy the same types of vehicles for operations in Afghanistan.

The Snatch, Viking and Vector were all sent to Afghanistan in the first year of major British combat operations but are now all being withdrawn from service due to their flawed designs and a lack of adequate armour to deflect explosions. Dozens of British servicemen have died in the vehicles during operations due to poor protection even though Snatch was upgraded with additional armour and the Viking and Vector vehicles were procured in 2006.

Protection has been the primary focus of vehicle designers in an effort to overcome casualties caused by bomb attacks. While there have been some successes such as the Mastiff and Ridgeback armoured vehicles, which the Taliban have effectively given up attacking, there have been widespread concerns with other models in the new fleet of vehicles the MoD has procured under an urgent operational requirement.

The Jackal has attracted the most concerns due to its design according to North. The front seats are over the front wheels making the driver and front passenger vulnerable to any explosion. Problems with the weight distribution have made the Jackal susceptible to rollovers, and bolt on armour has proven to be ineffective and has taken away the little mobility the vehicle has.

Army commanders have also been forced to use the vehicle, originally designed for off-road reconnaissance, for fixed road reconnaissance, supply escorts and patrols.

Already ten servicemen have died in the Jackal, despite the MoD spending hundreds of millions of pounds procuring it.

But the problems do not stop there. Last year the MoD ordered 262 Husky armoured vehicles from Navistar Defence, to be used as medium sized command and support vehicle in less dangerous areas. But according to North the deal came just as it was confirmed that the Husky had failed a blast test during a US Army vehicle contract competition. US Army officials are alleged to have expressed concerns over the "basic" design of the hull bridge which resulted in the Husky failing the mine test.

Given the success of v-shaped hulls on vehicles in Afghanistan, it is not clear why the MoD is procuring a standard hulled vehicle. Word of the US Army test failure was not announced until after the MoD had signed the £150m contract with Navistar.

There are also concerns over the new Panther armoured vehicle which North calls fundamentally flawed and "stupidity beyond measure". Panther is a designated command vehicle which will allow the Taliban to target higher ranking officers and field commanders in greater numbers than ever before.

The MoD is scheduled to buy 400 of the vehicles which North describes as "a fine modern product of the Italian automobile industry, and therefore completely unsuitable for military use."

The outside of the vehicle is made from "crushable" or "deformable" materials. While the Panther is well protected, any attack by an IED or mine will cause significant damage to the vehicle resulting in it becoming non-operational.

Procurement officials spent £400,000 per vehicle but it did not come with adequate protection for the engine, no electronic counter measures equipment and it only held three people. North estimates that by the time the full upgrades are completed, the MoD could be spending up to £700,000 on a vehicle that the insurgents can destroy with £20 worth of explosives.

The MoD for its part has argued that a number of upgrades have made the Husky, Jackal and Panther better protected and more able to deal with the operational challenges in Afghanistan.

The number of vehicle design flaws is part of a wider debate on mobility v. protection. Many vehicle design experts have argued that you cannot have both. If you have an agile vehicle it is limited in how much armour it can have. If you have a heavily armoured vehicle, case in point the Mastiff, you lose the element of surprise and ability to rapidly descend on the enemy or exit an operational centre.

North disagrees.

"I think it is a false paradigm. The Army doctrine says that you optimise on mobility and for specific theatres or specific threats you add on protection. Protection is seen as a separate issue added on after the event with design parameters," North said.

The problem is that when a "mobile" vehicle needs additional protection, engineers use bolt on armour which prejudices mobility. Vehicle engineers and procurement officials in turn conclude that mobility and protection are mutually contradictory.

Bolt on armour in many cases has proven to be ineffective against IEDs and mines.

Engineers should instead be "optimising for protection and then adding mobility" in vehicles according to North. A mobile well protected vehicle is possible but it would require a different mindset throughout the MoD's project teams and within industry.

There is still a large adherence to the successes of the past, North argued. Using mobile armoured vehicles to defeat Rommel in North Africa in the 1940s is still a primary reference point for today's armoured vehicle fighting strategies even though the scope of warfare has changed dramatically since then.

As a result, of the hundreds of new vehicles the MoD is rushing into service, many are plagued with design flaws or are used the wrong way.

"They are repeating the same mistakes and are doomed to repeat them over and over again," North said. With problems and concerns already arising in the Husky, Jackal and Panther vehicles, more mistakes could be on the way.

Richard North is the author of "Ministry of Defeat" and the website Defence of the Realm.

COMMENT THREAD

Dead soldiers tell no tales

One of the things that is possibly upsetting the defence establishment is this blog's pursuit of the story about the Iveco Panther – the latest development I have been sitting on, while other more pressing issues were dealt with.

As it stood, we had found that this absurdly expensive machine, ordered in 2003 at a cost of over £400,000 each, had to be converted at an additional cost of £300,000 to make them suitable for use in Afghanistan, bringing the price to well over £700,000 each for a four-seater protected patrol vehicle.

However, we had also established that only 67 of these vehicles were being put through this conversion process, leaving 334 from the original batch of 401 that are basically unsuitable for deployment. Thus, it was left to Ann Winterton to ask what was to happen to the rest.

Answer there came from Quentin Davies that the remainder would be used for pre-deployment training individual and collective training, and trials and development. Never in the field of human conflict, he might have observed, have so many been used to train so few.

The more serious point is that, while the Army is crying out for protected vehicles, we have these useless machines stuck at home, when a fraction of the cost could have bought decent protected vehicles and had them in theatre.

Apart from Booker, however, only Defence Management was taking an interest in this procurement disaster. The rest of the media, so full of faux concern for "Our Boys" isn't interested in getting its hands dirty and actually reporting what is going on.

But then, an in-house cock-up by the MoD does not fit the narrative. Unless the story is about Gordon Brown and his "penny pinching", leaving "Our Boys" without the kit they need, the popular media does not want to know.

It is actually too much to hope for a responsible media though. Even if the story was handed to it on a plate, it would probably get it wrong and, if anyone gets near reporting the truth, we see the result .


However, one of the pieces can still be found on Google cache. This is what you are not allowed to see:

Hundreds of Panthers cannot deploy
Wednesday, July 15, 2009

The MoD has spent hundreds of millions of pounds on a new armoured vehicle that will mainly be used for training in non-operational settings.

Only 67 Panther armoured vehicles are in suitable condition to operate safely in Afghanistan according to the MoD.

Yesterday the minister for defence equipment and support Quentin Davies admitted to MPs in a written answer that 334 of the Panther armoured vehicles "will be used for pre-deployment training, individual and collective training, and trials and development."

The Panther Command and Liaison Vehicle (CLV) was procured earlier this decade to provide commanders and combat support services with better protection when they are on the battlefield. At £400,000, it will undoubtedly serve as one of the most expensive Army training vehicles, ever.

The vehicle has been riddled with problems from the outset, resulting in just 67 being available for Afghan operations due to a lack of capability requirements.

In May Defencemanagement.com revealed that none of the vehicles had originally been delivered with the required capabilities for Afghan operations, despite extensive field tests in Afghanistan earlier this decade. As a result, procurement officials were forced to spend an additional £20m upgrading just 67 vehicles.

This resulted in further delays to a programme that was already running over a year late.

The vehicle additions included a better protected engine compartment, the addition of Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) equipment, air conditioning and adding space for a fourth crew member to the vehicle.

Richard North, author of "Ministry of Defeat" said recently that the Panther "is a fine modern product of the Italian automobile industry, and therefore completely unsuitable for military use."

The outer portion of the vehicle, when hit by an IED or landmine is likely to be permanently damaged.

According to a National Audit Office Report, the MoD originally planned to buy 486 of the vehicles but due to "affordability" issues, was later forced to reduce the order to 401 Panthers. It is not clear whether the MoD will pay for the other 334 Panthers to be upgraded to combat standards.

As the threat from IEDs and landmines has grown, so has the demand for better protected vehicles. Ministers insist that they are sparing no expense in ensuring that troops have the best protection money can buy. However problems with the Snatch, Vector, Viking, Jackal and now Panther, leave these claims in doubt.

Even this fairly anodyne report, however, is too much for the defence establishment. It is far more important to stifle criticism than to protect "Our Boys" from getting murdered by the Taleban. In one of the more recent strikes, they only pulled the top half of the driver out of the vehicle. There was nothing else of him left. But hey! Dead soldiers tell no tales.

COMMENT THREAD

It's not lost

As I was hinting last night – and did so prematurely last week – the storm has run its course. The number of new stories or new "angles" on Afghanistan has fallen to a trickle, and very soon it will be back to "normal" – if one dare use that word.

For all the torrent on media coverage, the pessimistic view is that absolutely nothing has been achieved, nothing resolved. That is not the case though. Waves have been made and, in the fullness of time, changes will become apparent, but not all for the good.

The view from theatre – if there can be something as straightforward as a single view – seems to be that the helicopter issue was totally overblown. At the moment, with the US forces in place, the bulk of their helicopters are available as "theatre assets" and the troops are getting plenty of helicopter rides.

In the green zone also, where the bulk of the fighting has been, the value of the Viking, in being able to cross difficult terrain is much appreciated. But there is indeed nervousness about using it: preliminary estimates of the weight of explosives that took out Col Thorneloe's Viking are that some 30kg of homemade explosives were used.

That weight, equivalent to about 10kg of military-grade explosive, would have been shrugged off by a well-designed mine-resistant vehicle, yet when it exploded under the driver's seat, it ripped through the floor, killing him instantly. For all the talk of the Taleban building bigger bombs, this was not one of them. In the right vehicle, the explosion was survivable.

Elsewhere, the US Marines captured a major cache of IEDs and the photograph above shows the face of the enemy – 25 litre plastic drums, packed with fertiliser (click the pic to enlarge and, at the back of the room, you can see the 25kg bags of fertiliser).

Meanwhile, of our own MoD, a report today accuses it of losing track of £155 million-worth of radio equipment. That doesn't mean to say it is lost – just that the MoD doesn't know where it is.

That, in fact, sounds like a description of the whole Afghan campaign. Perhaps we should send them a roadmap.

COMMENT THREAD

That's journalism!

As another British soldier is reported killed in Afghanistan, two investigative sleuths from The Daily Mail, Tim Shipman and Matthew Hickley, breathlessly tell us that the announcement came "as Lt Col Richardson revealed that American, Dutch and even Australian helicopters are being used to launch British combat operations in Afghanistan." UK forces have used coalition aircraft to "seize areas of ground" from the Taliban, said the Colonel.

The Daily Telegraph goes one further as star reporter Rosa Prince scribes these immortal words:

The Daily Telegraph understands that American Chinooks were used for a combat mission as part of the Panther's Claw operation within the last month. Lieutenant Colonel Nick Richardson, spokesman for Task Force Helmand confirmed that UK forces were forced to rely on foreign helicopters.

These fearless hacks can however, shelve their dreams for nominations for the next Pulitzer prize for investigative reporting. The MoD Website for 23 June – nearly a month ago – blandly informs us that:

More than 350 soldiers from The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (3 SCOTS), have launched an airborne assault into one of the last Taliban strongholds.

Twelve Chinook helicopters, supported by 13 other aircraft including Apache and Black Hawk helicopter gunships, a Spectre gunship, Harrier jets and unmanned drones, dropped the British soldiers into Babaji, north of Lashkar Gah, just before midnight on Friday 19 June 2009.

Not only did we rely on helicopters (with the MoD thoughtfully providing a pic – see above), we were "forced" to rely on a USAF Spectre gunship, Harriers (USMC – ours have gone home) and probably US Predator UAVs. Since 90 percent – or thereabouts – close air support is provided by US assets, we are routinely "forced" to rely on F-15s, F-16s, B-1 Lancers, A-10s ...

And then, of course, on the ground, we are "forced" to rely on Danish Leopard II tanks, on their APCs, on Estonian APCs and even the Ex-MoD Mamba mine protected vehicles which we sold off for a song.

But Hey! This is a coalition effort. We are not alone ... and have not been for some time. But then, here's another "scoop". During WWII, the US stripped out the armour from its one and only armoured division and sent the Shermans to the 8th Army. To win the battle of el Alamein, we were "forced" to rely on foreign tanks.

Shock! Hold the front page!

COMMENT THREAD

Keeping a secret

There is a report today of another Russian helicopter going in, an Mi-8 – this one at Kandahar, sadly with at least 16 deaths. Enemy action is not suspected.

The operator was the Russian air company Vertical-T, another of those dodgy Skylink "partners", although there is no information yet as to whether this was running a Nato or British contract. It could have been, but it could also have been ferrying for an NGO or other outfit in the region.

Meanwhile, in a lazy, ill-informed article by Christopher Leake in the Mail on Sunday, we see the paper wake up to part of the story about civilian contractors supplying helicopter lift to the MoD in Afghanistan.

Under a plainly wrong headline, which declares: "Now we are borrowing Russian helicopters to fight the Taliban", we get Leake proclaim that "British frontline troops in Afghanistan are so short of helicopters and transport planes that they are being bailed out by the Russians."

Actually, we may be using "Russian" helicopters (although the new models are not built in Russia) but there is no direct Russian involvement in the helicopter supply. As we know, the contract is held by the Canadian firm, Skylink, which then subs out to all manner of operations.

In typical Mail style, pompous and self-important, however, we get this piece of information dressed up as "The Mail on Sunday has established that the Ministry of Defence is using civilian Russian-built Mi-8 and Mi-26 transport helicopters ... ".

All the key information here, and much more of which the Mail is evidently unaware, has actually been announced in Parliament or tabled as responses to Parliamentary written questions, starting with an oral statement by Des Bowne on 20 May 2008, with a question from Dr Fox on 2 June 2008, followed by two questions from Ann Winterton, on 25 March 2009 and 20 April 2009 respectively.

And, for all Leake's hyperventilation, he completely misses the main story about the Mi-26 going in, fact that it was shot down and the very shady history of the operators. All Leake can manage is, "The pilots are freelance Russians and Ukrainians." No doubt, he calls this journalism.

And the thing is, in missing the real story, Leake is making drama out of a non-story. It makes absolute sense to augment lift with suitably qualified and reputable civilian operators. It is cheap and highly flexible. The MoD should be commended for saving taxpayers' money - it took them long enough.

But then, Leake even makes a big deal out of the fact that we are hiring "massive commercial Russian Antonov aircraft to fly vehicles and heavy equipment from RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire to Afghanistan." And the point is? Everybody uses these aircraft, even the Americans. They are simply the biggest in town ... chartered from perfectly reputable operators, including several based in the UK. And if he looks at some of the MoD press handouts, he will see pics of Antonovs, going way back, with military kit being loaded on them.

For his "scoop of the week", however, Leake has picked up bits of information about the use of Mi-8 MTVs by Special Forces. But, he tells us, they are being used "because of a desperate lack of UK aircraft." Er ... nah! They are being used because they are the best aircraft for the job – and very successful they have been.

Then Leake tells us they are "on loan" from an unspecified "Third World nation". Er ... nah! The RAF bought six of them in 2007 (or could be a bit earlier) – there are five left. We may occasionally "borrow" others, but then that is normal in the theatre. The Yanks operate them as well – anonymous machines, camouflage-painted and no markings, just like ours.

To add to the mystery, Leake embellishes what little detail he has with the legend that they are flown by an elite team of UK Army Air Corps pilots, trained at a secret special forces base in Afghanistan. Er ... nah! In the main, they are flown by serving RAF officers. And they train in Boscombe Down, where two machines are kept for "evaluation" purposes. For sure, the pilots do theatre-specific training when they get there ... as do all operational pilots.

To Leake, though, this is a "humiliation" and he gets some talking heads – anonymous, of course – to say they are "dismayed" about being forced to borrow helicopters.

At times, you can understand the MoD's reluctance to tell the hacks anything. They will only get it wrong, or "spin" it. Clearly though, the best way for the MoD to keep things secret is to get the defence secretary to announce them in Parliament. Hansard, websites and Google are clearly beyond the reach of Mr Leake.

COMMENT THREAD

The truth begins to emerge

Now it is the Observer's turn to pick up on the details that we've been running on this blog and DOTR for months, most recently here, here and here. I suppose I shouldn't keep saying, "you read it here first," but you bloody well did.

Defence ministers, we are told spurned three separate deals to buy American Black Hawk helicopters which would have helped to plug the dangerous shortage facing British troops in Afghanistan. The most recent rejection came only days ago, "the Observer can reveal."

The ministers are, of course, acting under the advice of their officials and the military. And there is only one reason why the Blackhawks are not being bought. There is not enough money to buy this (cheaper and better) helicopter and that pile of over-priced garbage otherwise known as Future Lynx so if the Blackhawks were ordered, the Future Lynx was junked.

The Army – as we have already said – blocked the Blackhawk because it is too heavy for the Army to fly. Under current arrangements, the RAF would operate them. The Army loses is organic utility helicopter capability – bye, bye Army Air Corps. And the Colonel Commandant of the AAC? Mr Saintly Dannatt, who made keeping the AAC more important than getting capacity into theatre.

We must remind readers that he had a lot of support – the lobbying has been ferocious on this, from across the board. Had ministers ignored their officials and Mr Dannatt's orchestra, there would have been the mother of all political rows, and the media would have pitched in ... on the Saintly Mr Dannatt's side.

Instead, having already pulled a fast one with the Merlin, the officials told the ministers to go for the only other option on which the Army and the RAF would agree - refurbishing Pumas. They should, perhaps have rejected the advice but hey! The narrative is that ministers should take the advice of the military.

So it is the Observer tells us that "under the initial offer from Connecticut-based Sikorsky in 2007, 60 Black Hawks would already have been available for British forces in Helmand province, where they have sustained heavy casualties from roadside bombs in their renewed offensive against the Taleban."

Yea ... and where was the media then, while an unpaid blogger has been doing the running? Where was the Tory opposition? Er ... lobbying hard for Future Lynx.

And then we have bandwagon rider extraordinaire James Arbuthnot, chairman of the defence committee, whose report last week "condemned the Puma refit" and expressed concern over its "poor survivability" in combat. He says: "The Black Hawks are extremely good, they could be acquired in large numbers and the cost of running them would be low." So why didn't he recommend getting them in his report last week?

Answer, there will be none.

COMMENT THREAD

Clear military advice

Such is the overwhelming fog of impenetrable distortion that, at times one is tempted to walk away from the Afghan War issue, perhaps to write an earnest piece about wind farms and energy policy – or a careful analysis of Booker's column, which indeed I must do later today, if only to express my horror at the events he reports today.

What impels one to continue – I suppose, because I don't really know why I invest so much time, energy and emotional capital into this, when I have more pressing things to do - is perhaps because of an overpowering sense of injustice, and an equally powerful sense of a story that must be told, for good or bad.

This is particularly provoked by a piece in The Sunday Telegraph today, headed: "Labour at war over Afghanistan." It makes the highly tendentious claim that, "Labour is bitterly divided over defence spending as the Government's Afghanistan policy suffers a series of fresh setbacks."

One point must be addressed immediately – the rest later in this post. Labour is not at "war" over Afghanistan, not in any sense that this mischievous headline implies. It is basing its assertion on a single strand, comments by former defence secretary John Hutton who, for reasons of his own, has chosen to write "exclusively" about Afghanistan for The Sunday Telegraph, calling for more troops and helicopters.

One should also note, that Hutton – whatever arrangement he might have had with The Sunday Telegraph - Hutton has also allowed himself to be interviewed by The Sunday Times where he "breaks silence to fight for the generals".

With this, there is clearly an element of calculation, which fits ill with Mr Hutton. If he cared so deeply, then he might perhaps have stayed in his post instead of quitting after a mere nine months, and fought from the inside. Instead, he walked out at a critical juncture, a decision he had made well before the current controversy reared its head.

Mr Hutton's current pitch, though, is that, "When it comes to the numbers and the equipment it is absolutely essential politicians listen to advice from the military. Politicians must not become armchair generals. They must make decisions based on clear military advice."

Matthew Parris put this in context yesterday, warning us that the politicians should not defer automatically to the generals. Furthermore, Charles Moore reinforced this theme, writing in his column:

And do remember that our top brass, patriotic though they undoubtedly are, are also engaged in inter-service rivalry. It does not hurt the Army, losing money to the Navy's carriers, to protest that it does not have enough for Afghanistan. Just because you don't believe a minister, don't automatically believe a general. Ministers have to adjudicate between competing claims: it is not easy.

So doth Hutton say that politicians should listen to advice from the military. Indeed they should. But that does not mean to say they should take it, or that they should not listen to other opinions, and modify their decisions accordingly.

It also does not mean that they should not take into account the broader political issues that are outside the remit of the generals – and to which they are not always privy – or that they should not take account of the views of allies and, in this case, that of the host nation.

Hutton also says that politicians must "make decisions based on clear military advice." And indeed, subject to the above caveats they must. It would be very nice to be able to do so. But, as this campaign has progressed, it has been clear that the military itself is divided as to the best or correct course of action, that there are different agendas and schools of opinion within the military, and that "clear" advice is not always the right advice.

Politicians, also, must not become armchair generals, says Hutton – not least, one assumes, because the current generation of ministers have no military experience.

However, from their successive statements in Parliament and elsewhere, it is highly evident that ministers – and politicians generally – are extremely deferential to the military, perhaps too much so.

If, for instance, military advice had been slavishly followed in June 2006, Mastiff protected vehicles would not have been ordered in August and rushed into service. Instead, yet another batch of Pinzgauer Vectors would have been purchased. That was the "clear military advice" at the time, which also counselled to keep the Snatch Land Rover in service as it was "mission critical".

In fact, of the many problems affecting the Afghani campaign, one is most definitely that too much "clear military advice" has been taken. It was such advice from the RAF that deterred ministers from ordering large numbers of Mi-17s in early 2007 – even though the RAF had purchased this machine for duties with the Special Forces.

Even though this would have resolved the helicopter lift problem, ministers instead took the RAF advice to buy the six Danish Merlins – at a cumulative cost of over £186 million – advice which – as we record in the previous post, has yet to deliver a single extra airframe to theatre.

Other attempts were made by ministers to bring extra lift into theatre, but ministers were also required to balance their budgets. How they do that is a political decision – it is not for the military to make. The deal was to delay or even scrap the Future Lynx project in order to divert the funding to meet the more pressing need. This aircraft was not due to deliver to operations until 2014-15 – at the earliest – so it had no impact on immediate requirements.

But each time, the "word" came back that the Army did not support any such arrangement. And, although you will not find his fingerprints on any document, that attitude went right up to Dannatt. His concern – as Colonel Commandant of the Army Air Corps – was to protect the Corps. The Future Lynx would ensure its survival. Support helicopters would go to the RAF.

Ministers could have pressed the point but, such has been the ferocity of the pork-barrel campaign to keep the order – with the full and very active support of the Tory front bench – that discretion ruled. The last thing wanted was an open spat with the Army and its serried ranks of supporters.

Yet other options were considered, as The Sunday Telegraph excitably reports, telling us that "the Government" turned down the chance to buy 12 "cut-price" SA 330 Puma transport helicopters from the United Arab Emirates (example pictured), at a cost – we are told - of about £6 million each.

This, as it turns out, was only one of many possibilities considered, and a very tentative one at that. Prices were never discussed and, since they had just been refurbished at £10 million each, the £6 million is a tad on the low side.

Anyhow, the idea was turned down on "clear military advice" from the RAF and MoD. Ministers are the first to acknowledge that they are not technically competent to make detailed appraisals as to the suitability of second-hand helicopters for service in the RAF – and they are not in a position to over-ride the advice they have been given. Thus, they took the "clear military advice" that it was more cost-effective to upgrade the existing RAF fleet of Pumas.

And then we come to the "boots on the ground" issue. Actually, there never has been any "clear military advice" that an extra 2,000 troops should be committed to theatre – as Dannatt has now acknowledged. And the "clear military advice " from the likes of US General John Craddock is that the priority is the provision of transport (particularly helicopters and mine-protected vehicles), intelligence and medical capabilities.

"Too often," he said, "the forces there now are relatively fixed, because we don't have adequate tactical mobility to move them around to be able to do the jobs we need them to do." Without that "tactical mobility", additional troops are either ineffective or, worse still, become additional targets.

Given that this is also a coalition operation, and that General McCrystal, on behalf of the coalition command has yet to complete his review of force requirements, and that the whole issue was marked down for an ongoing review after the August election, it is a tad premature to be discussing enhancements of British force levels.

But, says The Sunday Telegraph leader, "Troops are more important than political points." The paper is wrong. Troops levels are an intensely political issue and, in a parliamentary democracy, the civilian politicians make the political decisions.

It is surely right for the generals to warn of the consequences of any such decisions, but it is then for the generals to dispose the forces allocated accordingly. We are not a military dictatorship and, however much this current government might be detested and mistrusted, ministers – not the generals – are constitutionally accountable.

Advice is one thing – and not all of it is either clear or good. Demands are another.

COMMENT THREAD

Impotency writ large

Jon Lehman, secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration, has a pop at spiralling inflation in defence costs in the WSJ today.

When John McCain was shot down over Hanoi in 1967, writes Lehman, he was flying an A4 Skyhawk. That jet cost $860,000. Inflation has risen by 700 percent since then. So Mr. McCain's A4 cost $6.1 million in 2008 dollars. Applying a generous factor of three for technological improvements, the price for a 2008 Navy F18 fighter should be about $18 million. Instead, we are paying about $90 million for each new fighter. As a result, the Navy cannot buy sufficient numbers. This is disarmament without a treaty.

This, as readers will know, is a theme we constantly revisit, in which context the reference to the Skyhawk is rather appropriate. In March, two years ago we quoted Ed E. Heinemann, designer of the Skyhawk as well as the B-26 Invader and the A-1 SkyRaider. He was lamenting:

The obstacles to any simplification may seem insurmountable, and the reasons for more complexity are many and powerful. But if we permit this Frankenstein of complexity to continue to work at its current plodding, insidious rate, it will slowly overwhelm us to impotency.

That is, of course, what is happening now, if you think about it. Despite our current financial travails, we are still one of the richest nations on earth and, here we are taking on the rag-tag Taleban in one of the poorest nations on earth, and we are in the middle of a funding crisis over maintaining a reinforced brigade, with supporting elements, in the field.

Banging this drum, as one does, one wonders what it takes to drive the point home, one that comes into high focus when we look at the cost of the Merlin helicopters that Jock Stirrup is "busting a gut" to get into Afghanistan.

Ann Winterton and I have looked very closely at the costs of these machines and have established that the original acquisition cost of the RAF operated Merlin Mk 3 was around £19 million, with a total operating cost per hour of approximately £34,000.

Then there were six, unused Danish machines that were bought to supplement our fleet. These, we were told cost £29.3 million per individual aircraft. And, in order for them now to be despatched to Afghanistan, they need an "upgrade". That, we are told equates to "an estimated average of £1.8 million per aircraft".

Thus, Stirrup's Magic Merlins are working out at about £31 million each. I don't know about him "busting a gut" the taxpayers will be, in having to pay for them.

The Danish Merlins are, in fact, an interesting case study as their acquisition arose from the very strong pressure from government on the MoD to increase helicopter capacity in Afghanistan.

At that time, in late 2006/early 2007, the Mi-17 option was being heavily pursued, with an offer to supply a number of machines for an all-in cost, including military-trained pilots, of £3,000 an hour – with the further option that the RAF could acquire its own airframes at about £3 million each – perhaps £6 million by the time all the "bells and whistles" had been fitted. Up to twenty of these machines were being considered, each of which have the same load capacity as the Merlin.

Horrified at such a cheap solution being offered, the RAF went into overdrive, inventing every possible excuse as to why the Mi-17s could not possibly work - not to RAF standards, etc., etc. - despite already having secretly acquired six airframes for the arduous role of supporting the Special Forces.

Publicly though, with the help of its industry lobby and pork-barrel MPs, it managed to sell the idea of acquiring six new Merlins which had just been delivered to Denmark, which the RAF then proceeded to absorb into a brand new squadron. This was celebrated by a happy little ceremony in January 2008, when the MoD chirped that the Royal Air Force element of the Joint Helicopter Command had received "a substantial boost".

Unfortunately though, "Our Boys" did not get to see this "boost". The aircraft were completed ready for service in May 2008 but, although they had been bought specifically for Afghanistan, as set out in Defence Management, they were simply added to the existing pool of 22 aircraft operated by the RAF and used for churning up the skies around RAF Benson in comfortable Oxfordshire.

Then the RAF pulled a blinder. Having pitched for the additional Merlins as the solution to the capacity problem in Afghanistan - it "decided" unilaterally that it was too difficult to set up a logistics and support chain in that theatre to support a new type. It therefore intended to limit the type to Iraq, where there was in fact no great need for additional machines as the campaign there was in the throes of winding down.

As to the apparent advantages of acquiring a common airframe to add to an existing fleet, there are still substantial differences between the RAF and ex-Danish Merlins. The Cockpit layouts and the radar differ to the extent that additional training had to be provided, even for pilots who might not be flying these Merlins on a regular basis.

The result is that, some more than two and a half years after the government had told the RAF to sort the problem of helicopter capacity in Afghanistan, and committed the well over £180 million to make it happen, there are still no Merlins in theatre. The likelihood is that they will not arrive until early 2010 – and even then there will be operational problems.

Thus, fashionable though it might be to load all ills on Gordon Brown and his "penny pinching", we have a situation where money has been thrown at the problem of helicopter capacity – with the acquisition of an absurdly expensive machine – and it has still not yielded dividends. This is "impotency" writ large, for which the buck seems to stop at the door of an RAF which seems intent on its own brand of disarmament.

COMMENT THREAD

A certain weariness

With the newspapers still full of news and comment on Afghanistan, no-one can now complain that it is the "forgotten war" any more. That we now have a "debate" though has not proved an unalloyed blessing – we are still in "more heat than light" territory.

It is to Matthew Parris, therefore, that we turn for an alternative view, specifically to his column in The Times.

Something of a curate's egg writer (good in parts), he retains the capacity to surprise - as he does today, having established a reputation as a convinced "outer" - telling us that, "Our forces will have to stay in Afghanistan. But Britain must resist being sucked deeper and deeper into this disaster."

Parris takes the view that it is time to stop striking poses over Afghanistan. Effectively, he says, the politicians are perfectly right to act as a check on the generals' ambitions – there are too many examples in history where giving the military its head has led to disaster. And, in any case, to hand them a blank cheque, "forgets that military chiefs are humans, not gods, and will always ask for more." Thus, he writes:

No extra troops. No extra money. Less for Whitehall-directed aid projects and more for smaller, independent charities. A clipping of Nato/Isaf’s ever-multiplying wings. No wild talk about gender equality and human rights. A scaling-down of ambitions for state-building and democracy. This is the sober new direction. There is no possibility of our hopes for a new Afghan dispensation taking shape, but no reason why the existing dispensation, intelligently propped, should collapse.

Put more prosaically, we should cut our cloth according to our means, instead of getting caught up in the hysteria of the moment, pledging more and more blood and wealth, in a never-ending spiral that could drain our resources and our patience.

Injecting a practical note – where so many people, including this writer, have difficulty in defining why we are there and what we are supposed to do – the one thing about which there is clarity, in principle, is that we should be training and equipping the Afghan security forces.

At a certain level – as was the case in Iraq – they should be able to continue the fight, more or less unaided, and we can depart with honour. We are not there to win the "war" – that is for the Afghanis to do for themselves.

That said, there is a certain weariness with the way the debate is going – bogged down in ever-increasing idolatry for the Saintly Dannatt and ever more arcane discussions about how many helicopters can dance on the tip of a needle (or is it a pin?).

Squaring the circle, the one thing the British are not doing, to any great extent, is training up the Afghan Air Force, a much needed capacity that, without which, the host government has no more chance of prevailing than we do without air power.

Under the circumstances, the most logical way to resolve the current helicopter shortfall is to plan a phased withdrawal of all British helicopters from theatre. They should be replaced progressively with Mi-8 MTVs – aka Mi-17s - (pictured), forming new RAF squadrons, which could then continue operations. Other "Russian" models could also be purchased.

Into these new squadrons should gradually be absorbed Afghani aircrew, with the aircraft increasingly serviced by indigenous ground crew, until such time as the Afghanis are reliably capable of autonomous operations.

That a start could be made very quickly, in terms of obtaining machines, is evident from a recent US initiative, in obtaining a number of helicopters for the Pakistani Army.

When they arrived, Gen David Petraeus, praised the speed with which the delivery was made. "Within two or three weeks of request from them for helicopter support, we wheeled four Mi-17s just refurbished out of the back of a Colt," he said. That just goes to show what can be done when there is a will.

The US was also able to provide "training assistance" and, as an example of what it is doing for the Afghans, it is leasing aircraft to train USAF pilots, who in turn can pass down their skills.

We, of course, have our own capabilities. With five Mi-17s already operated by the RAF in Afghanistan, plus the models at Boscombe Down in the UK, we already have a cadre of trained pilots who could train many more. And there are plenty of machines available on lease, with skilled ex-military flying instructors, who would be more than happy to speed up the process.

The point of this is that it would demonstrate a very clear commitment to an exit plan, with very visible and easily measurable metrics. When the squadrons are trained and fully operational, we leave – barring technical advisors.

There is a world of difference between fighting an endless war in a foreign land, co-opting the host nation forces in the fight, and actively and clearly setting out to train the host nation to fight for its own objectives – against a declared and honourable exit strategy.

Of this, one suspects, even Matthew Parris might approve – although we suspect that the RAF might rather resent being deprived of the opportunity of obtaining some more "toys" of their own, which is what much of this helicopter spat is all about. But then at least they would not have to wear out their own fleet so, possibly, everybody should be happy.

Somehow, though, there has to be a worm in the apple. It can't be that easy.

COMMENT THREAD

Brown envelopes galore

When it was raised in Parliament yesterday by the redoubtable Ann Winterton - the ONLY MP who raised the embarrassing report of a British-chartered helicopter ferrying military supplies to a British base getting shot down by the Taliban, Miliband and Ainsworth did NOT want to talk about it. The full exchange is here.

Of course, there is every reason why they should not want to be up front. Not only was the prime contractor Skylink subcontracting the work to dodgy Moldovan gun-runners – in breach of the contract requirements – the Moldovans were subcontracting the operating of the aircraft to an equally dodgy Ukrainian outfit, which explains why six of their number were killed.

Moreover, as more details come in, it is now very clear that this was a deliberate Taleban ambush, mounted directly under the noses of the British, aimed at bringing down a Chinook – one of the main strategic aims of the Taleban. The unfortunate Mi-26 happened to wander along, in company with an Mi-8 MTV. Both took fire and the Mi-26 bought it. Bad luck on the Ukrainian crew and bad luck for the Taleban. They wanted an RAF Chinook, and will keep trying until they get one.

As for Skylink, this is an aviation company that has no aircraft. It specialises in supplying aircraft in war zones for the UN and other tranzies like the EU, for NGOs and any shady outfit that happens to be passing with a dodgy cargo it wants moved in a hurry. It buys contracts top dollar, with brown envelopes passing freely. It is so corrupt that even the UN blew it out, until it bought its way back into favour by greasing the right palms.

The company then subs out the work down the chain to dodgy Moldavans, Ukrainians and the rest, mostly operating clapped-out ex-Soviet hardware with safety certificates that owe more to photoshop than they do any certifying authority, their aircraft banned from any and all Western airspace. These outfits work as a group, sharing and swapping assets when they get outed, forming and reforming companies, appearing and disappearing, and cropping up with new names and the same aircraft just as frequently.

These are the people that are working for the MoD, the contract carefully laundered through Nato to give plausible deniability, thus avoiding a Tory and media uproar when it was learned that the MoD was hiring dodgy ex-Soviet choppers to make up for capacity shortfalls.

The trouble was that the original arrangement was that the aircraft should serve the transport hub between Kandahar and Bastion. They were not permitted to fly into FOBs – that is military airspace, from which they were to be excluded.

However, once there, the mission creep set in and, with the desperate shortage of lift, the brief was extended to the aircraft uplifting into the FOBs like Sangin. The Ukrainians, desperate for cash, were squared off with generous bonuses and thus agreed to fly into hot war zones, where even RAF Chinooks will only fly with Apache escorts.

The MoD was happy, being able to release Chinooks and Apaches for operations, Skylink was happy with the extra hours and the bonuses, and the Ukrainians at the sharp end needed the money anyway. And hey! They are expendable.

As long as the contract was piggy-backed off Nato, and thus totally deniable, no one had to be told and everyone kept schtum ... including the Tories. And now, no one wants to talk about it. Says Ainsworth: "I do not want to trespass on to operational details." You bet he doesn't.

As for the Tories, having decided to make "helicopters" their cause celebre, the last thing they want to know is that the Taleban are parking outside the gates of British bases, waiting for an opportunity to down a Chinook. Rather shoots the Fox - to coin a phrase - about more helicopters saving lives.

So goes the conspiracy of silence. The British media ... forget it. E-mails from special advisors? MPs' expenses? Dead safe ... nay problem. If you look too deep here, you don't live.

COMMENT THREAD

Not even cat litter

Yesterday, with the coroner's inquiry into the death of Trooper James Munday, the first soldier to be killed in a Jackal, we could have been something of a landmark in seeking better protection for our troops exposed to IEDs in Afghanistan. Instead, the opportunity was frittered away by a quiescent coroner and our loathsome media.

Worst of all though is the media. Too lazy and ignorant to see past the MoD "spin" – without exception the hacks went for the "human interest" angle of the grieving mother and her understandable but entirely misplaced attack on "politicians" who were "feathering their own nest".

First in no particular order was The Times which headlined "Dead soldier’s mother criticises politicians over Afghanistan". It then tells us of "the mother", Caroline Munday, who spoke of the "hellish conditions" the troops were facing, and said that politicians should concentrate on the needs of serving soldiers rather than "feathering their own nest".

Only then do we learn that Trooper Munday was killed while driving the Jackal, with a careless injection of MoD "spin" as the vehicle is described as open-top and "mine-resistant" – even though that term has a very specific meaning and it most certainly does not apply to the Jackal.

Then we get more of the "spin" as Mrs Munday is recorded faithfully parroting what she had been told, saying "she was aware the protection capabilities of the Jackal had been criticised, but said she understood that if an IED was big enough, it could kill those travelling in it." Thus she utters the words thaqt must have delighted the MoD, declaring: "If an IED is big enough unfortunately, if you are in the wrong place at the wrong time, it’s going to take lives."

We are then laboriously informed that all equipment was working properly at the time of the explosion. Trooper Munday was wearing the correct body armour and other kit, and the Jackal was armoured underneath to provide protection.

So there we are then, as far as The Times is concerned – just one of those tragic events. Move on, nothing to see here, says the report, written by the same Michael Evans who earlier reported on the "tenth soldier killed in 'flawed' vehicle" – the very latest Jackal casualty.

Then we have The Guardian, this time with the headline "Grieving mother accuses government of failing to provide best equipment," the story complete with the "feathering the nest" gibe and then quoting Caroline Munday, saying: "Our troops are fighting in hellish conditions. I hope our government will stop feathering its own nest and provide our guys with the best equipment they can because they deserve it. I am so glad the other two soldiers survived. God bless our soldiers."

However, we also get Warrant Officer Mark Hatton, of the army's special investigation branch. We learn that the Jackal Munday had been driving was not faulty. Then we get:

The IED was carrying between 15 and 20kg of homemade explosive which was detonated by a pressure plate when the vehicle drove over it. It was a significant amount of explosive. The Jackal did have protection underneath. It is a tragic set of circumstances. James did have all the right protection which unfortunately didn't save him.

Ah ... the "tragic set of circumstances" – move on, nothing to see here. Unremarked is that, had between "15 and 20kg of homemade explosive" gone off under the wheel of a Mastiff, a Ridgeback, or any Class I MRAP, the vehicle would have shrugged off the blast and Munday would probably not even have suffered a headache.

MRAPs are resistant to 14kg TNT equivalent under any wheel, and with homemade explosives producing as little as 30 percent of the blast effect of military explosives, not only would Munday still be alive, the vehicle could have been back on the road in a few hours, fully repaired.

But all we get is that Warwickshire coroner Sean McGovern recorded a narrative verdict that James died from blast wounds.

From The Daily Express, we get the same dire fare. The headline is, "Mum tells labour: you must put troops first", "feathering the nest" gets an airing and we are told that Trooper Munday served with Princes William and Harry in the Household Cavalry's D Squadron.

As for the Jackal, it was "hit by a 45lb roadside bomb" and "athough the Jackal had a specially reinforced floor, the young soldier was killed." Two other soldiers with Trooper Munday were injured in the blast but survived.

And, while we have the paper declaring that "the timing of Mrs Munday's attack will embarrass Gordon Brown as his funding strategy for the war comes under close scrutiny," we also get MoD plant, Warrant Officer Mark Hatton, who tells the inquest: "The Jackal did have protection underneath. James did have all the right protection, which unfortunately didn't save him."

Finally, for no apparent reason, we get from The Sun a eulogy (which also appears in a number of other papers), not for Trooper Munday but another Jackal casualty. Neil Dunstan (pictured) one of two of the three-man crew killed.

And there, embedded in the text is the MoD's planted message – the whole reason for the piece – helpfully articulated by Dunstan's surviving girlfriend, "Brave Kate", who was due to wed Neil next July.

She, we are told, doesn't blame his death on a lack of kit. She said: "Even if Neil was in a better armoured vehicle, the bomb still would have taken him from me. It's a miracle one person survived."

What makes The Sun particularly loathsome is that, as the self-appointed champion of "Our Brave Boys", it so easily retails MoD propaganda, and thereby helps perpetuate the equipment flaws which are killing them.

The final travesty though is The Times which, three days ago had Melanie Reid take exception to that dreadful Top Gear puff, with Jeremy Clarkeson playing with the Army's latest kit. She writes:

The film was designed to show-case the Army's mechanical machismo. The Jackal. The Mastiff. The Panther. The Trojan. Millions of pounds’ worth of futuristic military hardware possessing shields to deflect bombs, probes to clear mines, grabbers to grab stuff; and the horse power to whisk men to safety. Everything, in fact, designed to enable the Army to wipe out the enemy, any enemy, in a few hours. Just like it happens in the movies. And in Army recruitment films.

Except that, the Top Gear credits having rolled, one switched over to the Ten O'Clock News and the real world. That's the world where young British soldiers are being pinned down in vehicles that cannot protect them and are being wiped out by roadside bombs. Take the Jackal, for instance, so mine-resistant that ten men have died in it in the last year in Helmand.

I don't mean to criticise Top Gear: it represents some of the most fun to be had on TV. But their timing was rotten. When eight young men have died within 24 hours, blown up because of a lack of military hardware to protect them, there was a terrible irony to that episode. And when the real world runs up against a play world, we have to be very careful.

None of these papers today are even worth using as cat litter. Full of faux concern for our "brave soldiers", when the chips are down, not one of the reporters dealing with the Munday inquest gives a tinkers damn, as long as they can fill their spaces with the easiest available garbage.

COMMENT THREAD

Playing politics with peoples' lives

Although ostensibly addressing a serious deficiency in our military capabilities which is affected the campaign in Afghanistan, there is something distinctly tawdry about the way the Defence Committee has today "rushed out" a report on helicopter lift.

The nuance would not be apparent to most but this is the same committee which has never seriously addressed the issue of mine/blast protected vehicles – and the management of the IED threat generally. Yet, a significant proportion of the current casualty rate stems demonstrably from inadequacies in the Army fleet of vehicles, and the lacklustre approach to controlling IEDs. The problem here is far more serious than the perceived shortage of helicopter lift.

On that basis, it is very hard to escape the conclusion that chairman James Arbuthnot is indulging in the not-unknown political sport of bandwagon-riding, hitching his star to an issue because it has – more for the sake of expediency than on its intrinsic merits – been catapulted into the public consciousness.

One cannot nevertheless gainsay all the Committee's findings or its primary conclusion that the lack of helicopters is "undermining operations". Even then, we could dispute its conclusion that this stems from a shortage of medium and heavy lift battlefield helicopters.

When one looks at the ponderous tactical deployment of British forces in the field, and the intrinsic vulnerabilities of such helicopters, there is at least an argument that the operational need would be better served (in part at least) by a larger number of smaller, tactical helicopters, on the lines of the Rhodesian "Fireforce" model which deployed multiple sticks of four soldiers from Allouette III helicopters, each machine armed with a 20mm cannon.

Arbuthnot and his merry men, however, do not even enter this territory, trapped as they are in an orthodoxy which rests with their oft' demonstrated inability to think outside the box – or draw evidence from outside the military-industrial complex.

Thus we see the Committee recommending the "pork barrel" route to enhancing capacity, going for the procurement of new helicopters, oblivious to alternatives and totally ignoring the cost implications. More seriously, given that the capacity shortfall needs addressing urgently, the MPs have opted for the slowest possible route, offering absolutely nothing that will fill immediate needs.

Then, although not given prominence in the Committee's press release, the
"bandwagon agenda" emerges in the media coverage of the report, as was surely the intention. Thus we have The Times currently reporting that, "The lack of helicopters available to British troops in Afghanistan is costing lives, MPs concluded today." Worryingly, we also see written, the assertion that:

Extra medium-lift support helicopters would cut down on the number of road convoys that have proved vulnerable to Taleban attacks. Twelve of the 15 deaths in Afghanistan over the past fortnight have been caused by roadside bombs.

This, possibly, is added in by the journalist Michael Evans, and relies in part from the populist (child-like, even) tendency to describe IEDs as "roadside bombs".

However, to make the link between these casualties and a shortage of helicopters is tendentious, to say the very least, if not downright dishonest. But, once the virus is in the system, never let it be said the British journalists will ignore it. This is now the narrative, and narrative it shall be.

As for cutting down the number of road convoys, thereby reducing the number of attacks, we have the news of the recent loss of the Mi-26 which was performing precisely the role of cutting down road convoys, yet neither Michael Evans nor the Defence Committee take this into account. One could take the cynical view that, because only six Ukrainians and an Afghani child died, this does not matter – as long as our "Brave Boys" are not killed.

But, as David Axe discusses, although civilian helicopters may not be as well protected from missile (MANPAD) threats as military hardware, this machine may have been brought down by an RPG – against which there is no protection other than tactical flying.

Yet, as one of our readers reminded us, not too long ago, an RAF Chinook was very nearly brought down by an RPG. Only exceptionally skilled flying – and luck - saved the day. And, if that is hazard enough, if the Taleban do manage successfully to deploy anti-aircraft guns, the machine they hit is toast. "Game over," as we said. It is unlikely that the momentum for withdrawal would be stoppable.

In his narrow pursuit of more helicopter lift, therefore, Arbuthnot and his committee may be pushing for a course of action which might increase risk, not reduce it – even without taking into account other factors, which we rehearsed in an earlier post.

The idea that transferring troops from the roads to helicopters very much stems from experience in Northern Ireland but, as we pointed out, the situation in Afghanistan is not the same. While in the earlier campaign, the troops were largely the targets of the terrorists, in Afghanistan, the Afghani security forces and the civilian population are also being killed. If we abandon the roads, in pursuit of the notional (but possibly ephemeral) safety of our own troops, we cede the game to the terrorists.

This is brought home by a recent, haunting piece in the New York Times which refers to the tendency of the coalition forces to look after their own, concerning themselves less with the safety of Afghan forces who work alongside them and who are taking far greater casualties.

Given that the strategic plan is eventually to hand over to Afghan forces, it is difficult to accept that these personnel will even begin to assume the burden as long as they see their better-equipped – and highly risk averse - "partners" using their resources to avoid the very hazards to which the indigenous forces are also exposed, with far greater consequences (pictured above – an ANP patrol vehicle destroyed by an IED which killed five, including a senior commander).

Support for the Afghanis, therefore, would suggest that we have to share the same threat environment, which means that countermeasures and protection must apply to all, not just the select few.

The answer there – in dealing with IEDs – is not for coalition forces to run away from the threat but to deal with it, using the many technical and other measures at their disposal, to ensure not only their safety (as far as that is possible) but also to protect Afghani forces and civilians.

While, thus, the Defence Committee is enjoying the ride on its new-found bandwagon, it is missing the point – perhaps deliberately – and playing with peoples' lives.

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