Pratting about

As the political claque indulge in their endless prattling, with ever-more detailed scrutiny of their own navels, the real world goes on.

In that real world, real people die because these wastrels cannot concentrate on the jobs for which they are paid, one of which is to ensure that our troops are properly equipped, fighting to a workable strategy which has half a chance of success, and that the people running the show are properly scrutinised and brought to account.

I cannot estimate how much time and energy has been spent inside and out of parliament discussing MPs' expenses, but I can tell you exactly how much time has been spent on the floor of the House discussing current military strategy in Afghanistan – precisely none.

Thus we get the wages of neglect. MoD website, item 1:

It is with great sadness that the Ministry of Defence must confirm that one British soldier from 1st Battalion The Royal Gurkha Rifles and one member of 173 Provost Company, 3rd Regiment, Royal Military Police have been killed in Afghanistan.

MoD website, item 2:

It is with great sadness that the Ministry of Defence must confirm that a British soldier from 2nd Battalion The Rifles was killed in Helmand province yesterday evening, Thursday 7 May 2009.

MoD website, item 3:

It is with great sadness that the Ministry of Defence must confirm that a British soldier from The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland, was killed as a result of a gunshot wound in Afghanistan today, Thursday 7 May 2009.

Four soldiers in one day. We have been writing for months that the situation was going belly-up … it is going belly-up. The first two were caught by a suicide bomber, in a market area of Gereshk district. Twelve civilians were killed and 32 injured as a Snatch Vixen patrol was targeted, the two killed soldiers having dismounted.

In the next incident, we have a Jackal driver killed, the sixth soldier now to be killed in this "boy racer" toy. Of the soldier shot, we are still awaiting more details. And the "fighting season" is yet to start.

Yesterday, we had an inquest into the death of Jason Barnes, the fifth and hopefully last soldier to be killed in a Vector.

Major Joe Fossey, an explosive expert from the Royal Engineers, described the front cab as "mangled beyond comprehension". "The front axle punched up and there was a buckling of metal" that had "crinkled it like a crushed Coke can". Capt Boyd described the driver's side of the vehicle a "complete mess". Cpl Barnes suffered catastrophic wounds with the front plate of his body armour blown away.

The vehicle has now been withdrawn - £100 million pissed up against the wall for a useless killer of men. And just three newspapers bother to report it, in short, down-page items. None of them tell us it was a 6kg mine. The minimum specification for a Level I MRAP is protection against 7.5kg. If the MoD had bought decent vehicles, the man would have lived.

Yet The Daily Mail report has as its headline, "MoD vows to 'learn lessons' after death of soldier ….". And the "lesson" is? The same day that the US Army rejects the International MXT, after failing the mine resistance test at the Aberdeen proving ground, the MoD orders 200 at a cost of £120 million.

The MoD is pouring money down the drain. It is spending £93,000 each on dune buggys - the US forces buy theirs for $18,000. We fly Harriers which take 60 manhours maintenance per flying hour, compared with a quarter of that for an F-15. It is planning to buy Lynx helicopters for £14 million each. The comparable US helicopter is lighter, faster, can carry more, costs less than half that amount and is available off-the-shelf. We can have our overpriced garbage in 2014.

And where the hell is Parliament in all this? Where is the political blogosphere? When the hell are these prattlers going to stop wasting their time and ours on personality politics, as Jeff Randall complains, and get down to some serious politics, scrutinising the hard issues … such as why our troops are dying in Afghanistan, with some of the military warning of worse to come?

COMMENT THREAD

Different realities – 3

The official reports do not always give the locations of the strikes but, for the date, Monday 4 May, the closest match tells of Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets and an Air Force B-1B Lancer being called to carry out air strikes during an engagement between anti-Afghan gunmen and Afghan national police. The jets hit several enemy fighting positions and a compound in which enemy personnel had gathered after the fight.

This is the attack which, according to the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) "killed dozens of people, including women and children" in an area near the village of Granai in the Bala Baluk district of Farah province, Afghanistan. The same source claims that the deaths arose during fighting between the Afghan National Army, backed up by international military forces, and "armed opposition" which had taken place in the area on 4 May.

The IRCC, however, "was not in a position to know whether armed opposition fighters had been in or near the houses when the air strikes took place, as it had not been on the spot at the time." Thus the spokesman for the organisation said: "We will now try to learn as much as we can about exactly what happened and then raise our concerns in bilateral dialogue with the parties to the conflict."

The New York Times adds detail to the account, telling us that villagers reached by telephone said many were killed by aerial bombing. Muhammad Jan, a farmer, said fighting had broken out in his village, Shiwan, and another, Granai, in the Bala Baluk district. An hour after it stopped, the planes came, he said.

In Granai, he said, women and children had sought shelter in orchards and houses. "Six houses were bombed and destroyed completely, and people in the houses still remain under the rubble, " he said, "and now I am working with other villagers trying to excavate the dead bodies."

One reporter "on the spot" is Patrick Cockburn, writing for The Independent. Actually, though, his dateline is Kabul, more than 400 miles from the scene as the jet flies, or well over 500 miles in a tortuous drive by road. But, at least, he is "there".

Cockburn has his own brand of reality, which does not allow for doubt, thus permitting his newspaper to offer the headline, "'120 die' as US bombs village", with the strap: "Afghan outrage after strike targeting Taleban fighters hits women and children."

"A misdirected US air strike," he writes, "has killed as many as 120 Afghans, including dozens of women and children." The attack, he adds, "is the deadliest such bombing involving civilian casualties so far in the eight years since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan."

Cockburn, however, in contrast with the IRCC and the NYT, tells us that the air strike was on the Tuesday, called in by US Marine Special Forces supporting the Afghan army. He then relies on an account retailed by "local residents" via "Afghan officials". They put their children, women and elderly men in walled compounds in the village of Gerani, which is three miles from the scene of the fighting and where they thought they would be safe. It was these compounds which were then attacked from the air and most of the people sheltering inside were killed.

"Dozens of dead bodies were seen in the two locations we went to," says Rohul Amin, the provincial governor of Farah. He told The Independent that "the dead numbered over 100". Villagers brought 30 bodies, including women and children, in a truck to Mr Amin in Farah City to prove it had happened.

As one might expect, The Guardian has its own version of reality. Under a headline, "Afghanistan police operation leaves devastation behind", its man "on the spot", Jon Boone - also in Kabul – has the village named as "Geraani", without putting a date to the incident.

In his account, the villagers of "Geraani" and another in Gangabad had just finished their breakfast when the Taleban came to their town to collect a so-called tax on the area's poppy farmers.

Unfortunately for the people of the lush agricultural area in the western province of Farah, the cavalry arrived two hours later in the form of the Afghan police and army, backed up by US bombs. By seven in the evening, many houses had been turned into piles of rubble out of which the villagers pulled their dead.

Some locals estimate the death toll at up to 200. The Red Cross, the only international observers to have thus far visited the area and reported on what they saw, say "dozens" of people were killed, including many women and children.

Village elder Hajji Issa Khan from Gangabad may be more precise because throughout yesterday his tractor was used to carry the dead to a central area where the villagers could mourn their dead and bury them immediately, in accordance with Islamic custom. "In this operation there were 127 people killed. I can tell you exactly because my driver was carrying those … people to the centre of the town and he came and told me that he carried 127 people."

As to the background, Boone relies on district police chief Haji Khudadade. According to him, a huge number of militants – about 400 – put up a fight and had 130 Afghan forces surrounded. He said the Afghans had no choice but to call in air support, a call that the US military was quick to point out was an Afghan decision taken at the highest level of the military command. The provincial police chief, Ghafar Watandar, then says the Taleban deliberately used the villagers as human shields.

To ring the changes, Jeremy Scahill, writing for the Huffington Post has yet another version of reality. He writes of, "a US bombing massacre that may have killed as many as 130 Afghans, including 13 members of one family." At least six houses were bombed, we are told, and among the dead and wounded are women and children. And the US airstrikes happened on Monday and Tuesday.

The Washington Post, now reporting on an Obama government, has Greg Jaffe, its staff writer in Kabul, writing on yet another version of reality. Jaffe has the top US commander in Afghanistan sending a joint US-Afghan team to investigate the airstrikes "that killed more than two dozen people".

Jaffe also quotes a US defence official, speaking "on the condition of anonymity", saying that "the Taleban went to a concerted effort to make it look like the US airstrikes caused this." The official did not offer evidence to support the claim, and could not say what had caused the deaths.

The BBC, on the other hand, reports protests in the streets in Farah "at the deaths of civilians in US air strikes earlier this week". But it also cites a "Pentagon official" saying it was not clear who was to blame for the death of the civilians. "Initial American investigation shows that some of the deaths do not seem to be in concert with how a civilian would die from an air strike," the official says.

But it also has one protester, Haji Nangyalai, 42, declaring that he was demonstrating to "show our anger at the crimes committed by the American forces". "We ask the Afghan government to force the American forces to leave Afghanistan. They kill more civilians than Taleban," he says.

Associated Press has its reporters, Jason Straziuso and Lara Jakes – datelined Kabul – citing a "former" Afghan government official saying that up to 120 people may have died. If so, the pair observe, it would be the deadliest case of civilian casualties since the 2001 US-led invasion. But it cites top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiern. He is allowed to say: "We have some other information that leads us to distinctly different conclusions about the cause of the civilian casualties."

A senior US defence official then adds that Marine special operations forces believe the Afghan civilians were killed by grenades hurled by Taleban militants, who then loaded some of the bodies into a vehicle and drove them around the village, claiming the dead were victims of an American airstrike.

Afghan police add that 25 Taleban died in the fighting, which began Monday and lasted until early Tuesday. It was unclear whether they were among the dozens of bodies witnessed by the Red Cross.

Then again, we have a different brand of reality from the Wall Street Journal. It cites Col Greg Julian, the main US military spokesman in Kabul. He says that a US-Afghan investigative team was in Farah, with the results of its investigation expected today. "I'm pretty sure the high numbers of casualties are not going to prove true," he says.

Of course, the other reality is that Obama is in talks in Washington with presidents Karzai and Zardari. The Taleban is nothing if not media aware, and skilled at manipulating the Western press.

And, to contrast two of the different realities, while The Guardian tells us of the Taleban coming to their town to collect their so-called tax on the area's poppy farmers, with the "cavalry" arriving two hours later … backed up by US bombs, the WSJ has a completely different version.

According to this source, with writers Yochi J Dreazen and Peter Spiegel in Washington, the disputed airstrike incident began Sunday when Taleban militants publicly beheaded three villagers. When Afghan forces went to investigate, they came under attack and radioed for help to nearby US forces. A US quick-response force went to the area, but was also attacked. The American troops then called in air strikes on locations believed to house the fighters taking part in the hours-long gun battle.

From the look at it, according to this version, the whole affair is compatible with the Taleban having planned a deliberate set-up, to coincide with the Obama talks, deliberately to muddy the waters and create hostile publicity – a classic propaganda coup.

But then, what do we know? We weren't there. But neither were any of the reporters and, from those who were there, we get confusing, conflicting stories of uncertain accuracy (some, possibily deliberately so). In the battle for hearts and minds, though, the truth hardly matters. By the time the "real" reality emerges, no one will believe it anyway. In war, it is the perception that counts. That is the reality.

COMMENT THREAD

Different realities - 2

If the reality of Michael M Phillips – for a short period at least – was Jalrez Valley in western Afghanistan, defence correspondent Michael Evans has been living a different reality with "our boys" in Helmand.

Published in The Times on 5 May, Evans gives as a quirky insight into one of the incidents briefly mentioned in the USAF "airpower summary" for 30 May.

The bare bones of that incident, as reported by the USAF, were that "a coalition aircraft" strafed an enemy improvised explosive device team. The aircraft engaged after detecting anti-Afghan personnel setting up a "daisy-chained," multiple-explosive IED. The aircraft used guns rather than a precision bomb to prevent damage to the roadway.

Behind that lies a fascinating story, headed in the newspaper as "Wandering Afghan goatherd holds up lethal attack on Taleban roadside bombers". The location is Garmsir and the narrative begins with four Taleban insurgents appearing at one end of a bridge on what is called by British troops "Route Cowboys". They begin to dig a hole for an IED (Evans calls it a "roadside bomb").

This is a scene that must have been repeated thousands of times, in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Far too many times, the outcome has been fatal for British or other coalition troops. But not this time.

Flying above them at a height of 9,000ft, we are told, is a Hermes 450 UAV, relaying pictures of the scene to British controllers. They call in air support, which materialises in the form of two Belgian F-16s. Evans calls them "Belgian Air Force" aircraft, unconscious perhaps that the BAF was disbanded in 2002, to be replaced by the "Air Component" of an unified armed force. It is a small detail, but a telling one.

The F-16s prepare to attack but they are warned off as a young Afghan goatherd with a few goats around him is seen walking towards the bridge. By the time the goatherd has cleared the scene, one of the Taleban fighters, apparently the leader, has left on a motorcycle while another has began to walk backwards holding a wire and disappeared from view.

Then, and only then, the F-16s are cleared to attack. Rather than dropping a 500lb bomb that would have damaged the bridge, one strafes the area with, Evans says, a "30mm cannon", killing the two bomb emplacers. Our reporter is thinking, presumably, of an A-10 which is thus equipped and the figure he offers does not immediately register. But the F-16 is equipped with a 20mm M61 cannon. Another small detail wrong from the man who "was there".

Anyhow, the remaining insurgent mounts a motorbike and leaves, but the UAV follows him south, observing him as he enters a compound to change clothes and drives off to a rendezvous spot known to be a Taleban command centre. "He was allowed to escape," Evans tells us, without further explanation. Not for long, we suspect.

In this piece from Evans, there is a distinct difference in style, compared with the offering from Michael M Phillips. Both have a narrative of the events they observe but Phillips also works in an element of analysis and something of a "strategic overview". This is entirely lacking from Evans – as it is so often from British media pieces. His is a straight "Boys Own" narrative with nothing of any depth which might trouble the reader.

What Evans does do, however, is demonstrate – perhaps unwittingly – the vital and devastatingly successful role of the UAV in counterinsurgency warfare and, in particular, its "battle-winning capabilities" in the fight against the IED.

Therein lies a further story, one which Evans does not tell – the fact that, had British forces been equipped with the Hermes 450 in Iraq, and in particular in al Amarah, history could have been different. Instead, as we recounted at length in an earlier post, the Army there was equipped with the useless Phoenix, thus requiring patrols to be mounted in Snatch Land Rovers, with the tragic results which we have also recorded.

Even then, the availability of the Hermes 450 was a close-run thing. The original plan was for the Phoenix to be replaced by the more sophisticated Watchkeeper system (a heavily modified Hermes), as part of the FRES capability. Although this was not due to be introduced, and then incrementally, until 2010, the Army initially resisted the idea of acquiring the more basic version off-the-shelf, for fear that it would prejudice the Watchkeeper programme.

It was not, therefore, until May 2007 that the issue was forced, and an Urgent Operational Requirement was issued for the Hermes, too late to affect the outcome in Iraq but in time, as Evans now attests, to do good service in Afghanistan.

Even then, when we could use as many of these machine as could be supplied, even last year, the defence committee was retailing the view of industry that the provision of UAVs for "current operations" could undermine future industrial capacity.

Fortunately, as the political emphasis has shifted from "future capacity" to support of current operations, the Hermes has been bought but, had it been left to the Army and the defence industry caucus, the situation described by Evans might have had a less happy outcome for British troops.

To give him his due, Evans's narrative did not stop with this one episode. He goes on to describe a foot patrol, where more traditional methods of IED detection and disposal are witnessed, but with the Hermes in the air providing persistent overwatch.

A bomb is found using methods which our forefathers would have recognised, illustrating that the battle is now being fought with a meld of the old and the new, the answer – such as there is one - being a combination of tactics and techniques, with no "magic wand" that will deal with all eventualities.

Partly – but only partly – illustrating that point, Evans offers a separate analytical piece, telling us that "Helmand's improvised explosive devices exact a terrible toll".

In this, he actually tells us nothing we did not already know, but he also underlines the utility of "protected vehicles", recalling an earlier incident he had reported. This was where a Mastiff had successfully withstood a "donkey bomb" - two buckets hanging on either side of a tethered donkey filled with an estimated 20 Kg of explosives and set off as the vehicle was passing. No one was seriously hurt.

One additional detail is interesting. To help in the hunt for IEDs, we are told that "every aircraft with photographic capabilities roams the skies to look for Taleban fighters digging up the ground. Even the US Air Force B1B bomber has been used because of its advanced cameras."

Despite all this, the IED is still regularly claiming victims. Elsewhere, however, we learn that the successful countermeasures, and especially the use of better armoured vehicles, is – as we would expect – provoking a Taleban response.

The conventional wisdom is that the insurgents would simply build bigger bombs, but in fact the Mastiff has proved so resistant to attack that, even despite six stacked mines being used, no soldier has yet been killed in one.

What seems to be happening is that Taleban bombers have shifted to attacks on Afghan soldiers and police, who do not have the MRAPs or other countermeasures. Thus, with about as many Afghan personnel as there are coalition troops, the Afghans are taking higher casualties because they are more vulnerable.

In Iraq, the US found it necessary to equip the Iraqi Army with its own fleet of MRAPs, and with IED investigation equipment, and it looks as if a similar programme will have to be mounted in Afghanistan. But, for the moment, at least some progress has been made.

More and better technology is still needed. Some is on its way but there are still gaps and glaring deficiencies in an Army which should have been better prepared but which has been behind the curve throughout the campaign.

COMMENT THREAD

Different realities - 1

National interest is never so obvious as when newspapers are reporting on the deeds of the military in foreign fields.

Thus, while we have a major counter-insurgency going on in Afghanistan, involving troops from many different countries, today the Wall Street Journal offers us a detailed account of the exploits of US troops while, predictably, The Times gives us an equally detailed account of the exploits of British troops.

Neither of accounts, viewed entirely from the national perspective, can give us an overview but, thanks to the internet, we can see both. By reading and contrasting both, we can in fact build a more comprehensive picture than either newspapers offers.

Add to that an overview afforded by primary sources that the media do not report, and build in other less mainstream reports and the image expands. Perhaps a more coherent picture emerges. But the caveat "perhaps" remains. It is still incomplete, still filtered and distorted by the inherent selection bias.

The problem is trying to work out what represents reality. Each of the journalists who files reports gives us a tiny snapshot. Each of the other sources only give us a fraction of the totality of events happening over a wide range of territory. And much of what is happening is not reported at all.

With that in mind, in this first of several linked posts, we look at the "reality" offered by WSJ reporter Michael M Phillips, that of the Jalrez Valley, where he gives us a preview of surge, telling us that: "US Calms Afghan Valley but Peace Is Fragile".

The piece is worth reading in its entirety, retailing how "A single company of fresh U.S. troops has turned this insurgent haven into a laboratory test for President Barack Obama's Afghanistan troop surge." It would be otiose either to reproduce it here, or to offer an edited version. More useful is to draw some observations from the narrative.

Here, we see an essentially lawless district, dominated by the Taleban, into which has been inserted, by helicopter, a company of American infantrymen who have set up outposts along the valley. Previous, limited incursions have been met with bloody fighting but this time, with troops arriving in force, they met virtually no resistance. Since the soldiers arrived, insurgents have twice fired rockets and once taken potshots at them. They have encountered just two roadside bombs.

Jalrez itself, with a population of 75,000, "sits astride an important if heavily decayed stretch of road that runs west to Herat and eventually Iran" and, "taking advantage of the calm, construction crews funded by the Italian government are preparing to pave the valley's pitted dirt road." Afghan and US officials hope this will allow locals to more easily send apples to market in Kabul or Pakistan, and remind them that their interests lie with the government.

The force commander Lt-Col Kimo Gallahue hopes that, as the Jalrez settles into "quiet stability" he can expand the US footprint, moving into some of the subsidiary valleys. He is, however, conscious of locals' fears. "If the coalition left, the Taleban would come back and kill me and everyone else who worked with the US government," says Sayed Ali Abas, the 40-year-old commander of a new US-backed neighborhood-watch brigade in Jalrez.

Pashtun villagers, some of whose sons are thought to be part-time insurgent fighters, are particularly reluctant to be seen supporting the US and the government. Others tell a US officer that they can't risk taking sides, for fear of retaliation. "We can't fight you, and we can't fight the Taleban," said one of the men.

Then we are told that the insurgents, "unable or unwilling to fight face-to-face, have resorted to scare tactics." At night, they tack warnings to mosques and houses. "We consider anybody cooperating with the infidels to be their slaves," said one such night letter left at a Jalrez Valley home. "Those people who work for the infidels and invite others to work for them ... will be slaughtered and hung on trees by the road."

Looking at the bigger picture, Lt-Col Gallahue's battalion represents an enormous increase in the US presence. But he still has only so many soldiers and there are a lot of valleys.

Just 25 miles to the south of the Jalrez Valley, insurgents are a powerful force in Chak, where the Army fought the two-day battle in late April. Each of the 13 sub-districts of Chak had its own Taliban commander and a sort of parallel government. In a district of 114,000 people, there were just 30 police officers and no permanent US base.

The effect of Lt-Col Gallahue's efforts, therefore, has been to push the insurgents into Chak. He would like to leave a permanent force in there but, despite increased force levels, does not have enough men to spare. Gallahue looks at a map and scans the valleys his men hold and those he wished they held. "That's depressing," he says. "Chak is burning."

Looking at this in the round, several observations come to mind. The first is that the "take, hold and build" strategy currently touted clearly has its limits. Although 21,000 troops are to be added to the current force of roughly 41,000 US soldiers, that is still a pitifully small number when some estimate that it would take 500,000 troops fully to hold all the contested territory in Afghanistan.

Secondly, one wonders why Gallahue is "depressed". If the Taleban are following the classic Maoist three-phase model of guerrilla warfare, then he should expect them to retire in the face of superior, better-equipped forces.

Further, should his forces ever move on to challenge them on their new ground – and in so doing vacate the current area of operations – then he should expect the Taleban to reoccupy that ground. That is the essence of guerrilla warfare.

Thirdly, one notes with interest the plan to pave the valley's pitted dirt road, to "allow locals to more easily send apples to market in Kabul or Pakistan, and remind them that their interests lie with the government." Here, the thinking is obviously sound, but it raises some interesting questions.

For instance, one might ask what the cost of transporting Lt-Col Gallahue's troops into the area were, and what the total costs of maintaining them in place will be. Then one could ask what the cost of sending a unit of combat engineers, those troops slowly moving up the valleys, rebuilding the roads and dealing with insurgent interference as it happens.

One suspects that the overall cost might, in fact, be less and it is useful to speculate whether the net effect might be very much the same. If the game is to remind people "that their interests lie with the government", would that objective have been any less well served by simply building the road?

The answers are, of course, not clear. But the fact is that the locals are right to be wary. Lt-Col Gallahue's troops are there now but how long will it be before the political winds change and they are gone? And what then?

One thing for sure, troops may come and go, as they have done for centuries. A properly built road, linking the valley to the markets and to government, will most probably last a whole lot longer and have a more powerful effect.

COMMENT THREAD

Another day ... another GBU

Looking at the latest instalment of the venture that is set to cost the British taxpayer some £3 billion this year, even we find ourselves raising our eyebrows slightly at the latest available airpower summary from the USAF. This tells us of the events in that haven of security and peace that is Lashkar Gah, in Helmand province, Afghanistan, where our blood and treasure are so freely expended.

From this source, we learn that, on 30 April a US Navy F/A-18C Hornet responded during firefights between anti-Afghan forces and combined Afghan national army-coalition units in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. The jets employed GBU-12s to hit enemy positions in response to their mortar, RPG and automatic weapons fire.

In the same area, a coalition aircraft strafed an enemy improvised explosive device team. The aircraft engaged after detecting anti-Afghan personnel setting up a "daisy-chained," multiple-explosive IED. The aircraft used guns rather than a precision bomb to prevent damage to the roadway.

A Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet executed a show of force over anti-Afghan forces shooting at a coalition unit in order to suppress their fire. When the enemy shooters were not deterred, the jet hit their position using a GBU-38. Some surviving enemy personnel continued firing, but fled after the jet performed an additional show of force.

Of course, "the problem with all information that the military releases to the public, like the US Air Power Summary, is that it does not contain the context necessary to interpret its information appropriately."

For that, one presumes, one must imbibe the latest MoD press releases telling us how wonderful things really are (if there were any). After all, we get Super Hornets screaming up the High Street in Wibsey virtually every day, dropping GBUs and strafing the pub-goers as they spill out onto the road after closing time – so we should not take much notice of these "out of context" reports.

Alternatively, we could rely on another "ill-informed" and "out-of-date" journalist, this one James Palmer writing for the New Jersey Star Ledger newspaper.

Palmer, in fact, is writing what could be taken as an upbeat piece, charting the construction boom in Lashkar Gah. He finds "dozens of sprawling new villas" springing up, each with "gleaming glass windows, wraparound balconies and gabled rooftops that sit behind tiled walls." Then there are, "towering hotels and vast commercial centres, sturdy piles of fresh brick sealed with thick slabs of mortar."

The headline to the piece, however, gives the game away: "In Afghan construction boom, reflections of corruption", it reads. Palmer tells us that town residents and local officials offer two reasons for the boom: drug trafficking and government corruption.

"Many of these new big houses and commercial buildings belong to high-ranking government officials and drug smugglers," says Mohammed Enwar Khan, who heads a group of elders acting as liaisons between residents and the government, commonly known as the provincial council. Khan says the link between their illegal activities and their wealth is an open secret here, saying simply, "Everybody knows this."

Another local, Ramazan, a 48-year-old mechanic, who adds that the drug traffickers and crooked politicians are enriching one another. "Everything here depends on money and power," he says. "The smugglers have the money and the officials have power."

Then we get Sadar Wali, a 30-year-old poppy farmer from Helmand's Nawa district. He offers a sobering explanation of how the Taleban now work: "They tax our crops however much they want by sending notes to the houses," Wali says. "If you don't pay, they will accuse you of spying for or working with government and kill you."

That much and more from Palmer tells you that the glowing picture of "peace and stability" in the so-called "security zones" is an illusion. The Taleban move freely within the town, running extortion rackets, intimidation, murder and kidnap, many of the incidents not crossing the radar of the coalition forces safely ensconced in their fortress on the edge of town.

And of course, as long as the farmers pay their "taxes" to the Taleban, and the drug lords building their new palaces in the town pay their homage, the Taleban do not trouble them. They do not foul their own nest, indulging in their violence out of town where, occasionally, they meet Navy F/A-18E Super Hornets in full flight.

One wonders, incidentally, whether the author is the same James Palmer who last October wrote a piece for The Guardian describing how the once showcase project, the $190m Kandahar to Kabul highway had become the most dangerous stretch of road on the planet.

Government and military officials, recorded Palmer, say insurgents and bandits regularly pull travellers from their vehicles, murdering or kidnapping them for ransoms. Corrupt government security forces seek bribes and collaborate with insurgents and robbers. Roadside bombs frequently target Afghan police and military patrols, along with Nato convoys. No one in an official capacity can even quantify the violence.

Thus, what started as the road to recovery has turned into a highway of terror in Afghanistan. A project that was to bring economic prosperity has become a symbol of failure. The road is littered with burned-out green police pick-up trucks, 4x4 vehicles, Nato supply trucks and demolished bridges.

No doubt Palmer is "ill-informed". His piece is undoubtedly now "out-of-date" and, in any case, to draw any conclusions from his information is to take it "out of context".

Those three descriptors seem to be the layered defence adopted by the military and officialdom. Either the information is wrong in one or other detail, in which case the writer is "ill-informed" and can be ignored. If the information is correct, it can be dismissed as "out-of-date". The situation has moved on, so the information is no longer relevant. Or, failing that, where the information is both correct and relevant, it is "out of context". Then too, it can be ignored.

However, what is interesting about Palmer's road experience is that we have been there before. In a number of remarkable studies of the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, one in 1988 and the other in 1995, produced by the US Army, graphic accounts were offered of what the Russians called the "highway war" - dorozhnaia voina.

In these studies, it was reported that the favourite tactic of the Mujahedeen guerrillas was to interdict the movement of troops and supplies of all types over the limited road network throughout Afghanistan. Interestingly, that was also a favourite tactic of the Viet Minh in French Indo-China during the 1950s, with epic convoy battles on the infamous RC4, with accounts chillingly similar to those written by Russian troops twenty years later.

Unsurprisingly, this carried over into the Vietnam conflict with both the Viet Cong and the NVA adopting the same tactics. In 1968, however, after a major loss, it was then realised that, far from being a drag on operations, convoy and route protection should be used as an opportunity to bring the enemy to battle on favourable terms, defeating them in detail in the war of attrition that characterises counterinsurgency operations.

As was later recounted in the current counterinsurgency doctrine, "A change in thinking about a logistic problem converted the perception of convoy operations from an unglamorous defensive activity into a valuable opportunity to offensively engage elusive insurgents."

What is staggering, therefore, is that in 2008, thirty years after the Russian experience, and forty years after US tactics were adjusted to deal with similar threats, our modern, technological, "superbly equipped" coalition forces are still getting caught out.

It is not that the Taleban have suddenly adopted new, especially effective tactics. They are simply doing what the Mujahedeen did before them and, before that, the Viet Cong and the Vietminh. What has changed is that our own forces have forgotten the lessons of their own history, and ignored the lessons and experiences of others, even to the extent – with the Americans – of their ignoring their own doctrine manual.

So it is with the "take and hold" strategy which the British so proudly proclaim and hold up as an example of progress in Lashkah Gar. The Taleban simply move in, in "mufti", change their tactics and prepare to wait for the day when some anonymous bean counter decides that the level of troops is no longer needed. Then, the Taleban, who never left and never changed, simply pick up their weapons and takeover … again.

As we write in our latest response to the troubled "Praetorian", success in dealing with insurgencies comes when people begin to see the balance of advantage in supporting the government as greater than in supporting (or tolerating) the insurgency.

If on the one hand, the people see the coalition forces creating their "security bubbles" in the towns, which merely create the conditions for the drug lords to flaunt their wealth, while the Taleban range freely, practising their extortion, kidnap and intimidation under the noses of the authorities; if the people see that the coalition cannot even protect the main transport routes; and if the people see the rural hinterland become the playground for free-range F/A-18C Hornets and the like, this is not an insurgency which is going to be defeated.

Such is the situation though that any "debate" requires us to agree wholeheartedly with the authorities, otherwise you are branded "negative" and "defeatist". On the other hand, we see political and public disengagement, media indifference, and MoD concealment, plus criminally inept strategy and procurement.

Meanwhile, we have allowed ourselves to become a bit player in our own destiny and our national security is now entirely in the hands of the United States. And their answer is, another day, another GBU – with, all too often, dire results.

COMMENT THREAD

Corporate self-deception

After last week's piece, Booker returns to the subject of Afghanistan with a vengeance this week, taking on the man signing himself "Praetorian", claiming to be the Operations Officer for 3 Commando Brigade which has just returned from Helmand.

It was last week that Booker argued that "our military humiliation in Afghanistan is a scandal - and the cover-up is an even greater one," under a strap line, "The under-funded British Army is being forced to make the same mistakes in Afghanistan that it made in Iraq". Praetorian did not so much disagree as simply, in lofty style, dismiss Booker's arguments outright, stating that he did not recognise the situation that Booker described, claiming he was "out-of-date and ill-informed."

We are not at all ill-disposed to argument and discussion, although a rebuttal was denied us when The Sunday Telegraph published two lengthy comments from Praetorian but failed to post either of the comments I had placed on the site. What is not acceptable though is this lofty dismissal, claiming with the authority of rank and position and on the basis of supposed experience, a situation that simply does not accord with the facts.

Thus it was that Praetorian had it that we – the British military mission - had secured the five major population centres in Helmand and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams had "exploited this security to deliver tangible, effective and sustainable reconstruction and development." During our tour, the man added, "you could count the number of security incidents in these areas on the fingers of your hands."

That tour, as we recounted in a separate post, started on 8 October and, within days of taking over, in just one of those "major population centres" – Lashkar Gah – the Brigade was pitched into battle with major Taleban forces attempting to take over the provincial capital. With US and Canadian forces called to assist, an additional 1400 Afghani troops were also drafted in and it took ten days of continuous fighting before victory was declared.

During the rest of the tour, noted by Booker in today's piece, we were able to identify 69 further "security incidents" in just that one "major population centre", set out in another post. Not all of these were centred on the town itself and some were recorded as part of ongoing operations by the Brigade. But the detail indisputably gives the lie to the impression Praetorian sought to give – that the areas under British control were secure. The evidence shows that they are far from secure.

Booker also shows, with an account of the threat to RAF Chinooks which provide a vital support role, just how tenuous is the grip of British forces in the province, the details rehearsed in our post and also in The Daily Telegraph yesterday.

Far from offering the security to the Afghanis that Praetorian claims, the British forces have major problems of their own. We are, basically, one major incident away from a monumental domestic crisis of confidence which could castrate the military effort and lead to the termination of our participation in the ISAF operation.

Whether Praetorian is lying, or not, is moot. He certainly labours under the handicap of working for an overarching organisation, the MoD, which lies freely, an organisation which distorts, prevaricates, bullies and "spins" to the extent that, amongst those who know, it has lost any confidence or trust.

Further, within the military, fresh from its debacle in Iraq, we see a dysfunctional organisation, unable to come to terms with its own failings – or even the fact that it has failed – locked in a state of denial from which its seems unable to escape. This is an organisation that has lost more credibility that it can begin to imagine.

Most likely though, Praetorian sufferers from the very problem of which he accuses us – he is ill-informed. But there is much more to it than that, helpfully elucidated in a paper carried by Small Wars Journal reproduced from the Marine Corps Gazette.

Analysing the pressures on the military to come up with optimistic assessments of its own performance, author Bing West makes the following observations:

In sum, garbage and lies reside inside any large organisation in the form of optimistic forecasting. A healthy human mind accentuates the positive. Thus, we stress that a particular surgery has a 90 percent success rate, rather than to admit there's a 10 percent chance of dying. We hold onto our losses when the stock market goes down, because selling is an admission of failure, even when it's the rational choice.

Similarly, it's especially tough for a commander to objectively assess his own battlespace. Hence there is a need in the Afghanistan war for an independent risk assessor who can expertly calculate the rough odds of succeeding in the mission of nation building versus the size of the US force commitment.

In his paper, Bing discusses various metrics used in different conflicts to assess performance and likelihood of success, demonstrating that flawed choices, or incomplete data, can distort perceptions – either way. Praetorian, within the "bubble" that he inhabits, no doubt has his own set of metrics in which he is entirely confident, allowing him to make his assertions in the sincere belief that he is right.

However, the problem in an insurgency – certainly in the "guerrilla warfare" phases - is that incidents tend to be widely dispersed in space and time. Most areas, most of the time, will be free from violence. Furthermore, the enemy is highly adaptive, changing tactics rapidly in response to security force action, altering the tempo at will, in accordance with counterinsurgency activity.

This we have seen in Iraq and see again in Afghanistan, where the response to a failure to tackle the security forces head-on led to guerrilla tactics, relying on the ambush, the bomb and harrying indirect fire – plus the tactics of the urban guerrilla, which include extortion, murder, kidnap and intimidation within the civilian population.

Thus, the only way one can get a "feel" for which way the insurgency is going is to assess the totality of available information. And because the metrics are constantly changing, there us a need for intuition as well as hard analysis. Since so much depends on public sentiment, both here and in Afghanistan, that is as valid a tool as any.

Nevertheless, one metric alone speaks of failure. During March, the number of roadside bomb attacks in Afghanistan for the first time exceeded the number in Iraq, with 361 bombing incidents recorded, compared with 343 in Iraq. That, in itself, tells you that the Taleban is active and had not lost its core strength.

On the other hand, a metric often quoted in support of claims of "success" is the "fact" that seven million school-age Afghans were this year studying in 12,600 schools across the country. When compared with about one million six years ago, this is seen as a real sign of progress.

However, it is still the case that roughly half of Afghan children - mostly girls - are still not in school. And the overall situation is extremely fragile. For instance, we are told that insurgent attacks and crime killed around 70 Afghan teachers, students and education workers over the past year, and wounded another 140. Violence linked to the insurgency also stopped 240,000 students from attending school, mainly in southern and eastern Afghanistan.

There have also been multiple attacks on schools over the past years with scores of buildings burnt down or blown up, as well as students and teachers threatened. About 480 schools are still closed because of insecurity and, although the government reopened nearly 100 this year, keeping them – and other public facilities - open is becoming a major part of the battle.

The latest in this battle came on Friday 1 May, when the Taleban blew up a health clinic in the Lakan area of Khost province, eastern Afghanistan. Four rooms were completely destroyed. In another incident, a high school serving over 1,300 students was dynamited in Nadir Shahkot district of the same province. Seven out of 18 classrooms were destroyed. This is the third school to be destroyed in the past month in that district.

Another metric – one favoured by the media – is the death rate for coalition soldiers. Here, there is less than good news. On Friday also, five soldiers were killed – three American and two Latvians. They were attacked with small arms and RPGs at an outpost in Kunar province near the border with Pakistan. About 30 troops were stationed at the outpost and several others were wounded.

Two days before that, a German soldier was killed and nine were injured in two separate attacks in the northern Kunduz province, where the army is suffering more frequent insurgent assaults. The soldier who died was killed in a roadside ambush, with four injured. The other five were injured in a suicide bombing – but only slightly. They were in a Dingo MRAP.

German officials now admit, "It's become more difficult there [in Kunduz] than it was four years ago," and, as if to emphasise this, on Friday evening there was another roadside bomb in the same province, damaging a police vehicle. Fortunately no police were killed or wounded.

Earlier, on 18 April, a Taliban commander was killed after he led a raid on a police checkpoint in the province. Police returned fire, killing the rebel commander. In the neighbouring Baghlan province on 27 April - where it is normally peaceful - Taleban fighters stormed the Birka district headquarters and set it on fire.

That week, on the Tuesday, a British soldier was killed north east of Gereshk by an explosion, while patrolling on foot. Additionally, two civilians were killed and seven others, including five children, were wounded when a rocket hit a residential area in the Lashkar Gah district – another of those "security incidents" that isn't supposed to be happening.

These "security incidents" are breaking out with increasing frequency. Also that week the US military battled with Taleban southwest of Kabul in the strategic province of Logar - the site of a multi-billion-dollar Chinese project to develop a copper mine. Ten insurgents were killed.

Elsewhere, in the British sector of Helmand, on the same day, Afghan and US forces killed five Taleban in Nahr Surkh district. The joint force had been attacked from several compounds while on a reconnaissance patrol, and had returned fire.

Through such metrics, the impression gained is of a country on the edge. But most disturbing of all is a recent report in The Independent indicating that the flood of aid continues to be misspent. Apart from anything else, 40 percent of the international aid budget is returned to aid countries in corporate profit and consultant salaries

Far from improving the lot of Afghanistan, conspicuous spending by the elites and foreign workers is increasing the disparity of wealth. And, with the rural aid programme stalled, displaced workers and refugees are pouring into the city, a dispossessed, poverty-stricken mass that is a natural recruitment ground for the Taleban. Not for nothing was Kabul referred to in a recent Channel 4 documentary variously as a "city under siege" and a "city waiting for the Taleban".

The problem is that no one seem to be able to get a grip, thus leaving the "bubble dwellers" like Praetorian mouthing their mantras and relying on their flawed metrics, convincing themselves – but few others – that they are doing a marvellous job.

In a repeat of Iraq, we can see them still doing it as the British Army packs up its bags and leaves Afghanistan for the last time, defeated again but refusing to accept it. Unable to confront the reality of the situations it has to deal with, it prefers the cosy world of make-believe where the word "defeat" has been abolished.

COMMENT THREAD

They still don't get it

It is quite amusing in a macabre sort of way to see the so-called "political" media and blogs dive for cover when there is a real political issue on the agenda.

And whatever the finer details, the final retreat of the British from Iraq and the ongoing war in Afghanistan are intensely political issues which cast their shadow into the future, defining and shaping our defence and foreign policies and indeed our perception of ourselves as a nation.

The sheer complexity of the issues, however, defy easy analysis. Furthermore, the paucity of information make attempts at analysis and comment prone to error and misunderstanding, while following through the threads of discussion and argument require brutally hard work.

All of which might explain in part why so many take the easy option and either ignore the issues or rely on "drive-by" comment little better informed than "man-in-pub" gossip.

Heavily into that category is the pathetically tivial analysis of the Iraqi campaign by David Blair in The Daily Telegraph. This is put into perspective by just one comment on the online edition. It reads:

As a former regular officer, I am fed up with all these pieces of so-called reportage which are permeated by talk of the Forces' "quiet pride". Sickening stuff. This article is very short on statistics - and offers not even a perspective on the situation from a few locals which might answer the headline's question. The whole Iraq episode was shameful - politically and strategically, even if individual soldiers did their duty as (still!) expected.

This, in respect of Iraq is very much the line we take. Individual soldiers did do their duty and too many paid the ultimate price for what indeed were "shameful" military and political failures. At least, though, The Times is reporting defence secretary John Hutton declaring that there would need to be a "proper investigation" into the failings of the mission.

It is this which is exercising David Cameron and other opposition politicians, with Cameron calling for an immediate inquiry similar to that carried out by Lord Franks following the Falklands War in 1982. "After years of foot dragging," he says, "I believe it is the time for the Government to announce a proper Franks-style inquiry. Instead of starting in many months' time, it should start right now."

The problem is, however, that this is likely to rake over old ground as The Telegraph suggests that an inquiry is expected "to examine the faulty intelligence that led to the invasion, including information on weapons of mass destruction, and should look at why British forces were poorly equipped and under-resourced."

Con Coughlin picks up on this on his blog, arguing that Cameron should forget the Iraq inquiry and concentrate on Afghanistan.

"I would love," writes Coughlin, "to see David Cameron show the same enthusiasm for discussing our critical mission to Afghanistan as he does with his repeated calls for an inquiry into the invasion of Iraq." Given that we have already had two inquiries into the build-up to the war - Hutton and Butler – he cannot see what new material would be provided by a third.

What really worries me, he adds, is that while the leader of Her Majesty's Opposition is happy to provoke debate about events that happened six years ago, he is less forthcoming about the current parlous state of our military.

Coughlin, as so often, is both right and wrong. He is right that there is little to be gained by once again rehashing the events that led up to the Iraqi war. But there is everything to be gained from an inquiry which is focused specifically on the conduct of the post-invasion occupation and counter-insurgency campaign which started formally in 1 May 2003 and ended yesterday.

Not least, many "lessons learned" from such an inquiry would be directly applicable to the current military adventure in Afghanistan, where the same mistakes are being made that we saw in Iraq.

However, what is concerning Coughlin is his view that Gordon Brown has "seriously undermined the effectiveness of our military commitment to Afghanistan" by refusing to authorise the deployment of the extra troops our commanders require to fulfil the mission. This, he says, is a golden opportunity for Mr Cameron and his defence team to drive another nail into the coffin of this increasingly discredited government.

And yet, he asks rhetorically, what have we heard from the Opposition on Afghanistan, an issue that is infinitely more important and perilous than Iraq? The answer is: "Next to nothing."

Perversely, there is a response from the Conservative opposition but it comes not from David Cameron or, as you might expect, shadow defence secretary Liam Fox. Instead, in The Independent we see former shadow home secretary and now back-bencher David Davis. He writes under the heading: "Brown's policy in Afghanistan is never going to work".

It would have helped Mr Davis's scribing if he had shown any knowledge of what "Brown's policy" actually was. In the absence of any such knowledge, so fatuous and superficial are his comments, including the obligatory reference to "Vietnam", that they need not detain us.

What is worrying Coughlin though is his perception that "Brown's half measures will put our soldiers' lives at further risk". Falling for exactly the same military/MoD "spin" that afflicted Michael Evans yesterday, in a long piece in the print edition, repeated online, thus tells us that "Peace in Afghanistan will be even longer in coming if the Army is not at full strength."

As usual when dealing with a Gordon Brown policy initiative, we are told, the devil is in the detail. Couglin then ignores that detail – and the background to it – and writes that "by far the most alarming feature is the humiliating rebuff he has delivered to our Armed Forces." By denying the request by senior officers for an extra 2,000 troops, Mr Brown is seriously jeopardising the chances of achieving the success he craves.

This extra manpower, we are informed, would make the world of difference to commanders on the ground, giving them the resources not only to capture territory, but to hold it. All too often, important gains have been made, only to be surrendered because of a shortage of troops.

"Put simply, the more troops we have, the more able we are to dominate the space in Helmand and keep the Taleban at bay," says a senior Army officer. "Without the extra troops, we simply won't have the resources to impose our presence on Helmand in the way we would like."

Strangely, it is Michael Evans who – doubtless unwittingly – in his own piece today gives us the clue as to why more troops are not the answer. There we see evidence of the same ponderous "garrison mentality" referred to on the Rand Report on the Rhodesian counter-insurgency, which we reviewed in March.

This was also brought up by Ann Winterton in the recent procurement debate, where she pointed out that, while convention dictates a ratio of 10:1 for security forces needed to combat insurgents, the Rhodesians succeeded with a ratio of 1:1 and a minuscule budget. Thus did she remind us:

The Rhodesian security forces functioned under severe financial constraints that limited their access to late model, sophisticated high tech weapons and to large quantities of material. The Rhodesians’ ability to overcome these constraints by embracing innovative strategies and tactics, including novel techniques in road security, tracking and reconnaissance, small unit tactics, special operations, and intelligence gathering, suggests that the successful prosecution of counter insurgency need not entail huge expenditure.

However, neither the military nor the journos seem to be able to drag themselves out of the "more resources" mindset, the latest to join the refrain being the Financial Times, which offers its own story of the Army's woe, with the legend: "UK block on Afghan surge riles army chiefs."

The paper cites a "senior defence figure" who gets the boot in, telling us: "People are pretty angry about the decision around here … We're not in a situation where generals are thinking of resigning. But the outcome announced by Number 10 this week has come as something of a surprise to people."

It should not have surprised anyone who knew what was going on. We flagged up the doubts here and here and the Financial Times itself points to on of the reasons why this "surge" was never going to happen. Some Whitehall officials, the paper says, argue that the UK operation in Afghanistan is well resourced. They note that the operation will cost a projected £3bn in 2009-10, while the cost of UK operations in southern Iraq never rose above £1.5bn.

Despite this, it seems the editorial writer cannot read his own paper, offering a leader headed: "War on the cheap." The point, of course, is that not only is the campaign in Afghanistan not cheap, the military have yet to be able to demonstrate whether they are getting (or could get) any useful effects from the flood of cash pouring into theatre.

But, as the hacks pile in, with Robert Fox of The Guardian adding his penn'orth, there is not a single one of them with an original thought.

Still, the basic flaw in the strategic thinking survives unchallenged, typified in a Reuteurs report, which has an interview with Brigadier David Hook in Helmand. Warning that a "Bloody summer" looms, he tells us that insurgent attacks in the first three months of this year were 73 percent higher than the same period a year ago.

But, with the influx of US troops, he talks of international forces being able to provide a "degree" of security to over 90 percent of the population in the south, up from 60 percent. "That is the pivot point," he says. "That is the point where we will have created the humanitarian space to allow the agencies to come in behind and do the reconstruction and development."

There is it in all its glory – this totally artificial distinction between "security" and "reconstruction and development", with the latter conditional on the former. As long as there is this continued failure to understand the very point that is addressed in "Brown's policy", there is going to be no progress at all in Afghanistan.

They didn't get it in Iraq, and they don't get it now. Watch the video (and enjoy the little girlie struggling).

COMMENT THREAD

Game over

It is now a matter of record that one of the reasons why the platoon house at Musa Qala in 2006 was effectively surrendered to the Taleban was that it had become too dependent on Chinooks for supply.

With a limited number of landing sites, and the Taleban closing in, it was felt that it would be only a matter of time before the insurgents "got lucky" and downed one of these helicopters. The effect on public opinion - with the loss of upwards of 40 personnel - would have been, it was felt at the time, so severe that it is unlikely that continued British participation in Afghanistan would have been politically possible.

At that time, possibly the main threat to helicopters was RPGs, ground fire from Kalashnikovs and even 12.7mm machine guns. But, as the campaign progressed, there was an even more serious threat – the possibility of hand-held guided missiles (MANPADS as they are called) bringing down a machine.

That this has not happened – despite several attempts – is one of the untold successes of the military, and British industry. Aircraft in theatre have been fitted with a complex of physical and electronic countermeasures, known collectively as the Defence Aids Suite (DAS) which, with a combination of good tactics, superbly skilled flying and an element of luck, have thwarted Taleban attacks.

However, in a sinister turn of events, it could be that the Taleban are reverting to old technology – the dedicated anti-aircraft gun - in an attempt to achieve a "spectacular", the shooting down of a fully-laden Chinook. This, they are fully aware, could still have a devastating effect on British sentiment towards the war.

Possibly, there was some intimation of this development on 15 November last year when US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs were called in to fire cannon rounds and a B-1B Lancer dropped a GBU-38 onto Taleban hiding in a compound trying to shoot down an aircraft. A coalition aircraft also performed a show of force to deter enemy activities near the compound where the anti-aircraft fire was seen.

Nothing much was made of this at the time but, as we reported recently on 21 April there was another disturbing development.

In the space of 12 hours, the Taleban had fielded two heavy anti-aircraft weapons, each capable of taking out a Chinook or other British helicopter. Both were Soviet-made ZPU-1s, loaded and ready for use, mounted on the back of pick-up trucks. They were located in the Nad Ali district, close to Lashkar Gah, where British troops are stationed and from where Chinook helicopters frequently take off and land from the helipad.

Fortunately, as we reported at the time – in an encouraging testament to the ground work done by coalition forces - the villagers spotted the first gun and reported it to the authorities. Shortly thereafter, it was attacked by two US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt Iis which destroyed the gun and the truck, using their 30mm Avenger cannons.

The next gun was also a ZPU-1, and again it was reported by villagers in the Nad Ali district, after it had been fired in the vicinity of the local bazaar. This one was taken out by US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles. They first disabled the truck using strafes, preventing enemy personnel from driving the vehicle into a civilian area, and then bombed it using GBU-38s.

Although the ZPU-1 is 70s-era equipment and obsolete, with a 14.5mm calibre, it is a potent anti-aircraft weapon and could have made short work of any helicopter it hit. The rapid intervention of the US Air Force, said a coalition forces spokesman, "without a doubt saved the lives of Afghan and coalition forces".

However, the situation was to get potentially worse. We later reported, on 28 April, that another gun had been seen – this one on the 26th. This time is was a ZPU-2 - the twin-barrelled version of the guns previously reported – and very much more devastating. A Chinook would not have survived a sustained attack from this weapon.

Fortunately, as it was being towed by a farm tractor, again close to the British base at Lashkar Gah, it was taken out by a US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper, which fired Hellfire missiles. Both the tractor and the gun were destroyed.

However, it now appears that there was a fourth gun, this one reported on 25 April when it was strafed by an A-10 and destroyed. Again it was – most probably – a ZPU-2, this one mounted on a truck. The vehicle and the anti-aircraft gun were destroyed.

Thus, it seems, in the space of less than a week, the Taleban have fielded no less than four potent heavy anti-aircraft machine guns, close to a British base, the obvious intention being to shoot down a British helicopter. This is the first time that so many of such weapons have been deployed against coalition forces and could represent a new level of threat.

If the Taleban have had four of these guns, the possibility is that they could have more, and are prepared to risk all to use them. So far, we have been fortunate in that the guns so far deployed have been spotted. But the Taleban only have to be "lucky" once. A fully-laden Chinook hit by one of these guns could lead to forty or more being killed.

What is doubly disturbing is that, while the US Air Force has reported these guns – in a low key way – no mention has been made of the threat by the MoD, which has been flooding the media with "feel-good" human interest stories, avoiding any hard-edged news of the war in Afghanistan.

This presents an entirely false picture of the risks our troops face and thus fails to prepare the public for the remote but nevertheless real possibility that we could some day be confronted with the news of a helicopter disaster involving significant loss of life.

Unprepared, media and public reaction is likely to be extreme and the fall-out could very well create overwhelming pressure for the removal of British troops from Afghanistan. In one fell swoop, the Taleban could achieve a major victory.

With luck, skill and vigilance, this may not happen by the MoD bears considerable responsibility, if it does, for leaving the public unprepared, to an extent that the whole campaign is threatened. As with the famous "Blackhawk down", one Chinook down and it could be game over.

COMMENT THREAD

On the fingers of your hands

Following the attempted take-over of Lashkar Gah by the Taleban on 11 October 2008, 3 Commando Brigade, which had only taken over on 8 October, were effectively confronted with a baptism of fire, almost in the nature of a mini "Tet Offensive" experienced by US forces in Vietnam.

It cannot then be suggested that, even in the limited area of Lashkar Gah district, that the security situation settled down and was largely without incident. Setting aside the major operations undertaken by 3 Commando Brigade, such as Operation Sond Chara in December, which was mounted as a direct result of the October incursion into Lashkar Gah, the record shows steady, continuous background enemy activity in the district.

As before, the most complete record is the US Air Force daily airpower summary. Because the rules of engagement allow airpower to be called in only when there is observed enemy activity, this provides a useful metric, by which enemy action can be measured.

From that, we can see there was little respite. On 24 October, for instance, only days after the incursion had been defeated, a US Air Force F-16A Fighting Falcon was called in to drop a GBU-12 onto enemy positions in a building that was using RPGs against coalition forces near Lashkar Gah. That day, incidentally, 50 close air support missions were flown by US and coalition aircraft.

The next day, 25 October and the day after, the 26 October, saw typical low-level activity with coalition aircraft performing shows of force to deter enemy activities. No munitions were expended but the process demonstrates that there was enemy activity on those days, what might reasonably be described as "security incidents".

The 29 October saw a more serious incident, described as occurring in an area to the south of Lashkar Gah. ISAF soldiers killed a Taliban commander by the name of Mullah Ziauddin. He had been linked with other senior Taleban members and was said to have controlled forces responsible for attacks on ISAF and Afghan security forces. Another suspected Taliban commander, Mullah Mashar, was captured in the same area.

On 4 November, it was back to a show of force, this time comducted by a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet, followed by a coalition aircraft on 7 November, both "in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah." The 9 November also saw a show of force, this time from a US Navy F/A-18A Hornet.

Six days later, on 15 November, there was something altogether more serious. US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs were called in to fire cannon rounds and a B-1B Lancer dropped a GBU-38 onto Taleban hiding in a compound trying to shoot down an aircraft. A coalition aircraft also performed a show of force to deter enemy activities near the compound where the anti-aircraft fire was seen. This alone, had it succeeded, could have had devastating effects.

It was nearly two weeks later, on 27 November before air activity was again recorded, this time a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet. It conducted a show of force to deter enemy fighters and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. The next day, 28 November saw an A-10 and a coalition aircraft conducting shows of force to deter enemy activities near Lashkar Gah.

Much of the activity at this time fell into this category, indicative of background level enemy action. Thus on 30 November we saw US Navy F/A-18A Hornets and F/A-18Es conducting shows of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy conducting IED search operations in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

The 1 December, however, had a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet and a coalition aircraft firing cannon rounds onto the Taleban holding positions along a river, in order to clear the path for a coalition forces convoy travelling along that route. In addition, F/A-18Fs conducted a show of force to deter enemy fighters and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy in the same area.

Then, on 5 December, a US Air Force MQ-1B Predator used Hellfire missiles against the Taleban who were firing RPGs at coalition forces from the western edge of a tree line in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. In addition, coalition aircraft performed shows of force to deter further enemy activities in the same area.

On 6 December, a US Air Force B-1B Lancer dropped guided bomb unit-38s onto the Taleban who were firing RPGs at coalition forces from inside a compound in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

On 9 December F/A-18A Hornets conducted shows of force to deter a group of suspicious people gathering near a coalition checkpoint, on 10 December, a F/A-18C Hornet and a coalition aircraft conducted shows of force and, on 11 December a coalition aircraft conducted a show of force. Then, on 12 December, an A-10 and a coalition aircraft performed shows of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition forces convoy that was disabled near Lashkar Gah.

The 17 December saw a US Air Force B-1B Lancer dropped a GBU -38 onto Taleban who were firing RPGs at coalition forces from a nearby enemy compound in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. A US Navy F/A-18C Hornet conducted a show of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition forces patrol that had taken fire in the same area.

A day later, on 18 December, US Navy F/A-18C Hornets performed shows of force to deter enemy activities and provide armed aerial overwatch for a coalition convoy in the area. On 29 December, coalition aircraft conducted shows of force and provided armed aerial overwatch for a coalition ground forces convoy receiving RPG and small arms fire in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

With that, there was something of a break and the New Year seems to have started relatively slowly. Not until 6 January were shows of force needed, but these required an A-10 and a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet. The slow start continued, but with more aggression on 15 January when several US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets destroyed Taleban bunkers and firing positions using GBU-38s. The strikes were conducted after coalition ground forces began receiving fire from those locations in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah.

With the tempo hotting up, on 18 January a coalition aircraft routed a group of Taleban personnel gathered near Lashkar Gah with a show of force. The jet also scouted a roadway in advance of a coalition convoy movement to ensure it was clear of enemy personnel or improvised explosive devices.

The 27 January saw a US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle (pictured) performed a show of force, expending flares, in order to discourage enemy attack on coalition soldiers.

Two days later, on 29 January saw some serious action near Lashkar Gah when a US Air Force B-1B Lancer and coalition aircraft dropped GBU-38s and Paveway munitions to counter enemy fire on coalition units. The aircraft tracked the enemy shooters through several firing positions in civilian settlements, providing shows of force along the way to cover friendly ground forces' manoeuvres. The aircraft finally released weapons once the enemy was positively identified and in a position where the blasts would no longer endanger civilians.

The next day, 30 January, has US Navy F/A-18A and -C Hornets, plus F/A-18F Super Hornets out in force, initiating shows of force near Lashkar Gah to prevent enemy forces from interfering with coalition troop movements in those areas.

The 2 February had a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet executing a show of force over a settlement near Lashkar Gah. Enemy forces had been targeting coalition soldiers there with RPG and automatic fire, but dispersed following the manoeuvre.

The next day, 3 February again saw serious action in the Lashkar Gah area. A US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet and a coalition aircraft used several kinds of precision munitions and rockets to target enemy gunmen barricaded in buildings. The aircraft used strike tactics that avoided damage to nearby buildings and even caused only minimal damage to the occupied structures. The airstrikes supported coalition units fighting building to building against the Taleban.

On 4 February , it was a coalition aircraft that flew a show of force, this time over a group of armed individuals suspected to be Taleban. The aircraft also performed tactical reconnaissance along a heavily travelled highway, discovering signs of improvised explosive devices.

Three days the elapsed when, on 7 February a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet performed a show of force to deter enemy actions near Lashkar Gah. In total, 68 close air support missions were flown that day.

The following day, 8 February, had near Lashkar Gah, a coalition aircraft employing a GBU-12 and a strafing pass, striking enemy snipers concealed in a building. The snipers had been firing at coalition soldiers when the aircraft's weapons halted their attack. A total of 74 close air support missions were flown that day.

The 12 February had a coalition aircraft fly a show of force in the area of Lashkar Gah in order to discourage enemy forces from launching indirect fire attacks from a position they had used in the past.

The 13 February saw a US Air Force F-15E strafing a Taleban position concealed in a tree line near Lashkar Gah. Enemy gunmen had been firing at coalition soldiers with assault weapons and rocket propelled grenades.

Then, for the third day running, "air" was in action, on 14 February, when a US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle and a Navy Hornet teamed up near Lashkar Gah to engage and destroy anti-Afghan fighting positions that had opened fire on a coalition ground unit with a disabled vehicle. Using a combination of GBU -38s and strafing attacks, the aircraft destroyed or warded off the enemy force. The Hornet performed a show of force following the engagement to deter further enemy activity.

After a day's break, on 16 February, during a coalition convoy operation a US Navy F/A-18C flew overhead and conducted a show of force along the convoy's travel route. On 18 February, in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah, a Navy Super Hornet engaged an enemy firing position using a GBU-12. The air strike occurred in response to a call for air support after Taleban forces opened fire on a coalition patrol.

The 20 February had A-10s and a coalition aircraft flying shows of force over Lashkar Gah as deterrence against enemy action while coalition units performed their missions and, on 21 February, a US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet conducted a strafing pass against enemy forces dug in behind a line of trees along a road near Lashkar Gah.

The Super Hornet had been flying overwatch for a coalition convoy when enemy gunfire erupted from the roadside. While the jet's cannons quickly ended the direct threat to the convoy, the aircraft followed up with a show of force and expended flares to deter a possible enemy counterattack.

The 22 February had a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet providing overwatch near Lashkar Gah, then using a GBU-12 to target an enemy indirect fire position launching attacks on coalition units. The strike successfully ended the attacks.

On 25 February, near Lashkar Gah, a coalition aircraft then flew a show of force to allow a coalition convoy to withdraw from an engagement there. Enemy troops in concealed bunkers had ambushed the coalition convoy with an improvised explosive device and automatic weapons, but broke off fighting as soon as aircraft arrived. The coalition jet then performed tactical reconnaissance overhead as coalition attack helicopters targeted the enemy from close up.

The next day, on 26 February , a coalition aircraft used a precision guided munition to destroy a Taleban compound near Lashkar Gah. The jet released weapons after coalition troops began taking fire from enemy fighting positions within. This was followed the next day, 27 February, by a US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper which engaged a group of enemy personnel with a Hellfire missile near Lashkar Gah. The UAV launched its strike in response to an enemy attack on coalition forces.

On 2 March, a US Navy F/A-18C Hornet and F/A-18F Super Hornet flew overwatch in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah. They performed shows of force and expended flares when the convoy they were protecting received small arms and RPG fire. The attack stopped abruptly upon the appearance of the jets. The convoy reached its destination without further incident.

Two days later, on 4 March, US Navy F/A-18C Hornets and Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles provided air support to a coalition raid on an enemy narcotics production compound near Lashkar Gah. When personnel inside the narcotics compound started shooting with machine guns and RPGs, the Hornets executed shows of force to suppress their fire as coalition soldiers pulled back. Once ground forces had reached a safe distance from the facility, the Strike Eagles destroyed the narcotics compound with a series of GBU-38 strikes.

A day after that, on 5 March, near Lashkar Gah, a coalition aircraft performed a show of force and expended flares to deter enemy activity over a local settlement. The aircraft was providing aerial overwatch for a coalition unit in the area.

On 6 March, aircraft flew shows of force to suppress enemy activity and on 7 March multiple US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets provided their firepower to a battle near Lashkar Gah. Using 20mm auto-cannon strafes and a GBU-38, the aircraft knocked out several hostile fighting positions and an enemy facility.

The following day, on 8 March, US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles flying aerial overwatch near Lashkar Gah strafed a group of enemy personnel who had set up an improvised explosive device along a roadway. The individuals were hiding in a tree line, apparently waiting for an approaching coalition convoy, but were detected before they could carry out an attack.

The 9 March had US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets dropping GBU-12s on an enemy firing position and an enemy compound near Lashkar Gah. Both strikes took place in response to enemy forces firing at coalition personnel with small arms.

On 13 March, a coalition aircraft responded to a dawn attack against a friendly patrol base near Lashkar Gah, releasing a GBU -12 on one of several Taleban positions firing into the base. The air strike combined with howitzer fire from coalition field artillery served to stop the enemy gunfire and relieve the base.

Then, on 14 March, the RAF was in action with a GR-9 Harrier performing route clearance, searching for IEDs over supply routes and highways in Helmand province. The aircraft also performed a show of force in the vicinity of Lashkar Gah to deter enemy action.

The 15 March saw F-15Es and a coalition aircraft performing shows of force to deter attacks near Lashkar Gah, after coalition ground forces detected signs of enemy presence. In total that day, 74 close air support missions were flown.

On 16 March, a flight of Strike Eagles flew shows of force near Lashkar Gah, deterring enemy forces as a convoy traversed the area. The jets also performed a route scan ahead of the convoy and provided armed overwatch.

The next day, 17 March, US Navy F/A-18F Super Hornets flew a show of force, expending flares, and then engaged using a GBU-12 near Lashkar Gah in response to enemy automatic weapons and mortar fire against a coalition convoy. The action targeted Taleban around an enemy supply compound. Coalition ground observers helped the strike land on target, passing coordinates for a direct hit using the precision munition.

On 20 March, a US Air Force MQ-1B Predator fired a Hellfire missile on an enemy compound near Lashkar Gah. Coalition ground forces were receiving enemy fire from within the compound.

And on 22 March a US Air Force B-1B Lancer used GBU-31 and -38 munitions to completely level a Taleban compound where enemy forces were holed up and firing away with machine guns and RPGs. The strike relieved a coalition ground unit a few hundred yards away, allowing them to continue on their mission.

Coalition ground controllers called in Navy F/A-18C Hornets and F/A-18E Super Hornets to hit a building where an enemy mortar team was hiding and firing rounds. The aircraft strafed and then dropped a GBU-38 and a GBU-12 on the building, destroying the mortar position.

F-15Es bombed and strafed an enemy force confronting coalition troops near Lashkar Gah. The aircraft targeted several groups of enemy fighters, including rifle, heavy machine gun, and RPG teams. The jets tracked and hit enemy personnel again as they unsuccessfully tried to escape into the mountains.

Two days later, on 24 March, a Super Hornet executed a show of force and expended flares near Lashkar Gah to prevent a pending Taleban attack after enemy gunmen had been spotted outside a coalition forward base. The aircraft's appearance provided a deterrent and prevented hostilities from developing further.

That day, in the district, an operation started. Afghan and coalition forces arrived at a compound militants had occupied for the night. The force immediately was engaged by Taleban from inside the compound. Several Taleban fled, while the force continued to receive small-arms fire from inside a building. The force cleared the building, killing three enemy.

One Taleban was barricaded in one of the buildings, using women and children as shields. The force used precision small-arms fire to kill the militant with no harm to the women or children.

The force pursued the Taleban who had fled the compound on foot. One was killed when he manoeuvred on the force. Four others engaged the force with a PKM machine gun and were killed. Two others armed with AK-47 assault rifles were killed after posing a serious threat to a nearby compound. One suspect was captured unharmed and detained.

It took four days before 28 March "air" was used again, this time with aircraft performing shows of force. The next day, 29 March had another RAF GR-9 Harrier in action, flying shows of force and expending flares to support a coalition ground patrol which was receiving RPG and small arms fire. The aircraft's manoeuvres kept the enemy pinned down while friendly forces overran the enemy position.

On 29 March, a local man on a bicycle was shot by ISAF forces after he failed to respond to warning signals while approaching a convoy. He was not in possession of any explosives.

The 2 April saw an Air Force F-15E executing a show of force expending flares in order to help a coalition unit break away from enemy gunfire. When the enemy's shooting continued after the fly-over, the F-15E strafed the hostile forces with its guns. An F/A-18E also flew a show of force, suppressing enemy fire from another enemy position.

On 3 April, a coalition aircraft and an A-10 executed shows of force near Lashkar Gah and Nangalam to prevent enemy activity in those locations. The aircraft supported coalition ground forces carrying out security and reconstruction efforts.

The 6 April had coalition and Air Force aircraft performing shows of force in Lashkar Gah to deter enemy actions. That day, 76 close air support missions were flown. The next day, 78 missions were flown, with 7 April a Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet flying a show of force over a group who appeared to be setting up an improvised explosive device. The manoeuvre prevented the individuals from succeeding while avoiding risk to nearby civilians.

The 8 April had a suicide bomber killing at least five people in an attack on an anti-drugs patrol. Police and civilians, at least one of them a child, were among those killed in the attack in Lashkar Gah. Nearly 20 others were hurt. The patrol was travelling north of Lashkar Gah in a convoy of six vehicles when it was attacked by a suicide bomber on foot. The attacker detonated explosives strapped to his body as he approached the convoy. One vehicle was completely destroyed, and four others were damaged.

On 9 April, in the mountains near Lashkar Gah, a Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet strafed enemy personnel shooting from a tree line. The enemy gunmen had opened fire on a coalition mounted patrol, prompting the aircraft to intervene. A second Super Hornet performed a show of force and expended flares to deter enemy reinforcements from moving into the fight.

On 10 April, the last day of 3 Commando Brigade deployment, a UK Royal Air Force GR-9 Harrier flew a show of force during an Explosive Ordinance Disposal operation near Lashkar Gah. The flyover deterred Taleban activity so that bomb squad technicians could remove an explosive threat without enemy interference. Nearby, a ground patrol called in a Coalition aircraft to fly several shows of force while the patrol was under attack.

Also, on that day, 15 insurgents were killed after opening fire on a U.S.-Afghan patrol. The coalition troops had returned fire, killing all 15 attackers with small-arms, heavy weapons and aviation weapon support.

Thus, by the conclusion of the 3 Commando Brigade deployment, in just one of the major population centres, of five – where there were supposed to have been no more "security incidents" than on the fingers of your hands - there were at least 69 which fitted that description, ranging from suspicious groups gathering, to attempted bomb laying, a major suicide bombing and full-blow gunfights, with aircraft strafing and bombing – plus an attempted take-over of the town by the Taleban.

During the Brigade's deployment, 32 men were killed. The Commanding Officer, Brigadier Messenger, said that is "something that will stay with me for the rest of my life."

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