In our stead

The lottery of death and mayhem that characterises the campaign in Afghanistan has this time cast its shadow on two Estonian soldiers, Eerik Salmus and Raivis Kang, both 26 (pictured). They died on Sunday after their unit came under fire while clearing explosives from a road in Nad-e-Ali.

Their deaths are in addition to the loss of a US soldier, but they will not be equally mourned. The US contingent will look after its own but, the deaths of the Estonians, as part of a small contingent serving a small nation, will be largely unregarded outside their own country.

The point is though that the Estonians, highly regarded and respected, are an integral part of the British command, working alongside British troops, supporting them and sharing the risks. And, working in Nad-e-Ali – the focus of Operation Panther's Claw – they were performing tasks that would otherwise have had to be done by British soldiers (or Danes). It could so easily, therefore, have been British casualties that were recorded.

There is a tendency, however, both with the MoD and in the media, to treat the deaths of "foreigners" as somehow less important as our own. Yet these troops are our coalition allies, working alongside us, dying for the same cause.

One would expect the media to display its usual narrow parochialism, but there is no excuse for the MoD. Since it regards part of its duty, the promulgation of casualty details on its website, it should record the passing of two soldiers who were also serving under British command. There is equality of risk – there should be equality in death. We owe them that.

COMMENT THREAD

They were in a Mastiff

In The Observer today we find published extracts from the diary of a soldier engaged in Operation Panther's Claw. As well as recording his experiences, the account provides a valuable insight into the thinking of one soldier as he grappled with the news of colleagues terribly injured and killed by the growing menace of IEDs.

He himself is shot in the chest and has to be evacuated, but he also finds himself twice in a Viking struck by IEDs. On these occasions, all troops inside survived.

Clearly conscious of the IED threat (he could hardly be otherwise) he asks why the Army does not have more sniffer dogs, suggesting that finding IEDs would be "a lot easier with a furry friend running about and a lot more lives would be saved." He observes that, since arriving, he has not seen one dog.

The pertinence of this observation is reinforced when he learns that another soldier has been killed in an explosion while searching for IEDs. The soldier also observes that, "We are so spread out and overstretched on the ground and it means the Taliban are taking the piss. They can lay these IEDs at fucking will. We are not there at the moment to put out ops or sniper over-watch and the Taliban know it."

Several points emerge from these observations. Firstly, as one might expect – this is not a criticism – the man is interpreting what he sees from his own very narrow perspective.

Thus, while he is clearly aware of the utility of sniffer dogs, he has not necessarily thought the issue through – that in a "kinetic" environment (which this certainly was) dogs and their handlers are extremely vulnerable and tend to be targeted by the Taleban.

As to "ops or sniper over-watch" to counter the IED emplacers, that is an infantry response but, in the context of this overall operation, we have already observed that this was an ideal role for UAVs and, in this piece noted:

In that Panther's Claw is a "deliberate operation" – i.e., one that was planned and executed in an area of choice - the fact that the Taleban had laced the area with IEDs could perhaps have been pre-empted. Not least, troops could have been provided with far more knowledge of their locations and extent than they seem to have been.

Our soldier also writes of being told that a checkpoint spotted "two males lying prone and digging on the track where we keep getting hit." In this instance, he reports with disgust, "...we only fired warning shots at them. Another wasted opportunity." Indeed.

In other instances, we have seen reports of the lethal effect on bomb emplacers of the combination of UAV surveillance and airpower and one wonders why such assets could not have been employed here.

But in another diary entry, we read this appalling observation:

We have spent all that money on a new bomb-proofish vehicle but you've still got four blokes with metal detectors out at the front of it and one commanding them. Sometimes I just don't get it. We need to invest in better bomb detection equipment and get more dogs out here. Surely there is something that we can use to trigger bombs off early?

And, of course, there is. Earlier, we reported on these self-same "primitive" British mine/IED clearance methods, compared with their US counterparts, noting that the USMC were equipped with a 10-vehicle clearance team that included a vehicle equipped with a mine roller, pushed ahead to detonate pressure-pad actuated mines and IEDS, a Husky mine detection vehicle and a number of MRAPs, all manned by specialist combat engineers.

Later, we then noted how the British deficiency had been made up by borrowing "an American anti-explosive unit, Task Force Thor, with specialised vehicles, sweeping the road ahead for the ever-present threat of bombs."

The soldier's comment, where he calls for investment in such kit, displays his own ignorance. The MoD has invested in some of this kit, announced last October as "Project Talisman". A better question, therefore, might have been why the investment was made so late – a question which the media could be asking, but have never bothered with.

The results of this lack of investment have all too often been tragic, but on one occasion the soldier is able to report better news. He is told that two casualties had been flown in, their vehicle hit by a 40kg IED. One "had a bad arm" and that other "his vertebrae done". "They were in a Mastiff," writes our soldier, "that's why they survived. They were both very lucky. The Mastiffs are worth their weight in gold."

Compare and contrast this with the experience of Pte Richard "Hunty" Hunt, as recorded by Sean Rayment in The Sunday Times. As the driver of a Warrior, he was protected by several tons of metal but, as it trundled along a river bed, en route to the main British base at Musa Qala, his vehicle, the 11th in a convoy of 30, hit an IED.

Such was the force of the blast that Pte Hunt's head was smashed against the side of the Warrior. Even though he was wearing a helmet, the impact caused immediate brain damage. Close to death, he was taken to the field hospital at Camp Bastion, where surgeons fought to keep him alive long enough so that he could be flown home to spend his final hours with his family.

Our soldier, of course, was luckier. With his chest wound, he was flown home on a medical flight. There are, he writes, "blokes with no legs on board." He sits next to one lad who is completely deaf. Another tells him he has been hit with IEDs four times while inside a Viking and he's just had enough, too frayed to get inside another vehicle.

It would be facile to suggest that he should have been in a Mastiff, and that mine clearance/detection teams should have preceded him. But the diary of our soldier does suggest very much that our troops are not getting the deal they deserve.

COMMENT THREAD

Bogged down

In an exchange with a military expert yesterday, one who describes himself as having made a good living critiquing UK MOD programmes, we agreed that the MoD – and the military generally (it is hard to draw a clear line between divisions and responsibilities) – is "essentially incompetent".

You have to look no further for confirmation of this than in today's Sunday Times, which has been able to get hold of a full copy of the 296-page Gray report on defence procurement.

Featured briefly by Channel 4 earlier this month, with the benefit of far more detail the paper is able to tell us that the scale of MoD bungling is so severe it "is harming our ability ... to conduct difficult current operations".

Using blunt language not normally seen in official documentation, the report by Bernard Gray, a former senior MoD adviser, talks of "lethal" weakness in government programmes and failings so bad they "cause damage to UK military output".

The report goes on to claim that, on average, new equipment arrives five years late and costs 40 percent more than first estimated. The MoD equipment programme is £35 billion over budget and – most damning – the MoD's incompetence is helping our enemies who "are unlikely to wait for our sclerotic acquisition systems to catch up".

The management is so poor, the projects so expensive and many items so out of date by the time they arrive that one defence expert is reported as saying sarcastically: "The system is failing to produce the equipment we don't need."

The Sunday Times gives the report full treatment, with an additional feature-length article and a leader.

Interestingly, the paper notes that Labour politicians, including Gordon Brown, have insisted that the money is available for British forces to have what they need to fight the Taliban but, it says, the MoD is so incompetent at procuring equipment that billions of pounds are being wasted, the wrong systems are being ordered and soldiers' lives are being put at risk.

Also of great interest, Gray dismisses claims — often made by Labour ministers — that cost overruns relate to projects inherited from the last Conservative government. "The analysis of the data suggests that the problems are widespread, affecting projects old and new, large and small, to a greater or lesser extent," he says.

However, The Sunday Times, in its own journalistic way, then seeks to makes political capital out of this. But to attach the whole blame to ministers is a travesty. The report does not do it. It focuses at least as much or more on senior military officers either working on procurement or making strategic decisions about procurement. In particular, it criticises inter-service rivalry, lack of commercial competence and other issues which drag the system down.

Despite this, Liam Fox and other politicians are given their say, making their usual party political points. They miss the point. The problems with the MoD are structural, spanning administrations and even generations. As it stands, the MoD is not so much out of control as beyond control. The last Conservative administrations failed to get to grips with the problems, the current Labour administration has failed and there is no indication whatsoever that the next Conservative administration will fare any better.

However, comprehensive though the Times report might be, this only deals with one aspect of the defence activity. As we have remarked previously, the military is equally sclerotic when it comes to devising and updating doctrines and, as one of our recent posts might indicate, lethally slow when it comes to adjusting tactics to deal with the realities of the battlefield.

Small anecdotes tend to confirm this. Recently, a soldier, who had completed tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan, found himself being instructed by seniors in tactics and procedures which had long been discarded in theatre, then being required to become proficient in them for his promotion examination.

Across the board, therefore, we are looking at an institution (or institutions) which are basically incapable of dealing with a lean, adaptive enemy such as the Taleban, and which will always be left floundering, behind the curve, as it has so often been.

It is on that basis that I came to the conclusion that we cannot win this conflict, and we should therefore withdraw.

I have searched my heart and conscience long and very hard on this matter and while, intellectually, I remain convinced that this war is winnable, I cannot convince myself that our military, as an institution – saddled with its own corporate inertia and the incompetence of the MoD – is up to the task. It can no longer conduct effective operations and gain operational and thus strategic success.

On this, it would appear, I am in tune with public sentiment – if not necessarily for the same reasons. In a Mail on Sunday poll, more than two-thirds of respondents (69 percent) want our troops withdrawn from Afghanistan. Only 31 percent believe the mission is worthwhile.

Downing Street advisers, we are told, had hoped that the prime minister could swing public support back behind the war by making the strategic objectives clearer. But 74 percent claim to understand the government's objectives, implying that they do not think them worthwhile or achievable.

Previous polls, this paper reminds us, have shown opinion to be evenly split on the issue. It thus suggests the milestone of 200 British deaths, passed a week ago, has proved a tipping point. That is probably the case and sentiment, at least under this administration, is probably irrecoverable. It is unlikely even that the incoming government will be able to claw back support, especially if we see the casualty rate continue to climb.

Personally, I do not know what it would take to convince me that the mission is worth the grief, and I doubt very much whether there exists within the MoD the ability to make the case that would bring people back on board.

In October 2007 the CDS was admitting in respect of Iraq that the government as a whole – including himself - had not communicated the strategic position very well. They have done no better with Afghanistan and now appear to have left it too late. They are so bogged down in their own incompetence that they cannot even dig themselves out of their hole.

COMMENT THREAD

Fine words ...

"I find it so distressing to hear lavish praise being heaped upon the procurement of vehicles that are potential death-traps and to listen later to expressions of condolence to the families of those who have perished in them."

So said Ann Winterton in a debate in the House of Commons on 4 June this year, but her distress might easily apply to the expressions so freely offered (and repeated) every time troops are killed.

"Fine words butter no parsnips" – a phrase which seems to have its origins in antiquity - seems an appropriate response to these gushing outpourings, so easily trotted out every time a soldier is killed.

Thus we see, yet again, the MoD website tell us that: "It is with great sadness" that it must confirm that one soldier from 3rd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's) and one soldier from 2nd Battalion The Rifles have been killed in Afghanistan.

The soldiers, we are told, died as a result of an explosion that happened whilst on a routine foot patrol, not connected to election security, near Sangin, northern Helmand province, on the morning of Thursday 20 August 2009.

Yet the "great sadness" phrase is just words, pulled off from a standard MoD template, to be pasted in against the details of whichever incident is then current.

Even now, the media team are rushing around collecting statements from the colleagues and relatives of the deceased, to paste into the increasingly lengthy eulogies that are in the process of being written, but they too will be just words. They butter no parsnips – they do not bring the dead back to life and nor do they prevent troops yet to die from being killed.

Furthermore, built into the brief announcement from the MoD is a "lie" – a circumlocution, if one wants to be charitable. The incident happened while the troops were "on a routine foot patrol" says the MoD.

We saw this "routine patrol" lie in November 2006 when the MoD described the deaths of four military personnel on the Shatt al-Arab waterway in Iraq in terms of them being engaged in "a routine boat patrol".

In fact, they were in a "water taxi", sent to their deaths, wholly unprotected when it was thought that this was the safest way of transporting personnel between bases. It certainly was "routine" – and that is what killed them – but it certainly was not a "patrol". These were lambs led to the slaughter.

Nor indeed was this current incident a "routine patrol" – at least, not wholly. In fact, according to Thomas Harding of The Daily Telegraph, it was not one incident, but three. The first may have arisen from such an event, although the whole idea of a "routine" is an anathema in counter-insurgency. Routines kill, as they did on the Shatt al-Arab.

The first soldier, writes Harding, from the 3rd Bn The Yorkshire Regiment, a unit sent out as emergency reinforcements to Afghanistan last month after the very high casualty rate this summer, was killed instantly after his foot patrol was targeted.

The second soldier, from 2nd Bn The Rifles, died as a force was sent out to retrieve the body of their dead colleague. Then, as the remainder of the force attempted to evacuate both fatalities a third device went off. Two soldiers were wounded in addition to the two killed in the attack, bringing the total number of British fatalities in Afghanistan to 206.

These facts immediately elevate the incident into a different league. We note that the location is what we have called the mincer of Sangin and that these two deaths bring the total in this area to 57, and this year to 22, with nineteen of them arising from IEDs.

With the grand total of 206 fatalities now recorded, an estimated 176 of these are KIA, which has Sangin and its immediate environs accounting for nearly a third of all deaths in action (32.4 percent).

That, in itself, is remarkable, as the area is often cited as one of the government's key targets for its "co-ordinated delivery of military and civil effect". Its aim has been "to provide a secure environment to allow stabilisation activity to take place", an aim in which it seems singularly to have failed, despite numerous intensive operations - although the MoD claims otherwise, one observer "noting" that ISAF is making "small baby steps" that, if continued, will soon pick up greater pace and confidence.

But what has marked out the most recent casualties – and magnified the rate of attrition – is the Taleban tactic of employing multiple IEDs in complex traps, with secondary devices aimed at killing rescue parties when they come to the aid of those caught in the primary blast.

With this current incident, this is the fourth time in the Sangin area since 10 July that troops have been caught out with fatal effect. That is not to say that similar tactics are not being used by the Taleban elsewhere – they are. Earlier this month we saw a soldier killed near Gereshk (although not so very far from Sangin) when he sought to recover an Afghan soldier's body. Then there was the incident in December 2008 when a soldier was killed after a complex ambush on a Viking near Lashkar Gah.

From other reports, though, it would appear that complex IED ambushes are now theatre-wide, these also having been experienced by USMC patrols further south in Garmsir.

Nor indeed is the slaughter confined to British troops. While we have lost 15 so far this month, the total losses for all coalition forces have now reached 50, not so very far short of last month's rate, when the total reached 76.

Public (and therefore political) acceptance of this continued toll of fatalities – which admittedly by contrast with previous campaigns is relatively modest – requires us to trust that the Army knows what it is doing, and the casualties are a necessary and unavoidable consequence of war, all in the context of the military making progress towards achieving its aims.

Sensitised by the saga of the Snatch Land Rover, however, and many other subsequent episodes where it has been demonstrated that the military (with or without the dereliction of the MoD – and it is difficult to assess where the responsibility lies) has been somewhat cavalier in its responsibilities, we are less than convinced that the Army has a grip on the situation.

Looking down from this end of the telescope – lacking the context and broader appreciation of the campaign in Helmand – all we see is a progression of casualties, some of which are evidently caused by the same Taleban tactic, for which the Army seems to have no obvious counter.

The Army response (and that of so many of its fellow travellers) is to retreat behind the wall of OPSEC (operational security) oblivious to the very obvious fact that the enemy clearly knows a great deal about its operations, with so many others directing sneering condescension at those who have the temerity to question or even doubt the wisdom and professionalism of "Our Brave Boys".

So often are our soldiers cast as "heroes" that there is virtually a cultural taboo against offering even the mildest criticism of soldiers, even though there is nothing particularly heroic about being blown apart by a hidden IED, or having limbs ripped apart. In fact, it is a squalid, miserable way to go.

Somehow, though, the military – or perhaps the politicians – are going to have to come to terms with the legitimate, but often overstated demands of OPSEC, and the need to provide enough information to assure its critics that the Army is responding effectively to the different threats in theatre, and is taking them seriously.

Fine words are no longer good enough – if they ever were.

COMMENT THREAD

Chinook shot down

At the moment, even though the incident apparently happened last night, details are sketchy. We learn from Reuters that a British Chinook helicopter made an emergency landing in southern Afghanistan following an engine fire, but the crew escaped unhurt.

From the MoD website, we learn that the incident happened after two helicopters dropped off cargo and passengers a few miles north of Sangin. Shortly after take-off "the four-strong crew of one Chinook saw cockpit indications of an engine fire during take-off."

The pilots skilfully continued to manoeuvre the helicopter about 1km away from the "danger zone" (the MoD phrasing) "to safely make an emergency landing." All four crew onboard managed to evacuate the aircraft safely. They were recovered by the second helicopter which took them out of the area.

The MoD, initially, quite deliberately did not rule out enemy action, and have now confirmed that the aircraft was brought down by a combination of "RPG and small-arms fire".

Precisely what damage was caused has not been revealed, but a Chinook has a sophisticated and highly effective fire suppression system and, therefore, a straight engine fire should not present a catastrophic emergency. Furthermore, the engine casings are heavily armoured, which makes you wonder what sort of weapons were deployed. Then, the aircraft has a capability to fly on one engine, especially if it is lightly loaded, as was the case.

Interestingly, the extraction of the four crewmen was effected by the other Chinook, rather than relying on – say – the quick reaction force from Sangin (or even the troops who had just been dropped). One should not read too much into this, especially as the other Chinook was in the air over the scene, but in the event that the crew were uninjured, one might expect them to remain by their machine, pending either repairs or arrangements for recovery.

This brings in a fourth point, that the aircraft was subsequently destroyed by a coalition airstrike, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Taleban. This clearly indicates that it there was a significant enemy threat and that it was thought tactically inadvisable to commit ground troops to secure the area.

For such a high-value asset, the possibility of recovery would have been strongly considered – unless of course the aircraft was much more badly damaged than has been indicated, and was already deemed to be beyond economic repair.

In fact, that seems to have been the case. According to The Times, a Special Forces unit had disembarked with their kit only minutes earlier, but when the helicopter lifted off with just the four-man crew on board, it came under attack. The engine burst into flames and the crew had to fight the controls to make an emergency landing. "They managed to fly the Chinook forward 500 metres to reach a safe area before landing it," one MoD official says.

The "unrecoverable" helicopter was still on fire and a decision was taken to destroy it to prevent Taleban insurgents from seizing any of the equipment on board. A Nato bomber was called in and dropped a 500lb bomb on the wreckage.

The fact that it was destroyed says a great deal about the strength of the coalition grip in the area, where a considerable number of operations have been mounted to "chase out" the Taleban. Normally, the preference would be to secure the site, even if the aircraft was destroyed, in order to carry out a crash investigation.

That this aircraft was downed as result of enemy action comes as no surprise. Since April, we have been aware of a deliberate Taleban strategy to down a Chinook, with it becoming very obvious that these helicopters were targets.

Further evidence came with the downing of the Mi-26 in July, followed by an initial announcement by the Taleban that they had shot down a Chinook, when it was even more evident that the enemy was aiming for a "spectacular". Fortunately – the aircraft downed was empty, and no one was hurt. The Taleban still have not succeeded, but it is quite obvious that they are trying.

If as a result of all this, helicopter re-supply to forward areas is considered too dangerous, this will impose considerable extra strain on resources, as may already be happening. But it also calls into question the prevailing narrative that more helicopters are the answer to reducing troop casualties.

As we have pointed out, again and again, more helicopters operating in a highly insecure environment, could simply expose troops to a different kind of risk, with the possibility of casualties in the 40s. That would be a "game changing" event, creating huge political pressure for withdrawal.

This loss, therefore, could have significant implications for on-going operations and raises serious questions as to the overall tactics of "take and hold". Already, we have seen complaints of the huge "percentage of time and effort sucked up into the black hole" of orchestrating road moves, simply to re-supply outposts. The situation could be about to get a whole lot worse.

COMMENT THREAD

Coincidence?

In July, we reported the shooting down of a Mi-26 as it was delivering supplies to the British military base at Sangin.

Now we learn from the MoD website that a convoy stretching for five miles and consisting of more than one hundred UK, US and Afghan National Army vehicles set off recently to resupply coalition bases in northern Helmand.

The 116-vehicle convoy, one of the biggest to ever leave Camp Bastion, was travelling a dangerous 40 miles to bases in the Sangin Valley via the outskirts of Gereshk and then off-road through open desert. It took a full day to get to the first base, with a Manoeuvre Operations Group [MOG] in Vikings acting as a screen for the convoy and clearing the path ahead (one of which took an IED hit).

The road convoy was mounted, incidentally, at a time that the US forces are increasingly relying on airlift. Since 2005, there has been an 800 percent increase in air drops – from two to three per week to seven to eight per day. In July, the USAF made 1,700 air drops over Afghanistan. That is the most since the start of the Afghan conflict, in 2001.

Given the considerable manpower required to mount extensive road convoys and the danger of attack, one would have thought that the British would be keen to use helicopters as force multipliers. But then, with 20 tons of lift capacity having been taken out, and the situation obviously very dangerous in Sangin, here we see land convoys being mounted.

Of course, this could be a coincidence. It could be that the British have so many troops that they are short of things to do with them.

COMMENT THREAD

A bit bloody late

It was in December 2006 that we published our own "shopping list" for new equipment to fight the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of which addressed the urgent need for better surveillance capabilities.

To give him his due, on 27 February 2007 Chris Bryant, who had then recently been to Basra Air Station, asked in Parliament what was to be done to ensure that we have better ISTAR — intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.

On 21 March 2007, we offered "cheap and cheerful" options for achieving improved surveillance. Like Bryant, our comments went unreported.

Then, on 22 April 2008, we were writing about Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, observing how difficult it is to get the USAF "old guard" to change its ways, and address the realities of fighting counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

He was addressing officers at the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, telling them that the US military needed more UAVs and equipment to collect intelligence and conduct surveillance in Iraq despite a big boost in those capabilities since 2001.

On 5 August 2008, I was writing of complaints, voiced in The Daily Telegraph that the MoD has been "slow to appreciate' potential of drone aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan". To that, I ventured that we would say, in a voice laden with irony, "You don't say!" We might also add the question, "what took you so long to notice?"

However, it was on 4 December 2007 that I had written, in the specific context of securing adequate surveillance assets: "Until and unless we start getting grown-up discussions ... we are going to get nowhere."

There has been very little in the way of grown-up discussions since, certainly not in the British media, but now we get The Daily Telegraph picking up on Gen Dannatt's call for 24 hour surveillance in Afghanistan.

This follows his "shopping list" of more equipment he delivered last month, and we are now told that his demand for more surveillance systems is his most explicit yet. Sir Richard wants an increase in resources for Britain’s Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) programme, "a network of planes and unmanned drones that collect images and listen in on enemy forces."

As the same time, a document submitted to the Commons defence committee, has the MoD admitting that it does not have enough ISTAR specialists. "Manning shortfalls in these groups vary widely and may apply at different levels within a trade group. The ones of particular concern from the point of view of current operations are linguists, human intelligence operators, image analysts and Royal Engineer (geographic) and manning shortfalls in these areas range from 10 per cent up to around 40 per cent."

Then, in evidence to the committee, senior military officers expressed concern about the shortage of ISTAR specialists in Afghanistan. Brigadier Kevin Abraham, Director Joint Capability at the MoD described the staff shortages as "a serious challenge" to ISTAR operations.

With the scene thus set for him, Liam Fox makes a foray into what for him is virgin territory. Despite having had hundreds of opportunities to raise the issue, in Parliament and elsewhere, only now does he finally observe that: "Good ISTAR capability, in addition to more helicopters, earning the trust of the local population and increased armour, is the best way to counter the IED threat. If there is a shortage of this capability, the Government must do everything it can to fill that gap."

He, the media, the military and, in particular, Gen Sir Richard Dannatt, could have been saying these things three years ago. They weren't. But, in his own intervention, David Cameron accuses ministers – and only ministers - of paying inadequate attention to the Afghan operation, saying the government must show more "focus" on the mission there. His remarks could, however, equally be addressed to his own defence team and also to the MoD and military.

Speaking personally – we are allowed to do this occasionally – I am getting tired of all this posturing. I take a great deal of flak from all and sundry, about not "being there", about my lack of military experience, about being "ill-informed" – and all the rest of the crap.

Yet I was writing seriously about the role of surveillance in counter-insurgency as early as November 2004 - getting on for five years ago – and have made over 70 references to the need for surveillance on this blog alone, with a particularly strong piece about equipping for counter-insurgency warfare in August 2006 and one in November 2006 on surveillance.

Then, in that November, I was complaining that "all we hear is silence". Now, all we hear is complaints from the very people whose voices we should then have been hearing. I think that I'm more than a little justified in saying they're a bit bloody late.

COMMENT THREAD

A smell of corruption

One of the most bizarre episodes most recently carried on this blog was the news of the Mi-26 crash in Sangin last month, not only for the dubious history of the operator, but also for the fact that the MSM did not touch the story.

However, there was a brief flurry of interest when later that month an Mi-8 crashed at Kandahar airbase, killing 16, but there was absolutely nothing written about the operator, Vertikal-T, which also has a very dubious history.

As to the British use of these helicopters, it is assumed, inter alia that these rather dubious operators were employed for their willingness to take risks and, especially, for their cheapness. However, it has also been admitted that the MoD does not deal directly with these operators but hires the helicopters through an intermediate company, Skylink, yet another operator with an extremely dubious history.

But what now emerges from unlikely source is the actual cost of these helicopters. This comes from a private background briefing note being used by MoD press officers for when they talk to the media about helicopters, where it is revealed that the contract "provides 340 hrs at a cost of around £3.9M per month" (figures the defence secretary would never give to Parliament).

The payments are for one Mi-26 and two Mi8s, the average working out at about £11,500 per hour. Now, another general assumption is that, for routine contracts, the MoD – all things being equal – goes for the cheapest bidder. And here is the rub.

This blog has sight of a formal offer made to the MoD for the supply of the same helicopter types, costed at £3,500 per hour for an Mi-8 and £6,000 per hour for an Mi-26. This would work out at considerably less than half the cost of the Skylink contract, potentially saving the MoD £2 million a month. However, the eastern European and Russian operators are known to offer their services at rates considerably below these figures, offering potentially even greater savings if they were employed directly instead of through Skylink.

Furthermore, other things were not equal. The bid seen by this blog included the services of ex-Nato force pilots, all of whom could be security cleared and who were willing to be vetted as a condition of their employment. The aircraft maintenance was to be supervised by western-certified mechanics, and the supplier, having already operated in Afghanistan, had an excellent safety record.

Not only was this bid rejected out of hand, it emerges from a recent AP backgrounder that not only do the helicopter operators employed by the British and Nato have very suspect safety records, with links to known illicit arms dealers, there are also serious security concerns.

This is freely admitted by one of the Russian operators, Valery Gabriel, who admits that "Russia is delighted to be involved with the supply contracts" through its nationals and its aircraft. Not only is it "big business" – with one supply contract to the US worth over $400 million a year - this makes the coalition forces increasing dependent on Russia, conferring obvious political advantages.

But Gabriel also adds that Russia's GRU, its military intelligence arm — believed to have close links with several Russian companies operating in Afghanistan — may also stand to benefit. "From a GRU standpoint, you have an extremely useful source — low-level but extremely useful intelligence," he said.

When asked what safety and security checks it carried out on the operators and the personnel who were delivering high-value supplies into UK military bases throughout Afghanistan, the MoD replied that they had no responsibility to carry out "due diligence" on subcontractors.

Mark Galeotti, a military and organized crime expert at New York University, ventures that companies such as the Toronto-based Skylink are often used as intermediaries to give an element of "plausible deniability" when "cowboy" operators are used – but the MoD is paying dearly for the privilege.

And when, in this case, nothing stacks up, with the MoD hiring sub-standard providers, with dodgy safety and security records, at more than twice the price of legitimate operators, there wafts gently into the nostrils that unmistakable smell of corruption. While the MoD is short-changing injured troops on compensation, someone, somewhere in the chain, is making a great deal of money.

Strangely though, the AP backgrounder – damning in its own right – has been ignored by the British media. Of the very few users that have published the complete piece, you can count the Tehran Times and The Moscow Times - as well as the New York Times.

That tells you something about our media. The stink is not confined to the corridors of power.

COMMENT THREAD

Media responsibility

It is easy to recall the squawks of media indignation when Gen Dannatt artfully explained that the reason for his travelling on a US Blackhawk helicopter during his tour of Helmand in July was that there was no British machine available.

Helicopters, of course, comprise only one aspect of the shortage of British equipment in theatre. There is equally a pressing need for specialist mine/IED detection and clearance vehicles, the first of which are not due to arrive until next year as part of project Talisman.

Given the carnage caused by IEDs, one might have thought that the media might show some interest in this vital deficiency, not least because this equipment – even more than helicopters – is needed to protect supply convoys and mounted troops as they go about their patrols.

However, despite US forces, the Canadians and now the French having acquired such equipment, the British media has been almost completely silent on this remarkable and dangerous lack of capability in the British Army.

Interestingly, we now see Kim Sengupta, of The Independent writing about Operation Tor Shadey, the last offensive by British and Nato forces to clear insurgent-held areas before this week's national elections.

Entirely with critical comment, though, he notes that the British convoy, moving through the night to the operational area was "a laborious affair", trailing behind "an American anti-explosive unit, Task Force Thor, with specialised vehicles, sweeping the road ahead for the ever-present threat of bombs."

This is the same Kim Sengupta who enthusiastically wrote up the debate on helicopters, but he (and his fellow hacks) is apparently completely unconcerned about the shortage of equally vital equipment.

Of course, Sengupta could have made this an issue, focusing his piece on a "shortage of IED clearance vehicles" which had forced the British to rely in US resources. But then, while helicopters are part of the "narrative", IED clearance equipment is not.

It is probably not unfair to assert that the media furore over helicopters has at least focused ministers' minds on the shortage of helicopter capacity, and perhaps ensured that machines will be brought to theatre a little earlier than they might have been.

If that is the case, then arguably, a similar furore over the criminal lack of specialised IED clearance vehicles could have had a similar effect. To that extent, it would not then be unfair to assert that the trivial, superficial and careless conduct of the media over such equipment is part of the problem.

Journalists do like to dish it out, and are ever so good at criticising all manner of people – especially defence ministers – who might offend them (or provide good copy). But one wonders whether they might also think about taking some responsibility for their own conduct.

COMMENT THREAD

Unacceptable attrition

Reflecting precisely a comment on our forum, we have Lt-Col William Pender (rtd) in the letters column of The Daily Telegraph today, making the essential point about the war in Afghanistan: either we fight it properly, or not at all. More specifically, he writes:

The fundamental question, both for the Government and for Nato (if it is to remain a meaningful alliance), is whether defeat of the Taleban and establishment of a stable, long-term democracy in Afghanistan really is a vital interest.

If it is vital, then since national security is the prime duty of any government, whatever it takes in manpower – but primarily willpower – from all Nato member nations, must be allocated to fulfilling this aim. If this means putting economies on a war footing – fine.

If, on the other hand, these aims are merely desirable rather than vital – and with governments led by politicians with no personal military experience, and more concerned with interest rates, credit crunches and unemployment – why, let them say so.

Then the nations that contribute combat troops can resign themselves to long-term attrition of their soldiers committed to an unwinnable war.

For "attrition", read feeding troops into a mincer, sustaining a never-ending toll of casualties for no strategic effect. In such a battle, with our small, expensive Army, we can never win against the unlimited manpower of the Taleban, sustained by a never-ending supply of young men from the North-West frontier. Even at an exchange rate of 1000-1 in our favour, we cannot win.

Iain Dale notes that "politics is upside down" when Sunny Hundal supports the war and EU Referendum says we should withdraw.

For the record, we support the war. But that support is conditional on it being prosecuted effectively, with clear objectives and some prospect of success. None of those conditions currently apply.

In our overnight post, we write of the tragic episodes where three foot patrols in Sangin in the space of just over a month are confronted with the same type of complex IED ambush, each suffering multiple casualties in exactly the same circumstances.

On a smaller scale, the Army response seems to mirror the tactics of the First World War when the Generals, having experienced the carnage of sending troops "over the top" to face the German machine guns – to be slaughtered in their tens of thousands - hit upon the new, "war winning" tactic - of doing exactly the same thing again.

In terms of this war, it is not the machine gun but the IED which is the decisive weapon. And, as in the First World War, we see an Army which is completely unprepared, both physically and intellectually, to deal with the threat.

Faced with the endless attrition arising from sending men out on foot patrol to confront IEDs which have been manufactured and emplaced on an industrial scale, the Army's tactic is simply to do exactly the same thing again, and again and again. We are not alone in being less than impressed with what passes for Army tactics.

The point is, of course, that the Taleban's use of the IED was expected and predicted - back in June 2006, when we arranged through Ann Winterton for the defence minister to be asked what he intended to do about it. The answer was not reassuring.

Only now, three years later, is the outgoing CGS at last taking the threat seriously. In a long interview with ITN yesterday (summarised here) Gen Dannatt "vows" to deliver swift retribution to sneak bombers who attack UK soldiers with deadly booby traps in Afghanistan.

He calls for his troops to be given better "technical" equipment to locate the devices and catch those responsible in the act so they can be eliminated and we are told that the General "has been forced to endure reports of death and injuries inflicted on those under his charge" by IEDs.

"IEDs are a critical issue at the moment. We need more technical equipment to have 24/7 surveillance and the ability to target these people and kill them, if necessary, when they are laying these devices," he says.

The (rhetorical) question is, where was Dannatt three years ago when the threat was being predicted but had not then materialised? Well, as we know, this "honest general" was obsessed with the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES).

Interviewed by RUSI in Summer 2006, he spoke of having "won the argument for the medium-weight equipments," predicting confidently that "we will have them." Even then, with "roadside bombs" ripping the heart out of his army in Iraq, IEDs were never mentioned.

With the Army three years behind the curve, there can be no "swift" retribution. It will take several years to devise the necessary countermeasures, equip and train the troops, deploy the equipment and introduce new tactics. The consequence is that, in the interim, the Army must cede the tactical initiative to the Taleban in order to minimise casualties, or sustain losses which would make continuation of the current campaign unacceptable.

The alternative, as Lt-Col William Pender writes, is to put the UK on a war footing, injecting massive resources into the campaign to overcome the years of neglect. If we had any confidence that this might happen, either under this or the next administration, then our view of the war would be different.

Devoting the necessary resources, however, is as politically unsustainable as bearing the current casualty rate. Brown is not going to do it, and neither is Cameron. For want of that, therefore, we must withdraw. There is no way out, other than to resign ourselves to long-term attrition of our soldiers committed to an unwinnable war.

And that simply is not acceptable.

COMMENT THREAD

Why we are losing

Anthony Loyd in Sangin reports for The Times on the latest fatal attack, which killed three soldiers and injured many more. He writes as follows:

As the dust cleared around them, revealing the terribly injured body of one of their comrades, the fusiliers knew that the horror might have only just begun.

Three of their number had died on Thursday in the same green zone south of Sangin — killed by a secondary device that exploded among soldiers trying to rescue the wounded from the first blast.

Shortly after first light on Sunday, the same was about to happen again, killing three more British soldiers and taking the death toll to 204.

As the troops of 3 Platoon, A Company, 2 Rifles battlegroup carried their casualty through reeds on the bank of the Helmand River towards ground that was clear enough for a medical helicopter to land upon, another blast ripped through them.

"I was blown on to my backside," said Sergeant-Major Pete Burney. "I thought, 'That's me then' but as I picked myself up I saw I hadn't a scratch. Then I realised we were among a belt of IEDs [improvised explosive devices]."

To his right he could see a medic, a woman who seconds earlier had been attempting to resuscitate the first casualty, but who had been blown past him and lay wounded on the ground. Another fusilier and a Royal Military Police corporal were injured. A fusilier lay dead among more IEDs.

The other incident to which Loyd refers happened on 13 August. But then there was the incident on 10 July when five died, again through a combination of a primary bomb and a secondary set to kill members of the rescue party.

To paraphrase Lady Bracknell, once may be regarded as a misfortune; twice looks like carelessness. Three times?

But we had exactly the same dynamic with Snatch Land Rovers. On 29 May 2005, L/Cpl Brackenbury is killed in a Snatch by a type of bomb then new to the British sector – the explosively formed penetrator (EFP) – against which the vehicle was defenceless. Three others are injured.

Then, on 6 June, an EFP "daisy chain" is discovered intact and successfully defused. It is taken away for forensic analysis, from which the Army confirms with no room for doubt that Snatch Land Rovers offer no protection at all to this type of device.

So what does the Army do? On 15 July it sends another Snatch patrol out into the same general area where the device is known to be used. Three soldiers are killed and two more injured. And then the Army does it again and again and again.

We are led to believe that the Army is manned by professionals – soldiers who know what they are doing. We can criticise the politicians freely, but not our "Brave Boys" who put their lives on the line.

So which politician was it that decided to send a foot patrol out into an environment where twice previously soldiers had encountered complex, multiple IED ambushes and experienced multiple casualties?

Or could we possibly surmise that this was an "operational" decision, just like the decisions to deploy Snatches into a territory where weapons were being deployed which rendered them defenceless?

And just how many times do soldiers have to walk into such traps before it dawns on someone that this is not a terribly good idea?

Incidentally, it was on 10 March 2007 that Anthony Loyd, soldier turned photographer and war correspondent, argued: "for once" an Afghan war is winnable, declaring that, "the tide is turning against the Taleban".

Some tide ... some Taleban.

COMMENT THREAD

A matter of interpretation

A tactical decision to pull some British units out of Sangin, in northern Helmand province, led to a surge in Taleban attacks in and around the town in which 14 British soldiers were killed by IEDs in five weeks.

Thus writes Michael Evans in The Times today, a report that can be interpreted at several levels.

The information comes from a "senior defence source", who says that to make up numbers for Operation Panther's Claw, units in Sangin were "thinned out". The Taleban had then suffered such heavy losses that they had looked elsewhere to see where they could inflict the most damage on British troops and selected Sangin for their attacks.

Ostensibly, this makes complete sense. That is what "guerrillas" do. If their enemy saturates one area with troops, the classic strategy is to move out and cause mayhem elsewhere.

That this was the dynamic at play is "confirmed" by Lt-Gen Simon Mayall. Commanders had used the resources available for the "main effort." "As a corollary, the Taleban moved elsewhere and they turned to Sangin," he says.

However, this may not be an accurate (or complete) explanation for what is happening. In Sangin this year, there have been 20 British fatalities. Six were killed prior to the start of Panther's Claw and 14 afterwards. But raw numbers do not tell the whole story.

Between 1 January and 19 June when the operation started, there were six attacks on British troops, giving rise to six fatalities. Three of the deaths were from shooting. Three were from IEDs.

After the start of Operation Panther's Claw, there were 14 deaths, but also six fatal attacks. The main difference was that all the attacks involved IEDs and three of them gave rise to multiple deaths: five, three and three respectively, accounting for 11 of the 14 deaths.

On the face of it, therefore, we are not seeing substantially increased Taleban activity in response to Panther's Claw, especially as half of the pre-19 June attacks took place in May, with one in early June.

What we are most definitely seeing, however, is a change in tactics. There is a greater reliance on the IED, with the use of multiple devices, and the sophisticated use of secondary devices, increasing the kill rate per attack.

Thus, while displacement of guerrilla activity is one thing, if the Taleban are increasing their kill rate for a roughly constant level of activity, this is a very much more serious development.

Unknown to us though is the number of unsuccessful attacks, those where injury and no deaths occurred, and those involving foreign nationals, which have not been factored into the story in The Times.

We do know from Michael Yon, however, that on 13 August, when three British soldiers were killed in one IED attack, there was another ambush which killed two interpreters. This was not recorded by the British media (or the MoD) – foreigners do not count.

This actually changes the arithmetic slightly, but we do not have enough information overall to draw definitive conclusions. But then, neither does The Times. Lt-Gen Mayall may know more, but he does not bring any facts to the table.

Crucially though, from what we know, we cannot assume that a reduction in troop levels in a particular location (and/or an increase elsewhere) is responsible for increased casualties. For all we know, more troops could have meant more patrols, more "targets" and more deaths. The precise situation, therefore, is not clear – to us, at least. It is a matter of interpretation.

COMMENT THREAD

Bring them home

It is almost painful to agree with The Guardian, but we do. It describes our adventure in Afghanistan as: "Mission impossible." It is.

That was never pre-ordained. It could have been different, and it could still be different, but it will not be. As we have watched the train wreck that masquerades as strategy in this benighted country, we have become more and more convinced that it is wrong – totally, completely, fundamentally wrong.

It cannot succeed. It will not succeed and the inevitable outcome is that, after the expenditure of much more of our treasure – which we can ill-afford – and the death of many more fine men (and, probably, some women), we will be forced into a humiliating retreat, dressed up as victory, leaving the country in no better a condition than when we found it – if not worse.

This is not a knee-jerk reaction to the "grim milestone" of now 200-plus deaths in theatre. We have seen this coming and were prepared for it. But, while the media talks glibly about the first hundred deaths having taken from 2001 to early 2008 to have been reached, with the next hundred taking 15 months, what few if any have commented on is the fact that, of those 100, just over 50 occurred in the last five months ... an effective doubling of the casualty rate.

Unless urgent action is taken on the ground by military commanders to minimise casualties, that is the continued fate of our soldiers – to fall to the combined threat of direct assault and, mainly, the unseen peril of IEDs, against which out military have no effective counter.

That was the action taken in Iraq, with a retreat to our bases inspired entirely by the need to keep the headline death rate down. It was a self-defeating strategy, ceding control to the militias and abandoning the population which needed and deserved our protection.

So it would be in Afghanistan, where a similar retreat would cede control to the Taleban and abandon any attempt to pacify and police the country. The alternative is to keep taking the casualties, and the current rate is politically unsustainable.

The British forces – and to a great extent all the coalition forces – are therefore caught in a deadly trap. On the one hand, they are locked in to an unworkable and fatally flawed strategy. If they attempt to implement it, the result will be unacceptable casualties.

On the other hand, if they prioritise on force protection, the strategy falls by the wayside and they achieve nothing, other than to see the violence escalate and the Taleban strengthen their hold. Either way, we lose – the Afghani people lose and the international community loses. We might just as well lose from the comfort and safety of the UK, with the troops back home polishing their toys, rather than in Afghanistan, polishing the next batch of coffins.

Consistently, on this and our sister blog, we have sought to offer advice on how to avoid this trap. This comes not from a reservoir of our own experience and knowledge of the area (we have, after all never been there). It comes instead from that ill-used and often misunderstood process of research and analysis.

We don't know the answers, but we know lots of people who do. By listening, researching, studying, distilling and – above all – analysing the dynamics of this conflict, certain basic principles emerge which are of unchanging value.

At the core of this is the central precept that "security" – the Holy Grail of our current endeavour – cannot be imposed on an unwilling or cowed population. It must emerge from them. Thus, the objective of a counter-insurgency campaign must be to create the conditions whereby the people themselves opt for security, and strive to achieve it, not as passive observers watching the manoeuvres of foreign troops, but as active participants.

Therein lies the fatal flaw in our strategy. By artificially creating a divide between "security" and "development", and making the latter dependent on the former – then seeking to impose security as a precursor to any further endeavour – we are setting ourselves up for failure.

Bizarrely, those involved with this train-wreck of a strategy cannot see the logical flaws of their own creation. All of them will happily chirp that there is "no military solution" to the insurgency. Yet, they say, the solution is to impose security. And what is that if not an attempt at a military solution?

Thus, the only way out is to forge ahead with development, the military task thence being defined as to protect (and in many cases carry out) the development. The unreformed lefties of the FCO and DFID should be retired early and sent home, together with their fatuous "hearts and minds" cult.

The only "development" worthy of the name is hard-edged infrastructure improvement – roads, rail where necessary, communications, electricity, airports – plus industrial and commercial development. The aim here should be to enhance wealth-creating activities, enabling Afghanistan to capitalise on its considerable economic assets. With economic stability comes social stability.

As far as governance goes, there are only three requirements. Firstly, there must be imposed an equitable system of property rights, and a means by which citizens can enforce them. Without that, there can be no progress.

Secondly, the government of Afghanistan must be given a deadline to establish a universal taxation system. It must be set targets for revenue collection and we should then reduce the amount of international aid paid directly by the amounts we have set the government to collect for itself.

A government that lives off international aid has no need of its people and a people that does not pay tax to its government has no need of a government. If the people then want schools 'n' hospitals, let them lobby their own government to pay for them – and pay the taxes to support them. We should not be providing them.

Thirdly, develop an agricultural policy, subsidising small famers to stay on the land and to produce food crops. Whether Pashtuns or Anglian barley barons, farmers are farmers throughout the world - a calling that transcends nation, ethnicity and religion. If they can make money out of growing crops and rearing animals, they will do so. Give them the money and the opium problem will solve itself.

As to the international community generally, it should do a series of vital things. First, grant Afghanistan favoured nation status for the purpose of trade. Secondly, it should allow free access to Afghan produce, without tariffs or similar restraints. Thirdly, it should buy the goods. A Tesco supermarket buyer with a cheque book is worth a battalion of troops.

Then, there is the vexed question of building up the Afghani security forces. Forget it. This is a matter of the Afghani government. A government that depends on its people – aka taxpayers - for survival will find a way of protecting its people – aka revenue base – from outside interference. The initiative must come from the government. Then we can help, but only then.

None of this, though, is going to happen. The principles have been talked about endlessly. Those in the know agree with these fundamentals, but lack the wherewithal to make them happen. Policy is decided, therefore, not by reference to what is right and necessary – and that which works – but what is possible within an entirely inadequate and dysfunctional framework. And, for that, soldiers die.

That is not good enough. We have had enough of futile gestures and the posturing of politicians. If we can't do the job properly – and we can't – then we should get out. Bring our troops home.

COMMENT THREAD

On our way out?

With yet another three soldiers reported killed in Sangin, bringing the total up to 204, the Scottish Daily Herald is reporting on a UK opinion poll on our involvement in Afghanistan.

From this we learn that some 57 percent believe British forces should not be in Afghanistan at all, only 13 percent think it is "very clear" why the UK military is there and 82 percent say the UK Government is not doing enough to support our troops. Undoubtedly, sentiment has been heavily influenced by the rush of casualties over the last two months and, as public opinion hardens, the opposition to our continued presence is only likely to increase.

But, if The Daily Telegraph is any guide, the growing public wish for withdrawal might come sooner than expected. Defence secretary Bob Ainsworth, it appears, is telling us that the mission in Afghanistan could largely be concluded as soon as 2010.

That the mission was to undergo fundamental changes was in fact signalled by Gordon Brown in his announcement on the AF/PAK strategy at the end of April, where he intimated that, from the autumn, greater effort would be devoted to training and mentoring Afghan security forces, with a view to an accelerated hand-over of responsibilities to them.

Whether this is realistic in view of the known inadequacies of the Afghan forces is moot, but it provides a political figleaf to cover our progressive disengagement, much as we did in Iraq, enabling us to declare a "victory" and leave with the flags flying.

In fact, according to Mick Smith in The Sunday Times, there are other pressures in theatre which may lead us to disengage even faster. These are coming from the Americans who are expressing their concern about the inability of the British to hold and stabilise Musa Qala district, in addition to their current commitments in the so-called green zone.

Following Operation Panther's Claw, which had British troops "clearing" the Taleban from 150 square miles of the green zone north and northwest of Lashkar Gah, troops have been left exhausted and there are barely enough men to mount "framework patrols" to secure the area.

Thus, the US forces are taking a more and more active part in operations, even to the extent of sidelining the British command structures, centred on the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood, west London. In theory PJHQ controls all British military operations abroad, but is increasingly toothless. With the Americans taking control of most of Helmand, it has lost much of its role.

That much is evident to the west of Musa Qala where, this weekend US Marines and Afghan officials completed yet another operation in Now Zad, this time hoisting the Afghan flag over the deserted town (pictured). Through the week, 400 Marines, with 100 Afghan troops had been taking part in operation Eastern Resolve II and are mow claiming to have regained control of the district.

Until recently, the US Marines have had only a tenuous grip over the district, taking considerable casualties, with a lone company responsible for policing the area.

Now Zad was, of course, one of the four original British "platoon houses", which included Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qala. Now the US has taken total responsibility for Now Zad, if Musa Qala is also taken over, then half of the "outstations" held by the British will have gone.

But, if the casualty rate at Sangin - with over 50 dead - continues, it will only be a matter of time before there are serious questions as to whether holding this district is tenable by British forces. Certainly, it cannot be long before the media focuses on this area and the toll it is extracting, creating a situation where US forces might feel impelled to move in and then, eventually, take over.

By slow progressive moves, therefore, British involvement – at least in terms of the areas occupied – could gradually be scaled down, leaving a situation where one can imagine that the force is concentrated on Lashkar Gah and then Bastion, before retreating entirely to barracks and thence onto the ramps for the final airlift which will take them back home - and military oblivion.

The likelihood is that Gordon Brown's administration is unlikely to see this end game but Brown's successor will almost certainly see it to fruition. There is no longer any appetite for this war, either in the British public or even in the military – and the current casualty rate is politically unsustainable. Despite the analysis from Michael Evans in The Times, given a figleaf by the Americans, we will be gone.

COMMENT THREAD

Armour is not enough

With awful symmetry, both the 150th and the 200th soldier to be killed as a result of fighting in Afghanistan were from the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Welsh Regiment.

Both deaths were also recorded on the 16th, one on 16 March, the other today, 16 August – although the actual incidents that gave rise to their deaths were on the 14th and 13th days of the respective months. The latest death brings the toll in the last five months to 51, an average of a fraction over ten per month. Both were killed by IEDs and both were operating in the Musa Qala district at the time.

There, the similarities end. The first of the pair to die, L/Cpl Christopher Harkett, was at the start of his tour, having been in Afghanistan only a week, caught by an IED while on foot patrol. The second soldier, as yet unnamed, was killed while patrolling in a Warrior MICV.

The only journalist so far to impart this last bit of information has been Mick Smith of The Sunday Times, who reports that the vehicle was not penetrated by the blast that caused fatal injuries. The soldier died as a result of injuries sustained by the effect on the vehicle of the shock wave from the blast.

This is the second soldier to be killed in a Warrior in Afghanistan, the first being Colour Sergeant Krishnabahadur Dura in November 2008. A female soldier was also badly injured. In this case, though, there was understood to be a hull breach.

Since then, additional under-belly armour may have been added but, with a flat base rather than the profiled hull of a purpose-designed blast protected vehicle, the amount of protection afforded would have been minimal, as this incident has shown.

This is not the first time blast effect has been experienced, with a soldier having lost a leg while riding a Mastiff in November 2008. The force of the blast then had been so severe that it had buckled the hull. The Times, however, suggests that more than one soldier may have suffered while riding Mastiffs.

Nevertheless, this is the first time we have seen reported a death arising from blast effect, without a hull breach, in relation to any armoured vehicle. That it should have occurred in a Warrior underlines the limitations of armour, per se and thus emphasises the need for design attributes which will further enhance protection.

COMMENT THREAD

Media management

Considering that the news of the 200th fatality arising from our expedition in Afghanistan was released only about 7pm last night, it says something for the technical skills of the print media that the news made most of the front pages of the Sundays today.

However, such was the timing that only hasty re-jigging got the news in, without sufficient leeway for the editorial and comment pieces that would have accompanied such news, had the details been available earlier.

The same also applies to the 201st fatality. Although incurred – in Sangin again – earlier on Saturday, the release was held back until the Sundays had gone to press, thereby robbing them of the news "hook" which would have cleared the front pages and most of the rest of the "book".

Even in the grisly arithmetic of battlefield casualties, therefore, news management plays a central part in the drama, the controlled release thus enabling Gordon Brown to hit the TV studios today (featuring on the Andrew Marr show) in a carefully planned exercise in damage limitation, before the Monday papers get to chew over the issue.

This was always going to be the case. As long as the media is intent on using the completely artificial "milestone" of 200 deaths as a trigger for a torrent of (largely hostile) coverage – the government will attempt to manage the news, to mitigate the adverse effects.

In fact, the KIA stand at about 170, others having been killed in accidents, illness or suicide, directly or indirectly related to the action in Afghanistan. But, as we pointed out in the forum, Service-wide non combat deaths far exceed those experienced in combat, the largest single cause being vehicle accidents. These, however, escape under the media radar. Until recently, they were not even recorded centrally.

The distinction between total fatalities and KIAs, however, leaves it open to the media to come back for a second bite at the cherry, recording the event when the KIAs reach 200. By that time, total casualties will be close to the "magic" figure of 255 – the number lost in the Falklands War. That, in turn, will trigger more press comment.

There is no point in decrying this dynamic. That is how the media works and to expect it to do otherwise is like expecting the archetypal cat to bark. But what today's media response – and the response in days to follow – does illustrate is that media management is as much a part of modern warfare as is engaging with the enemy, and just as important.

What is not as clearly recognised is that media response also has tactical and strategic implications. With the headline treatment of fatalities, commanders have been known to adjust tactics – contrary to theatre requirements – in order to minimise casualties, or even delay operations which might give a casualty spike, in order to avoid politically sensitive events, such as domestic elections.

Both these dynamics were evident in the Iraqi campaign, with the retreat to the bases in Basra (and the evacuation of Camp Abu Naji outside al Amarah) dictated more by the need to keep casualties down than for any sound tactical reasons.

Similarly, the decision to abandon Musa Qala in 2006 was very heavily influenced by the increasing difficulties experienced in re-supplying the platoon house by helicopter, and the fear that it was only a matter of time before a Chinook was lost, the casualties arising having a devastating political effect.

The problem confronting the military, however – and also the politicians – is that they need to square the circle: they need to be able to keep the casualty rate down, without compromising operations or strategic aims. And that requires something in which neither the politicians nor the military have shown any great skill – forward planning.

It is highly significant in that context that the 201st fatality reported today is the 100th to die from an IED. Take those (or a substantial number of them) out of the equation and the media storm that is about to break would not be occurring. But, to have been able to deal with the IED would have required a whole new set of equipment and tactics, which neither the politicians nor the military have been able to devise in time.

Thus, in the absence of effective battle management, all the government has left is media management and, as we write, there is evidence that this is not going to be enough. New Labour is at last beginning to discover that even the most skilful "spin" cannot trump reality for ever. The body bags are telling their own story.

COMMENT THREAD

An engineering solution

Those with a far more intimate knowledge of London than I will no doubt be able to put names to places and streets, but my lack of specific recall does not negate a general point that the design of central London owes much to military planning, and the need to defend important spaces.

Much the same can be said of many towns and cities in England and indeed, as this tract testifies, of many of the urban centres in Europe.

The relevance of this comes to mind as we read Sean Rayment's account in The Sunday Telegraph of the multiple IED ambush which recently killed three soldiers in Sangin (and five before them in July), fortified by the vivid description of a recent action in the town by Michael Yon.

The latter in particular describes areas of the town which form natural funnels and ambush points, without cover or escape routes, where the close-in ambush in which the Taleban seem to specialise can have particularly deadly effect.

On this basis, any rational appraisal of the prospects of successfully policing the town would necessarily conclude with the Irish Tipperary joke – where a local tells an American couple asking for directions to the town: "I wouldn't start from here."

That British troops are singularly failing to pacify the town and the surrounding countryside, therefore, is no reflection on their skills or courage – both of which, Yon will aver, they have in plenty. Simply, they are being asked to do an impossible task, venturing daily into the mincing machine to act as targets for an increasingly proficient enemy.

As we have argued in the case of roads, therefore, if the job is impossible for the infantry to deal with "as is", the only logical – and essential – course of action is to reshape the environment, better to enable troops to prevail against the enemy. In other words, it is not infantry but combat engineers that are needed, their task to re-plan and then rebuild the town (or parts of it) that will remove the death traps that are giving the Taleban their edge.

In any modern society, there are provisions in law for the state to intervene in town planning, not least through compulsory purchase of land which is required for development. In the context of the urgent need to control and effectively police the town and its environs, if such provisions do not exist in Afghanistan, then they need to be introduced as a matter of urgency, then to allow the (armoured) bulldozers to move in.

It is unlikely that our engineers have need of any guidance, but should they require an aide memoire, this US army manual of 1897 will tell them all they need to know, so well-established are the principles. And, without their application, any occupation and intended pacification is merely going through the motions, sacrificing young men on futile gestures.

Bearing in mind that Gen Richards is talking of a 40-year occupation, the current strategy of "mowing the grass" is no more likely to produce dividends over that period than it has over the last three, while the current casualty rate is more likely to ensure the complete removal of our forces within the decade, their mission unfulfilled.

Our forefathers knew what it took to impose the rule of law. Major surgery is required on the town and its environs, or we will see much more of it, of a different kind, in Camp Bastion hospital.

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