Little boxes

It seems bizarre now, even to be thinking about UK defence – much less running a blog called "Defence of the Realm" when, on Friday last our prime minister went to Lisbon to hand over a huge tranche of powers to the European Union to such an extent that what little independence left to this country is even more eroded.

In the short-term, however, nothing changes – it never does immediately – although, in the fullness of time, this blog will most probably have to change its name to "Defence of the Union", any idea of the UK mounting its own, independent defence policy being one of those sad little remnants of the past.

For the time being, therefore, life goes on and we return to last Tuesday and our report the following day on the defence policy debate in the House of Commons, our reporting so far having been confined to a commentary on the absence of Tory defence policy.

In any event, running as it did to 96 A4 pages and 56,000 words – the length of a short novel - the debate, without a single theme or plot, is impossible to summarise succinctly. Thus, all we can hope to do is pick out points of interest and highlights, in an attempt to give a flavour of what went on.

One of those highlights – from our partisan point of view – was a speech given by Ann Winterton (spool down nearly to the end) where she, in typical style, concentrated most of her efforts on Armed Forces equipment.

She could, of course, have delivered that same speech a week earlier in the procurement debate but back-benchers cannot rely on “catching the Speaker’s eye” and, had she spoken earlier, she might not have been called for this debate. And this, on policy, was the more important of the two.

Ann Winterton's thesis, itself, was one not unfamiliar to readers of this blog, and one she has rehearsed before. Its essence was that the three armed services are financially bogged down with high costs projects such as the Eurofighter, the Royal Navy's new aircraft carriers and the Army's future rapid effects system (FRES). Everything, she said, was geared towards providing a high-tech expeditionary rapid reaction force, but no one had asked why that should be so, or has asked what has been omitted in the meantime.

And while those at the top of the military seem to have become obsessed with high-tech, high-priced, overcomplicated new equipment, in the real world, we are engaged in ongoing operations in difficult counter-insurgency situations.

We will return to the detail of this thesis shortly, but what was especially interesting was the response to it, first from the Conservative shadow minister, Andrew Murrison, who summed up the debate for the opposition, and then the armed forces minister, Bob Ainsworth, who did likewise for the government. Murrison simply noted that Ann Winterton had "discussed defence equipment in her inimitable, robust and highly thoughtful fashion," while, in a similar fashion, Ainsworth remarked that she had "talked mainly about procurement."

On first watching and hearing the speeches, and then reading them afterwards, it suddenly occurred that both men had indeed thought that Ann Winterton's comments had been directed to that issue and, more to the point, that was all she was talking about.

Yet, taking her to task for being "concerned" that the Royal Navy is going to be dominated by the carriers, Ainsworth then demonstrated precisely the relationship between procurement and defence policy, which Ann Winterton was seeking to highlight. "Yes," said Ainsworth,

…the carriers are going to be somewhat dominating features of the Royal Navy. If we want our Navy to have worldwide reach and the ability to project force around the world wherever we want it - be it air power or assault capability - the carriers and the protection force are the single most important way in which we will do that. That is why the carriers are so important.

Turning this round the other way, in the few decades (or less) that Her Majesty’s Government actually has a foreign policy, it takes the view that an essential part of that is to "project force around the world". That being the case, it is also taking the view that an effective mechanism for so doing is the aircraft carrier, for which purpose it is intending to commission two such vessels.

Hence does Ainsworth affirm the link between policy and procurement. In this case, the policy comes first, and the equipment – which enables that policy to be implemented – follows naturally.

But it works the other way round as well. A defining characteristic of military equipment is its functionality – it is designed for very specific purposes and only very rarely can equipment designed for one purpose be entirely suitable for others. Thus, if we wish to implement policies successfully, we must have the equipment that enables us to do so.

That is what Ann Winterton was getting at – our policy, ostensibly, is to fight the "war on terror" on Iraq and Afghanistan, yet we seem to be equipping our forces for some mythical, unspecified war in the future.

Thus did she observe that, "the real needs of the present have been overlooked, and the hard-learned lessons of the past appear to have been forgotten." So many people, she said, "thought that Iraq would be another Northern Ireland, where the use of Snatch Land Rovers was appropriate, but they were completely wrong, and many people have lost their lives or been maimed as a result."

Specifically, it was in the larger equipment that the procurement process was going wrong, and she therefore explored the choices of vehicles made by the Army. There was the Panther command and liaison vehicle is a very expensive runabout, not to be used on operations. The inadequately protected Tellar bomb disposal vehicle, the Pinzgauer Vector - an excellent off-road vehicle, "but any engineer knows that a mine blast turns it into a death-trap."

Then there was the so-called Supacat mobility weapon-mounted installation kit, "super for the special forces, but why have 130 of them, when they are a liability for normal patrols and convoys, as an infantryman can take them out with one bullet?"

On that basis, asked Ann Winterton, "Who is to say that the first round of FRES for the utility vehicle will be any better? Given the recent track record, we can have little confidence in getting that right. The vehicles can be transported, one at a time, only by the A400Ms—an aircraft that we might never get. What sort of a rapid reaction force will that be?"

And so she went on, observing that:

The military seem to be obsessed with fast jets, yet history has proved that small and slow is far superior for close air support. For the price of one Eurofighter we could have a squadron of Super Tucanos. They can carry the same ordnance as a Harrier, with its loud bang, but unlike the Harrier, which can be over the battlefield for no more than 20 minutes, Tucanos can loiter overhead for hours on end, ready for use in a ground attack at a moment's notice. We also tend to go in for expensive and complicated helicopters, which soak up manpower, like all complicated equipment. There appears to be little understanding of how light helicopters can be used effectively for ground attack.

In particular, she then referred to the exploits of the Rhodesian Light Infantry and their use their limited helicopter resources to devastating effect. And the need for total air surveillance on all key routes as a means of dealing with the IED threat.

In was in this context that she raised the issue of money and manpower. "We constantly hear about not having enough money and that our forces are overstretched almost to breaking point," she said, referring again to the Rhodesian forces. "They had little money and equipment, due to sanctions, and very small numbers of men, yet they succeeded beyond all expectations. They used what they had wisely, implementing ideas from the bottom up."

Thus she concluded:

British defence policy is caught in a vacuum, created in part by the military taking their eye off the ball while planning the longer term in procurement and reorganisation. In the meantime, we have been ill prepared to fight wars on two fronts - in Iraq and Afghanistan - and we have forgotten the lessons of the past in terms of counter-insurgency.

Almost three years to the day, I posted a piece remarking on how you could look at military equipment and divine from it the tactical doctrines of the armies that operated it. The equipment is defined by the purpose, I wrote, and the purpose is defined by the thinking.

The absence of any significant amount of specialist equipment dedicated to fighting – and winning – counter-insurgency operations, combined with the obsession for high-tech kit, tells you a great deal about the thinking that is going on in the military. And, as that thinking reflects the policy, it is the policy that is at fault.

But the point escaped the House on the day that Ann Winterton spoke. Policy is policy and procurement is something else. They are thinking in little boxes.

COMMENT THREAD

The Saturday "toy"

The Vulcan flies again. One of the cold war bombers, it left RAF service in 1984 but yesterday, XH558B, based at Bruntingthorpe Airfield near Leicester, made a spectacular 40 minute flight before returning home with a textbook landing. The restoration, by the Vulcan to the Sky Trust (VST), was completed in the 25th anniversary year of the Falklands Conflict. Rejoice!

An absence of policy

You would not have known it from the media, but there was a debate on defence policy in the House of Commons yesterday – not just any old debate, but one of only four in the year on this subject, this one being regarded as the main event. To that effect, over six hours were devoted to it, occupying most of the day's session, with no time restrictions imposed on MPs who wished to speak.

As so often, however, it was thinly attended by MPs – we counted only eight opposition MPs in the chamber and, at times, the number was down to two. But, even at their lowest ebb, the MPs must have outnumbered the journalists, as not one single report in today's media can be found of the event. Thus, whenever the media tell you how important defence is to the nation, and how we should care for the welfare of our troops, their statements might be measured by their own performance.

So it is, though, that the MPs should be judged. Those many who blather about the need to support our troops were voluble by their absence. And, by and large, most of the few that did speak were ill-prepared, offering formulaic speeches that added little to the fount of human knowledge.

Furthermore, it was an ill-natured debate, characterised by acrimonious exchanges between the secretary of state for defence, Des Browne (pictured right), and his "shadow", Liam Fox (below left), from the Conservative benches.

But what really highlighted the divide was an intervention from Bernard Jenkin – the Conservative MP for North Essex and a member of the defence committee. He challenged Des Browne on the level of defence spending, complaining that we were falling "far behind" so many of our international comparators. This brought the following response from Browne, in which he starts off by saying:

The first point that I make to the hon. Gentleman - and others in his party who constantly look for comparators to justify, in their terms, the allegation of cuts in UK defence spending, which they have thankfully moved away from - is that our real-terms growth in defence spending contrasts significantly with what happened during the last years of the Government whom he supported. They cut defence spending by £0.5 billion a year in real terms.

But this is just an oeuvre. Warming to his theme, Browne then continues:

The challenge for him and his Front-Bench spokesmen is not whether they can compare spending in the UK, in its particular circumstances, with spending in any other country that they might identify. I could identify many countries where the comparison goes the other way.

The challenge for his party is to match the level of spending to which we have committed in the spending review and to say whether it intends to spend more on defence—and, if so, to say what it would spend that money on and which public services it would cut in order to spend it. If the hon. Gentleman and his Front-Bench spokesmen are not prepared to engage in that debate, they cannot be allowed to seek solace in comparisons that they have drawn out of the air.

And that really does set out the terms of the debate. In his own speech, Liam Fox aired the familiar litany of complaints, but also ventured that his Party supported all of the current major spending projects – including the Eurofighter, the two carriers and FRES.

On the basis of that, his concern about overstretch, his demands for better housing, medical facilities, pay and allowances – to say nothing of compensation for injured personnel – all imply significant spending increases yet, despite constant challenges, Fox refused in any way to affirm that there was any commitment to increased defence funding.

It was then Labour MP Don Touhig, himself a former defence minister, who observed that Fox should "take a lead from his leader" – David Cameron - who had said in a webcast interview recently, "There is no magic pot of money we can dip into to spend...on our armed forces." There we have it, said Touhig, "if the Tories were in power, there would be no more for the armed forces."

Fox later tried to dismiss this attack as a "red herring" but he cannot gloss over what is a huge lacuna in the whole Conservative approach to defence. Unless the Tories are prepared to engage in the funding debate, they do not have a serious (or any) defence policy.

COMMENT THREAD

The right kit for the job

Regular readers of this blog might get the impression that we think less than highly of the MoD, the Army and the military in general. That is not the case – many of the things they do are right, but it is not our (self-appointed) role to hand out plaudits.

However, even our diet of criticism should be leavened occasionally, when something is properly done, and this is one of those occasions.

This is a report on the MoD website which records the impact of the recently arrived Warrior MICVs in Afghanistan, and the dramatic effect they are having on the tactical situation, something that was touched upon in an earlier MoD report.

Now, however, we get the "full frontal", with a report headed, "Warriors give Taliban 'a pasting'". We are told that the area around Forward Operating Base (FOB) Arnhem has seen continual fighting over the last 12 months and until recently was a Taliban stronghold. That was, says the report, until a new type of Warrior arrived in the neighbourhood, and one that is giving local villagers the confidence to come home.

There are the Warriors from Right Flank, 1st Battalion, Scots Guards provide overwatch on the edge of the Green Zone. The Guards have been at FOB Arnhem, the front line of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) operations against the Taliban in southern Helmand province, since early September. But, we learn:

The base was built in August and overlooks an agricultural area several kilometres wide known as the 'green zone'. Arnhem has unfettered views into the area within which the Taliban had been operating at will.

But the Taliban have left the area after initial incursions by ISAF into the zone were followed up time and time again, culminating in Op PALK WAHEL which saw the Taliban squeezed between 2 battle groups and forced out. Right Flank played a major part providing mobility and fire support to both battle groups.

There is much more to the report, which is for once not too badly written, and includes a pithy comment from Guardsman Brown, who summarised the effect of the Warrior. "Basically," he says, "since we arrived the Warriors have given the Taliban a pasting. We haven't seen much of them since."

There is also some of the usual PR "pap" but this is partially excused by the publication of a superb shot of a Warrior (above). It would be good to see more of this type of shot, but it would be even better if we saw them in the media, with an acknowledgement that, in deploying Warriors, the Army has got it right.

It would be churlish to observe that they should have done it earlier, and that there should be more there. So we will not. But this does underline the importance of having the right kit for the job.

COMMENT THREAD

We need some more answers

Rightly, The Sunday Telegraph is devoting considerable space today to the results of its investigation into the number of Service personnel who have sustained serious injuries as a result of enemy action in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It has discovered that 47 Service personnel have had limbs amputated, lost the use of arms or legs or lost eyes since 2003. Of those, 30 servicemen have lost legs, four of whom suffered double amputations, five have had arms amputated, two soldiers have lost the use of limbs and 10 have also lost eyes.

What spoils the whole exercise, however, is that we do not get any indications of how those servicemen actually sustained their injuries. The focus, as always, is on the care and rehabilitation of those injured (and their compensation). This is worthy and necessary but it leaves that huge and vitally important gap – the pressing need to prevent soldiers sustaining such injuries.

As we have so often before articulated, it is absolutely essential that some effort be directed to that end. Care and compassion for the injured is fine but we would much rather have soldiers fit and healthy than receiving the best care in the world for injuries that were wholly avoidable.

But so far divorced from this imperative is The Telegraph that it has not even begun to addressing this issue. Instead, it is actively – if unwittingly – misleading its readers. In its editorial backing up its investigation, it refers to the now celebrated Lance Bombardier Ben Parkinson who, says the paper, lost both legs and suffered brain damage from stepping on a mine in Afghanistan.

We know this to be untrue. Parkinson was the rear gunner in a WIMIK Land Rover when he sustained his terrible injuries which, we aver, could have been prevented had he been crewing a better-protected vehicle.

This points up the comment made by Liam Fox in last week's procurement debate, in which he complained of the many "who make a false distinction between procurement and welfare issues."

"Procurement is a welfare issue," he said. "For our servicemen and women and their families, there are few issues as important as whether they have the equipment to maximise their safety and ensure the success of the tasks that they undertake in our name."

One MP who has been attempting to track down the link between WIMIK Land Rovers and the mounting toll of injury is Owen Paterson who, during the Summer recess, put a number of pointed questions to the Defence Secretary on the issue. In particular, he asked:

…how many WIMIK Land Rovers issued to British forces in Afghanistan were written off in each of the last three years; how many were written off as a result of (a) accidental damage or mechanical failure and (b) enemy action; and how many written off as a result of enemy action were the subject of mine or improvised explosive device strikes.

This was the answer from Armed Forces minister Bob Ainsworth:

Since the deployment of weapons-mounted installation kit Land Rover vehicles in summer 2006 to Afghanistan, a total of 19 have been lost as a result of operational use. Those losses have occurred either as a result of direct enemy action or denial operations by UK forces where vehicles have been extensively damaged (either through enemy action or accidents) and cannot be recovered.

Paterson then asked how many personnel in Afghanistan had been seriously injured or killed while crewing WIMIKs, and especially through mine/IED strikes.

Again the answer was fielded by Ainsworth, who replied that as of 10 September 2007, five personnel have been killed from "an explosion due to enemy action." However, he then went on to say:

The number of service personnel injured in incidents involving WMIK Land Rovers is not recorded centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.

This latter assertion is outrageous. If the Army is not collecting injury figures by cause and type – to assess potency of the enemy actions, the efficacy of force protection measures, and to determine whether any enhancements are needed – then it is being criminally negligent. And, of course, if the data are being collected, then the minister is lying.

However, putting the Telegraph and the data from the questions together, we can have a stab at assessing the bigger picture. We have 19 WIMIKs lost from "operational use" – each with a crew of three (but sometimes carrying four). Five have been killed in the incidents where loss occurred, of a minimum "at risk" group of 57. But how many of the 52 "not killed" were badly injured?

Well, we know Ben Parkinson was one and we know of an incident in September where two were killed in one vehicle. It seems highly unlikely that the third crew member escaped with light injuries – to say nothing of the interpreter who was also in the vehicle.

Then there was the Kandahar incident, also in September, with one soldier and an interpreter killed. The other two soldiers were injured – but how badly?

Another one we know of is the incident in July, which killed Guardsman Neil "Tony" Downes. Four others were injured in the incident – which also involved an "exchange of fire" with the Taliban. How many were seriously injured?

One other, of which we know, happened in December 2006, where one Royal Marine was described as "seriously injured", yet here the vehicle may not even have been written off.

These, however, are just WIMIK incidents. To those we must add Pinzgauer Vectors and "Snatch" Land Rover losses - the latter exceeding the WIMIK number. Tenuous though it may be, therefore, it does not seem untoward to suggest that of the 47 Service personnel which the Telegraph reports to have had "limbs amputated, lost the use of arms or legs or lost eyes", the largest single proportion of that figure arose from crews of inadequately protected vehicles.

Of course, if the MoD came clean about quite how many soldiers had been injured in these vehicles, and the extent of their injuries, we would not have to be guessing. Small wonder that the MoD does not want to release the figures, but all the more reason why the media – and Mr Fox – should be pressing for some more answers.

COMMENT THREAD

Mining for nuggets - 1

In our previous post, we promised that we would continue exploring the procurement debate of earlier this week, "mining for nuggets" as it were, to bring you the more interesting and important parts of the discussion.

One such was a point was made Nicholas Soames, himself a former Armed Forces Minister and one time officer in the 11th Hussars. Not that we hold any brief for the man: it was once said of him and his Army career that he was so stupid that even his brother officers noticed – and for the Hussars, that is saying something.

Anyhow, Soames, in his own speech, addresses the minister thus:

…will the Minister see what he can do to try to improve on the Ministry of Defence’s dismal performance in respect of telling the story of the astonishing achievements and activities of British troops on operations? The continual bleating about nobody knowing what the Army is doing on operations is entirely the fault of the structures to promote such stories. There is no reason on earth why well informed, well told stories that give away nothing, but enable people here to get some comprehension of the astonishing challenges and remarkable achievements of our troops, should not be told. It is incumbent on Ministers to review the situation and see what they can do to drive it forward. At the Ministry of Defence, in both military and civilian bureaucracies, there is a sort of leaden resolve to say no to everything. I urge the Minister to improve on that.

It is left to Derek Twigg at the end of the debate to respond, echoing the "important point" made, "…the fact that what our armed forces are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan is not getting wider recognition in the press and elsewhere."

That, in fact, was not the point made by Soames, who had complained of the Ministry of Defence's "dismal performance". However, Twigg continues:

General Dannatt has also recently raised this issue, and we share those frustrations. Reporters are embedded in both theatres and, as the hon. Gentleman will know, there are opportunities to talk to our armed forces personnel. They could also go to Headley Court, where on two or three occasions I have spoken to them. There are plenty of opportunities to do more and plenty of information exists. A number of documentaries have been made and there have been TV involvements, but I agree that more should be done, and I urge those in the media to do more to publicise the fantastic bravery of our armed forces. My hon. Friends and I will continue to do as much as we can to ensure that the message about the bravery and professionalism of our armed forces gets across, but we cannot force people to print something or to show something.

One cannot call Twigg stupid – we do not know enough of him to applaud him thus - but he certainly seems to typify both MPs and many in the corporate world who see the media as the primary source of publicity. What they do not see – or do not understand – is that the world of mass communication is changing with incredible rapidity, and that the key medium is now the Internet.

Here, as we have oft noted, the MoD has at its disposal funds of which we could only imagine, and a web site with a domain name to kill for. Further, almost every Regiment and branch of the Services has its own web site, the culmination of which gives the MoD every opportunity to put out its story.

Not only does the MoD not need the media but, if the sites under their control were imaginatively used, they would provide an ongoing resource for journalists (and bloggers) who would be only too happy to lift material from the site (the difference being that bloggers tend to acknowledge their sources while the "professionals" are more likely to pass off the work as their own).

But, turning to the main "resource", the MoD website (illustrated above), what do we see?

Currently - at the time of writing - the three headline stories were the increased compensation to injured troops (covered widely by the media), Prince William (covered obsessively by the media) and a story on the deployment of 52 Brigade to Helmund.

Following that third link, which is the only one on the site specific to troop operations in Afghanistan, and we learn from Royal Anglian Regiment commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Birrell - in the dreadful, leaden prose of corporate PR - that "We have undergone a comprehensive training package to get us to this point, and now we are here we are keen to get started."

Hold the front page: British troops "have undergone a comprehensive training package". You can see The Sun simply flying out of the newsagents, when that news leaks out.

Turning to the specific page on Afghanistan (illustrated), however, this is no better. The page is dominated by the picture of Major Alexis Roberts and the eulogies devoted to him – dated 7 October. The next story, is dated 2 October and the one under that the 27 September. Are we really to believe that in now 15 days, there have only been three Afghanistan-related stories worth publishing – one of which is "Browne meets Kiwi VC hero"?

Still, at least one can follow the link to the "photo gallery", to see the pictures of our brave troops in action in Afghanistan? Er … no. The latest postings date from 4 September and show Armed Forces Minister Bob Ainsworth visiting a defence manufacturer in Coventry.

This is not so much neglect, as criminal negligence. As we have written so often – most recently my colleague – "If we do not win the propaganda war we may as well not bother with the shooting one." We are not the first to observe that the Internet is part of the battlefield yet, here is the MoD with a potentially powerful and effective weapon in that theatre, and it is conceding the ground to the enemy.

Earlier, we noted Stirrup's complaints about poor communication - with us suggesting that he could exert his influence on the MoD website – and we have also complained about the general paucity of information and the tendency to use the website for propaganda rather than information – addressing our comments that time to Dannatt.

Whether Dannatt, Strirrup or Twigg, though, this issue must be sorted. Good information in counter-insurgency operations (or any war) is not an optional extra. It is a central part of the campaign - in this case every bit as important as new Mastiffs for our troops - and the MoD is performing very, very badly indeed.

COMMENT THREAD

What are they for?

The primary purpose of a general debate in the House of Commons (in theory, at least) is to afford MPs the chance to discuss issues of concern and, in particular, to bring the responsible minister to the House for questioning. It is thus a vital tool by which our government is held to account.

On an issue as vital as defence procurement, this process of scrutiny - holding to account - is sorely necessary, not least because of the dismal record of this government (like its predecessors) on the issue, but also because of the vast sums of money involved (some £16 billion a year) and because the entire efficacy of our Armed Forces depends on the right decisions being made.

There is also the equally important matter of the safety of our Service personnel for, as we have demonstrated so often in this blog, the wrong decisions can and do cost lives.

So it was that yesterday we had an adjournment debate on defence procurement, giving MPs precisely the opportunity of questioning the newly promoted Minister for the Armed Forces, Bob Ainsworth (pictured, top).

For those unfamiliar with the procedure, this type of debate is open-ended. There is no "motion" as such – merely that "the House do adjourn", discussed, typically, in a near-empty chamber.

Traditionally, the senior minister opens with a speech, he (or she) is answered (and questioned by a senior opposition spokesman - in this case, Liam Fox for the Tories), then by spokesmen for the lesser parties, following which the debate is opened to the "floor". At its conclusion, the debate is then summed up by shadow spokesman – this time it was Gerald Howarth, shadow defence minister – and then there is a response from a junior government minister. On this day, that duty fell to Derek Twigg.

The problem – and indeed it is a problem – is that such general debates are too general. Serious minded MPs might like to press the minister on major issue – like better equipment for troops on operations – but this is also an opportunity for any passing MP to "intervene" on the minister and air a particular hobby horse.

Thus it was that Ainsworth, not minutes into his speech, was interrupted by Bill Wiggin, the Conservative MP for Leominster, who persists to the degree that the minister is forced to give way.

But Wiggin is not concerned with matters such as would normally find their way into this particular blog. He wanted to know what discussions the minister had with DEFRA about increasing from just three percent of the amount of British lamb that our forces are allowed to eat. Introducing more British lamb through the procurement process, says Wiggin, would be good for the taxpayer, good for the farmers on whose land our troops train and, most of all, good for our troops, because British lamb is so delicious.

Shortly afterwards, we get another intervention – this from Ian Davidson Labour MP for Glasgow, South-West. He tells the minister how grateful he and his constituency are for the award of the aircraft carrier, and then wants clarification on whether the MARS - military afloat reach and sustainability -contract will be offered for award outside the United Kingdom through the Official Journal of the European Union.

This is an issue which we raised over a year ago and it deserves a debate in its own right. Davidson wants the minister "to reverse Government policy" on the matter – as if he could. If the project comes under the EU procurement directives, then he has no choice but to open the contract out to EU competition. But Ainsworth simply bats the question away with the uninformative statement that, "the MARS project is still in the development stage."

But before he can get back into his stride, the Labour MP for Chorley, Lindsay Hoyle, chips in with a comment about the BAE yard at Barrow getting a share of the carrier building work. And, no sooner has that been dealt with than the Lib-Dem MP for Yeovil, David Laws, raises a point about "the first partnering agreement for the Future Lynx helicopter".

Such "interventions" are the daily fare of Commons debates, but it is worth referring to them here as it illustrates the general incoherence of the discourse and also the difficulty in reporting such events. Many minutes into the debate, the minister has said nothing very much and we have been all over the place.

In fact, the minister says nothing very much at all – they never do. His speech is a bland tour de table of the current procurement situation, heavily politicised, self-congratulatory and uninformative. Ann Winterton intervenes at one point, asking about the order for medium protected patrol vehicles. The answer is also bland, but reassuring, and on it goes.

Frankly, at this point, interest wanes. The real "fireworks" are supposed to come later, when the opposition spokesman pitches in, so we move forward to Liam Fox, with Ainsworth, en route telling us that, "Our armed forces are among the most capable in the world…".

Come Fox's speech, however, starting 36 minutes into the debate, any idea of a thread or specific theme has long been lost. And the opposition spokesman immediately turns to his personal hobby horse, complaining about those "who make a false distinction between procurement and welfare issues." He adds for good measure, "Procurement is a welfare issue… For our servicemen and women and their families, there are few issues as important as whether they have the equipment to maximise their safety and ensure the success of the tasks that they undertake in our name."

We could not disagree here, but his speech is then a litany of complaints about falling defence expenditure, about cuts, cuts and more cuts, inadequate resources, overspending and again – a quote he used at his Party conference – the words of the Oxford coroner at the inquest of Sergeant Roberts in Iraq:

...to send soldiers into a combat zone without the appropriate basic equipment is, in my view, unforgivable and inexcusable, and represents a breach of trust that the soldiers have in those who govern them.

At this point, we do walk away. Had I been a journalist tasked with covering the debate (not that there were any), I would have been moving towards the door, to the bar, the toilet, the office, or even home – anywhere but this debating chamber, with tired mantras flying, vying for attention with stale clichés.

There are nuggets later in the debate, and we will mine them, refine them and refer to them in other posts, but the spoil heap is huge and should not trouble our readers. Debates in Parliament are not for the faint-hearted. Nor are they for seekers after truth or even simple-minded souls who want answers to questions.

One might, therefore, ask our own question about these debates, such as "what are they for?" The question is easy. Answers are a little more difficult.

COMMENT THREAD

Thank you Gerald

There was a defence procurement debate in the House yesterday, with enough material (74 densely-packed A4 pages on my printout) to keep journalists and commentators busy for weeks, if they were at all interested.

Therein lies a tale. You will search in vain for any account of the debate in a media which professes to be soooo concerned about the welfare and equipment of our troops.

However, pending a review of the debate on this blog, one part of the speech from Gerald Howarth, shadow defence minister, caught our eye. Says Gerard:

The Supacat vehicle, which is a superb vehicle, was on display at the defence systems and equipment international exhibition. It is made by an excellent company called Supacat down in Devon. Its managing director is my secretary’s nephew and I have visited it a couple of times. I give it a plug because it is a jolly good company. It is a small British company doing a splendid job, and it is not just the big boys that we need to be concerned about.

It is so good to have a shadow minister who is really on the ball. But then, this was the man who also thought the Pinzgauer was "superb", allowing himself to be photographed in the cab of the vehicle, which the company used for promotional purposes.

One wonders what be might now say to the widow of Major Alexis Roberts?

COMMENT THREAD

A battle won … but a war to fight

Overshadowed as it was by the news of troop cuts in Iraq, it was inevitable and entirely predictable that the media should have all but ignored Gordon Brown's announcement yesterday of the purchase of 140 Mastiff protected patrol vehicles (designated MRAPs by the US forces).

The only specific pieces that show up in a Google search are one from Reuters and another from a Polish news agency, which simply rehashes a UK government release.

Thomas Harding, however, did offer the not unreasonable comment, in a more general analytical piece, that:

The MoD can be applauded for buying an extra 140 Mastiff vehicles for Iraq and Afghanistan as they have proven resilient to mines and roadside bombs. But it is unfortunate that the Mastiffs are deploying on operations as we leave Iraq after years of controversy over the Snatch armoured Land Rovers in which more than a score of troops died.

In a sense, however, the hacks were only taking their lead from the MPs, the only one of which he responded to Brown’s announcement in the debate that followed was the redoubtable Ann Winterton, who sought clarification on whether the cost would be borne by the Treasury or the Army budget.

Clarification we got and, contrary to our earlier assertion, it appears that the funding is to come out of the Army settlement. This, in itself, is a highly significant development, of which more shortly.

Ann Winterton also asked about medium protected patrol vehicles – which we flagged as a possible Cheetah purchase – when she got a response from Brown that "we are looking into those smaller vehicles…". We understand that these may not necessarily be Cheetahs - a completely different vehicle could even be on the cards - but we should be able to expect an announcement within 2-3 weeks and very rapid action thereafter.

Returning to the issue of funding, followers of this blog will know that the original order for Mastiffs was imposed over the heads of the Army brass. They were totally opposed to buying in equipment for what they saw was a short-term need, in case it prejudiced funding for their "future army" plans, and in particular, FRES. Then, it was only on the understanding that the purchase was funded through an Urgent Operational Requirement – and thus paid-for by the Treasury – that they were prepared to accept the vehicles.

That the Army is now prepared to fund the new batch itself thus reflects a new realism that current operations must be properly equipped - with dedicated rather than general-purpose kit – and that the funding must come from the mainstream equipment budget.

This in turn represents a hard battle fought and won within the defence establishment about the relative importance of the "future army" and a reigning-in of the "futuritis" which afflicts defence planning. Hence the yesterday's announcement is far more significant than the casual observer could even being to appreciate.

But the strange thing is that, for all the fluff, indignation and politicking that we saw in yesterday's debate, barely a single MP in the House even realised that the battle had been fought, much less won. The MPs are not so much "above the debate" as unaware even that it is happening.

However, if this is a victory, it is only one battle in a long war. To fight is the issue of helicopters, and not only as "airborne trucks", which is – with the exception of the Apaches - largely the British military establishment's view of them. There is a doctrinal battle to be fought and won on the tactical use of small helicopters, pioneered in what emerged as the Rhodesian "Fire Force" model, which still stands as a shining example of how to conduct counter-insurgency operations.

Then there is the issue of providing the right aircraft for close air support, something that has yet to receive the attention it deserves, in which the Army is dealing with an enemy far deadlier than the Taliban … the might of the vested interests of the Royal Air Force. If they can be overcome, then bringing peace to Afghanistan will, by contrast, be relatively easy.

Thus, a battle we might have won, but there remains a war to fight.

COMMENT THREAD

I don't think we have communicated it very well

In a candid and important admission to The Times, published this morning, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of Defence Staff, said that the "government as a whole" had failed to set out the strategic prospects for southern Iraq, further adding that, "we have not done as well as we should have done at thinking strategically".

"The key question", he said, was, "are we gaining strategic advantage in return for the price they (our troops) are paying?” To that, his answer is "yes". "If I thought we weren't, my recommendation would be to end it," he said. "But it's a difficult message to get across to the public, and I don’t think we have communicated it very well."

The piece offered by the newspaper goes under the heading, "Government 'gave public false hopes' on achieving Iraq goals", focusing on another admission from Stirrup, that the government gave the public "false and inflated expectations" of what could be achieved by British troops in Iraq.

We are told that Sir Jock decided to speak out because of his "growing concern" that the public are failing to appreciate what the British troops have been doing. "All they get are snapshots, which are sometimes really good and sometimes really bad," he says. "In my view, and contrary to what many people may think, the British military in the south of Iraq, against some quite daunting odds, has been successful, and the nonsense about the British having failed in Basra is completely misjudged."

However, he added: "Of course, it does depend upon recognising what the mission was in the first place, and I'm afraid we did allow some false and inflated expectations to arise. But the mission for the military was to get the place and the people to the state where the Iraqis could run that bit of their country if they chose to."

For this blog, which has been struggling to make sense of the events in the British occupied sector, we would be the first to say that the task has been tremendously difficult.

Even now, we get highly conflicting reports, for example one recently talking of growing stablity while another, in the same newspaper, claims that, so desperate is the situation that Iraqi army officers in Basra are preparing to make a desperate plea for the return of British troops to patrolling the city to stem rising sectarian killings and political violence.

That Sir Jock is prepared to admit to a poor communication strategy, therefore, is a good start, but it would be interesting to learn what he intends to do about it. One place, of course, where he could exert his influence, is on the MoD website, where he could insist on the publication of daily communiqués from both Iraq and Afghanistan, appraising us of what is going on.

No doubt many will quote the fabled "operational security" as a reason for not being more forthcoming. Out experience, however, is that the enemy is very often much better informed that is realised, while the main reason for OPSEC – in our jaundiced eyes – seems to be to keep information from the "home front".

That apart, one warms to Sir Jock who is reported to be "sceptical" about Dannatt's call for homecoming parades for troops returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. "I think a lot of units wouldn't want parades," says Sir Jock.

He is dead right and, despite the Telegraph's attempt to whip up a storm, aided and abetted by the Conservative's defence team, according to the Daily Mail, recent events have not been completely successful.

Dannatt's interventions, as a whole, have given the media plenty of copy but we rather feel they have been less than helpful in helping us understand what is going on. Perhaps, as part of Sir Jock's new "communications strategy", he could persuade Dannatt to shut up.

COMMENT THREAD

Somebody has been listening

According to DefenseNews, the MoD is to add another 148 Mastiff MRAP vehicles to its existing 108-strong fleet, more than doubling the number, with the bulk of them going to Afghanistan.

This order is being executed by way of an urgent operational requirement, which means it will be funded direct from the Treasury, rather than the defence budget. Deliveries are expected by 2009, once agreement with the US (which already has its own orders for 1,900 of the vehicles in place) for priority production is in place.

Furthermore, sources are suggesting that the MoD may also order a batch of Cheetah light tactical four-wheel-drive vehicles (pictured), for a British special forces requirement.

This, we got a hint of in April this year when the MoD issued an expression of interest in 180 of what it termed the "Medium Protected Patrol Vehicle" (MPPV). The contract value was to be between £20-100 million for a wheeled vehicles with an approximate gross vehicle weight of 14 ton, capable of carrying up to seven crew members.

Some sources are now saying that this may be upped to 250 of the vehicles, which employ the same mine protection technology as the bigger Mastiff, and would provide a partial replacement for the dangerously vulnerable WIMIK Land Rovers and Pinzgauer Vectors.

The details will emerge today at 3.30pm in the Commons when Gordon Brown makes a statement on Iraq, which will cover troop numbers and deployment. Then we will see a much overdue enhancement in the protection level afforded to our troops. It will be good to know that someone, at last, has been listening.

UPDATE: Brown confirms 140 Mastiffs during his Iraq statement.

COMMENT THREAD

No wonder they wanted to keep it quiet

Major Alexis Roberts, we now learn, courtesy of The Sunday Telegraph died in a Pinzgauer Vector, a vehicle we have consistently condemned as being dangerously vulnerable to mines and IEDs.

Small wonder, therefore – as we noted yesterday - that the MoD failed in any of its official announcements on the death of Major Roberts to identify the type of vehicle in which he was travelling.

Some information must have leaked out, however, as The Daily Mail - alone of all the news media – did note in yesterday's edition (albeit in a down page item) that he (Major Roberts):

… died when a booby-trap bomb blasted his armoured vehicle as his troops were returning to their main base in Kandahar, following days of fierce fighting against the Taliban in neighbouring Helmand Province. The Vector armoured truck was one of a fleet purchased specially by the MoD last year to provide extra protection for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, but its armour proved too weak to protect the soldiers inside.

But, in what bears all the hallmarks of a damage limitation exercise, the MoD - through defence correspondent Sean Rayment in a separate article in The Sunday Telegraph - places an apologia for the vehicle, so bland in its description that no ordinary person would begin to realise that something was badly amiss.

The online edition of Rayment's story is, in fact, headed: "Blast fuels fears Iran is involved," thus diverting attention away from the fatal weaknesses of the Vector, that headline having no more substance than a comment in the text, that: "The attack will also increase fears that the Taliban are getting military help from Iran's government."

As to the attack, Rayment tells us that:

In a long convoy of armoured vehicles, the men of the Gurkha's Fire Support Group, which was commanded by Major Alexis Roberts, were on the last stage of their journey back to their base at the sprawling Kandahar air field when disaster struck.

Under cover of darkness, Taliban fighters hid an improvised explosive device (IED) on Route One, the main road through southern Afghanistan, 20 miles west of the southern city of Kandahar.

Despite being the most mined country on earth, a shortage of helicopters and the demands of an increasing number of operations in southern Afghanistan means that troops are increasingly using roads to travel around the country.

The Taliban would have had plenty of warning of the convoy's movement. "Dickers" or agents using mobile phones would have called ahead telling the Taliban ambush team that it was approaching. As the convoy commander, Major Roberts would have been in the front vehicle – an obvious and easy target.

Hidden close to the road, the Taliban would have watched and waited before detonating the bomb beneath the officer's armoured Pinzgauer vehicle as it passed by. The blast was devastating and Major Roberts was killed instantly.

With that background, Rayment is then at pains to tell us that:

The Pinzgauer, a German vehicle, bought by the British for use in Afghanistan, was supposed to offer more protection than the much-derided "Snatch" Land Rover which most soldiers regard as a death-trap.

But there is no such thing as impenetrable armour and the Pinzgauer will not protect troops inside from a large and powerful bomb. This is not the first attack in which the Taliban used IEDs to destroy armoured vehicles and kill British soldiers.

And therein is the subtle, but mendacious propaganda – apart from the factual errors which makes one really wonder about the capability of a man who calls himself a "defence correspondent". The Pinzgauer is not and never has been German. It was originally an Austrian design but the company has since been bought out and is now owned by BAE Systems and the vehicles are manufactured in Guildford.

The real "error" though is the assertion that "the Pinzgauer will not protect troops inside from a large and powerful bomb" – what is known as a "true lie". For sure, it will indeed not protect troops from "a large and powerful bomb" – but it will not protect troops from a small bomb either. The Vector, in this respect, is less well-protected than the Land Rovers they are replacing (see left - this Land Rover "wolf" took a mine hit, yet the crew survived uninjured - because the front seating is over the wheel arch, in the Pinzgauer the crew would not survive even this modest blast).

What Rayment has done though, is plant the seed: it was "a large and powerful bomb" – no one could have survived it. Therefore, no one is to blame - even if this flies in the face of the evidence.

From what we know, the Pinzgauer Vector carries a crew of 4-5 troops (typically five). We know from the official reports that Major Roberts was killed and two others were injured. The likelihood is – unstated – that there were others in the vehicle who escaped uninjured. Either way, had this been "a large and powerful bomb", no one would have survived - as we have seen from other incidents.

The reasonable and entirely sound inference, therefore, is that – as we did point out yesterday – had Major Roberts been in a better-protected vehicle (such as this Canadian RG-31, from which the crew escaped uninjured), he would have survived this attack.

We know this. The MoD almost certainly knows this – and from the number of e-mails and comments I have received today – a lot of people are of the same view. That makes it all the more essential, of course that the MoD diverts attention from its own negligence in buying the vehicles in the first place – amounting, we aver, to corporate manslaughter.

And, with other newspapers willing – albeit sporadically – to address to issue of inadequate vehicles (see: here, here and here), how necessary it is for the MoD to have "useful idiots" like Rayment to cover up what, on the face of it, was yet another avoidable death.

COMMENT THREAD

Shouting a little louder

There gets to a point where you have said all you can say on a particular subject, and there is little more you can say without repeating yourself, and shouting louder.

So it is with the report of the death yesterday of Major Alexis Roberts, serving in Afghanistan with the 1st Battalion, the Royal Gurkha Rifles.

He died, we are told, as a result of an improvised explosive device just after 0800 hrs local time when the Battalion was returning to their base in Kandahar after taking part in Operation PALK WAHEL. He was commanding a convoy of the Battalion’s vehicles when he was killed, and two other soldiers were injured.

Much is being made in the media of Major Roberts being a former commanding officer of Prince William but nowhere in any of the reports, official and otherwise, is there any mention of the vehicle in which he was driving. One can only speculate that, with three involved in the incident, that it could have been a WIMIK Land Rover, but it could have been an ordinary "Wolf" Land Rover, or even a Pinzgauer. We simply do not know.

Of one thing we can be certain, it was not a mine resistant – ambush protected vehicle (MRAP) and, since there were two survivors and only one fatality, it is entirely reasonable to assert that had Major Roberts been travelling in such a vehicle, he would still be alive today. Needless to say, no-one in the national or international media thought to make that point.

By coincidence, however, local journalist and good friend Jim Greenhalf , on Bradford's Telegraph & Argus does make the general point for me, in to two-page report of this "Bradford-based political researcher's campaign for mine-resistant vehicles for our troops" (reproduced here in two parts – click to enlarge).

Although a local paper, the Telegraph & Argus's proud boast is that, within its catchment area, it sells more copies than all the national dailies combined, which means that, today, the message has got though to a good few thousand people more.

It might seem perverse that this blog, so dismissive of the media, should resort to the dead tree sellers to bring the message to a bigger audience, except that it was never our view that the blogs would replace the established media. Rather, it is a symbiotic relationship where we rely on the MSM for much of our material but they, in turn, feed of us.

In this case, much of the material came from this piece, and the fact of the existence of this blog makes the message more accessible to journalists, as well as giving it more credibility.

Soon enough, we will get another outlet, with Parliament resuming on Monday – although, if there is an election, we will be deprived of that for another month.

At the first available opportunity, however, Ann Winterton needs to remind the defence minister of a question she put in June last year, which we cited again in our previous piece, drawing attention to the possibility (expectation) that, as the Taleban lost out in direct confrontations with our troops, they would revert to the use of improvised explosive devices.

That possibility, as Major Roberts tragically discovered, has now become the reality. It is a reality which needs shouting a little louder.

COMMENT THREAD

The Saturday "toy"

Happier days - three of the aircraft from the Battle of Britain Memorial Fund (BBMF), courtesy of the MoD. They are, respectively, a Spitfire Vb (foreground), a Lancaster B1 (middleground), and a Hurricane. Always a favourite with the crowds at airshows, it is staggering to realise just how popular these aircraft are. More than six million people watched them, in 750 displays and flypasts this year. (Click the pic to enlarge.)

A crack in the façade?

A Reuters report today (no link) tells of a suicide bomber targeting a foreign military convoy in southern Afghanistan, slightly wounding one soldier.

The attack, adds the agency, came a day after a suicide bomb killed at least 11 people on a police bus in the capital Kabul, part of a Taliban offensive coinciding with the holy month of Ramadan. Another 30 people were killed in a similar attack in Kabul on Saturday.

Crucially, we are then told that the number of Taliban attacks has risen this year "as the insurgents switch tactics from the conventional battles of last year to suicide and roadside bombs."

This, of course, comes as no surprise as the eventuality was flagged up by Tory back-bench MP Ann Winterton in June last year, who – on the basis on what she had heard from a number of military sources – asked the defence minister:

As our forces appear to be winning the firefights in Afghanistan, does he expect those who oppose our troops there and in other theatres to revert to the use of improvised explosive devices?

With Gen. Dannatt claiming that Nato forces are "winning the tactical battle", more than ever we should expect the Taliban to revert to such hit-and-run tactics, leaving our forces highly vulnerable and, also, tying up huge numbers of troops in routine force protection measures.

It thus becomes absolutely imperative that exposure to IEDs should be reduced, to which effect it becomes all the more important that we see increased use of helicopters to carry out routine logistics tasks and troop transportation.

However, while the MoD is slowly gearing itself up, at glacial speed to provide additional Merlin helicopters (the latest news, incidentally, replacing Brown’s announcement on troop reductions in Basra which, curiously, has disappeared from the MoD website), there are some indications that, at last, the chronic shortage is going to be addressed.

The first hint of this came in an article in the weekend's Sunday Times, with Mike Smith writing that a group of high-level civil servants had been set up to investigate the possibility of hiring private contractors to perform defensive duties in warzones.

Then, today we saw a report that the "Nato military alliance" was thinking about leasing helicopters. "We need helicopters everywhere and one of the options being studied is leasing contracts," said spokesman James Appathurai in Brussels. He said that NATO already had such agreements for fixed wing transport aircraft — another area in which there is a shortage — "with our Ukrainian and Russian friends, which is working well."

A Nato diplomat said it was a question of "leasing dozens of helicopters", while Appathurai added that ISAF had launched a military mission dubbed Operation Pamir, in and around Kabul as well as in east, south and west Afghanistan, which was likely to last a number of months. That would make such air support all the more important, the report concludes.

So it is that the military bureaucracies seem at last to be considering an option that was obviously the best way forward months ago which, even now could be saving lives and money.

And they call this military efficiency?

COMMENT THREAD

Is there a politician in the house?

There is nothing inherently wrong with charities taking a hand in the welfare of our troops – far from it. Very often, such organisations can be more responsive, more effective and more efficient that the bureaucracies of government departments. Furthermore, the charities themselves give the public the opportunity to show their appreciation for our troops, in a direct and practical way.

Thus the launch of a new charity Help for Heroes by cartoonist Bryn Parry, who served in The Royal Green Jackets, is only to be welcomed. And, as a determinedly non-political charity, the first tasks it has set itself are to build a gym and full-sized pool at Headley Court rehabilitation centre in Surrey, to assist the "growing number of wounded UK service personnel".

Similarly, the Royal British Legion - best known for its annual "Poppy Appeal", which launched its "Honour the Covenant" campaign last month, again dedicated to better welfare provisions for our troops, improved compensation for the wounded and more care for the families of Service personnel.

There is certainly plenty of work for these charities to do, but not least of their activities is to shame the government into taking more action, to which extent there is a definitely a political edge to their involvement.

However – and necessarily – there are limits to the degree to which they can involve themselves in political issues and the line has been firmly drawn, leaving on one side the welfare issues but on the other – in the untouchable category – "operational" issues such as the suitability of equipment and its sufficiency, and decisions relating to its deployment.

This has the effect, therefore, of positioning the charities of being concerned for the dependants of the dead and the welfare of the injured. But they cannot concern themselves with the fit and healthy and the measures necessary to keep them that way. Such issues are "too political".

If that is the way it is to be, however, this places a huge responsibility on the politicians, whose trade is – in theory at least – that of politics. Their task must be to cover the whole territory, which must include the operational issues that the charities cannot (and should not) touch.

Unfortunately, as my co-editor has observed recently, and I have commented upon before, on these vital issues the politicians have effectively departed the field of combat.

Of this, no better example could be found than today's speech at the Conservative Party Conference by Dr Liam Fox, the Party's shadow defence secretary, who delivered his thoughts this morning in a presentation which could, to a very great measure, have served any number of charity representatives.

Headed, "We need a Government that honours our Armed Forces," this was hardly a suitable lead for a man who seeks to become not a minister representing the Armed Forces but one entrusted with the defence of our nation and its interests.

Yet, in "charity mode", his offering immediately led to a description of a meeting with "a young man in a hospital who had just returned from Afghanistan with horrific injuries." As a doctor, Fox says, "I marvelled at his physical bravery…".

Then we get the "service families living in miserable accommodation" and the "veterans in homeless shelters", which takes us into a polemic about "unhappy personnel" and "unhappy families" before moving on to discussion of the compensation scheme for injured soldiers and thence to the delay in holding inquests for dead soldiers.

We are well into the speech, therefore, before Fox even begins to address the issue of equipment, but then he goes for the populist gibe about the Coroner’s comments on Sgt. Roberts's body armour – an issue which was resolved even before the inquiry was held.

It would be otiose now to fisk every word of Fox's speech, other than to note that all the usual mantras re-appear – the allegations of "cuts" (despite their arguable nature), and of "overstretch" (heedless of the inefficient way our forces are deployed), together with a promise of "a bigger army" but without any commitment to increased funding.

Yet, if Fox is to pay for the two new carriers (and their hugely expensive aircraft) totalling perhaps £20 billion, the introduction of FRES at £16 billion and all the other expensive projects in the pipeline, how is he going to find the money?

Skating over such a minor detail we return to "smaller things" like seeing "more service men and women in uniform in our towns and cities", and seeing them "properly welcomed home", and the development of "proper psychiatric services", and so on.

Only at the very end do we get a brief homily about the threats we face, listed as: the spread of nuclear weapons; the danger of terrorist fundamentalist (sic) and the threat to our energy security. And Fox's answer is, "Armed Forces big enough to face these challenges." This brings us to a conclusion that we need, "a change to a government that honours our Armed Forces, a change to a government that puts our security first and a change to a government that believes in Britain". That is all we get.

While it would be unreasonable – in a conference speech to the faithful – to expect a detailed exposition of the Conservative's strategic vision, one could expect some clues as to the underlying principles and the direction of defence policy. As it was, we saw none. Had there been a medical emergency in the conference hall, no doubt Dr Fox the GP could have volunteered his services, but had a cry gone up, "is there a politician in the house?", answer there would have been none.

COMMENT THREAD