The tale of the Panther

This week has seen the launch of a political campaign by the Services charity, the British Legion called "Honouring the Covenant", demanding better medical care, swifter holding of coroner's inquests into the deaths of those killed in action, and more generous compensation.

It coincides with a with a report from the House of Commons Defence Committee on Service accommodation standards, which claims that "troops are housed better in wartorn Afghanistan than at some barracks back home".

That message might have carried more conviction on one newspaper had the photograph accompanying the piece shown British rather than American troops – but there you go … nobody is perfect.

Both issues have been given an amount of publicity today, not least by The Daily Telegraph and the Independent, both these and other newspapers citing the case of Lance Bombardier Ben Parkinson received only £152,150 in compensation after receiving terrible injuries after being blown up in his WIMIK Land Rover in Afghanistan, after it had hit a mine.

What got no publicity at all – and neither could have it been expected – was an industry "puff" released by BAE Systems, announcing the "trials success" of the Panther Command and Liaison Vehicle. However, while this might appear completely unconnected to the concerns of the British Legion and substandard accommodation, there are threads common to them all.

On the one hand, there is the failure of the Army to provide adequately protected vehicles, which would have prevented soldiers like Ben Parkinson getting injured in the first place and the second is the continued waste of money on equipment procurement, money which could be better spent elsewhere – not only on better equipment but on pressing needs such as better accommodation.

Turning to the Panther, this typifies the rot that afflicts the procurement process, with £166 million having been spent on 410 armoured vehicles which are essentially useless – certainly as far as current operations are concerned and even for the roles for which they were purchased.

The detail of the purchase has been rehearsed in numerous posts on this blog so suffice to say that, in the procurement competition where a selection was being made, the Panther was added after the short-list had been closed, in breach of the MoD's own rules and then chosen against better and cheaper competition.

The process was then defended by a Mr Andrew Simpson of Bath, who claimed to be the MoD desk officer who initiated the programme, which resulted in the procurement of the Panther vehicle and was "the only person to have been intimately involved in this programme from initiation to contract award." Mr Simpson then went on to forge a lucrative arrangement with the vehicle builder, Iveco, as a consultant.

Now, with the shortlist having been drawn up on 15 June 2001 and the contract having been signed in November 2003 for a vehicle which was then already in service in the Italian Army (pictured, left), it has taken until this month for BAE systems to announce that it has "successfully passed its UK MOD reliability qualification trials". From June 2001 to now, that is, incidentally, a period longer that the entire Second World War.

The reason why, of course, that the vehicle is effectively useless is that it is primarily designated as a command and liaison vehicle, which means that – by definition – it will most often be carrying officers and high-value assets like command radios. Given its distinctive appearance, akin to an SUV, in asymmetric warfare where there are no front lines, it will almost certainly be specifically targeted by insurgents if it is deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan.

Furthermore, although nominally a five-seater, by the time the radios and other equipment are fitted, the vehicle is down to three seats, which means it is too small to carry out its function. And herein lies a bizarre twist to the tale.

As originally specified by the Italian Army, for which it was designed, the key parameter which determined its overall size was that it should fit inside a Chinook helicopter. However, in the hand of the MoD, the vehicle is permanently fitted with a roof-mounted, remote controlled machine gun, which means it can no longer fit inside a Chinook helicopter. As we keep saying, you couldn't make it up.

What all this points to is that the MoD is a seriously dysfunctional organisation, one which a simple campaign by the British Legion and a report by the Defence Committee will hardly begin to address. But, in terms of priorities – as we also keep saying – worthy as these efforts are, we also need much more emphasis on keeping our troops alive and uninjured.

The tale of the Panther illustrates just how high a mountain we have to climb.

COMMENT THREAD

Who will be first?

It has long been an open secret in defence circles that there is only one thing stopping the UK cancelling the last tranche of the Eurofighter order. That is the knowledge that, while all the other "partners" want to do likewise, the first to do the deed will bear the bulk of cancellation costs and compensation – estimated at billions of pounds – almost as much as buying the remaining aircraft.

However, such are the pressure on the defence budget that the need to rid themselves of the burden is becoming intolerable, hence a piece in The Times today, announcing: "MoD seeks a way out of Typhoon contract".

Having already bought 144 of the aircraft, the MoD is still committed to buying another 88 – the so-called "tranche 3", at an approximate cost of £5 billion, but it is now negotiating with the four-nation manufacturing consortium over how much it would cost to cut or reduce the order.

The pressure apparently comes for the Treasury, which is looking ahead at the forthcoming Joint Strike Fighter contract and asking why the RAF needs two types of strike fighter – the latter being the dedicated role of the tranche 3 machines.

The need for the tranche 3 version is, in any event, being reduced by current developments, with the introduction of an "austere" air-to-ground into all new RAF aircraft coming off the production line, and plans to retrofit all existing aircraft with that capability.

One option thus being explored is a deal with would enable the MoD to count 72 Typhoons that it is about to sell to Saudi Arabia as part of its 88 commitment. But, predictably, this is not being met with any enthusiasm by the UK Eurofighter builder, BAE Systems.

Meanwhile, the cracks are showing up elsewhere. Last month, the Italian defence ministry stated that it would "probably" cut its order of 121 Eurofighters "because the planes have become more expensive". It has already bought 75 aircraft and is expected to take delivery of another 46 after 2012, but that is now in doubt.

With 236 aircraft so far bought, from the 620 to which the four-nation partnership have committed to buy, if the UK does manage to pull out, with Italy following, this will almost see the end of the long-running multi-national project. It will also mean the end to any potential export orders – not that there is anything substantial in the offing apart from Saudi. With it will die the fond dream of European aerospace integration, leaving the US-designed Joint Strike Fighter to hoover up the orders for the next generation.

Then, the ghost of Heseltine will finally be dead.

COMMENT THREAD

Spin and reality

In the previous post, on equipment spending, I remarked on how little Parliamentary scrutiny there was of smaller projects and that, once the equipment was in use, there was little or any follow-through to see how the equipment performed - even when there are real problems.

In fact, the situation is even worse than indicated for, instead of anything like an honest appraisal of the equipment so expensively purchased for the Armed Forces, all we get from the MoD is a series of public relations "puffs" telling us how wonderful the kit is.

One such is a piece posted on the MoD website today, another gushing eulogy on the Hagglunds BvS10 Viking tracked vehicle, telling us, in no uncertain terms, "Vikings' (sic) prove their worth in volatile Helmand".

"Troops on front-line duty in Afghanistan," we are solemnly told, "are trusting their lives to a vehicle which helped guarantee a bright operational future for the Royal Marines," with the piece continuing that it has become, "one of the vehicles of choice for Army soldiers".

Initially deployed last year with the arrival of 3 Commando Brigade in Afghanistan, the reality is somewhat different. Faced with a chronic lack of armoured vehicles, in the context of the infantry having routinely to mount infantry assaults against defended positions – where, in traditional doctrine, such assaults would be supported by infantry fighting vehicles and tanks – the MoD decided to retain the one and only personnel carrier with any armour, and had it over to the Army.

Not a hint of this do we get from the MoD piece though, which quotes Major Jez Hermer of the Royal Marines' Armoured Support Company, telling us the vehicle, "has proved indispensable … everyone has woken up to the success of Viking."

With no sense of irony, we are then told that the forces' inventory of armoured vehicles, "has come under serious examination in Afghanistan and Iraq" and that, "with excellent protection, an ability to operate in all weathers across all terrain, including to 'swim' in water, and to withstand a range of threats, Viking has performed well". We are also informed by Major Hermer that, "We have a 96 per cent mission success on operation Herrick which for a vehicle like this is pretty much unprecedented."

Cut now to journalist Vaughan Smith on his Front Line blog who, coincidentally, has just posted a report on the Vikings. Driving through the town of Gereshk, he writes:

Half-way through the journey we ended up towing another Viking and a Viking towing another Viking … But to save the engine, which gets very hot towing a second vehicle, the driver turned off the air-conditioning. Within 10 minutes we were soaked in our own sweat.

He then continues:

Later in the journey we too broke down and had to be towed. Fuel leak. Again, no aircon … The journey took twice as long as we had planned. The Viking vehicles have all done three times the number of operating hours that they should have done according to their proscribed maintenance schedule.

Three of them broke down and needed to be towed by other Vikings. A fourth turned over on bad ground while driving in the dark and also ended up being towed.

Smith then concludes his piece, stating:

The wear and tear on vehicles and helicopters, the expensive kit, is problematic. It is causing difficulty and aggravation. Commanders miss briefings, soldiers are late on leave and journeys like mine take longer than they should.

It is hard to estimate the cost to operational efficiency caused by a shortage of working helicopters and worn out vehicles but it is a real problem. It was not clear to me that the solution was simply, and expensively, to provide more helicopters and vehicles. Each helicopter and vehicle requires an expansion of the existing logistical support and it may be that there are ways to keep existing equipment working better.

Offered in good faith, this does paint something of a different picture from the MoD puff, although Smith does not offer a view on the combat performance of the vehicle. That, we get a taste of from one of our own experts, who tells us that, although it has been bought for the Royal Marines, he casts doubt on its suitability for other users:

Band-track wears out fast on hard surfaces. The suspension is minimal and would be trying for lengthy operations. The protection is quite limited - with an MPV you can go to 50-cal AP rounds or their equivalent. If you up the protection on the Viking you lose some of its other attributes such as swimming, the ability to traverse soft ground etc. Also - the Hagglunds are not that cheap if I recall rightly.

Thus, he concludes, it is "not a tank or indeed a front-line fighting vehicle by most estimates".

Indeed, the Vikings are not cheap. Quoted by Strategy Page at $890,000 (at 2005 prices), this is well over half a million pounds per unit, before radios and other expensive equipment is added, together with additional armour.

We also get some reservations from Daily Telegraph defence correspondent Thomas Harding and, elsewhere, in unpublished observations, we heard field commanders tasked with assaulting Taliban compounds holding off and calling in air strikes rather than commit troops in Vikings which lack sufficient protection and firepower.

It is that lack of sufficient armour and punch, more than anything, which is forcing an over-reliance on close air support and is thus, indirectly responsible for friendly fire accidents.

Now that the Warriors have arrived, the deficiency is partly remedied, although, to do a similar job to the British, Canadian Armed Forces not only have infantry fighting vehicles, they have tanks as well.

Strangely, we have has no news from the MoD on the Warrior deployment but the Ministry has spared no effort promoting the Viking.

To question to MoD, however, is not to denigrate the vehicle. Designed primarily to protect Royal Marines during amphibious operations and to give them a degree of beachhead mobility – with good cold weather performance – this expensive, specialist vehicle is being misused in Afghanistan.

Troops "are trusting their lives" to the vehicle, we are told. But it is not as if they have any choice and, in other areas, they were trusting their lives to Snatch Land Rovers. For want of something else, the Viking is better than nothing and better than much of the equipment in theatre. But that does not make it the right kit, and one really does wonder what the MoD is seeking to achieve by ramping up what is, in fact, a less than satisfactory and expensive expedient.

Possibly, its less than candid approach is meant to conceals the lack of commitment to providing the right equipment to theatre but, whatever the motives, it does not inspire either trust or confidence.

COMMENT THREAD

Overspend! Overspend!

We saw yesterday, the annual report from the Public Accounts Committee on defence spending on capital equipment.

In a now familiar ritual, the Committee routinely castigated the MoD for its latest round of overspending. This, according to the committee, now stands at £2.6 billion over budget on its 20 biggest projects, which, the Committee said, "could have a damaging knock-on effect on the Armed Forces". Additionally, this year, the PAC also criticised the MoD for a certain amount of "creative accounting".

Needless to say, the MoD cherry-picked the good bits from the report, and offered the now ritual denials of any wrongdoing. Meanwhile, the media offered some disapproving “tut-tuts”, with the likes of The Times, The Daily Telegraph and the Independent all picking up on the headline £2.6 million figure so conveniently highlighted by the Committee.

However, even this was a familiar routine and, with their spleen vented for another year, the media have gone back to sleep, with nothing by way of follow-through in today's media.

But then, this is hardly surprising. Overspend on big projects is virtually a given, not only in defence but in virtually every sector, from IT to civil engineering, to say nothing of the current Olympics project. And neither is it a British phenomenon, with the same familiar story being told of US, Australian, Indian and even Turkish projects.

However, looking back to 2005 – I don't think we could be bothered to do a review last year – we see an interesting contrast. Compared with this current complaint of a £2.6 billion overspend (11 percent of budget), the figure then reported was £5.9 billion, or 13 percent of the total forecast set at approval – although the cumulative delay for the top 20 projects was then to 206 months compared now to 433 months.

In fact, by general consent, the government – largely through the intervention of the procurement minister Lord Drayson – has got a grip on the spiralling costs and large projects do seem to be better managed. And, since many of them are "legacy" items, such as the Astute attack submarine programme (pictured), the Nimrod and the Type 45 Destroyer – where the overspend has already been incurred - there is very little that can be done other than contain further increases.

But, in 2005 – as of now – we feel that the Committee and the media miss the point, or do not go far enough. It is all very well criticising the management of current projects, after they have been approved, but in many cases it is arguable as to whether they should have been approved at all. Certainly, in respect of the Nimrod MR4 project, hindsight at least would suggest that a new-build would have been a better option.

The weakness in the system is that the MoD makes its own decisions, without consulting Parliament – as opposed to the US system where Congress holds the purse-strings and each individual project must be approved in advance before money is released. Whether that would make for better decisions over here is moot, as the US system has produced some pretty dire systems, although we have also seen some excellent weapons emerge.

Another weakness of the British system is that, once a weapon or system goes into service, there is little if any Parliamentary oversight. The MoD and the relevant Services largely escape scrutiny, and there is rarely any input into whether equipment is to be retired, refurbished or upgraded.

Finally, while all the emphasis is on the big-spending projects, there is next to no oversight on the smaller programmes although, cumulatively, these can involve very large amounts of money and also have significant impacts on operational efficiency.

In short, for a system of Parliamentary democracy, the MoD is far too much a master in its own house. This is a subject to which we will return.

COMMENT THREAD

That's progress

It was only a few months ago – in April - that, with Goebbels-like confidence, the MoD website was proudly announcing the delivery of the first set of wings for the RAF's future transport aircraft, the Airbus A400M. They had been flown to Spain to be fitted to other parts of the aircraft.

There was no mention, of course, that the A-400M programme timetable is seriously slipping. An aircraft which was formally ordered in May 2003 (with the political decision having been made in May 2000), with a projected in-service date of 2011, is now unlikely to reach the Royal Air Force even to meet that relaxed timetable.

Delays were in fact announced in January of this year and, by March, we were remarking that the aircraft looked like coming in late, overweight and short on range and payload – not that you would have got a hint of that from the MoD.

Now, according to Reuters, things have got even worse. The agency's source is France's new defence minister, Herve Morin, cited in the newspaper La Tribune who is predicting further delays arising from a flaw in its turboprop engines.

The French, who are first in line for deliveries - expecting theirs at the end of 2009 – are now resigned to a slippage of six to nine months, up from the three month's delay already admitted. No great detail is being given as to the latest reasons, other than "a flaw related to the engines, which feature the world's largest aircraft propellers."

Interestingly, Morin's comments to La Tribune were part of a longer interview in which he criticised costly projects to build over-sophisticated weapons when cheaper ones would do – a theme on which we have been known to comment occasionally.

Ironically, when it comes to the A-400M – which is to replace the RAF's shrinking fleet of C-130 Hercules transports (see here, here and here - we did, of course once have an airlifter in some ways more capable than the A-400M, which entered RAF service in 1966. It was called the Short Belfast.

Now, forty years on, we are running short of airlift capacity while waiting on the Europeans to deliver something that might arrive, at this rate, sometime never.

I suppose that's progress.

COMMENT THREAD

The turning point

There is no point or value in this blog replicating, or even reviewing the torrent of comment on the testimony of General David Petraeus to Congress yesterday. Those that have an interest will have already formed their opinions, for better or worse, and those who are happy to let the world pass them by will let this event pass them by also.

Perhaps the most interesting observation from commentators, however, came from an observer in the US, half-heard on BBC radio news, who noted that 60 percent of adults in the US did not know who General Petraeus actually was. I suspect you would get a similar percentage here, if anyone thought to ask.

Either way, it suggests that the progress of the "surge" is something more of a "beltway" preoccupation in the US, and an issue for the chattering classes over here. My best guess is that the rest neither know nor care or – and this may even be the majority view – are prepared to give Petraeus the benefit of the doubt, and let him get on with the job.

Of the testimony offered by the General, I found the most striking was a single sentence: "There will be no single moment at which we can claim victory; any turning point will likely only be recognised in retrospect." From that shines not only optimism but the truth. It is encouraging that we have in Petraeus a man who is able to articulate both.


But, in war that has been dominated by a single weapon, the improvised explosive device (IED) – which has been responsible for more than half of the total US casualties since 2003 - Petraeus may be being too modest. The graph above, charting US combat losses from IEDs tells its own story – from an all-time peak in May, the decline since then, as the "surge" got under way, has been precipitate.

Part of the reason for this is the remarkable picture of the top of this post: recent deliveries of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles – mostly 4x4 and 6x6 Cougars, with a sprinkling of Buffalos – some of the 7,000 or so additional protected vehicles which are on order, the bulk of which will find their way to this theatre.

That picture symbolises the raw energy and determination of a nation which believes it can win, and in prepared to invest in winning – a marked contrast to the British government, which has invested meagrely in new equipment, grudgingly and only when pushed. And, as we remarked before, although many commentators are dismissive about such "toys", their very functionality means that they are a window into the military mind and soul. You can read their minds by looking at their "toys".

Of course, it is not only "toys" that are winning the day, even if these are potent symbols of power and determination - and the outwards evidence of a mindset. Despite all their many, many mistakes, the Americans have been prepared to change tactics, to experiment with the new, to revisit old lessons and, above all, to engage in vibrant and continued debate about the best ways forward.

It was after the Japanese attack at Peal Harbour in December 1941 that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto is said to have brooded: "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve."

On this, the sixth anniversary of 9/11, we see history repeating itself after a fashion – "terrible" it may not be, but the evidence of resolve is certainly there for all to see. Look beyond the posturing of the Democrats, the prating of the BBC and the blathering of that self-seeking band of anti-war campaigners and, in that one picture, you will see the iron in America's soul - a "can-do" nation that has lost none of its energy.

I suspect Petraeus will not have long to wait before his turning point is recognised.

COMMENT THREAD

"Ignorant or malignant civilians"

There are few things worse, I sometimes feel, than in the aftermath of an air crash or some other man-made disaster, than the "expert" pundit coming on television, sometimes minutes after the event, who – with minimal information - then pontificates on likely causes (which so often turn out to be wrong).

It would be very easy to fall into the same trap with the recent "friendly fire" incident in Afghanistan. There is a fine dividing line between discussing such incidents in general – and the role and limitations of Close Air Support (CAS) - and speculating on the precise causes of and remedies for any specific incidents.

Considering that this blog has published no less than four posts on the issue, including the one linked above (plus this one, this, and this), I hope we have come down on the right side of the divide, providing a semblance of informed comment without undue speculation.

In order to do so, I have read some of the vast body of literature that touches in one way or another on ground attack, and to a lesser extent CAS, and am now starting to read another superb book, this one by Douglas N. Campbell, called The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate. Although only a few chapters in, one message comes through loud and clear already, that the so-called "fast jets" are too fast for CAS. They simply do not afford their crews the opportunity of visually confirming their designated target before committing to a weapons release.

The author, as you might expect, makes the case for the A-10, unofficially dubbed the "Warthog" but those who recall the Matty Hull incident might believe that they are also too fast, as the pilot failed to distinguish British markings on a well-marked Scorpion light tank.

This is definitely the view I take, and this one from limited but personal experience of flying training jets at low level – and considerable experience of flying single-engined club aircraft at considerably lower speeds.

One person who shares that view is Tory MP Ann Winterton, who yesterday had published in The Sunday Telegraph a letter headed, "Slower planes would cut friendly fire casualties."

Her view, as expressed, was that, "fast jets such as the F15 are not the answer for close air support in engagements. Aircrews under the command of forward air controllers have to take split-second decisions in which the tiniest of errors could cause a friendly fire incident."

She goes on to add that she raised the issue in a Parliamentary question about the use of light and small propeller aircraft for close combat support – which, indeed she did - and was told such aircraft would be unlikely to meet the Defence Ministry's "demanding requirements".

Her conclusion was that, "the two-seater ground-attack version of the Tucano (the trainer already used by the RAF) appears to be a solution to the problem being faced in Afghanistan today and would give appropriate and safer cover to our troops on the ground than fast jets designed for long-range targeting and high altitudes."

That is precisely the view held by this blog and, what is doubly interesting is that, by coincidence, the paper also published a long eye-witness account from the patrol leader involved in the incident, who relives “the moment a US bomb killed three of his platoon in Afghanistan”.

What emerges from this are three salient facts. Two tend to support the thesis that visual confirmation of the target could well have been an issue. The other could indicate that we are not dealing with a mechanical failure but a targeting error, again possibly supporting the need for final visual confirmation before weapons release.

The first of these facts come from the account of the action, where on 23 August 23 with dusk approaching, 100 British troops left their base near Kajaki in northern Helmand. Two hours into the operation, at about 6.15pm, the patrol was attacked by the Taliban with rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons.

We then learn that six soldiers occupied a deserted compound while a Joint Tactical Air Controller called in an air strike by American F-15 fighters on the enemy position. Crucially then we find that the three soldiers who were killed and the others who were injured had been on the roof of a building in the compound – which suggests that they could have been visible to an aircraft flying overhead.

This ties in with the second "fact", an observation from the patrol leader who tells the paper that, after the bomb had hit, "I knew immediately that the bomb had fallen short …" What that seem to suggest is that the line of attack taken by the aircraft was from the "friendly" position in the direction of the enemy. If that is the case, then the aircraft would have had a better view of the friendly position than of the enemy positions, thus – potentially at least – affording an opportunity for visual identification.

The third key fact is that the enemy positions being targeted were, according to the patrol leader, either "500 metres away or another at least one kilometre from our position." The enemy was firing from both, he says.

This issue here, therefore, is not one where – as was occasionally the case in VietNam and elsewhere that troops were in close contact, with air strikes being called in to deal with enemy troops as close as 50 ft, which has been recorded. In those latter instances, a slight technical defect in the bomb, a fractionally early release, or a host of other issues, could make the difference between hitting the target or killing "friendlies".

In this case, from the presumed altitude of the aircraft (at around 500 feet), a 500 metre error – with the bomb dropping "short" – arising from a technical fault in the bomb does not, at first sight, seem possible.

So it is that Ann Winterton calls for "slower planes", a need that has been well-established ever since jets were introduced for CAS in Korea and then, especially, VietNam. There, with a range of fast jets available to the USAF, including the F-105, the F-4 Phantom (pictured above) and the F-5, by far the most effective CAS aircraft was the A-1 Skyraider, a piston-engined aircraft with its genesis in WWII, which first entered service in 1946.

Yet, remarkably, when – according to Campbell - the USAF obsession with fast jets – and their lamentable performance in the CAS role was challenged by a "coalition of lawmakers from the Northeast and influential staff members", who forced upon the unwilling Air force the A-10 "Warthog", they were dismissed by USAF Vice Chief of Staff Robert Mathis as "ignorant or malignant civilians".

With the RAF on the verge of introducing Eurofighters into the CAS role in Afghanistan, nothing much changes.

COMMENT THREAD

Mobility, protection and mindsets

The piece in the Independent on Sunday has been long in the making, with a huge amount of effort and care going into the superb graphic (click to enlarge), produced by designer Richard Burgess, which sets out with the utmost clarity the problems with existing vehicles and the principles on which the design of protected vehicles should be based.

Unfortunately, the piece is tied in with the sad news of two more soldiers killed, yet another two from the 2nd Battalion, The Mercian Regiment (Worcesters and Foresters).

Few details are given, other than they were taking part in a "pre-planned operation to disrupt Taliban activity, south of Garmsir, southern Helmand Province, when their patrol was attacked by enemy fighters". We do not know, therefore, whether this was amounted or a foot patrol and whether lightly armoured WIMIKs were a factor in their deaths.

Returning to the Independent on Sunday, it notes that the facts that the previous deaths, of Private Ben Ford and Private Damian Wright, 23, arose after they were caught "by a landmine explosion", with an Afghan interpreter who also died, and a third soldier seriously wounded. The paper adds:

But the fact that they were in a Wimik, an open-topped variant of the Snatch Land Rover in which many British soldiers have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, has heightened controversy over the equipment they are given to carry out their missions … [an] issue [that] goes to the heart of the Military Covenant, under which soldiers are promised adequate resources in return for accepting the risk of death or disablement in the line of duty.

Then, the criticisms of this blog are rehearsed, in particular the indictment of the M-WIMIK (now renamed the Jackal).

Next, however, we get the comments of Francis Tusa, editor of Military Analysis. Although he concedes that the MoD had been slow to react against the threat of roadside bombs, he stresses that, "no vehicle is completely safe against mines." We then get something of the mantra, with Tusa opining that, "You can't just keep adding weight to vehicles to protect them. Many troops are very keen on the WIMIK. In certain areas you need mobility, and you use that and the terrain for your protection."

That then brings in my counter, that the MoD announcement that Ptes Ford and Wright were killed on a "routine patrol" north of Helmand's provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, rather than in the desert expanses further south, implied that their WIMIK had been used in a role in which it was vulnerable. This brought partial agreement from Tusa, who noted that, "Once you are on roads, you need a vehicle that is more suitable, such as the new Mastiff, which has more armour. If you use the Wimik in a convoy, that is less than optimal."

But then we get an MoD spokesman telling us that the "real defence" of the M-Wimik "is its mobility and agility. It's well suited to the terrain of southern Afghanistan, where speed and manoeuvrability is required".

Therein lies the heart of the argument, one we saw rehearsed with the Snatch controversy, where Lord Drayson, as long ago as June 2006, told the House of Lords,

I do not accept that Snatch Land Rovers are not appropriate for the role. We must recognise the difference between protection and survivability. It is important that we have the trade-offs that we need for mobility. The Snatch Land Rover provides us with the mobility and level of protection that we need.

These same arguments are rehearsed in an ill-natured and sometime foul-mouthed debate on the informal Army forum, but the limitations of the mindset are betrayed most clearly by Tusa in his declaration that, "You can't just keep adding weight to vehicles to protect them".

The point, of course, is that protection comes not with weight, per se but by design, as amply illustrated by the graphic. Instead of the conventional chassis, the heart of the vehicle is a v-shaped monocoque steel hull which provides the protection and the structural base on which to mount wheels, transmission and the body. By this means, it is possible to have both mobility and protection – the two concepts are not mutually incompatible.

As to weight penalty, the larger, fully mine protected RAM-2000, which is able to mount three rather than two crew-served weapons, weighs in at 4½ tons, while the completely unprotected M-WIMIK comes in a four tons.

Tusa's mindset, however, is one-dimensional in that he is thinking on the conventional tramlines of building a vehicle first, for whatever function, and then adding protection as an afterthought.

Another issue is so-called "situational awareness", which basically means that the crew has unobstructed 360 degree vision but, as the precursor version of the RAM-2000 demonstrates (the RBY Mk 1 Armoured Car), the two attributes are not at all incompatible (see above). Even the British Army in 1939 equipped itself with an vehicle that offered armour and "situational awareness" - in the Dingo scout car (illustrated below). And, although it was highly vulnerable to mines, the point is thus proven.

Nevertheless, much of the Army forum "discussion" was focused on only one of the possible alternatives, the Mastiff, against which the M-WIMIK is far more mobile and offers the situational awareness that the larger vehicles cannot. But what is missing is any recognition that the Israeli-designed RAM-2000 is the nearer parallel and could probably perform most, if not all the functions of the M-WIMIK. Yet, it could also perform safely the routine tasks of convoy escort and routine patrols, for which the M-WIMIK is entirely unsuited and dangerously vulnerable.

If greater off-road performance is necessary, than there is room for an entirely new vehicle, but all the indications are that the MoD has not even given the idea of a protected high-mobility vehicle any thought. Instead, it sticks to the mantra of "speed and manoeuvrability", heedless of the fact that neither are any protection against a hidden mine or IED.

Thus it is that soldiers must die, and die, and die, all because the most simplest of ideas seems to elude those great "experts" who advise the MoD on their vehicle designs.

COMMENT THREAD

Independent on Sunday

We get an honourable mention in the Independent on Sunday. Unfortunately, the stunning graphic is not reproduced on-line, so we'll do a review later today.

Mind you, the boy racers don't like their little "toys" being mocked.

COMMENT THREAD

About time!

British milbloggers are few and far between, but an important gap is being filled by Vaughan Smith, ex Guards officer turned journalist. He has been embedded in Afghanistan and is turning out a series of illuminating video reports on the superb Front Line blog, giving a unique and much needed insight into operations there.

In one of his latest posts he brings much awaited news – not seen in the MSM – of the arrival of the first deployment of Warrior MICVs to Gereshk in Southern Afghanistan.

This, writes Smith, is what the military would call "proper armour": a company of Scots Guards, called the Right Flank, who arrived in a large sand-cloud with more than 20 Warriors.

Announced in February, it is about time the armoured vehicles arrived. In a campaign where much of the fighting is closer to conventional warfare than counter-insurgency, we have seen classic infantry assaults on Taliban compounds, for which the Warrior would be ideally suited.

To date, however, the Army have been reliant on WIMIK Land Rovers for their fire support, with the occasional intervention of Scorpion light tanks which, with their 30mm Rarden cannon, have been regarded as a "battle winner". For armoured personnel carriers, troops have been reliant on the undergunned Viking – retained from the Marines – and, more recently, the Mastiff, which was never intended as an assault vehicle.

Now, with the arrival of the Warriors, we have a vehicle which is actually better armoured than the Scorpion yet shares the same 30mm Rarden and can carry eight infantry into battle.

The Warrior has been a familiar sight in Basra, where its firepower and tracked mobility is largely wasted and where its armour, designed for conventional warfare, still leaves it vulnerable to IEDs.

In the wide open spaces of Afghanistan, it will find its true home and will provide a very valuable addition to the armoury. But, with more than six months between the announcement and their deployment, we can only wonder what took them so long.

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A broken Army?

If you ever needed an example of how difficult it is to deal with such a complex subject as the state of the armed forces, yesterday's Newsnight special on the "Broken Army" is one such.

The programme opened with Gavin Esler setting the scene, as he intoned, "We expect them to fight for us, to kill and sometimes to die … so are we letting the British Army down?".

Much was made of the public attitude towards the Army, the programme opening with a survey which asked whether parents would be happy to allow their sons or daughters to join up. Only 28 percent said yes, while a massive 68 percent said no. That same survey had the majority believing that the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan were lost.

However, the programme covered far too ambitious a range and, as a result, it no more dipped its toes into core issues and then left them dangling. Any one of a number of facets could have warranted programmes in their own right.

Having watched the programme twice now, replayed other bits for another look, and then transcribed parts, I have to confess that I am still none the wiser. Depending on your own viewpoint, you could take out of the programme what you want to hear, but you would really have no better idea of whether the Army was indeed "broken".

In one accepted that it was, and in any event, the lingering memory is of the carefully staged interview with former CGS Mike Jackson, whose recipe was simple: more resources. From the air, he plucked ten percent on top of the current £32-33 billion, which he thought "not unreasonable".

"More resources" was a theme we were to hear several times, with hints that the money should be spent on better accommodation, more compensation and higher pay.

Some of the more interesting comments, in fact, came from viewers who have e-mailed the programme, one in particular who complained of back-to-back operational tours, adding: "… when we are seeing so many deaths that could have been avoided if the politicians had provided the support to the military they take for granted themselves, it has a particularly bitter taste".

The centrepiece of the programme, however, was a panel which included the mother of Ben Parkinson, Lord Drayson and opposition spokesman, Gerald Howarth. Inevitably, therefore, the bulk of the discussion was dominated by the compensation issue, and an exchange between the two politicians.

What we did get from Drayson, though, was the stunning statement, that, "We need to do absolutely everything we can to make sure that we look after our service people both when they're on their service and particularly when they're injured."

The claim was never to be properly challenged, although Gavin Esler did take on Drayson over the defence budget. But, it was not only a question of the absolute amount of money, said Drayson, "it is making sure we are spending the money on the right things…".

That brought the one and only interjection from Gavin Esler on equipment. "Protected Land Rovers," he said, "better armoured Land Rovers is one thing that came up a lot in our e-mails, and people are saying you are not spending it on the right things…".

Well, in the case of Land Rovers, rejoined Drayson, this was, "…something which we took action on at the beginning of this year. Investment in new protected patrol vehicles, for example the Mastiff vehicle which we designed and got into operation in 23 weeks …".

That, as far as equipment went, was it.

There were also two Army officers on the panel. One was a Major who was shortly to leave the Army because he had found the strain of operations too great. The other was Major General Sir Jack Deverell. Both only got walk-on parts.

Deverell did try to confront the issue of fighting insurgencies, rehearsing the public perception that we were "losing" the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, rehearsing the issue we have raised on this blog – that you cannot actually "win" in the conventional sense. That was one of the many things that could have made a complete programme.

Arguably, had the programme been better structured, it could have achieved more. It raised a thesis that the Army was "broken" but never really set out to give a precise definition what was meant by that highly emotive term. For sure, we learnt that it was over-extended, fighting two "major" operations with too few resources and inadequate manpower, but those charges were effectively taken as given.

All this, though, takes the Army at its own estimate. In fact, in terms of operations, we have committed only just over ten percent of the Army manpower – effectively two reinforced Brigades, while, although we have only the 22nd largest in the world by number of troops, the British Armed Forces have the second highest expenditure (only behind U.S.) of any military in the world.

Clearly, there is something of a mismatch here. One factor may be, as we have suggested on this blog, that the Army is keen to keep its basic force structure intact, even while conducting its overseas operation. Another is the huge level of misspending and budgetary waste, one example of which we offered recently, where the MoD has spent £300 million on not buying a new light tank.

However, such issues were barely touched upon, if at all. On reflection, though, it would it too much to expect the BBC to address its own thesis in a coherent manner. A "broken Army" we may have, but the case has not been made, much less on how to fix it.

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A killer of men

Following on from yesterday's post about the Supacat M-WIMIK, or "MV", as it is called in the field (now called the Jackal - ed), we have since received high definition photographs of the vehicle actually on operations (sensitive details obscured).

The detail is sufficient to confirm absolutely that it is unarmoured, particularly the all-important wheel arches, which take the brunt of the force in the event of a mine strike or a hit from some types of IED (pictured, with the contrast artificially enhanced).

But another important detail (arrowed) is the Kevlar matting used as locally applied armour. Of special note is the left-hand arrow which points to matting used to line the floor of the cab in the vain attempt to confer some protection from the inevitable mine strike – a provision which demonstrates that the crews recognise the vulnerability of the vehicle.

It is utterly bizarre that a brand new, £250,000 vehicle, developed specifically for service in Afghanistan should be so unprotected that crews are impelled to add their own armour. This is redolent of the 1960s, in Aden (pictured) when the floors of trucks were lined with sandbags in order to reduce the force of mine strikes.

Forty years later, we have moved on, but only in the sense that we are now using Kevlar matting rather than sandbags, to overcome inherent vulnerabilities in operational vehicles.

But what is entirely unforgivable is that the need for supplementary armour has already been established, viz the soldiers of the Worcestershire and Sherwood Foresters, stationed in Afghanistan, who found it necessary to add protection to their own desperately vulnerable WIMIK Land Rovers.

And it was two soldiers from that same unit who, despite using additional armour, two days ago were killed in one of these WIMIKs by an IED.

Last night, in a BBC Television Newsnight special, we saw defence procurement minister Lord Drayson, telling the world that everything possible was being done for our troops. This scandalous situation gives a lie to this claim. At enormous expense, he is sending troops out, some to certain death, as a result of his decision to procure badly designed and wholly inadequate vehicles.

This, clearly, is not a question of money – it is a combination of reckless stupidity and arrogance, the end result being a vehicle that can only be described as a killer of men.

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A reasonable presumption

According to The Guardian and other sources, the "explosion"
we reported earlier today, which killed two British soldiers – and injured two others, including the civilian interpreter, while they were patrolling in their vehicle, was a "roadside bomb" (IED).

We now have confirmation from the MoD website and that the dead soldiers were from the 2nd Battalion The Mercian Regiment (Worcesters and Foresters). The soldiers from this regiment, according to a recent report, were adding makeshift armour to their own vehicles, in a bid to increase their personal protection.

The fact that it was an open WIMIK yet there were two injured survivors suggests that the blast was not massive. When very large bombs have been used, there tend to be no survivors, even in mine resistant and blast protected vehicles (MRAP).

This was certainly the case in July when six Canadian soldiers and their interpreter were killed by a "massive roadside bomb", even though they were travelling in an RG-31. Tragically, the group was travelling on a gravel road, used often by Canadian convoys and considered to be safe.

On that basis, therefore, it is a reasonable presumption that, had the two British soldiers killed in the recent blast been travelling in a MRAP (such as the Mastiff), they would have survived and their colleagues might well have been uninjured. As we have seen, these types of vehicles can withstand an extraordinary amount of damage while still keeping their crews safe – another example is shown (top), this one an RG-31 in Iraq, with the engine compartment blown completely off.

Also shown is another sequence, taken from an insurgent video, where a Cougar is travelling along a road and is caught by a huge blast which totally obscures the vehicle. Before even the smoke has had a chance to subside, though, the vehicle emerges and continues driving unchecked until it disappears from the frame. The bomb does not even slow it down.

On the other hand, the following picture is of a WIMIK which has been hit by a relatively modest bomb, members of its crew being seriously injured. It cannot, of course, be said with certainty that the British soldiers in the current incident would have escaped, but the evidence points very strongly in that direction.

However, given the number of times Canadian, Dutch, US and even German troops have survived mine/IED strikes, while travelling in protected vehicles, the presumption can stand.

Since even relatively minor bomb damage to a WIMIK can accompany serious injuries to its crew, this would support a contention that, once again, the Army has left its troops dangerously unprotected.

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A deliberate and brutal decision

There is sometimes a cruel irony in coincidence, where events combine to tell a shocking story. Here, that combination is the latest report of two soldiers killed in a vehicle "explosion" in Afghanistan, and the announcement of the MoD's purchase of grotesquely vulnerable vehicles for the theatre.

The deaths of the two soldiers was reported earlier today, and occurred while they were taking part in "a routine patrol" in Helmand province. A third soldier and a civilian interpreter were injured.

At this early stage, all we know is that the vehicle "was hit by an explosion". This could be a mine or an IED and, while the vehicle could have been a "Snatch", a Vector or even a Viking, the "three plus one" crew configuration strongly suggests a WIMIK Land Rover.

If indeed it was, this is the second within a week. And, given that most incidents go unreported because there are no fatalities, these deaths, and the others reported, in Pinzgauer Vectors, and from IEDs and landmines are, therefore, the tip of a gruesome iceberg.

Under such circumstances, and rational person might think that the MoD and Army would be putting a premium on protected vehicles. But, in an announcement which makes for the cruel irony, the MoD today confirmed the purchase of 130 Supacat WIMIKs (now re-named the Jackal - ed), described when the intended purchase was announced, like a Land Rover on steroids and by us as insane.

At £30 million, this confirms the cost price at roughly £250,000 each yet, despite this extraordinary price, the press release has procurement minister Lord Drayson burbling: "These vehicles are well armed, swift, and agile," adding that, "They will boost our capability with some serious firepower." But, of course, the one thing he does not mention is protection from either gunfire, IEDs or mines.

The reason for that is very simple: there is no protection. The vehicle is completely unarmoured. And, by design, with the driver and crewman alongside the front wheel arches, they are terribly vulnerable to mine strikes while the open aspect gives no protection from gunfire.

Furthermore, the MoD knows the vehicle is vulnerable and, if its casualty figures were not already telling it, it knows the nature of the threat. What is more, it knows we know. But the MoD and the Army have made a brutal choice between mobility and protection, and have come down firmly on the side of mobility – irrespective of the consequences.

To an extent, this reflects, if not indifference, an acceptance of the reality of war, articulated recently by former CGS Mike Jackson, who told The Daily Telegraph:

There is no such thing as a casualty-free military campaign … Perhaps we understand that better now. The harsh reality is that there is risk, sooner or later tragically personified in soldiers being killed and wounded.

The same realism was evident in the current CGS, Richard Dannatt, recorded again by The Telegraph, on his visit to Afghanistan, as saying that, "the mounting death toll in the country should not overshadow the success forces were having on the ground." The troops, he said, "are winning the tactical battle".

But, what both comments also represent is a lack of comprehension - bordering blind stupidity – of the political and social dimensions of a counter-insurgency campaign. As we have remarked so often, not least here, casualties are the currency of the insurgents, who go out of their way deliberately to inflict death and injury, in order to weaken the political resolve of the combatant nations.

In this context, with a largely hostile media, and a generation which has grown up distant from the horrors of total war, there is a massive intolerance to casualties, which can undermine political resolve and force the withdrawal of troops.

This was the case in VietNam, we are seeing the pressures all too clearly in Iraq and it was a significant factor in the cessation of open warfare in Lebanon last year. The Taliban are aware of this, and are exploiting the dynamic, but our Army generals are blind to it. Thus, Dannatt's troops may be winning the "tactical battle", but he is losing the strategic war.

Then, on the social front, as the MoD is all too aware, recruitment in a volunteer Army is a serious concern. We have an Army which is leaching experienced personnel, and "overstretch" is only one factor.

The troops see the injured as they are evacuated on the same aircraft in which they return on leave and at the end of their deployments. And they see the coffins of the dead lifted out of their transports, all too frequently, as the ceremonies are given wide coverage on the television, in the newspapers and on the internet. No matter what the attractions of Army life, they are not worth the loss of your legs, or the risk of sudden death, simply because the Army is not prepared to invest in protected vehicles.

The same goes for new recruitment, It was Maj Gen Andrew Ritchie, the retiring commandant of Sandhurst, who last year described the "mum factor", saying that they were concerned that their youngsters would be exposed to real risk and danger. "And mums are hugely influential in boys and girls joining the Army," he warned. Those "mums", who see and read of troops being killed in inadequately protected vehicles are even less likely to want their sons and daughters to join the Army.

Aside from this, the decision to buy the Supacat represents quite astonishing technical ignorance – which I have noted quite commonly in senior Army officers. In making the choice between mobility and protection, they seem completely unaware that the two are not incompatible – as witness the Israeli RAM 2000 (pictured), based on the 1975 RBY Mk 1 Armoured Car, which we featured in an earlier post.

Finally, to this mix must be added an overweaning arrogance. With almost all the other coalition forces acquiring mine-protected vehicles, only the British Army is going out of its way to add more unprotected vehicles to its fleet. Uniquely, therefore, our Army considers it safe to operate in mine-infested territories with no or little armour.

It is this huge spectrum of ignorance, encompassing political, social and technical issues, combined with that arrogance which makes one despair.

But the MoD and the Army have made their choice. It is a very bad one. They – and especially the Army – will pay the price, as indeed will the nation. But most of all, it will be the individual soldiers who will pay the greatest price, in deaths and shattered bodies.

Yet, this is a decision made by the Army, enthusiastically endorsed by Drayson and, in the manner of thing, approved by defence secretary Des Browne.

One trusts now, he will instruct the message which currently accompanies every announcement of a fatality to be changed. At the moment, it starts off, "It is with deep sorrow that the Ministry of Defence must confirm the death(s) …".

As we remarked earlier, being "sorry" is not good enough. Collectively, the MoD has decided that soldiers should die for want of protection. Being sorry after the event, permitting avoidable deaths, is merely offensive.

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