The Browne statement

It all started here on 23 March when HMS Cornwall, known as the "ice-cream frigate" from its F99 pennant number, despatched a mixed Royal Navy and Royal Marine boarding party in two Rigid-hulled Inflatable Boats (RIBs), escorted by a Lynx helicopter. Its task was to inspect an Indian-registered freighter moored in the shallow waters of the Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG), not far from the mouth of the Shatt al Arab waterway, between 8 and 11 miles distant from the Cornwall. It was not to return.

Today, the first available opportunity for him to do so, the secretary of state for defence, Des Browne, made a statement to the House of Commons on the event, and the issues relating to it. If we were to believe the hype, largely whipped up by a Conservative Party opposition looking for political scalps, Browne's job was on the line, wholly dependent on his performance on the day. It was not to be.

"Let me be clear with the House, I made a mistake ... something I profoundly regret," said Browne.

Getting stuck in, he told the House that payments must not happen again. On the capture, the Governor General of Gibraltar, Major General Rob Fulton, Royal Marines - former Commmander of the Royal Marines - is to head an inquiry. It will take six weeks and will be presented to the Parliamentary Select Committee in full. Browne is also asking a small team to look at the media handling, led by an independent figure with wide media experience.

Fox responded, asking some operational questions but, as expected, spent most of his time asking about the media handling. But, he bottled out of asking for Browne's resignation. His position was "becoming untenable", was the best he could manage, suggesting but not demanding a resignation. This was to be Fox's "big moment" but it was empty rhetoric. Browne apologised but the opposition wanted more - it wanted the "S" word. They wanted it, they got it. Browne said he was "sorry". The Fox was shot.

Nick Narvey, for the Lib-Dems, formerly the "opportunist party" came in behind Browne, declaring that the central issue was why the boarding party had been captured - the statesman that Fox wasn't. That was the real issue, he said, not the payment for the stories.

Malcome Rifkind questioned the conduct of the captives and asked whether the Browne was taking action to discover whether the personnel had been given adequate training. Browne responded by stating that all but one of them had been given the appropriate training. But, the view of experts in interrogation was that the captives behaved "well within the appropriate bounds". There was no legitimate criticism to be made of these young people and the way they were opportunisticly exploited by the Iranians, said Browne.

Robert Key stated the real losers of this are the men and women of the Royal Navy, who are hanging their heads in shame. He wanted Browne to confirm whether the Second Sea Lord had tendered his resignation. The answer, which Browne used several times, was: this does not help my accountability to this House.

The view is that Browne has handled the statement well and the opposition have scarcely laid a glove on him. Appointing Fulton was a master-stroke, a man who commands immense respect. No one will be able to complain of a cover-up, and the commitment to give the full report to the Select Committee was precisely right. Parliament is seen to be at the helm.

The full statement is now up on the MoD website. There can be no complaints about the scope of the operational inquiry. It will cover all operational aspects, including risk and threat assessment, strategic and operational planning, tactical decisions, rules of engagement, training, equipment, and resources. On Wednesday, during prime minister's questions, Cameron has nowhere to go.

COMMENT THREAD

Unfit for government

Some of our more frequent American visitors must wonder whether they are intruding on private grief, as the thrust of the posts on the Iran hostages drama moves from operational aspects to narrow UK party political issues.

However should the politicians currently masquerading as Conservatives – the Party of Margaret Thatcher – actually achieve power in the next general election, it will be them upon whom the US will rely for its continuing support in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The Party that is making the political running over the hostages issue may, therefore, determine the shape of the future alliance.

Why that might concern both US and British citizens is that, as we get to know the Party as it is led by the Boy King, David Cameron, it looks increasingly to be wholly unfit for government – not that we had any doubts right from the start. "New Conservatives – New Nightmare", might be an appropriate slogan.

In this post, therefore, we offer another example of why the Conservatives are unfit – an apparently minor issue but one which is potent in its symbolism and profound in its implications.

The example itself appeared in yesterday's Mail on Sunday claiming that three former minesweepers, converted into patrol boats, were currently mothballed in Portsmouth Harbour. Had they been available in the Gulf, the paper claims, they could have prevented HMS Cornwall's boarding party from being abducted by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

If the story sounds familiar, that's because it is. We ran it on 3 April after it had been raised in a letter to The Daily Telegraph on the same day. So much for the MSM being on the ball.

The points made, however - in the letter and in the Mail article are spurious. There is no need for three, rather ancient patrol boats – which would need substantial upgrading before they were suitable for operations in the Gulf – when there were already 12 warships in the area, including two British minehunters and the Cyclone-class fast patrol boats.

What is particularly relevant here, though, is that the Mail article cited Tory shadow defence minister Dr Julian Lewis, in support of the point it was trying to make.

Now, Lewis could have said that shortage of patrol vessels was not an issue. Precisely the point we have made above, HMS Cornwall was part of a coalition task force, under the command of a British officer, and there had been – on the face of it – no shortage of vessels. They crucial question appears to be one of how they were (or were not) deployed.

Instead, Lewis used the opportunity to promote the party political line, saying: "The main problem is the massively reduced number of vessels in the fleet as a result of its dogma that numbers do not matter in the age of powerful ships. But numbers do matter, and Gordon Brown's defence cuts mean we do not have significant vessels for duties like this."

Lewis does have a point, of course. It is one which we rehearsed on this blog last June, commenting on information sent to us by a reader on a (then) recent conference. "It is all very well," we wrote

…having the hugely sophisticated and expensive Type 45s, geared to knocking advanced fighters and bombers out of the sky, or massively costly aircraft carriers to support the European Rapid Reaction Force, but much of the Navy's work is in low intensity tasks such MIOPS (maritime interdiction operations – i.e., challenge, board and search potential smugglers) or deterring piracy and other forms of maritime crime. For this, we are told, there is an urgent need for a number of fast, armed patrol vessels.

Those comments look rather prescient now, except that, in May 2005, the prestigious Naval Review published a paper (no link) in which the author deplored the lack of definition of the role for inshore patrol vessels (IPVs). And this was hardly surprising. Then, and now, there were no IPVs on the Royal Navy's inventory. The Jamaica Defence Force is better equipped than we are (the picture shows, ironically, the JDF inshore patrol vessel HMJS Cornwall).

But, while defence spokesman Liam Fox set out his thinking for the strategic role of the Royal Navy in June last year , this was not an issue he mentioned specifically (or at all) and we are not aware of Dr Julian Lewis having mentioned it before either. But the need is there. We cannot always rely on coalition forces.

Yet, the likelihood is that neither of them did because, to remedy a major gap in the Royal Navy's capability, would require a spending commitment – and that is the one thing that Boy Cameron's team is not allowed to do.

Thus we have the familiar Tory opportunism, but possibly ignorance as well – and either would be worrying. But if Lewis did not know the background to the operations in the Gulf, then he is not fit to be the opposition spokesman. And, if he is not fit for opposition, he is not fit for government. Nor is the defence team under the tutelage of Dr Fox, if it cannot commit itself to remedying capability shortfalls in the Royal Navy.

COMMENT THREAD

How could they do otherwise?

I do wish I was clever, like those Sunday Telegraph journalists, who can waft effortlessly through life, delivering their ex deus pronouncements with such easy authority that one can only fall to one's knees and thank the Almighty that such gifted people walk the Earth amongst us.

How else would we find out, other than from the mighty pens (or keyboards) of those giants of modern journalism, Sean Rayment and Patrick Hennessy, who have "revealed" that a catalogue of "inexcusable" errors in the office of the Defence Secretary led to the story-telling fiasco over the sailors taken hostage in Iran?

Faced with such penetrating insight, need one read a single word more to know, without one scintilla of doubt or expending one nanosecond of thought, where the guilt lies?

However, for us lesser mortals, who are slower on the uptake than the towering intellects of the Front Page, the Great Gods of the Leader Writing Department have descended from Upon High to deliver unto us their mighty judgement. "We do not need an inquiry," they intone,

…to establish whose fault it is that the hostages were allowed to sell their stories. The controlling doctrine of British ministerial office is that "officials advise, ministers decide". The duties of Mr Browne's office do not require him always to be right. They do require him to ensure he is able to make well-informed, reasonable choices given the information that is available. It is clear that Mr Browne failed to meet that elementary demand.

Thus does the Leader pronounce its verdict: "Mr Browne has no defence". He is guilty as charged, m'lud – tried in absentia and found wanting in the air-conditioned offices of The Sunday Telegraph. Resignation is the least he can do. If a firing squad on the quarterdeck of HMS Cornwall was an option, this too might have been demanded.

It is not enough, of course, that one small voice, in the form of Christopher Booker's column, might actually demur. Who is this right wing demagogue – cast in the unlikely role of defender of a Labour secretary of state (which just goes to show how unreliable he is)? Who is he to cast doubt upon the Judgement of the Great Leader Writer?

However, a defence of sorts also comes from a slightly more substantial source – in circulation terms at least – no less than The Sunday Times. Buried in its Focus piece – so deeply that it did not fully lodge on first reading - is an account that matches and thereby completely supports the Booker view, with added detail that puts the whole affair in context.

Written by Michael Smith (for whom we have no love) and Maurice Chittenden, it tells of how the Royal Navy, sidelined by the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, feeling unloved and unwanted, has been struggling to keep its place in the (taxpayer-funded) sun. Thus do Smith and Chittenden set the scene:

Fearing further decline, navy chiefs ordered a publicity drive centred around HMS Cornwall, a frigate sent to take over last month as flagship of Task Force 158, the allied flotilla protecting the Iraqi oil installations and territorial waters.

Television crews from Sky and the BBC were flown on board the ship to film the crew at work monitoring the northern Gulf; Cornwall was to be the front-page story in Navy News, the navy's in-house journal. But from the start the publicity drive went awry.

Cornwall, known as "the ice-cream frigate" because of its designation F99, travelled to the Gulf via Barcelona, Malta and Croatia. Along the way the crew engaged in a series of sporting events with local teams; they lost every match (shown above is a "happy snap" of the hockey team in Valetta and below is some of the crew having a jolly time in a boat race with locals in Vela Luka).

The holiday atmosphere seems to have continued when Cornwall arrived in the Gulf, amid suspicions that the crew were also distracted by the presence of the television cameras.

Despite the rants of armchair admirals, many senior figures accept that the poorly armed patrol had little choice but to surrender when it was surrounded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards while checking a ship in Iraqi waters.

However, there is fury that their only real protection, a Lynx helicopter with a heavy machinegun, was pulled off apparently without consulting or even informing them.

And there is bewilderment at the complete failure of Cornwall, with its sophisticated radar and signals intelligence equipment, to detect the Iranian vessels operating in the Iraqi territorial waters that the ship was supposed to protect.

With that, we come to the beef:

As questions mounted over the operational failings after the 15 sailors and marines were captured, the navy frantically cast around for some way of retrieving the situation….

Lieutenant Colonel Andy Price, head of the navy's media operations … began drafting a strategy for the return of the sailors and marines… His hope … was to deflect attention away from the failings of Cornwall's operation and to concentrate instead on the treatment of the captives by the Iranians.

Price and the media centre advised that the captives give a press conference and interviews where they talked only about their arrest and subsequent treatment.

Like it or not – and the Tory Tribe will hate it (see the comments) – here is corroboration of the very thesis expounded in the Booker column and on the blog, that the Navy mounted an elaborate media operation to divert attention from the operational failings of HMS Cornwall and, although he is not named, Commodore Nick Lambert.

Furthermore, what begins to be clearer from this account is something that has been puzzling us for some time – the apparent involvement of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Jonathon Band. In the ordinary course of events, one might expect that, when a mere Commodore had fouled up (hardly a unique event in the history of the Royal Navy), the head of the Navy would simply throw him to the wolves (aka a Board of Inquiry) and distance himself from the events.

In this case, however, we have remarked earlier that Lambert, in focusing on his PR efforts, might have taken his eye off the ball when it came to controlling the operations of Coalition Task Force 158, and might even have ordered the fateful boarding operation specifically as a media opportunity. If, in so doing, he was acting directly or indirectly under the orders or directions of the Admiralty, then the buck does not stop with Lambert. It goes much higher – hence the nervousness of Band.

We now turn to the main charge of the God-like duo in the The Sunday Telegraph, that Des Browne went "Awol" at the crucial time when publication of the marines’ and sailors’ accounts were being considered. Rayment and Hennessy have it that Browne "was out of touch with his advisers and most senior aides for almost 24 hours as naval chiefs drew up plans".

At best, that is an unsubstantiated charge (where is the evidence - where is the quote from either the advisors and aides, or Browne himself, admitting it?). But, in the broader scheme of things, frankly, this is laughable. In modern government, with wall-to-wall communications, is it actually conceivable that a secretary of state for one of the "hot seat" departments would actually be out of touch with key personnel for so long - or at all?

Then, we are told, the details of the Navy's "controversial plans" were emailed to dozens of computers within the MoD but remained unread overnight. It was only the next day, Friday April 6, that they were finally seen by or read to Mr Browne and up to 30 of his officials.

Therein lies an important clue – the plans were emailed to "dozens of computers…". Were they specifically sent to the secretary of state's official e-mail address, for his personal (and immediate) attention or was this a generic e-mailing of which hundreds flow through ministerial offices each day?

In fact, anyone who has been in this game knows the score here. If you want to do something and have to notify your superiors – who you think might intervene – you send them details, nominally, but you make no efforts to ensure that they actually get to see them in time. Such is the classic ploy of, say, an Army headquarters, where a message will be sent to higher command, but the despatch rider is instructed to take the long way round – and have a puncture on the way.

Any one of us who might send an e-mail conveying important detail which needs to be acted upon urgently would, in the normal course of things, telephone the recipients to warn them of its despatch, and to flag it up for attention.

Such a procedure certainly applies in the civil service and, especially in relation to ministerial communications. I know this to be true – I have used the system myself when I have had need to communicate urgently with ministers. One is given an unlisted telephone number and instructions to call when anything urgent is sent. Usually, you are asked what it is and why it is so urgent and, if it truly is urgent, it can be in front of the minister within minutes. By the same token, has anyone recently tried sending an e-mail to an MSM journalist in the expectation of an immediate response?

Here, thus, the game has been updated. You send your missive to a generic e-mail account that you know will not be constantly monitored, and tell no one you have sent it. When the brown stuff hits the fan, you can claim that, "the minister was informed".

Now, finally – albeit briefly – to the doctrine so easily enunciated by the Great Leader Writer, that "officials advise, ministers decide".

There is a slight problem here, a thing called the Rule of Law. Ministers and government officials may not make arbitrary decisions. They must work within the framework of law, as approved by Parliament. Further, they may only exercise powers specifically granted to them and they may not interfere (unless the law specifically provides for it) with decisions properly taken by officials who are acting within the powers conferred on them.

The law, in this case, is Queen's Regulations, by which the secretary of state is as much bound as are any of his military officials. This is precisely the limitations of power to which I was alluding in my previous piece. In the context, the operative rules are set out in Annex A(J) to Chapter 12 and J12.022, headed: "Payments for Broadcasting, Lecturing or Writing for Publication." I quote that Article in full:

Broadcasts by serving personnel acting as official spokesmen and speeches and lectures on official subjects will normally be undertaken as part of their official duty and, as such, covered by their Service pay; no question of extra payment to individuals will therefore arise. If, however, all or part of the preparatory work and delivery of the broadcast, speech or lecture is done during the individual's off duty time he may retain the whole or part of any fees payable, as appropriate. This provision also governs the retention of any fees payable for the writing of books or articles on official matters or involving material or experience. Details of any payments should be sent to the appropriate Public Relations or Publication Clearance authority (see Annex A to this Chapter) to consider what proportion should be credited to public funds.

Clearly, this Regulation did not foresee the media scrum over the "cash for stories" but it is on that slender rule that the Navy had to rely. A fair reading might indicate that, once the fifteen had been given permission to speak to the media, they were actually entitled to payment, provided the delivery was done in their own time. It would seem that no one had the power to prevent them from being paid – not the Navy and, especially, not the secretary of state.

One can thus see immediately how us mere mortals got it so wrong. Lacking the innate wisdom and knowledge of the Chosen Ones, we had to rely on boring little details like the Regulations. But such things do not matter when you are a Leader Writer for The Sunday Telegraph. Imbued with their Greater Wisdom, they "hope" the Great Leader on Earth, the Boy Cameron himself, will call for and procure Des Browne's removal from his post. They also hope Labour MPs will "put politics aside and do what is best for Britain".

With such hopes delivered from on high, from such an authoritative source, how could they do otherwise but comply?

COMMENT THREAD

The cult of personality

In 1994, Christopher Booker and I wrote a book called "The Mad Officials", sadly out of print now – although copies are still available. In it, we did a virtual tour of Great Britain, telling stories of mad regulations and the even madder officials who enforced them (and sometimes invented them).

One of our themes, to which we have returned many times – not least on this blog - is how this country in many ways is no longer run by the politicians we elected to do the job, but by a growing band of those "mad officials", who were both unaccountable and unresponsive to the normal strictures of a democratic society. They were, so often, a law unto themselves.

Very much later, I had cause to meet a Minister to complain, on behalf of the trade group I represented, about a regulatory "reign of terror" which was effectively destroying an industry. She was flanked by civil servants and, as I spelled out the tale of woe, giving more and more examples of the damage that was being caused by "her" officials, my narrative was punctuated by her exclamations as she turned to civil servants, demanding: "Why wasn't I told that?"

I saw then a sense of shock, outrage even, from a person who – shorn of ministerial rank and trappings – was a genuine, caring individual, deeply concerned about what she had been told. Nothing happened of course and, for me, the meeting simply reaffirmed that which I knew already - so well portrayed in Yes Minister - the essential powerlessness of ministers in the administration of their departments.

Elsewhere on this blog, I recall telling the tale of my meeting another minister, this one a senior cabinet minister who, standing in his grand office, overlooking Horse Guards, likened his position with that of a signalman in an old-fashioned signal box, lined with all the gleaming brass levers. "I have all these levers," he lamented, "the levers of power". Turning to me he then said, rather sadly, "the trouble is that they are not connected to anything."

It is that background, the baggage I carry, which brought me the position we find ourselves today. To the frustration and anger of many of our readers and at odds with almost all the media and other commentators, we are refusing to dump all the blame for the Iran hostages debacle – not even the "cash for stories" issue – on the secretary of state for defence, especially on the basis of media speculation and largely anonymous sources.

Having learned the hard way the limits of power, I am not inclined to take the easy way out, especially in the context of the Ministry of Defence, where the military hierarchy and their bureaucrats have an extraordinary degree of autonomy. In many areas, they are beyond the reach of the secretary of state - any secretary of state.

As before, we have pointed this out and people nod wisely, as if they understood. But, at the first opportunity, they join in the hue and cry for the sacking of a minister, heedless of the possibility that, perhaps, he had little power to control events for which he is being held responsible. This is the cult of personality gone mad.

Thus we see the momentum build, with selective leaks to the media from an organisation which would make a colander look positively seaworthy, to be grabbed uncritically by all and sundry.

Such is the naïvety that people, who tell us gravely that they never believe anything they are told in the newspapers, lap up the often unsubstantiated detail, treating it as gospel. Anything offered which runs contrary to the narrative, of course, is dismissed as "spin" – as if it was only politicians who indulged in the practice.

However, sacking the secretary of state is the easy option. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly the one preferred by the guilty officials, many of them in uniform, who could then rest easy as blood lust will have been sated.

Rather, we want to see an inquiry (or inquiries) starting at the bottom of the food chain and working steadily upwards, covering all the issues which, by now, have been almost completely marginalised by the soap opera. Rarely has such a torrent of extraneous detail obscured such a vital issue as the operational efficiency of the Royal Navy, the actual reasons why the Cornwall's boarding team were left so vulnerable barely mentioned in passing.

We do not want the "closure" that a high profile resignation would bring. We want a process which will identify all those responsible for the operational failures, who would otherwise hide behind the smokescreen of a ministerial resignation.


It is about the original smokescreen that my colleague Christopher Booker writes in his column today (copied above – click to enlarge to readable size) where he sets out the details as best we have been able to establish of the extraordinary smokescreen put up by the Royal Navy in an attempt to conceal the incompetence of some of its officers.

For us, this is something of a defining moment. We could go with some of our readers, and join in the baying for blood, or we could stand by our principles, holding out for a process that will bring the guilty men to book – and thereby risk losing some of our readers.

Frankly, our principles are more important. We are not going to bow to people who cannot get to grips with the realities of power – and its limitations – and cannot cope with the fact that ministers are not the all-seeing, all powerful entities of myth. And we are certainly not going to fall in with an agenda set by the MSM and opportunist politicians who are more interested in adding a ministerial "scalp" to their belts than finding out (or even reporting) the truth. If nothing else, the events of the last few days demonstrate that they are not in the least bit interested in discovering why the Iranians (remember them?) were able to abduct our sailors and marines so easily.

Ours then is the battle with the "mad officials" – in and out of uniform – who let that happen. For once, there is an opportunity to bring some of them to account and repair some of the damage they have caused. The hunt for the ministerial "scalp" is a distraction, mere bread and circuses compared with the vital issue of improving the fighting efficiency of the Royal Navy. For the rest, let the responsibility lie where it falls, when we have sorted out that vastly more important detail.

COMMENT THREAD

Some quiet pride

While far too much time and attention is being devoted to a rather inadequate part of the Royal Navy – and its attempts to cover up its own incompetence – we can all share some quiet pride in the way the Army is now acquitting itself in Basra.

This is not just the robust action taken last week, when up to 30 Shi'te gunmen were killed, for no losses of our own. Today, according to Reuters, British forces again killed some gunmen, eight this time, who had been found laying IEDs, close to where the four British service personnel had been murdered earlier this month.

The report retails that British forces in southern Iraq are "pursuing a more aggressive policy towards Shi'ite militias", to which we can only say, about time too.

For too long now, it has looked as if British Forces were a soft touch. Now, unlike the pansy tendency in the Navy, it looks as though the Army has decided that a group hug is not the answer and the way to deal with terrorists is to kill them.

The more aggressive stance has come just in time. I was truly shocked to read in Michael Yon's report on British troops in Basra that, days after the four had been murdered, a Challenger tank had been destroyed by an explosion that also cost the driver his legs.

This, some experts warned would happen if we started introducing heavier armoured vehicles into theatre – put as an argument for keeping "Snatch" Land Rovers in place. The terrorists would simply build bigger bombs. But, as was pointed out, this is not a zero sum game. Bigger means fewer, they are more difficult to transport, they take longer to place and the bombers are thus at greater risk of detection.

Without knowing any details of today's gun battle, there is a possibility that these factors came into play.

It remains to be seen whether the MSM actually report this incident, but we do hope so. That the Army, at least, can still do its job, is something that should be widely known. I am all in favour of "quiet pride" – that is the British way. But it should not be so quiet that no one hears.

COMMENT THREAD

Fools rush in

Desperate to force the resignation of the defence secretary over the Iran hostages, Conservative politicians are now making spurious claims about his involvement in the "cash for stories" debacle. The political treatment of an issue vitally important to the Armed Forces and the nation has, thereby, been turned into high farce.

In what is clearly an orchestrated initiative, they have regaled both The Times and The Daily Telegraph with a wild charge that the secretary, Des Browne, has breached military regulations (known in this country as Queen's Regulations). These, they claim, required him to make the decision to allow the hostages to publish their story, on which basis, he is committing two unpardonable sins – giving "misleading information" and wrongly blaming the Navy for the decision.

In The Times, Browne is thus "accused of breaching Navy rules" and, from The Telegraph we learn that, "New evidence piles pressure on Browne". That paper tells us:

Des Browne suffered a severe setback in his battle to survive as Defence Secretary as it emerged that he - and not the Navy - should have taken the final decision on whether freed British hostages could sell their stories to the press.

Clear evidence that Mr Browne should have either actively approved or blocked the sale of stories is contained in the Navy's official rule book, the Queen's Regulations for the Navy, which the Ministry of Defence has been at pains all week to keep secret.

The revelation severely undermines Mr Browne's attempts over the last five days to deflect the ultimate blame for the "cash for stories" fiasco away from the MoD and onto the Navy.

Now, what is spectacularly evident is the thinness of the "evidence". The heart of that story is a quotation from the regulations which relate to obtaining permission to speak to the media. According to the paper, the relevant part reads:

Normally permission to express views on politically controversial issues will be refused. For any exception to this rule the Director of Information Strategy and News (at the Ministry of Defence) will seek the prior approval of the Secretary of State for Defence.

This is the authority the Tories cite to support their claim that Browne should have approved the decision to allow publication. And, in "unearthing the document", they have intensified the pressure on Mr Browne. Says Liam Fox (pictured): "It's very clear that the Royal Navy's own rules show that the ultimate decision is a Ministerial one."

Turning to The Times, we see a slightly different account. This time, Browne appears to be in breach of the regulations because he should have given explicit approval to the Navy's decision to let the hostages speak on controversial issues, rather than "note" it.

Again though, we get the quotation of the regulations, with the supposedly damning sentence that "permission to express views on politically controversial issues will be refused", and the caveat that the news director at the ministry "will seek the prior approval" of the defence secretary for any exception to this rule.

And so to the beef. Astute readers will note that the full text of the regulation includes the phrasing "...to express views on politically controversial issues". But, as we are all fully aware to the point of nausea, the hostages who did speak did not "express views". They simply gave an account of their experiences.

By any normal construction of the English language, to tell a personal story is wholly different from "expressing views" on an issue. The hostages' actions do not fall within the scope of the regulation cited.

Further, had Browne really breached his own department's regulations, the Navy's Second Sea Lord, Admiral Johns, would also have to be in the wrong. He says he made the crucial decision. On top of that, the MoD officials who briefed the secretary of state would also have been wrong. Failing to understand their own regulations, they must have given him the wrong information.

Any which way you cut it, Liam Fox's arguments are wholly spurious.

So obvious is this that one can scarcely credit the fact that two major newspapers have actually taken the trouble to print the story. And in each case senior political correspondents have added their by-lines. Such is their meat and drink.

Given the nature of the story though – and the importance of the main issue - is it any wonder that we hold so many politicians and journalists in utter contempt? More especially though, the Tories have nailed their colours to the wrong mast and are making complete fools of themselves.

COMMENT THREAD

Glory on the cheap?

As the Iran hostages saga progresses, the very worst of British politics is coming to the surface. It has descended into a party political squabble, with the main Conservative opposition party trying to extract sectional advantage, largely ignoring the serious operational issues in favour of trying to pin as much blame as possible on the political head of the Armed Forces.

However, it remains the case that, at the heart of this issue were serious operational failings, the responsibility for which must reside with Royal Navy commanders. And, at the heart of these lie failures in command and control, with the man in the frame being Commodore Nick Lambert, commander of Coalition Task Force 158.

Failure though, is rarely one-dimensional and, behind most headline events (such as the abduction of the personnel from HMS Cornwall) lie a complex chain of interlinked events and circumstances – some apparently unrelated to the proximate cause - which, collectively, gave rise to that event. In my studies of complex failures elsewhere, I came to call this the "event cascade", a term I have not seen used in other studies.

Some of those events have been raised on this blog, and in our forum where some of our more knowledgeable commentators have made interesting points, and raised important questions. Other points have, of course, been made elsewhere.

Some of these bring to light issues which have been touched upon earlier but have not been fully explored and may help to explain (if not excuse) some of the more egregious command failures.

Looking first at a few of those issues, questions have been raised about the Lynx helicopter – and the fact that only one was boarded when a Type 22 frigate can carry two - about the apparent communications difficulties between HMS Cornwall and the boarding party and, right up front, why Commodore Lambert seems to have taken his eye off the ball.

Oddly enough, all those disparate issues may be linked, and in an unexpected way – resting with the single fact that HMS Cornwall, in addition to being an active part of the Coalition Task Force, was also providing the "command platform" for Lambert as task force commander. It had, therefore, a dual role.

Now, as we know, batch III Type 22 frigates – of which HMS Cornwall is an example - are equipped to carry out flagship duties, being fitted with "excellent command and control and communication facilities".

However, there are flagship duties and flagship duties. Commanding a multinational task force, which is itself part of a larger multinational maritime effort, is in the upper end of the spectrum of capability requirements. In addition to the major communication load, there is a substantial staff needed to fulfil the range of duties – the US Navy had 50 of their own staff, plus the liaison officers, etc. – which may well have imposed an excessive burden on a mere frigate, which was also tasked with operational duties.

Certainly, when it came to providing the command function – in the absence of a capital ship (such as an aircraft carrier) in the northern Gulf, the United States Navy chartered a capacious sea-going barge called Ocean 6 (pictured). This was designated as an "Afloat Forward Staging Base" and features all the information and coordination capabilities of a coalition warship's Combat Information Centre. It also had berthing areas to house expeditionary forces, a galley to rival many warships and even a helicopter landing pad.

Additionally, says the US Navy (link above), "the barge will meet the quality of life goals of the Navy by providing Sailors and Marines serving arduous security assignments on the oil platforms in the NAG, wireless internet, flat screen televisions and crew lounges."

When it came to the British take-over of command on 7 March, however, the functions were moved to HMS Cornwall. As best, accommodation must have been cramped and facilities fully stretched. This may explain why a second helicopter was not carried – much of the hanger space would have been devoted to dealing with the overspill from the command function. It could also explain why the helicopter was pulled back from the "overwatch" for the boarding team – it was needed for task force duties.

The question must arise, therefore, as to whether HMS Cornwall was suitable for such an exacting task – in addition to carrying out her operational duties. And this may put a different perspective on the apparent failures of Commodore Lambert. Was he - and his staff - simply being asked to do too much with inadequate facilities?

If this is an issue, it would bring a new and highly political dimension to the Iran hostages drama. It might suggest that the Labour government, anxious for the prestige that command of the Coalition Task Force would bring, allowed (or even required) the Royal Navy to take on the role, without providing the necessary facilities – glory on the cheap once again, some might say. On the other hand, did the Admiralty take on more than it could chew, without informing its political masters of the possible consequences?

COMMENT THREAD

The faces of Britain

The picture shows two servicemen, of similar age, both having been stationed in Iraq. The soldier, photographed by Michael Yon* - unnamed and unrewarded by the media – is still there and actively engaged in operations. He, unlike his Navy contemporary, Arthur Batchelor – who blubbed because the nasty Iranians stole his Ipod - we would like to think is the representative face of the British military.

The soldier pictured had recently taken part in a vicious gunfight in Basra, and the strain shows on his face. And not for him is there mummy and auntie to hold his hands.

The action is one on which we reported briefly and which has been clothed with more detail by Thomas Harding of The Daily Telegraph, based in part on MoD reports.

But what brings the account to life is the superb report by Michael Yon who is entirely open in his admiration for the skill and professionalism of the soldiers engaged in the action. There would be no better way of returning the compliment than going to his site and reading the graphic narrative in full.

At a different level, Yon also conveys the constant indirect fire harassment of the soldiers at their base in the Basra Palace complex, something about which we have written many times. Another issue is the absence of helicopter support (although fixed wing surveillance would have been just as useful), which again we have written on many times.

Clearly, neither of these issues have been resolved and, if there was to be criticism of the MoD, it is there that the attack should lie. Better that than the unremitting scattergun approach that relies on the constant, tedious repetition of the sacred mantras "overstretch" and "underfunding".

For instance, in terms of airborne surveillance – the lack of which Yon points out - whatever happened to the Britten Norman Defenders which were purchased for Basra and would be admirable for the purpose? Despite extensive enquiries, no one to whom I have spoken - who has been to Basra recently - has seen them.

The more immediate issue, however, is the damage to the reputation of Britain and the Armed Forces, arising from the abduction of the "frightened fifteen" and their subsequent behaviour. It becomes imperative that the issues surrounding that incident should be given the most thorough examination. This time, there should also be a clear commitment to addressing the defects revealed, at all levels.

From the extensive investigations we have conducted, and reported in this blog, we are convinced that the heart of the problem lies with serious operational failures on the part of serving, senior naval officers, going to the very top of the Navy.

For the rest, we are seeing a media frenzy, powered by journalists about whom in the past we have complained so bitterly, for their lack of understanding of things military and for their constant trivialising of serious issues. They are no different now. They will find no end of inconsistencies in accounts we have heard, and blather in their self-important ways about their little discoveries, but what they are producing is meaningless fluff.

Buoyed by self-serving politicians, they are striving to extract political embarrassment, for no other reason than to promote their own idle interests. However much they may wrap themselves in Union Jacks, or parade the coffins of dead servicemen, they are not acting in the national interest and they are no friends of the military.

On Monday, we will see the Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne, stand up in Parliament and give account of himself and his actions. He is not a brilliant Parliamentary performer by any means but, despite the air of sleaze and corruption that surrounds this present administration, we believe he is an honourable man, trying to do his best in an extremely difficult situation.

We ourselves have attracted no end of vitriol for expressing that view but we – both of us – stand by it. The man should be given a hearing and if, as we confidently expect, there are announced on Monday one or more inquiries, they should be allowed to conduct their work and deliver their reports, so that urgent remedial action can be put in place. Then will be the time to dissect the detail and apportion blame, where it is due.

That is the imperative. That we owe to the unnamed solider, pictured at the top of this post, him and the many brave, dedicated service personnel, who deserve a better deal than they are getting from the media and opposition politicians. With the reputations of the Armed Forces and the nation at stake – on which lives depend - this is no time for partisan sniping or self-serving bickering.

* used with permission. Thank you.

COMMENT THREAD

One would have expected a little better…

The extraordinarily inept intervention by William Hague, shadow foreign secretary, on this morning's BBC Radio 4's Today programme, almost beggars description. So off the wall was it that one was tempted to ignore it as the posturings of an ignorant fool, evident as such to any sensible person who listened to it. However, such is the "Blair derangement syndrome", and the desperation of the Tory Tribe to see Blair as the fount of all evil, that it is being taken seriously in some quarters. Hague's irresponsiblity, therefore, cannot be allowed to stand unchallenged.

In his interview, what Hague was very clearly seeking to do was to make political capital out of the Iran Hostage affair. There is no political mileage in rooting out the operational failures by the Royal Navy - at the heart of the crisis - so he is instead focusing on the secondary issue of the publication of the hostages' stories, part we believe, of the smokescreen laid down by the Navy to obscure its own inadequacies (and to divert blame).

His tactic is to insinuate that No. 10 Downing Street (and thereby the prime minister) was in the loop, in the making of the decision to allow publication, the inference being that this was all some part of a greater conspiracy, the nature of which has yet to be defined. The plan is to make mud stick.

In pursuit of that, said Hague, "The accounts given in the last couple of days by Des Browne and by the Prime Minister are carefully chosen words which do leave the impression that you haven't really got the full picture." He added: "In a very centralised administration where Number 10 are routinely consulted by all government departments, it seems very odd that the Prime Minister read of this in the Sunday newspapers, they say, when David Cameron (the Conservative leader) and I and Liam Fox (the shadow defence secretary) all knew about this on Saturday."

The facts, though – and even a very basic knowledge if how government works – tell a very different story.

As it stands, it is a wholly undisputed fact that the decision to allow publication was made by the Second Sea Lord, Admiral Johns. Furthermore, it was made in the context of his interpreting Queens Regulations and, as such, was within his power to make.

In the context, this was not a civil servant, proposing a course of action, with the decision made nominally by the Secretary of State. The decision was made by a senior naval officer. It needed no endorsement or further approval. Thus, as is entirely normal in these situations, the Secretary of State was notified but he was not required to endorse the action - simply to "take note".

For the decision not to have been put into effect, the Secretary of State would have had, actively, to have countermanded it. Yet this was a decision by a senior naval officer - which incidentally had the approval of the First Sea Lord. That, is something any Secretary of State would do only reluctantly, with a great deal of thought and discussion. It is not surprising, therefore, that he took the weekend to do it. To do otherwise would have opened him to the charge of eroding the independence of the military.

Now, given that the decision to allow publication was a naval, rather than a political decision, there was no reason why Downing Street should have been involved, or even informed. In fact, there was every reason why it should not have been. There would be the most enormous row if military decisions, made by ranking officers, had routinely to be referred to Downing Street for approval.

Referrals are normally only made if a decision has been flagged as "politically sensitive". But there, the route is via the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Jock Stirrup. He is the link between the Secretary of State and the Armed Forces. He also has a direct line into Downing Street. It would have been his job to alert the secretary of state on the issue, and through him the prime minister, if needed. But, as we know, Stirrup was not consulted.

If Downing Street had intervened, it would have been via and in consultation with Stirrup and the Secretary of State. The Military do not take orders from "Downing Street" and the Chief of the Defence Staff can see off interference by invoking his right of direct access to the prime minister in person – even over the head of the secretary of state. This is a privilege which is jealously guarded and remains to this day.

It is thus very far from unbelievable, therefore, that prime minister Blair would have been unaware of a decision made by a Second Sea Lord. Ordinarily, he is not told of such decisions and would not be expected to be aware of them. Only if they had been flagged up first by Stirrup and then the Secretary of State would it have become a "political" rather than an operational matter, and brought formally to his attention.

Hague's intervention, therefore, is simply ignorant, political posturing. He clearly does not have the faintest idea of how the chain of command works in the military, how the MoD itself works - which is very different from other departments of state - or how decisions are made.

As such, therefore, he has no credibility. His speculation is of no significance, other than to show him up as a rather stupid little man, who is doing more harm than good.

His action, however, is beginning to typify the Conservative approach to this affair. Instead of concentrating on the main issue – why the Cornwall's boarding party was left so vulnerable, it is trying to make mischief for party political gain.

Unsurprisingly, it is being supported by The Daily Telegraph in this mischief, but the Daily Mail is also buying in to the attack on the secretary of state, with its graphic headline today. However, it should be noted that, when it came to the publication of Leading Seaman Turney's story, it offered a fee of £20,000 above anything any other bidder paid. Turney, however, turned it down. And, as we know, hell hath no fury like a newspaper scorned.

That a tabloid newspaper should act in such a fashion is hardly a surprise. But one would have expected a little better from Her Majesty's Opposition. There is too much at stake here for the Conservatives to indulge themselves in party politics. They are adding to an already thick smokescreen, hampering rather than assisting in the search for the truth.

COMMENT THREAD

Now he's asking

They get (nearly) there in the end … or some of them do.

Nick Robinson, BBC political editor, offered these words on the Today programme, this morning:

The issue … is did they (the government) fail to see the controversy over payments or did they regard the controversy as a price worth paying in order to get those stories told in that way, as against what might have been the alternative … which is very heavy scrutiny of why these soldiers (sic) were taken prisoner when they were and whether that could have been prevented.

Inevitably though, caught in the Westminster "bubble" as he is, Robinson is thinking in terms of "the government" – i.e., ministers. But why would ministers want to avoid scrutiny of the events which led to the capture of the sailors and marines? These are operational issues and the primary responsibility rested with operational commanders in the field.

The one thing on which ministers could be tasked is on the vexed question of rules of engagement, but even then it is up to the military to make ministers aware of whether they are appropriate, or put service personnel unnecessarily at risk.

If it could be shown that representations had been made to ministers, and they had been over-ruled, then there would be something for ministers to cover-up, but then it would be in the interests of the Navy to make sure that that little gem emerged. So far, though, it is the Navy which has set its face against a formal Board of Inquiry.

So who is really covering up and why?

COMMENT THREAD

A failed attempt

This morning, we saw a cynical attempt by the Conservative Party to extract party political capital from the Iran hostage situation. Fronted by the increasingly lacklustre Tory defence spokesman Dr Liam Fox, the attack started on the Tory Party website, and went from there.

Silent on the substantive issues, the website homed in on the "soap opera" of the "government incompetence over returned hostages", pointing the finger of blame at government ministers, following the "appalling" decision to allow the Britons held hostage in Iran to sell their stories to the media.

The bleating was picked up by the BBC although even it could not cope with the limited focus of the Tory "attack". It led its piece with the news that Fox was calling for an inquiry into the circumstances of the hostages' capture. But the thrust of the report was nevertheless on the "cash for stories" issue, with a demand that defence secretary should give "details of who was involved in the decision" and when.

The report had Fox squawking about "complete ministerial incompetence", charging that "New Labour's obsession with news management trumped issues of dignity, professionalism and discipline."

This was backed up by a turgid editorial in The Daily Torygraph which could have come straight out of the Janet and John book on Tory defence policy. It too homed in on the "fiasco following the release of the service personnel captured by Iran", asserting that "the sailors and marines were … enlisted as part of a despicable spin operation" by the government.

Pointing to where the Tory attack would lie, it then declared that, when Parliament returned next Monday, "Mr Browne had better go to the Commons and give a full and honest account of what led him to sanction the selling of the captives' stories to the media."

The Dail Mail also fell into line, with a ridiculous commentary, citing that great political commentator, General Sir Michael Rose (now fortunately retired). Sir Michael, who provokes derision even in his own former Service, also had it that the decision to allow the captives to sell their stories was "part of a crude government spin operation".

By lunch time, however, the attack was contained. On the BBC Radio 4's World at One programme, Browne was on the air, accepting "full responsibility" for the decision. It had, he said, been made originally by the Navy on Thursday, when the hostages had been released and endorsed by him on the Friday, following a briefing by an MoD official. Browne's full statement is here.

The secretary of state was followed by Labour MP David Crausby, a member of the defence select committee, who affirmed that it was "pretty clear" that it was a decision taken by the Navy. He had questions on whether Browne should have vetoed the Navy but, he said, the central question was whether the marines and sailors should have been captured in the first place. The controversy over the payments "should not allow this to overshadow this", he declared.

Interestingly, Lib-Dem spokesman Michael Moore agreed with this line. A lot of questions remain, he said, but the payments issue was "a major distraction". It was "in danger of distracting us from how on earth we got into this situation in the first place."

That left Liam Fox with nowhere to go. Even the BBC interviewer, Sean Ley, was by then looking at the bigger picture, pointing up the tension "between military independence and political decision-making".

In a later interview, though, the Boy Cameron still tried to pander to the tendency which prefers to see its politics in soap opera terms. Asking for the "equivalent" of a Board of Inquiry on the wider issues, he then went on quickly to the payments issue. The government's "cheap and tatty" focus on short term headlines could cause long-term damage to the armed forces, he said, desperately trying to up the ante by declaring that "the buck stopped with the prime minister". Tory Diary has the full statement.

Browne, however, had already shot his Fox. He was waiting for reports on the wider question of the hostages' capture and would make a statement on Monday to Parliament.

Then, this blog trusts, we will begin to deal with the substantive issues and, if the Tories want to bleat from the margins, they will consign themselves to irrelevance. Perhaps, in the manner of the "frightened fifteen", they should book a group hug and then get out of the way, to let the grown-ups get on with it.

COMMENT THREAD

The Anglosphere helps out

Putting European nations to shame which, with the exception of Poland have refused to provide any more troops for combat in Afghanistan, Australia has stepped up to the plate with an announcement from prime minister, John Howard, that Australian troop numbers are to be doubled, bringing the total to about 1,000.

The troops will be sent to the volatile Oruzgan province in the south of the country, their task to enhance the area's security and disrupt Taliban command and supply routes.

Interestingly, according to another report, the force includes 300 special forces troops, returning for a second tour, and Australia will also send air force radar crews to Kandahar, plus extra logistics and intelligence officers. It will also extend the deployment of a team providing protection and security.

Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, the Australian Defence Force Commander, said the special forces would hunt Taliban commanders. "Essentially their operations will be targeted on the Taliban, disrupting Taliban operations and going after the Taliban leadership," he said.

In his press conference at which the announcement was made, Howard aimed a none too subtle dig at his European allies, "We're not losing the war, but we will not win it without renewed and increased effort," then expressing a wish that some European countries would place fewer caveats on their troops' deployment.

His pleas are likely to go unheeded.

COMMENT THREAD

Political acumen

The Tory Tribe – or, at any rate, a voluble part of it – is, as usual, displaying the political acumen of the Forth Form Remove, falling over itself to applaud Michael Heseltine, who writes a piece in today’s Daily Mail on the fallout from the Iranian hostage situation.

On the strength of his comments on yesterday's BBC Radio 4 Today programme, Heseltine had been given license to comment in this tabloid, coming up with the predictable, politically motivated assessment that the whole blame for this current PR fiasco must rest with the secretary of state for defence, Des Browne.

Technically, Heseltine is right – in that the buck stops on the secretary's desk. But there is more depth to this former defence secretary's comments. Firstly, he asks for a public inquiry (which must surely now be needed) to "look into the exact circumstances of the detention of the Royal Navy party, studying in particular the alleged lack of support from the nearby task force headed by HMS Cornwall."

He also wants that inquiry to find out who actually took the decision to allow the personnel to sell their stories, asking at what level was it made in the MoD and whether the defence secretary or the prime minister was consulted, and indeed whether the chief of the defence staff was consulted.

These are valid points, and show some understanding of the complexities of decision-making in the MoD, but the thinking is too sophisticated for the "Tribe". It wants political blood and chooses to home in on the mantras raised by Heseltine of "underfunding" and "overstretch". It forgets, of course, that it was Heseltine who made the disastrous decision to buy the Eurofighter. Yet it is that white elephant which is currently soaking up a disproportionate amount of the defence budget, making absolutely no contribution to the campaigns in Iraq or Afghanistan, where resources are so desperately needed.

However, the best report so far of the events leading up to the publication of (some of) the hostages' accounts comes from Michael Evans, Defence Editor of The Times.

He reports that decision to let them sell their stories was taken only hours after the 15 sailors and marines landed at Heathrow last Thursday, after a submission had been sent to the MoD by Vice-Admiral Adrian Johns, the Second Sea Lord, who is responsible for all personnel issues in the Royal Navy.

According to Evans, citing "defence sources", Admiral Johns "judged that it was appropriate" for those released captives who wished to do so to be allowed to receive money. He sent the MoD a memorandum that outlined his reasons for giving permission to the Marines and sailors to tell their stories.

Des Browne, we are told, noted its contents, but took no further action. Adds Evans, again citing an anonymous defence source, "He was not required to make a decision. The decision had already been taken by the Navy and all he had to do was note it." That source acknowledged that as the political boss of the department he could have reversed Admiral Johns's decision but he felt it was a Navy matter and considered it right to leave it to the military.

A suggestion that Tony Blair had approved the proposal as a public relations strategy to counter Tehran's propaganda was dismissed by a senior MoD official as nonsense. There was, though, surprise that Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the most senior military adviser to Mr Browne, was not consulted.

This account is entirely compatible with our earlier assertion that the publication was orchestrated entirely by the Admiralty and does not in away way contradict our contention that it was part of a broader attempt at a cover-up, throwing the hostages to the media "wolves" as a way of diverting attention from the operational failures resulting from decisions made by senior officers.

That there were such failures is endorsed in The Daily Telegraph today by Allan Mallinson, a soldier for 35 years and former commander of the 13th/18th Royal Hussars. The affair started with a straightforward but entirely avoidable tactical military cock-up, he writes, adding:

The 15 sailors and Marines were operating in sensitive waters, with unclear rules of engagement, no reserve and inadequate military intelligence. For this, the local tactical commanders must answer. There must be a board of inquiry and the results nailed to the mast, signalled round the fleet, read out to troops on parade - as would have happened in braver days.

However, further up the chain of command, in the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood, and in the MOD itself, some very senior officers indeed must answer this question: why, when our troops are in daily and deadly contact with Iranian-supported insurgents in Basra, and with the experience of the 2004 abduction of the Marines on the Euphrates, were these boarding operations being conducted so casually?

The Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments), Vice-Admiral Charles Style, the MOD officer directly responsible for issuing the operational directives to the forces through the PJHQ, said on television last week that it was because they had conducted so many boardings recently without incident. This is breathtaking complacency that betrays a lack of understanding of the most elementary principles of force protection, the first duty of any commander, and even more of the unawareness of tactical-strategic linkage…

Having been placed in an absurd situation, the boarding party chose to surrender. This tactical decision should not be loosely criticised, but there are legitimate questions: what were the orders "on contact" with Iranian patrol boats, and were they followed? Was the decision not to offer armed resistance in any part due to the presence of a female sailor? The party's conduct after capture also begs questions, but again it needs cooler examination.

Mallinson then picks up on "the rush to judgement" by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, who endorsed the hostages' action in a painful interview with John Humphrys on Friday's Today programme, and by personally shaking hands with the returning sailors and marines. This, he writes, "is puzzling to say the least", asking: "Was it embarrassment at the failures at the strategic (MOD) and operational (theatre) levels?"

It is this behaviour, above all, that has raised our suspicions. Any sensible First Sea Lord should, one would have thought, have distanced himself from the incident, and relied on a Board of Inquiry to elucidate the details of what had transpired. His unprecedented decision to waive the Board and to rely on a watered-down "lessons learned" inquiry, plus this "rush to judgement", shrieks of a guilty man with something to hide.

The behaviour of Band, of the MoD operations' staff and of subordinate commanders like Commodore Nick Lambert, must therefore be subject to the most rigorous scrutiny. Only then, if it can be shown that the officers involved were handicapped by political rather than operational considerations, or were genuinely constrained by issues which only the politicians had the authority to resolve, should the blame be directed at the secretary of state.

There is, however, one important proviso. It is Des Browne's responsibility to find out what went wrong and to take steps to ensure that the necessary remedial actions are taken. Thus, demanding his resignation – as some of the Tory Tribe are doing – before even blame has been properly apportioned, is premature. But, if he fails in his own responsibility, he should go.

In the interim, the sensible Tory move would be to avoid political point-scoring (which simply irritates people) and demand – as indeed has Michael Heseltine – a full inquiry. That would be real political acumen.

COMMENT THREAD

Exposed and vulnerable

It must now be evident to knowledgeable defence watchers that the position of First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Jonathon Band (seen here playing with one of his toys), is untenable. His authority is spent.

Earlier Naval careers have foundered over mishaps with capital ships, as was the fate of the martinet Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon when 358 crew were drowned after the sinking of HMS Victoria in 1893. By contrast, the proximate cause of Admiral Band's demise is the loss of two rubber boats and the temporary detention of their crews by a hostile nation.

In fact, though, it is now coming clear that his greater sin has been to orchestrate a cover-up, attempting to obscure the reasons why the boats and their crews were captured.

But, in giving permission to the "frightened fifteen" to sell their stories to the media, bouncing his political masters into acquiescence, Band went too far. Yesterday, the secretary of state for defence, Des Browne, struck back, rescinding the permission with only the tiniest fig-leaf to spare the Admiral's blushes.

Even then, that was considerably more than he deserved, as his public support for the "frightened fifteen" and then his permission to publish their stories has produced such gut-wrenchingly sickening copy that it has made a laughing stock of the Royal Navy and our nation. Forget Leading Seaman Turney and her appearance in The Sun yesterday, followed by her "star" performance on ITV1, and dwell for a moment on an extract from the account of the youngest crew member, Seaman Arthur Batchelor, published in The Daily Mirror:

Arthur said: "I missed Topsy [Leading Seaman Faye Turney] most of all. I really love her, as a mum and a big sister. Not seeing her and not knowing if she was safe was one of the hardest parts of the whole thing. Then on the sixth day, when I was just about giving up hope, I was pulled from my bed in the early hours of the morning. They led me down a corridor and into a room, where I saw Topsy in a corner. I can't describe how that felt... just every emotion rolled into one. I ran up to her, threw my arms round her and cried like a baby. When I'd calmed down, she asked, 'Do you need another hug, a mother hug?' and I said, 'damn right'.

Des Browne may yet regret declaring that the Navy, in allowing this drivel to reach the public domain, was making a "tough call". Not even Admiral Byng managed to humiliate the nation so comprehensively, especially now as the Iranians have retaliated by releasing more video footage purporting to show how well the hostages were treated. Little Green Footballs has the link (video "grabs" below).

Such is the utter fatuity of the media, however, that – with only a very few honourable exceptions – most journalists have not even begun to wake up to the underlying issues, and the reinstatement of the publication ban is still being treated on the level of a soap opera.

But, with the "human interest" element now cut off at source – and the story unresolved – we may now see some of the media turn to the substantive issue as to why the boarding crew was put in such an exposed and vulnerable position. Gradually, the truth may emerge.

All of that puts the Navy itself in an exposed and vulnerable position. Expected imminently is an announcement on the building of the two aircraft carriers, for which the Senior Service has mortgaged its future, at an expected cost of £3.5 billion.

Such is the perception of weakness the Navy has brought upon itself, however, that there would be barely be any public protest if the order was not to materialise. After all, on current form, the Navy would simply hand over the ships to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard at the first opportunity.

Possibly, the situation may be recoverable, but the politicians are going to have to act fast. Robust action to rid the Navy of some of its dead wood is needed as an immediate confidence-builder, plus measures to restore a fighting spirit into a Service that seems to have gone soft.

COMMENT THREAD

A catastophic error?

Kelvin Mackenzie, former editor of The Sun, calls the decision to allow publication a "catastrophic error" and Lord Heseltine, former defence secretary, is fuming. All rules, regulations, discipline and traditions had been thrown aside in ways that were quintessentially New Labour, he said.

That man then went on to say that there must be an inquiry into who made the decisions to put the boats into such a vulnerable position and this blog's world is now turned upside down, finding ourselves in some agreement with the Lord High Europhile himself.

Mackenzie, on the other hand, retails how the Number 10 spin doctors were contacting all the main media offices last week, offering "help with their editorials". Looking through the prism of his relationship with No. 10, however, he thinks that the concern was that they were losing the propaganda war with Iran, and that is how he then sees the publication of the boarding team's stories.

The indications are, though, that both Mackenzie and Heseltine have got it wrong. The decision to allow the "frightened fifteen" to publish looks more like "old Navy" than "New Labour". To judge by the reaction of the CGS, Richard Dannatt, this was very much a Navy "do", orchestrated not by Downing Street - nor even by the MoD - but by the Admiralty.

This does suggest that the real agenda is still about saving the skins of a few over-paid, under-performing officers like Commodore Nick Lambert and, ultimately, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Jonathon Band. It seems that the Navy brass, in their rush to cover their own backsides - and hide the real catastrophic errors - are holding the entire political establishment to ransom, and causing inestimable damage to the Navy in the process. Funny, not even the Iranians did that.

COMMENT THREAD

Another one down…

The Union Jack was lowered for the last time in another bit of Basra yesterday, this time the British Army base at the Shatt al Arab Hotel – the northernmost of our bases in the city – as it was handed over to the Iraqi Army's 10th Division.

A number of Middle East papers carried the news, and the CNN website ran it but, at the time of writing, no mainstrean British news media had reported it. Thus does our inexorable retreat continue unremarked, leaving the British population largely ill-informed.

The Old State Building in the centre of Basra went on 20 March, also to the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army – although there are no reliable reports as to its fate. The massive Shaiba logistics base, to the south of the city – based on an old Iraqi Air Force air base – will go later this month and Basra Palace is expected to follow by late summer.

That will leave Basra Air Station, five miles to the west of the city, in which British forces will concentrate for as long as our government feels the Shia militias need target practice.

In command is Major-General Jonathan Shaw, who seems well-versed in Blair-speak. He decribes this process as a "repositioning" rather than a withdrawal, and denies hotly any suggestion that his troops have been "bombed out" of their other bases.

Nevertheless, there is recognition that the situation on the ground is not secure, so there is no longer any talk of handing over control of Basra province by the spring.

The human cost of the retreat, however, is high and likely to increase. As others have done before, The Sunday Telegraph reports fears that, hemmed into their single, isolated base (with very few roads into the city), troops will be prey to ambushes, leading to a significant increase in casualties.

Even now, virtually every time patrols venture onto the streets, they are attacked by heavily armed insurgents, or roadside bombs. And, with easily observable routes from Basra Air Base into the city, insurgents are able to observe military movements and set up their ambushes in good time. British commanders, The Telegraph says, now admit that the number of attacks against coalition forces are beginning to escalate dangerously.

Movement by military convoys around the city is also becoming increasingly more difficult and even the shortest journey borders on being a major operation, with routes having to be cleared by Army dog handlers checking "vulnerable points" - such as areas where roads narrow - for hidden explosives.

Thus, we are told, the eight miles to the airport can take more than five hours to travel because it is no longer possible to take a direct route in and out of Basra. And, says one officer, "it is only going to get worse."

On the back of the Iran hostage debacle, however, even strong supporters of the British presence in Iraq – like this blog – are losing faith in the military's ability and will to contain the situation. Public support – fragile at best – is ebbing fast and military morale, already low, has plunged even further as troops come to terms with the humilation dealt to them by the kidnap of the British hostages.

With the Iranian-backed Shia militias emboldened by Ahmadinejad's propagada coup, and a British new prime minister shortly to take over the reins - himself not an enthusiast for military adventures - it can only be a matter of time before the inevitable happens, and the "repositioning" does become a complete withdrawal.

Marking the end of the road for Britain as a credible military power, as it stands, the situation does not look to be recoverable.

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