Time to go back to basics

The big defence news of yesterday was the dire tale of the theft of a laptop holding the personal details of some 600,000 people who had expressed an interest in joining the Armed Forces.

The laptop had, apparently, been stolen from the car of a Royal Navy officer, who had left the machine in the car overnight. The MoD is taking some heat: the loss is claimed to present a security risk as the data were not encrypted. That apart, it can surely only be someone with cloth for brains that leaves such valuable property in a car overnight. These people are responsible for our defence?

In addition to that story though, the Telegraph found space for a story headed, "Kit shortages put troops' lives at risk". It tells us that thousands of troops had their lives endangered when they were sent to Afghanistan without essential equipment.

This, we are also told, was due to "government dithering", a claim relying on a document which forms part of the Board of Inquiry report into the death of paratrooper Captain James Philippson of 7 Para, Royal Horse Artillery.

He was the first soldier to be killed in southern Afghanistan and the circumstances of his death were briefly carried in The Times on 14 June 2006, its story headed, "British soldier died as he saved comrade in Taleban ambush".

As part of a quick-reaction force, Philippson had gone to the rescue of British troops who had been ambushed while on patrol in the Sangin district. The force arrived, we are told, in armoured Land Rovers to find a convoy of British vehicles pinned down by Taleban fighters who were firing from nearby buildings.

Philippson and his men jumped from their vehicles, firing their SA80 rifles as they ran to protect the convoy and to reach the wounded soldier. The injured man was successfully removed under fire, but while he was being pulled to safety a burst of Taleban gunfire hit Philippson and the other member of the quick-reaction force, killing the Captain and severely wounded the other soldier.

Returning to the Board of Inquiry document, the inference offered by The Telegraph seems to be that in some way Philippson’s death was in part attributable to the shortage of "vital kit" such as body armour, heavy machine guns, night vision goggles and ballistic matting for Land Rovers. One would like to see more of this report but, since Philippson seems to have been dismounted when he was hit, it may (or may not) be a lack of body armour that was partly responsible for his death.

This will, no doubt, come out in the inquest so we must reserve judgement and, for now, simply lament the death of a brave soldier. However, the combination of the Times account, which tells us that Land Rovers were being used, and the current Telegraph story, which reports a shortage of "ballistic matting", highlights a completely different issue.

The ballistic matting is the armour used to protect Land Rover crews from small arms fire and some would aver that it is more important to soldiers' safety than mine protection, the fire from the Teleban being regarded as the greater threat. The issue then is why Land Rovers are being used as fighting vehicles which are so unprotected that they need the addition of ballistic matting in order to improve safety.

Here, it is instructive take a historical perspective on the use of armoured vehicles in combat, which goes back over 100 years. In fact, the French lay claim to have built the first ever production armoured car - in 1905 - called the Charron (pictured top left). As with many of the designs which were to follow, it was a normal commercial vehicle to which armour had been added. With the additional of a machine gun, this made for a package which is still in use with armies to this day.

The British were relatively late on the scene, producing the Rolls Royce armoured car in 1914, a design which, with modifications, was still in use in the North African desert in 1940 (pictured left). By then, though, the concept of the armoured car had been well proven and the wartime Army was equipped with a succession of purpose-built vehicles, most notably the Humber and Daimler armoured cars, which continued in use after the war.

The Daimler (pictured right) and others were replaced in the 1950s – although the Daimler continued in use in Territorial units until the 1960s - by the heavier Saladin, equipped with a 76mm gun, and the lighter Ferret (below left). These two were then replaced by the Fox, introduced in 1973, a machine equipped with the potent 30mm Rarden cannon and a co-axial 7.62mm machine gun. It continued in service until 1993 in Territorial units.

Since then, the Army has not had a purpose designed armoured car. The roles which the armoured car fulfilled, however, remain and, to fill the gaps, the Land Rover Defender has been used. This is a light/medium utility truck which itself derives from a 1946 design but, to equip it specifically for the fighting role, a special derivant of the Defender 110 series was produced. This is known as the Weapons Mount Installation Kit (WIMIK) Land Rover.

The WIMIK has some armour on the engine bulkhead and under the floor, and is fitted with roll bars, additional stowage and mounts for a 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) and a .50 calibre M-2 heavy machine gun. To give added protection against small arms, the front compartment and the gunner's bay in the rear are now fitted with Kevlar ballistic matting.

It is a testament to the original design of the basic Land Rover, which weighs about two tons and would normally carry a payload of two tons, that – in its latest form known as the E-WIMIK ("e" for "enhanced") – it now weighs five and a half tons fully loaded. As such, it is heavier than the four-ton Ferret armoured car it replaces, with considerably less power, and only a ton and a half short of the much better armed Fox.

The central point, though, is that we seem to have gone full circle. From 1905 when armoured cars were produced by adding armour and weapons to existing commercial vehicles, we moved on to produce purpose-built vehicles and now, over a hundred years later, the British Army is back in the same territory. It is adding armour and weapons to a production vehicle to produce an armoured car in all but name.

Quite why the purpose-built armoured car should have fallen out of favour is surely a story that needs to be told, although it is now returning in a different form, called by the UK a "protected patrol vehicle" and by the Americans a "mine resistant ambush protected" (MRAP) vehicle.

What the larger of these vehicles lack, though is the essential mobility and flexibility of the vehicles like the Ferret, which has advocates of the WIMIK arguing for its superiority. Its small size allows it to be driven down the narrow streets and alleys of the Afghan villages, while its larger, better protected cousins are stranded on the outside.

Even the Americans have begun to realise this. With an extra 3,200 troops about to be sent to Afghanistan, they are to be accompanied by some 500 MRAPs. But, rather than sending the over-large Cougars, which form the basis of the British Mastiff, the US government has ordered 500 RG-31 models, cited as the lightest MRAP on the US inventory, recognising the need for more manoeuvrability.

However, press reports cite this vehicle as weighing 11.6 tons, while the current manufacturers specifications state a basic weight of seven. The mystery is explained by the latest development, the RG-31 Mark 6 (pictured right). An already large vehicle has morphed into an even larger armoured truck, adding four tons in the process. Although fitted with a turret and machine gun mount, it is very different from the armoured cars of history.

The military mind, it seems, cannot resist the temptation to take a basic concept and add weight to it, with more capability and protection. But, in so doing, they seem to lose sight of the original need for speed and manoeuvrability, resulting, bizarrely, in troops riding around in WIMIKs, less protected than any time since before the Second World War.

It is time, it seems, to go back to basics.

COMMENT THREAD

Is this the answer?

While the MoD is still dickering about buying the next batch of mine protected vehicles, the United States is forging ahead with the second generation of what it calls Mine Resistant and Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.

This promises to be a huge defence contract, with a potential order for some 20,500 units. With testing, spare parts and logistics support, this could turn out to be one of the largest land contracts of a generation.

One of the front runners in the competition is our very own BAE Systems which is only one of two contractors selected to develop and produce prototypes for the next generation vehicle, with the award of a $5.7 million contract.

Within the contract are two categories of vehicle. One is the so-called Category I, which will support operations in urban environments and other restricted/confined spaces, including mounted patrols, reconnaissance, communications, and command and control. The other is the Category II vehicle, which provide a "reconfigurable vehicle that can support multi-mission operations such as convoy lead, troop transport, explosive ordnance disposal, ambulance, and route clearance."

The Category I test vehicles will be based on the BAE System's Caiman 6x6 design, morphed into a 4x4 design (pictured above), while the Category II will be based on the company's RG-33 6x6 vehicle (right), itself a development of the ground-breaking RG-31.

In view of the controversy over the British WIMIK Land Rover, versus the Mastiff, the Cat I vehicle is of special interest. Its intended role most closely approximates that of the WIMIK, offering – in the words of the manufacturer – "the right balance of payload capability, automotive performance, and blast protection", complete with all-important "mobility upgrades". It also has the advantage of being based on the well-proven Stewart and Stevenson FMTV in widespread use in the US Army, with 85 percent parts commonality.

In the protection department, the Caiman certainly presses all the buttons. It has the classic v-shaped hull and a conformation which gives it a central armoured cell, with the front and rear axles outside the cell, offering maximum protection against mine strikes. But, at 14 tons, a very high profile and car-type doors which do not permit rapid dismount under fire, it is hard to see that this would be accepted as a WIMIK replacement in the British Army.

While Defense Update discusses the broader issues, however, we learn that another Canadian LAV has succumbed to a mine blast in Afghanistan, this one the Coyote - the reconnaissance version of the wheeled APCs chosen by the Canadian Army – with the death of a soldier.

This is the third Coyote to have been involved in a fatal incident (illustrated: see here), on top of several other LAVs, compared with only two (to our knowledge) RG-31s, underlining the vulnerability of conventional armoured vehicles in asymmetric warfare. It also raises further questions about FRES, as the LAV is based on the Piranha, one of the types submitted for the FRES competition.

Against this background, we see US defence secretary Gates argue in the LA Times that most of the European Nato forces in Afghanistan are not trained in counterinsurgency. "They were trained for the Fulda Gap," he said, referring to the German region where a Soviet invasion of Western Europe had been deemed most likely.

Training apart, their armies are certainly equipped for the Fulda Gap, and they are going to have to look hard at the MRAP II project to see is this can deliver vehicles more suitable to the needs of Afghanistan. But, from the look of the Caiman, it would seem we are a long way from seeing a light, armoured tactical vehicle which would fit British requirements.

COMMENT THREAD

A failure of planning?

Played big-time by The Sunday Telegraph at the weekend (and also covered in The Sunday Times) was the tragic incident when a "British war hero who bled to death after being injured in an Afghan minefield".

Under the title of, "Army hero left to die by failings at MoD", the paper's defence correspondent, Sean Rayment, charges that the soldier, Cpl Mark Wright, who was posthumously awarded the George Cross, "died because of a catalogue of failures, incompetence and equipment shortages." The charge itself is based on the findings of a Board of Inquiry (BoI), which the Telegraph had seen.

We were reluctant to add to or comment on this story being wary of what some term "Monday morning quarter-backing", particularly with regard to an incident at which we were not present, and of which we have no first-hand knowledge.

However, even at the time, some of the details of the BoI report did not ring true and following an exchange with an experienced ex-service helicopter pilot – with casevac experience – and from our own researches, we felt there were issues here that need further discussion.

Firstly, as to the details of the incident, this was covered in a separate report in the paper, which has the tragedy unfolding in the late morning of September 6 2006, in the mountainous terrain surrounding the Kajaki hydroelectric dam, in northern Helmand.

However, it is also covered in the MoD website. In this account, the incident starts when the leader of a sniper patrol was heading down the steep slope when "he initiated a mine and sustained severe injuries." The account continues:

Corporal Mark Wright gathered a number of men and rushed down the slope to assist. Realising that the casualty was likely to die before a full mine clearance could be effected, Corporal Wright unhesitatingly led his men into the minefield.

Exercising effective and decisive command, he directed medical orderlies to the injured soldier, ordered all unnecessary personnel to safety, and then began organising the casualty evacuation. He called for a helicopter, and ordered a route to be cleared through the minefield to a landing site. Unfortunately the leader of this task, while moving back across the route he believed he had cleared, stepped on another mine and suffered a traumatic amputation.

Corporal Wright, again at enormous personal risk, immediately moved to the new casualty and began rendering life-saving assistance until one of the medical orderlies could take over.

Calmly, Corporal Wright ordered all non-essential personnel to stay out of the minefield and continued to move around and control the incident. He sent accurate situation reports to his headquarters and ensured that additional medical items were obtained. Shortly afterwards a helicopter landed nearby, but as Corporal Wright stood up he initiated a third mine, which seriously injured him and one of the orderlies. The remaining medical orderly began treating Corporal Wright, but was himself wounded by another mine blast which caused further injury to both Corporal Wright and others.

There were now seven casualties still in the minefield, three of whom had lost limbs…

According to the Telegraph account, however, within an hour, an RAF Chinook helicopter had arrived, but the hilly terrain made it impossible for the aircraft to land. Crucially, says this report, the helicopter was not fitted with a winch to lift the stricken soldiers from the minefield. The pilot had little choice but to withdraw and as it did another mine was detonated, severely injuring Cpl Wright. A few minutes later another soldier had his leg blown off when he, too, stepped on a mine.

It was a horrific scene. Three soldiers had lost legs, four others had sustained serious injuries and Cpl Wright, with blast wounds to his arm, neck and chest, was fighting for his life. Despite his injuries, he took command of the situation and administered first aid to others less seriously injured than himself.

The soldiers, we are told, were eventually rescued five hours later by a US Knighthawk helicopter, which was fitted with a winch. But it was too late for Cpl Wright, who died during the journey back to the British base in Camp Bastion. He was later awarded a posthumous George Cross - Britain's second highest bravery award.

Now, as to the substantive "charges", the MoD has always maintained that Cpl Wright's death was the result of a tragic and unavoidable series of events. But the Board of Inquiry, reveals for the first time that the entire incident was avoidable.

The fundamental failing identified by the inquiry was the decision to withdraw all three Chinook winches and hoists from Afghanistan after a fault was discovered during routine maintenance. Although some winches were available, the report states that UK search and rescue helicopters were given priority over the RAF Chinooks in Afghanistan.

The report states: "If an air frame with hoist capability had been available immediately, the casualty count may well have been less and the need to continue to move in the vicinity of the incident would have been significantly reduced."

We also learn that Maj Gen Andrew Farquhar, the general officer commanding 5 Division, under whose authority the inquiry took place, writes in a summary to the report: "I find it disturbing that, in an area of operations where there is such a marked mine threat, there are no UK-equipped, rotary wing air frames that can provide guaranteed availability and an immediate casualty extraction capability."

There are other aspects to this report, but the issue we need to address is the claim that Cpl. Wright could have survived if a properly equipped helicopter had been available, this resting on the fact that the Chinook was not fitted with a winch and that it took a US helicopter so equipped, five hours later, to make the extraction.

The point here, affirmed by the pilot we spoke to, is that a winch is not necessary for a helicopter to make a "vertical extraction". In fact, since the late sixties, in the VietNam war, equipment has been developed for such purposes, one being the McGuire rig (illustrated). This was as 15 x 3 ft nylon strap fashioned into a loop large enough for a man to sit in and with a smaller wrist loop sewn into the strap to prevent the wounded or unconscious from falling out. The top of the strap was tied to the outside (running) end of a 120ft nylon rope stowed in the helicopter.

Alternatively, there was the STABO rig, a harness similar to a parachute harness, worn in the field as normal webbing. To the harness was attached a carabiner which could be linked to a rope, likewise fitted with a carabiner, dropped from a helicopter. A similar system was fitted to Rhodesian helicopters in the seventies, and routinely used to extract men, even under fire.

It is not our contention, however, that this equipment should necessarily have been available (or the updated version currently in use by US forces, known as The Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction (SPIE) system). Simply, it serves to demonstrate that rope extraction by a helicopter not fitted with a winch is feasible and one which has a long history of use in combat situations.

There are, it appears, difficulties with the McGuire rig when it comes to casualty extraction, but the techniques for lifting unconscious people are well established. At its most primitive, a "strop" or loop with a slip knot, placed over the head and under the armpits, with the knot in front of the chest and then tightened, can be used to lift an unconscious casualty.

Here, we rely on our pilot who tells us that, during his combat experience, "it is inconceivable" that any of his crews "would have left any of our soldiers bleeding in the field, no matter what the circumstances". He adds that, "there would have been courts martial and heads rolling at all levels if this had occurred. I cannot believe there was no attempt at jury-rigging some method of lifting them out." In one case, a helicopter pilot even dangled a weighted cargo net to soldiers who needed emergency evacuation (net illustrated, lifted by a Chinook).

With a rope lowered to the victims from the Chinook, fashioned as a strop, they could each have been lifted out and moved to a safe area, where the helicopter could then land and load them on board.

In the specific circumstances of this incident, we note that the Chinooks has previously been fitted with winches, but these had been removed after the discovery of a technical fault, and returned to the UK for checking. One can only surmise, but the natural presumption is that, when the winches were removed, some thought should have been given to an alternative, in the event that the helicopters were called to do an extraction where landing was not possible.

Raising these points after the event, of course, is hindsight but, before the event, there is also a name for it. It is called "contingency planning", a task which is supposed to be a particular military skill and one for which many highly paid staff officers are employed. In one of the most heavily-mined countries in the world, where the likelihood of a mine-strike was hardly an academic possibility, and where helicopter extraction is a standard and rehearsed routine, it can hardly be unreasonable to expect some forward planning, to cover the absence of the winches.

With that forward planning, there are also other devices that could have helped out. Simple and cheap devices such as mine shoes are widely available and used throughout the world (illustrated). They are special padded foam shoes that disperse their weight over a wide area. Thus fitted, a soldier weighing 160 lbs will exert no more than four ounces of pressure per square inch, enabling safe movement through a minefield with no risk of detonating a mine.

Would it have been too much to ask that every helicopter in theatre kept a few packs of these lightweight aids, ready for any rescue team called to extract stricken colleagues? And, if a crudely-fashioned strop would be considered too extreme for an injured person – especially as Cpl. Wright had lost an arm - the rescue catalogues have ample kit, such as rope-suspended litters, which could be used for this purpose.

Every which way – bearing in mind that the casualties were eventually lifted out by helicopter – the circumstances indicate that a modicum of forethought and, even without that, an element of field improvisation, could have saved Cpl. Wright. And, if the Board of Inquiry states that he could have been extracted earlier by a helicopter fitted with a winch, then all the indications are that he could have been lifted out by an improvised rope.

This brings us to another important point. As is the fashion these days, blame is pinned on the MoD. Thus is Sean Rayment's story framed in terms of "failings at MoD". But any rescue would have required minimal equipment – we are not talking here of projects needing millions of pounds, but items which the military could procure on its own authority, without intervention from the MoD.

And, in any event, had the MoD needed to be involved, would it have refused a few hundred pounds of expenditure – or even a thousand or so – had it been asked?

We are, therefore, most probably looking not at the failure of the amorphous "MoD", but a failure of field staff – military staff – people who should have done a job but who did not, right down to the Chinook crew which, according to people who know what is involved (my pilot consulted many of his experienced colleagues) could have improvised instead of standing idly by while a brave soldier bled to death.

Maybe, though, there are mitigating circumstances – some details of which we are wholly unaware – which would have prevented action by the Chinook pilots, and which the military staff could not possibly have foreseen. But it is hard to think what they might have been. One would have thought that a journalist for a prestigious national paper might have sought to find out – and perhaps written this into his story – answering the many questions raised.

But, in a sickening display of cheap journalism, instead Rayment goes to Liam Fox, the Tory shadow defence secretary, who is cited as describing the findings of the BoI as "an appalling indictment of Labour defence policy". Even had Fox been able to rule out military failings, however, they were no such thing. Operational failures at various levels there might have been, but this was not a policy failure. Fox, as an opposition spokesman could and should seek these out but he too was more concerned to make the cheap shot.

However, there was one area where Fox, rightly, could have criticised the MoD. As we have written many times (for instance, here, here and here) the Ministry has been offered many times the availability of leased helicopters to make up for the current shortage. These aircraft are fitted with winches and have ex-military crews, many of whom have decorations for both battlefield and casevac-under-fire operations.

They were – and still are - available to fill the gap whilst the long-term procurement process progresses but there has been no movement in getting them into theatre. Now that Nato is involved, the whole process of acquiring them seems to be drifting into a bureaucratic and inter-nation political football.

As for Rayment, he writes glibly that the real tragedy is that many within the MoD are more concerned about the negative media impact such stories have on their political and military masters rather than ensuring that such incidents are never allowed to happen again. But, having gone for the easy option of attacking the MoD, instead of attempting to get to the root of the incident, has he really done anything to prevent a repetition?

COMMENT THREAD

The spectator sees more of the game

In what may be part of a co-ordinated fight against being forced to acquire protected vehicles, David Axe, freelance journalist extraordinaire, has been given a license by the Army to take a pop at the Mastiff in an article written for World Politics Review. In it, he argues that, "for British forces in Iraq, protection means loss of effectiveness".

No one can deny that the man has had first hand experience, having been embedded with British troops in Iraq – or that he writes well and makes an arguable case. But he is still wrong. Like so many of his ilk – including Michael Yon – he is perhaps too close to the ground and cannot see the bigger picture. A truism it may be, but the spectator sees more of the game.

To lead us into his thesis, Axe acquaints us with a Royal Air Force security troops patrolling the outskirts of Basra air station in southern Iraq on 17 December. The soldiers leap out of their new Mastiff armoured trucks in order to scout out a bridge before the lumbering blast-proof vehicles crossed. One of the soldiers notices something he didn't recall seeing before: a crack in the concrete near the far side of the bridge.

He points this out to his commander, Flight Lt. Edward Cripps, who eyes the idling Mastiffs, their drivers waiting for the all clear. This is what happens, Cripps muses aloud, when you repeatedly drive 30-ton trucks over a bridge designed for much lighter vehicles. "We'll have to keep an eye on this," he says. But for now the bridge was sound, and the officer gestures for the Mastiffs to cross.

This, Axe now develops, noting that, although this may be "a small thing", the over-burdened bridge is "just one consequence of the changing nature of British military operations in southern Iraq." Two years ago, he continues:

… nimble, lightly-equipped British forces pursued a counterinsurgency strategy grounded in decades of operational experience - and with unusual effectiveness. So much so that heavy, aggressive US forces adopted British methods when they launched their much-vaunted "surge" campaign to retake Baghdad from insurgents.

Today, the British counterinsurgency operation has ended - some say prematurely - and the units slated to remain in Iraq as an "overwatch" force have adopted heavier, less agile weapons systems, such as the Mastiffs, and fortified themselves at the air station.

In doing so, they become less effective against low-intensity threats and, ironically, more vulnerable overall. British forces, say some military experts, in essence are making the same mistake their American counterparts did in the first three years of the Iraq war: they have confused "force protection" with effectiveness.

Now working from the particular to the general, Axe uses US military historian Max Boot, writing in the Los Angeles Times in 2005, to bolster his case, with a direct quote from the piece:

Successful counterinsurgency operations require troops to go out among the people, gathering intelligence and building goodwill. But few Iraqis are allowed on these bases, and few Americans are allowed out - and then only in forbidding armored convoys.

We then learn, according to Boot's contention, that troops concentrated at large fortified bases surrendered intelligence-gathering and initiative - that is, the ability to act first and compel your enemy to react - in a bid to minimise soldiers' exposure to attack. And when they did sortie from their castle-like compounds, they were so ignorant of what qualifies for normal in Iraq that they were prone to respond to the most innocuous activity with gunfire.

Before going too far with this, however, it is useful to step back and examine Axe's first premise, that the heavyweight Mastiff is causing damage, something he refers to later in his article, adding that they tear down city power and telephone lines, damage buildings and parked cars and over-stress dilapidated Iraqi bridges.

Staying with this, we have to examine the very specific use to which the Mastiff is being put, in the very specific context from which Axe draws his inspiration. That use, in fact, is airfield security – one of the main roles of the RAF Regiment – for which purpose they had previously used the WIMIK Land Rover (pictured right).

Yet, it was precisely that vehicle, in precisely that role, which led to the death last August of a British soldier from 51 Squadron RAF Regiment along with a civilian interpreter in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, with two other soldiers receiving minor injuries.

Had these personnel been riding in a Mastiff, it is undoubtedly the case that the whole crew would have escaped uninjured, as indeed did the crew of the Mastiff which was attacked outside Basra Air Base on 22 December, only days after the bridge incident.

Thus do we see a very selective use of evidence from Axe. He offers the downside of the Mastiff, but what message would he have to the parents and relatives of the deceased from the Kandahar incident? And what message would he have for the troops who escaped injury in Basra? Would he tell them that they should have died to protect city power and telephone lines, buildings, parked cars and dilapidated Iraqi bridges?

In fact though, Axe does have a point – although he does not make it. When you compare the Mastiff with the WIMIK, the size of the former highlights the obvious huge disparity in size. It is exactly that which became one of the points of contention when we started our campaign on the Snatch Land Rover - simply that protected vehicles were too big for Basra.

At that time, we were arguing for the RG-31, a very much smaller vehicle and one which, demonstrably, was capable of protecting crews. But the MoD in its wisdom decided upon the Mastiff, bigger than anything we envisaged. Indeed, it is too big for some roles and certainly, as Axe argues, too heavy for some applications.

However, as readers of this blog will be very well aware, the Mastiff is by no means the only protected vehicle available and indeed we have already mentioned the smaller RG-31 which weighs in at just over seven tons. For mine protection (as in Kandahar) probably the RAM 2000 would provide more than adequate protection, which weighs 4.5 tons, a vehicle based on the RBY Mk 1. There is also the RG-32M, with a combat weight of about seven tons, which would be ideal for airfield security.

It is also interesting to note that when the Rhodesians needed a mine-protected vehicle for airfield patrols, they managed with a converted Land Rover, which they called the Cougar.

On this basis, addressing Axe's very specific complaints about the Mastiff, the problem is not protection per se, but the wrong type of protection. We have a situation where the MoD currently only provides one type of vehicle – basically an armoured personnel carrier. It was never designed nor intended for airfield perimeter patrolling and is thus being misused. In due course, we will see lighter vehicles – presumably the 4x4 Cougar (to be named the Ridgeback) – although that in itself is the same height and width as the Mastiff, and is no great improvement.

Nevertheless, weight – and size - is not Axe's only complaint. Quoting General Petraeus' philosophy, he wants troops to get out of their armoured vehicles, move around on foot and engage with the local populace - all concepts, he says, the British had championed since the beginning of the occupation in 2003.

This, we will address later in this piece but even Axe acknowledges that troops will be using vehicles. Here he calls in aid Lieutenant Colonel Labouchere who abandoned the Abu Naji base at al Amarah in 2006, taking to the Maysan desert in lightly armoured WIMIK Land Rovers. The sprightly Land Rovers, writes Axe,

…which are smaller than the standard US Humvee - were vital to Labouchere's desert adventure and even allowed British forces to navigate teeming downtown markets. But for combat operations Land Rovers are being replaced by the new Mastiffs: six-wheeled vehicles that are too tall, too wide and too sluggish to even enter cities. In addition, the soldiers riding inside them are virtually blind: there are only four small windows thickly paned with armored glass.

It is this latter comment that is particularly telling, highlighting an issue we too have addressed, technically known as situational awareness. This is perennially brought up by advocates of light, highly mobile vehicles and currently championed in the latest round of the debate on the suitability of the WIMIK.

Such is the limited breadth of the argument, however, that the champions of the WIMIK cannot seem to grasp that protection and situational awareness – or high mobility, for that matter – are not mutually incompatible. In an earlier post, we illustrated the Dingo armoured scout car (left) and the RBY Mk1, both of which offer situational awareness easily comparable with the WIMIK. It cannot be beyond the wit of man to produce a mine protected vehicle with an open top, to perform the role of a WIMIK.

Thus far, but unfortunately at much greater length, we are able to deal with Axe's arguments on size and weight and on situational awareness but, although he does not labour it, his use of the word "sprightly" implies mobility. This is translated by other advocates as speed and off-road performance, which are at a premium in Afghanistan and which the WIMIK is deemed to offer.

Here, critics of protected vehicles may have a point in that armour does add weight – although not necessarily as much as some think. All things being equal, an unarmoured vehicle is going to be more mobile than its protected counterpart.

However, while some argue that the WIMIK is an unarmoured vehicle, it has some (very limited) armour. But, so vulnerable is it to attack that troops have been applying their own armour in theatre (pictured) and the latest version (the so-called E-WIMIK) has still more. It is now so heavily laden that its mobility is restricted while still affording less protection than a specifically-designed vehicle. And, with all that weight, it is dangerously top-heavy, making it difficult and dangerous to drive. Perversely, this "light gun platform" is now considerably heavier than a Ferret armoured car which weighed less than four tons.

Nevertheless, we still hear that good off-road performance can confer as much or greater protection as armour, simply by allowing more tactical flexibility. It can, for instance, permit drivers to avoid established tracks, where mines and IEDs might be laid. It is better to take a chance with mines than to be weighed down with armour and lose that tactical flexibility, or so it is held.

At several levels, though, this argument is flawed. Firstly, the topography of Afghanistan is such that, while there are the wide open spaces, on many routes to and from operations – and generally – there are so-called "choke points". At these, the terrain naturally channels traffic and there is no alternative but to follow narrow, defined routes, no matter how good the off-road performance.


Three such scenarios are illustrated here, one of the classics being while crossing wadis (dried up river beds) – the first of the sequence (above) showing a wadi crossing. And that, it is understood, is how Jack Sadler died. His patrol was seeking a route out of a wadi, and used a track they had passed over the day before. Only, that time, a mine had been laid by a Taleban which keeps British forces under constant observation.

Secondly, the need for vehicle mobility is very much overstated. Axe, as a fan of Labouchere, offers us two video reports (here and here) eulogising his hero, the latter sequence showing one of his "sprightly Land Rovers" trying to negotiate truly impossible terrain, getting totally bogged down and very nearly overturning. "Sprightly" that vehicle was not. In such terrain, even superb performers are slow, noisy and vulnerable, and therefore of limited value. Commanders need to recognise that there are other ways of doing things.

Where reconnaissance is involved, much of what is carried out by ground forces can be as well done – if not better – by airborne assets, either helicopters, fixed wing aircraft or UAVs, more so if working in very close co-operation with ground forces. And, under certain circumstances – if they are available – vehicles can be lifted by helicopters to be inserted and extracted when needed, by-passing difficult or dangerous terrain. When it comes to cross-country performance, there is nothing better than an aircraft.

As to the role of "air", we can cite our own expert, Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF, who argues cogently that the Army does not understand and is thus not able to exploit the full potential of airpower in counter-insurgency operations. Thus, in many respects, the Army makes its own grief.

Then, in terms of mobility, there are the other uses to which these vehicles are put, not least convoy escorts, urban patrols and, in the case of the "Snatch", personnel transport. In these roles, the scope for enhanced mobility is very limited. And where mobility cannot be relied on to ensure safety, other means of protection are essential.

The third point, however, brings in the bigger picture. Axe glibly quotes Dakota Wood from the US-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, using him to tell us that the deployment of "highly protected but operationally dubious armored trucks such as Mastiff" is the result of "an emotional debate" over casualties.

While indeed, there are emotional overtones to that debate - witness the piece is today's Sunday Mirror - these are underwritten by cold, hard, political calculations, again on several levels. The most immediate concern is for troop morale.

While soldiers are realistic about the hazards of their trade, they are more sanguine about being killed in a "fair" fight involving direct combat. But the seeming randomness, unpredictability, and persistence of IED and mine attacks – especially with their potential to maim as well as kill – are feared and detested. If troops do not feel they have protection against them, their morale suffers. And, as well as affecting operational efficiency, this has an influence on recruitment and retention rates, and on the perception of operations on the "home front".

It is at this "home front" level though that the political calculations are most acute. While the Army may see its objective as winning engagements, the Taleban are fighting the "attrition" phase of a long-term guerrilla war. Their objective is not to win the military battle but to kill soldiers in an attempt to erode the political will of the nations who send them.

Guerrilla war does not allow the simplistic military reckoning of "exchange rates". That much, VietNam taught us. Each death or serious injury is a victory for the Taleban - a step closer to undermining the home front, leading eventually to the withdrawal of troops who have not been defeated militarily. Thus, whatever willingness there might be of the Army, collectively or individually, to take risks and accept losses, this is not their choice to make. To win the war, they must do everything realistically possible to minimise their own casualties - especially when so many deaths and injuries are avoidable. The politicians realise this, but it is not clear that the military – and certainly not David Axe – fully understand it.

Now, so far, we have only addressed part of Axe's thesis. Starting with his slender argument that we should not be using protected vehicles, he relies heavily on Labouchere's "strategy" as an alternative. However, this amounted to abandoning the Abu Naji base in al Amarah under fire in order to spearhead "a drive to make British troops lighter, faster and closer to the local populace."

Writes Axe, after a particularly intensive mortar attack on his base, Labouchere persuaded his bosses to let him shutter the base completely, jettison his heavy weapons and armor and take to the desert with just his soldiers, his interpreters and a handful of reconnaissance vehicles and Land Rovers. Axe goes on:

The Maysan battle group moved constantly, zipping across the desert province on a mission to intercept criminals and militia fighters. Labouchere said that with his "lighter is better" approach, he was trying to prevent what he called the "self-licking lollipop" effect. That is, he wanted to avoid the heavily armored equipment - and associated logistical requirements - that can quickly distract a military unit from its actual mission.

What this narrative neglects, however, is the earlier history of the campaign and subsequent events and thus how Labouchere's retreat from Abu Naji set the seal on what this blog – and many others - regards as the British failure in southern Iraq.

A more rounded account would take in the relative calm in the southern sector immediately after the invasion in 2003, but then noted the Mehdi uprising in August 2003, which effectively marked the start of a full-blown Shia insurgency. As we recall in one of our posts, the situation rapidly deteriorated to the point that, by November of that year, the Army was being forced to patrol in protected (but still dangerously vulnerable) "Snatch" Land Rovers.

The following year saw what amounted to all-out war with the siege of Cimic House starting on 5th of August 2004 in the centre of al Amarah and lasting 23 days. And, while the situation was stabilised, British forces were later pulled out of Cimic House and troops were concentrated in Abu Naji base outside the town, from which patrols were mounted into the town.

After multiple attacks, ranging from street gunfights and RPG ambushes, to IED ambushes, by September 2005 it was no longer safe to use "Snatch" Land Rovers on the streets of al Amarah. For want of protected vehicles, patrolling was being conducted with tracked Warrior MICVs and Challenger II main battle tanks. At the same time, the base had come under sustained assault from rockets and mortars, against which the troops were powerless, partly because there were unable to police the areas from which they were being fired.

And that surely is the point. While the advocates of light vehicles talk so freely about "mobility", commanders in al Amarah were given the choice of "Snatch" Land Rovers, Warriors at 35 tons or Challengers at 60 tons plus, both of the latter being tracked vehicles. When the Land Rovers proved too vulnerable to use, they had no option but to resort to vehicles far heavier than the Mastiffs of which Axe so volubly complains.

Nevertheless, it was in that context that, in the following year, Labouchere evacuated the base, whereupon it was handled to the Iraqi Army but immediately taken over by Mehdi supporters and ransacked. The leader of the militias, Moqtada al-Sadr, declared this a great victory and claimed to have driven the British "occupiers" out of town. All Labouchere had done was send out a signal that, if the British were attacked heavily and often enough, they would run away.

Predictably, therefore, far from quelling the insurgency, Labouchere's action fuelled it. The action moved to Basra, where bases started coming under increasingly heavy attack. And, in each case, the Army responded not by seeking out and destroying the attackers but by repeating the Labouchere strategy of "running away". Progressively, the bases at the Old State Building, the Shaat al Arab Hotel, the Joint Provincial Coordination Centre and Shaiba were vacated, leaving only the outpost at Basra Palace and the air base outside the city.

It cannot therefore have been a surprise that Basra Palace then came under sustained siege, with resupply missions becoming more and more hazardous. Without the wherewithal to deal with the attacks, the British forces conceded defeat and evacuated their last base in the city.

It is thus fair to say that, far from a failure to get "closer to the local populace", this strategy of progressive retreat under fire represented a sustained failure to deal with the attacks on the bases. As to the Mastiffs, the real problem was that they arrived too late and in insufficent numbers to affect the outcome. There was a desperate need to restore mobility to the streets, allowing the troops to get to various locations (then to patrol on foot) without unsustainable casualty levels.

That is where Axe has it so wrong. He argues that American leaders abandoned the firepower-heavy approach for time-honoured counterinsurgency tactics adopted by the British. He claims that was the basis for General David Petraeus' "surge" campaign which has significantly reduced sectarian violence in Baghdad since January 2007. But he fails to understand that the surge itself was underwritten by the restoration of mobility, brought about by the rapid programme of introducing protected vehicles. Protection is not about firepower – it is about stopping troops getting killed by insurgents in order that they can then do their work.

This is also where Michael Yon goes wrong. Totally reliable on the detail of the conduct of day-to-day operations – and much respected for his accounts - he accepts the current Army narrative that a retreat from Basra was the best option as the Army had now become part of the problem.

Last August, though, before the retreat, Colonel Bob Stewart - styled as "former UN commander of British troops in Bosnia" - was interviewed by the BBC. Paraphrased, his view was that the reason why we were taking the casualties – which eventually forced our evacuation – was because we "cannot dominate the ground". The options, he said, were to retake and dominate the ground, or abandon it.

In the final analysis, we could not do the former without sustaining unacceptable casualties - a chicken and egg sitation - so we had to do the latter. But it was not a "victory" or even a success.

While it is all very well, therefore, for Axe to pontificate about the shortcomings of protected vehicles now that we have finally retreated from Basra Palace (pictured) and hunkered down in the last bastion at Basra Air Station, one of the reasons why we could not dominate the ground was because our troops had not been issued with vehicles like the Mastiff, in which they could move around safely. Contrary to Axe's assertions, it was the absence of protected vehicles early in the campaign, rather then their limited presence now, that has been instrumental in the defeat of the British Army.

And, although Axe was confining his remarks to Iraq, much of what applied (or should have applied) to Iraq also applies to Afghanistan. There, at least, the Army has not made all the mistakes that it so egregiously made in the Iraqi campaign, but its continued used of the WIMIK and the equally vulnerable Pinzgauers (both the unarmoured versions and the Vector), suggests it still has a great deal to learn.

COMMENT THREAD

Carrier programme delayed?

Some agencies and other sources, including DefenseNews, are reporting that the MoD is considering delaying the Royal Navy’s £3.9 billion carrier programme for up to 18 months or longer.

The Press Association on the other hand is reporting, "Green light for Navy carriers plan" saying that the Royal Navy's two new aircraft carriers will go ahead as planned "despite a delay in signing the contract". This is according to an official MoD release that says there has been a "slight delay" while the joint venture between BAE Systems and the VT Group, which will build the ships, was established as a legal entity.

Speculation nevertheless remains rife that the project is being held back, to "help plug a yawning hole in the defence budget", an assertion made by DefenseNews, suggesting that partners in the BAE Systems-led alliance “have been asked to look at ways of adjusting the spending profile on the program to help overcome cash shortages at the MoD over the next three years.”

Quoting an unnamed industry source, the journal says that, "One option being considered is continuing the design work but delaying cutting metal by 12 months. Another is to freeze the program entirely for 18 months." That same source adds that, "The former would just be tenable, but the latter would likely kill the programme". Another source, however, is indicating that the programme could be delayed by as much as five years.

This speculation adds fuel to the more general claims that the MoD is running seriously short of money and that one or other of its major projects are to be cancelled or heavily trimmed back.

However, what lends credence to suspicions that something is going on, beyond mere juggling with cash-flow is an earlier report in The Financial Times which notes that "higher depreciation and impairment charges on equipment" as a result of their heavy use in Iraq and Afghanistan is heavily eroding the disposable MoD budget, leaving it with only 0.9 percent real increases for day-to-day expenditure, rather than the headline 1.5 percent.

However, as one would expect, damage limitation – if that is what it is – is in full swing with "people close to the [carrier] talks" stressing that discussions were "part of the MoD's wider review of its equipment programme" and that no final decision had been made.

However, given the political sensitivity of the carrier issue, and the fact that the Royal Navy has staked so much on getting these two ships, the favourite for a cutback still looks like being FRES, which seems to have disappeared from sight altogether. Politically, it may be easier to cut this low-profile project, replacing it with some immediate high-visibility armoured vehicle projects, than it will be to take the Royal Navy head on.

What this current round of speculation might indicate though, is that the MoD has seriously underestimated the effect of wear and tear on its current inventory and is having to find large amounts of cash simply to keep equipment operational.

The lack of a specific programme contrasts strongly with the US Reset programme costed at estimated $13 billion, aimed at restoring and upgrading their own equipment.

It will be ironic if the need for maintaining existing equipment forces the MoD to delay its high profile projects, with the carriers held back to allow current forces to continue operating.

But then, with the projected in-service already set back to 2014 and 2016 - two years later than was originally envisaged – this may be a problem for a government of a completely different colour, so the temptation to delay spending now might seem extremely attractive.

COMMENT THREAD

Yet another WIMIK

British troops casualties, for the moment, remain mercifully low, reflecting the lower intensity of operations in Iraq and the seasonal lull in campaigning in Afghanistan. There is also, most decidedly, an effect attributable to the introduction of the Mastiff protected vehicles, which are acknowledged life savers.

It is thus the case that the more recent casualties have not occurred during direct engagements but in ambush scenarios, either through mines or IEDs – a phenomenon we have observed in the Canadian sector. And those deaths that do occur have often been attributable to the inadequacy of the vehicles with which troops are equipped.

Fully aware of the sensitivity of this issue, however, the MoD – pending the introduction of new protected vehicles, the details of which we are still awaiting – have come up with the disarmingly simple expedient of simply not identifying vehicle types when they report deaths.

This was the case with the most recent death in Afghanistan, that of Sergeant Lee Johnson, on 8 December. In this case, as so often, he was killed by an "explosion" while travelling in a vehicle, but the type was not disclosed and it was only in a subsequent Sunday Times report that we learned that the vehicle had been a Pinzgauer Vector.

Days before the death of Sergeant Johnson, however, there had been reported – on 5 December – the death of another soldier in Afghanistan, Trooper Jack Sadler of the Honourable Artillery Company. He had been serving with the elite 4/73 Special Observation Battery, Brigade Reconnaissance Force, while on a gap year between successfully gaining a degree in war studies and entering Sandhurst.

Again in the official report of his death mention was made of a vehicle being "caught in an explosion" but once again there was no mention of the type.

Thus, the death of a promising young man was recorded but, with details of his and other soldiers' deaths being withheld, no outside observer was able to build up a picture of how the Army equipment programme was failing our troops. And with no such information available, media interest was short-lived and confined to the facts of individual cases, with no general inferences being drawn.

However, the truth will out and we have recently learned that Trooper Sadler was riding in a WIMIK Land Rover. Not only that – as with the now celebrated Lance Bombardier Ben Parkinson who lost both legs and suffered terrible injuries when his WIMIK hit a mine – Sadler was the machine gunner, manning the weapon in the rear of the vehicle.**

With over a month passed between his death and the emergence of this detail, though, we are dealing with "old news" and the media will have little interest in the case. But here we have, yet again with dreary predictability, another totally unnecessary death. And the fact that it was so unnecessary, occasioned by completely inadequate equipment, has passed by the media, kept in the dark by the MoD.

Behind the scenes though, there is a growing band of relatives – mainly parents and wives – who have seen through this subterfuge. Rightly, they are angry and, like us, they want answers. They will not be denied.

** The vehicle shown is Italian-operated, but it shows clearly how little protection there is. In this case, the gunner seems to be standing on some bricks, possibly placed to afford some protection from mine blasts. In Rhodesia, Aden and elsewhere, it was common practice to line vehicle beds with sandbags for that purpose.

COMMENT THREAD

More Reapers

Reported by us in November was the arrival of the first of three British operated MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Afghanistan. And, so impressed have been the military with their performance that now, the MoD is bidding for an additional ten.

The total package cost, including the sensors, communications equipment and nine Lynx ground scanning radar sets, technically designated as "Synthetic Aperture Radar/Ground Moving Target Indicator (SAR/GMTI) systems" – complete with support and training – is in the order of £500 million. This makes the package a considerable and welcome investment in the Afghanistan campaign.

The event is covered by The Daily Telegraph today, which notes that (with satellite relays) the aircraft could be directed by an operator in London, and "can drop laser-guided bombs or missiles on to Taliban targets".

It is also covered in detail by Lewis Page in The Register, who notes the "interesting bells'n'whistles on MoD shopping list", including the Lynx ground scanning moving-target radar (pictured). This equipment is, in fact, is incredibly sophisticated kit, configured to produce high resolution imagery akin to high-resolution photographs (pictured below left).

With a range of up to 50 miles, it also has all-weather capability, with the ability to penetrate fog (a problem at Musa Qala), cloud and even dust storms. And such is the sensitivity that it can even detect "small surface penetrations" such as footprints in a soft terrain.

When it comes to equipment, this is simply the best there is of its kind and, while the Telegraph makes great play of the Predator's weapons-carrying capabilities – calling them "drone bombers" from the look of the package, it seems these UAVs are to be used primarily for surveillance.

What both the Telegraph and the Register miss, therefore, is that these unmanned aircraft partially replace and certainly supplement the hard-pressed Nimrod MR2 aircraft currently deployed on Afghanistan. That the MoD should be seeking to purchase them so soon after the Nimrod inquest is probably not a coincidence. One question that could be asked, therefore, is why this capability was not sought earlier.

Another interesting thought is that these UAVs offer a not dissimilar capability to the RAF's Sentinel R1, the so called "Airborne Stand-Off Radar" (ASTOR).

Although ordered in 1999 – at a procurement cost of just over £1 billion - with the five scheduled for delivery by the end of last year, operational deployment is not expected until the end of 2008. But it is understood that there are some development problems with the aircraft, and this may explain why the current batch of Predators is to be procured under the Urgent Operational Requirement system.

Either way, this is good news for the RAF, better for the Army and seriously bad news for the Taleban.

COMMENT THREAD

A gap in the market

After a prolonged Christmas break from defence issues, we return with a report from the Canadian Globe and Mail which may have profound implications for our defence planners generally, and especially those concerned with the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES), an announcement on which is expected sometime early in this year.

The report is of yet another tragic IED outrage, headed, "Roadside blast kills Canadian outside Kandahar", noting that this was the first casualty which occurred at the very end of December – since mid-November.

That in itself is a testament to the Canadian efforts to detect IEDs, not that this was any consolation to the soldier who was killed and the four others injured as their convoy was heading back from the front lines for a long-awaited New Year's break.

One significant issue from the point of view of our own planners is that the vehicle in which the troops were travelling was a TLAV (Tracked Light Armoured Vehicle - pictured), an upgraded M-113, very similar to our own F432, on which the Bulldog is based.

This reaffirms yet again the vulnerability of "conventional" armoured vehicles to IEDs and – as so often – we do not have any details of the nature or size of the bomb, we can assume that because one soldier was killed and the others survived (apparently, the other four casualties suffering light injuries), this was probably survivable in a better-armoured MRAP such as the RG-31 or Mastiff/Cougar.

Another significant issue is that this convoy was hit as it was conveying troops from their forward operating base back to their main base, where they were due to get a few days rest and relaxation.

The Globe and Mail report describes the roadside bomb attack as speaking to "the kind of invisible enemy the Canadian Forces face as they push deeper into insurgent territory in the south." Insurgents, the paper adds, often prefer to fight by stealth rather than along front lines.

This is becoming something of a trend as we see remarkably light casualties suffered during actual operations, the main burden being suffered as troops travel to and from the fighting areas, along relatively predictable routes. Thus, while the vehicles in which troops travel may be adequate for the specific operations they conduct, they do not appear to be affording the protection needed during transit.

What is especially significant here is that the TLAV was introduced in theatre by last year as a partial replacement for the wheeled LAV-3s, as well as Bison armoured carriers deployed by Canadian forces. One reason for this is that the harsh environment and the operational load has caused excessive wear on the vehicles, so extensive that many are having to be returned to Canada for extensive maintenance, amounting virtually to complete rebuilding.

This, incidentally, is going to be a major issue with British forces in the coming year, as much of the equipment in use is suffering similar deterioration and is going to require similar extensive maintenance, denting the already stretched defence budget.

That the TLAVs were available, therefore, meant that they could be quickly deployed, but there was another reason. The wheeled armoured vehicles, were apparently having some difficulties in negotiating the rough terrain in theatre, and in particular, found some of the irrigation ditches which criss-cross the area almost impassable (pictured, above and right). The provision of tracked vehicles, with their better off-road performance, was therefore seen as a tactical necessity.

This move has been much applauded with attention drawn to an article comparing the relative merits of tracked and wheeled armoured vehicles.

The upshot is that where a vehicle's mission requires off-road usage greater than 60 percent and gross vehicle weight exceeds 10 tons, a tracked configuration is preferred for combat roles. Furthermore, tracked vehicles, by design, are inherently more compact than wheeled vehicles, giving them a smaller silhouette, enhancing their survivability in a conventional battle.

It is that very compactness, though, bringing them closer to the ground, which makes them vulnerable to IEDs. As much as anything, it is the high ground clearance of the MRAP, with its v-shaped hull, which gives protection, the force of the explosion attenuating with the square of the distance. Additionally, while an explosion can shatter a track, leaving a tracked vehicle immediately immobile, MRAPs with their run-flat tyres often can survive explosions with some (limited mobility), sufficient to drive clear of the killing zones.

Pity the poor defence designers then. For conventional operations, their best option is a low-profile tracked vehicle. For counter-insurgency work, where the IED is employed as a major weapon, they need a wheeled vehicle with high ground clearance, giving the profile of a London bus. But, since – and especially in Afghanistan - vehicles can be used for both types of operation, there is no such thing as an optimum design.

Certainly - and here is the rub with FRES – there is no such thing as a dual-purpose design. If it is good for one role, it has to be, by definition, inadequate for the other. And a compromise design means its it sub-optimal for both.

However, if we go back in time, one of the major US tanks in the immediate post-war period was the M-48 which was developed into the M-60. That was considered a less than optimal design for its height, the reason being… a v-shaped hull (pictured - underside is of a model). In that, even in Afghanistan where some of the fighting approaches that of conventional warfare, tactical concealment is rarely an issue, which suggests a deploying a high-profile tracked vehicles would not be unduly problematic.

Given the fate of the Canadian TLAV, of Bradleys and Warriors in Iraq, and USMC Amtraks – and Vikings in Afghanistan - it seems there is a gap in the market for a tracked MRAP along the lines of the M-48/60 design.

COMMENT THREAD