Balls

Illustrating the continued unease at the behaviour of the "frightened fifteen", it is today the turn of The Sunday Express to deliver a snub to Leading Seaman Turnoff and her cohort of warriors (not), fresh from their diabolical torture at the hands of the Spanish Inquisition Iranians.

Yet it goes further than the Daily Mail yesterday and ignores completely the fifteen, focusing on its front page on the death of the two women soldiers from the bomb in Basra last Wednesday. In so doing, however, it also highlights the sister of the murdered officer, Holly Dyer.

She is also an officer, on leave from Iraq. And, after attending the funeral of her sister, she must complete her tour of duty in that country. Like Mrs Thatcher before her, it seems some of our "finest" women – as The Express calls them - have more balls than some of the men around them.

This is all the more reason why there must be a proper inquiry into the events surrounding the abduction on 23 March of our boarding team from the Northern Arabian Gulf, and while there has been a robust discussion on our forum as to the meaning of courage and cowardice, there is no disagreement that the senior officers involved in this debacle are displaying the highest form of cowardice.

By setting up their "lessons learned" cover-up instead of a properly constituted Board of Inquiry, and throwing their junior ranks to the media wolves, these officers are creating a smokescreen which obscures the more important issues. Effectively, they are hiding behind the skirts of Leading Seaman Turnoff – if she ever wears any.

It is precisely this "lessons learned" technique to which Christopher Booker turns in his column today, telling us:

The best way to cover up a catastrophic official blunder, as Tony Blair showed us after the 2001 foot and mouth disaster, is not to allow an independent inquiry but instead to stage a carefully-controlled "lessons learned" exercise. The same technique will be used, it appears, to bury the serious questions arising from the way the Royal Navy exposed a boarding party to humiliating abduction by the Iranians.

Booker too wants to know why Commodore Lambert did not make proper use of the forces under his command, including helicopters, when the Iranians had given plenty of warning that they were looking for a chance to interfere. Was he too preoccupied with the presence on his ship of a BBC film crew, Booker then asks, or was the chance to show off the British mounting a boarding exercise on their own, and with a woman in the front line, too good to miss?

Certainly, he concludes, there could be no better way to ensure that such questions are not publicly asked than by keeping the whole thing firmly "in house" and under wraps. A 2001-style "lessons learned" inquiry would ensure that the rest of us need learn nothing that the Navy and the government don't want us to know.

It is here that we need a really robust opposition, to prevent the government getting away with this transparent ploy. But – as we have already remarked – there is little sign of a masculine response from the Conservative's defence spokesman, Liam Fox.

But if Fox himself is limp-wristed, what price The Great Leader, none other than the Boy King, David Cameron? On the Conservative Party website, he welcomes the release of the hostages and then says that "both sides should learn lessons for the future". Both sides? Now there's a stirring call to action for you, from the Leader of Her Majesty's Opposition.

Balls? Forget it!

COMMENT THREAD

A loathsome ploy

This is very, very clever. But it also represents the very nadir of a loathsome government which is more interested in spin and its own survival than it is the welfare of the nation and the safety of its own troops.

According to the BBC, the "frightened fifteen" are to be allowed to sell their stories to the media and keep the money.

The Ministry of Defence has said their experiences amounted to "exceptional circumstances" that allowed its usual ban on such payments to be lifted. We are told that the MoD has said: "Serving personnel are not allowed to enter financial arrangements with media organisations. However, in exceptional circumstances such as the awarding of a Victoria Cross or events such as those in recent days, permission can be granted by commanding officers and the MoD."

What a disgusting parallel this is – to equate the action of these people with the winners of Victoria Crosses. But how deviously clever it is of a totally unprincipled MoD. Instead of seeking "closure" as I first thought, the spin meisters have evidently sussed the continued public interest in this issue.

By thus opening the gates to the "human interest" dimensions, it will feed the soap opera aspects of the Iranian hostage incident, drowning out the substantive issues in a torrent of irrelevant detail. And you can be assured that the stories will be very carefully vetted to exclude operational detail, for reasons of "national security", to ensure that nothing embarrassing leaks out.

The media, of course, will fall in with this ploy. Whatever distaste any particular newspapers might have had, greed will take over and we will see a bidding war for the rights to do the MoD's dirty work. Up front is LS Turney, who can command a premium for being the "plucky mum" in uniform.

This is far more skilful than a mere cover-up. It has been difficult enough to try to get people focused on the circumstances which led up to this episode and now it will be even more difficult. Commodore Nick Lambert can sleep easy in his bed in the coming nights in anticipation of the next honours list when he will receive his knighthood in recognition of his services to a grateful government.

Thus the rot which infects the very top of our Armed Forces will go unrecognised and unchecked. The weaknesses will remain unaddressed and the guilty will go unpunished.

For the rest, the thousands of brave and unassuming service personnel who do their duty by their country – their jobs will be inestimably harder and dangerous. And more will die.

By comparison with this government, Ahmadinejad is an honourable and principled man. As for the Navy (I can't bring myself to call it Royal), we might as well scrap it, for all the use it is.

UPDATE

According to The Sunday Telegraph, Turney is understood to have agreed a lucrative deal with ITV's Tonight with Trevor McDonald for a special programme to be broadcast tomorrow evening. It is thought the deal will also involve an interview with a tabloid newspaper. A source at the MoD said it involved a "life-changing sum".

The paper says it is understood that she was offered more than £100,000 to describe exclusively her experiences of the hostage crisis and the deal with ITV and the newspaper, believed to be The Sun, is thought to be worth a substantial amount.

The Sunday Times has it that critics are claiming that it (the aftermath) had become a media circus, with one former British commander saying the released hostages were behaving like reality TV contestants. The paper continues: "Others said they were being used as pawns in the propaganda war with Iran. But some former soldiers said it was a shrewd move by the MoD to control publication of the captives' stories."

Given the amount of money being paid, I suppose that's inflation for you ... it used to be 30 pieces of silver. Nelson would have hidden his head in shame. Never mind, though. Liam Fox has expressed his "concern".

COMMENT THREAD

The political dimension

It is unlikely that the prominence of the front page content of The Daily Mail this morning was entirely dictated by news values. And, if the message is not clear enough, the implied snub is made that much clearer by the headline spanning pages two and three (pictured below).

Its declaration, "An absolute credit to the Army", referring to the two women soldiers who were killed by a bomb in Basra on Wednesday night makes a marked contrast to the relegation of the Iran hostages story, which has to wait for pages six and seven for treatment.

Mercifully, none of the newspapers seem to have used the AP photograph of Seaman Batchelor, one of the captured boarding party (below left), who was snapped holding hands with not only mummy but auntie as well, a picture which does not exactly convey the martial values of this once great nation of ours. It is some small compensation that The Daily Telegraph and others carry an account of what our servicemen are still capable of doing.

In terms of news management, one can now see a certain amount of logic in the way the MoD spin meisters are handling the Iran hostages issue. By not holding back with an official Board of Inquiry, and holding a high profile news conference, objectionable though it may be, they have achieved a sort of "closure" and will now hope that the media circus will move on without looking too closely at the underlying, and even more embarrassing issues.

Here, of course, the blogs could come into their own, pursuing the aspects of the incident that the media have neither the patience nor the capability to follow but, throughout the whole affair. And, although that is precisely what we intend to do – although not with the same intensity of the least two weeks - it is quite remarkable how little comment there has been from the British blogosphere, and how superficial and ill-informed has been such comment as has found its way onto the net.

For robust and informed comment, you have to cross the Atlantic, where Michelle Malkin and her Hot Air blog, plus Redstate, National Review and others have led the way. Little Green Footballs, meanwhile, has the video showing how badly the hostages were treated.

Matching the silence of the (British) blogs has been a distinct lack of comment from the main political parties. In the early stages of the incident, this was understandable, as none would want to be seen to be handicapping the process of freeing the hostages. Now, however, when it is quite evident that the government is intent on burying the issue as fast as is humanly possible, the opposition should be in full cry, demanding answers to the hundred and once questions raised by the affair.

For sure, with Parliament in recess for the Easter holidays, the opposition is robbed of the opportunity to grandstand in the Commons, but, in some ways, getting your message into the media is actually easier. With mainstream government business in temporary suspension, the media is short of political copy and there is a good market for robust comment from opposition spokesmen.

The problem is though that, like the British blogs, the opposition – and especially the Conservative Party – has nothing interesting or original to say. We saw a taster of the line defence spokesman Liam Fox is going to take, when in his one and only BBC interview, the point to which he gave his main emphasis was the "shortage" of helicopters, which is by no means the most important of the issues to emerge and nor is it particularly relevant.

The limp-wristed response may be a function of the "girlie boy" line taken by the Boy King, who does not want his Green-Blue party to be associated with such nasty, manly issues like defence (even if women are getting killed and captured) but there must be millions of voters out there who have been appalled by this incident and want answers which the government is quite evidently unwilling to deliver.

There is, therefore, an opportunity for the opposition to shine, demonstrating an ability to get to grips with serious issues of the day and to back the government into a corner on matters that are of real interest to a very large number of potential Conservative voters. Unfortunately, it looks as if the Party is going to duck the challenge, projecting an image that is closer to Seaman Batchelor with his mummy and auntie than to one of a party which is fit and ready to govern.

COMMENT THREAD

Heads must roll

The kindest thing one can say of the press conference organised by the MoD yesterday afternoon, to show off the released Iranian hostages, is that it should never have happened.

If the Navy was actually serious about carrying out an inquiry – even if it is of the watered-down "lessons learned" variety – then the last thing it should have done was expose some of the key witnesses to media scrutiny, with carefully pre-prepared and rehearsed statements. Although the issue is not formally sub judice the same general provisions must surely apply, in order not to prejudice any findings.

However, by his behaviour this morning (see also here) before the statement by the two recently captive officers, Lieutenant Felix Carman RN and Royal Marine Captain Chris Air, First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jonathon Band has already delivered his judgement on the conduct of the boarding crew. That rather makes any findings which may emerge from any inquiry redundant, and the inquiry itself a charade.

And, by delivering his injunction not to second-guess "decisions that operational commanders and other people make," defence secretary Des Browne has effectively given carte blanche for the charade to continue.

This is a very foolish move which he may have cause to regret. He could have (and should have) stood aloof from the fray, behind the scenes insisting on a properly constituted Board of Inquiry, then announcing that he would stand by the findings. That way, he could rightly disown any responsibility for what in fact were operational decisions.

All that said, with the benefit of the press conference transcript to hand, we can agree with the officers' decision not to resist the Iranians – in the circumstances in which they found themselves.

It makes an interesting contrast with the December 2004 incident, where the boarding team remained on the ship they were inspecting, when challenged by Iranian Revolutionary Guards, while their boat(s) returned to the mother ship – the team eventually being lifted out by helicopter.

Since the officers have put their own conduct up to the bar of public opinion, we can have no problems with judging them. In that they appeared to have seen, from the vantage point of the boarded freighter, the approach of two Iranian boats, and decided then to return to their boats, this seems to be an unforced error. Like the 2004 crew, they might have been better off remaining on the freighter, sending their own boats away to avoid capture.

That apart, it seems more clear than ever that the capture could not have happened had a warship been standing off to protect them. It is even questionable whether it would have happened had the Lynx remained on guard, as it seems – according to the new narrative – that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards only approached after the unexpected departure of the helicopter.

It also seems, according to Carman and Air, that the boarding team contacted the ship to ask why the helicopter had gone, and was in contact when the Iranians approached. Here, therefore, there appears to be a conflict between this account and that offered by Commodore Nick Lambert.

Shortly after the event, he told the BBC that the boarding had been compliant and that the leader of the boarding party cleared the captain to continue with this business. After that, said Lambert, "we lost communications with the boat, but we did have a helicopter in the air – we always have a helicopter flying top cover – and our understanding is that the boarding party returned to its boats and was promptly arrested by a group of Iranian patrol boats…".

It is precisely to resolve such conflicts that there should be a Board of Inquiry and, for exactly the same reason, the boarding officers' evidence should not have been rehearsed in an informal context before it had been properly heard and evaluated.

That said, we are by no means alone in our criticism of actions taken in relation to this incident and, on yesterday's BBC Radio 4 PM programme – after the press conference – Max Hastings was insistent that the key question must now be how the boarding party was put in the position of being so vulnerable.

He was also highly critical of the lax attitude of the Navy, remarking that the Army had been fighting a "proxy war" with Iran for the last three years, yet the Navy did not even seem to be on a war footing. The operation, he said, had been treated, "apparently as if it were a Sunday stroll".

This in fact was Hastings repeating much of what he had written in The Daily Mail yesterday morning, in a piece headed, "Why there must be sackings over Iran".

The Royal Navy has blundered, he wrote. "It seems unlikely that Commodore Nick Lambert, the local commander off Iraq, will gain promotion to admiral, or deserve to." And, he adds, "Blame must go higher than the Commodore … Some naval heads must roll for the Iranian fiasco. It will not do merely to let officers 'retire with honour' at the end of their present postings. When a fiasco of this magnitude takes place in any walk of life, those responsible must not only be sacked, they must be seen to be sacked."

It was at that point that Hastings was under the impression that there would be a Board of Inquiry and his own fears of a "naval whitewash" now look exceedingly likely to be realised. But, with Band leading the cover-up attempt, apparently endorsed by Des Browne, it appears that they too are putting their careers on the line.

They should know that, in the way of these things, it is often the attempt to cover-up, rather than the original events, which destroy the players.

COMMENT THREAD

Compare and contrast

From a statement of the freed British sailors and marines, read out by their two most senior members, Lieutenant Felix Carman, 26, and Royal Marine Captain Chris Air, 25.

...we were flown to Tehran and transported to a prison where the atmosphere changed completely. We were blindfolded, our hands were bound and we were forced up against a wall. Throughout our ordeal we faced constant psychological pressure.

Later we were stripped and then dressed in pajamas. The next few nights were spent in stone cells, approximately 8ft by 6ft, sleeping on piles of blankets. All of us were kept in isolation.

We were interrogated most nights, and presented with two options. If we admitted we had strayed, we would be on a plane back to the UK soon. If we didn't we faced up to seven years in prison. We all at one time or another made a conscious decision to make a controlled release of non-operational information.

From the Wikipedia entry for Lance Peter Sijan (April 13, 1942 – January 22, 1968), a United States Air Force Officer and fighter pilot. He was awarded the Medal of Honor, the United States' highest military award, for his selflessness and courage in the face of lethal danger.

Sijan was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1942 from a Serbian father and Irish mother. He graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1965, and after attending pilot training, was assigned to the 366th Wing at Da Nang Air Base, Vietnam.

On his 52nd mission, on the night of November 9, 1967, Sijan and pilot Lt. Col. John Armstrong were tasked with a bombing mission over North Vietnam. As they rolled in on their target to release their ordnance, their F-4C was engulfed in a ball of fire, due to the six bomb's fairly new fuses which malfunctioned causing a premature detonation soon after the release point.

The jet then entered a banking climb before plunging into the jungle below. Sijan ejected from his aircraft, and a search-and-rescue crew, radioed to Sijan that they were attempting a rescue. After almost a whole day of locating his position and softening up air defences in the area, the SAR forces were finally able to get one of the big Jolly Green Giant helicopters roughly over Sijan's position (during this operation over 20 aircraft were disabled, due to the anti-aircraft fire, and had to return to base.

Another aircraft was also shot down, though its pilot was rescued with ease by one of the Jolly Greens on station.) Sijan, refusing to put another person in danger, insisted that he crawl in to the jungle and have a penetrator lowered by the helicopter, instead of sending down the helicopter's Para-Jumpers to carry him. However, he couldn't reach the penetrator quick enough, and after 33 minutes the rescue team, which faced enemy fire and the growing darkness, had to return to base. Although search efforts continued the next day, they were called off when no further radio contact was made with Sijan, due to his unconscious state, and he was placed in MIA status.

With a fractured skull, mangled right hand, compound fracture of the left leg, without food and little water, and no survival kit, Sijan evaded enemy forces for 46 days (all the time "crawling" or rather scooting on his back down the rocky limestone karst on which he landed, causing even more wounds) before being captured on December 25, 1967.

Although emaciated and in poor shape, he managed to overpower his guard and escape, but was recaptured within hours. He was transported to a holding compound in Vinh, North Vietnam, where he was put into the care of other American POWs. Here, in even more pain from his wounds, he suffered beatings from his captors, but never gave any information other than what the Geneva Convention allowed. After further travel to Hanoi, Sijan suffering from exhaustion, malnutrition, and disease, died in captivity on January 22, 1968.

Sijan was promoted posthumously to captain on June 13, 1968. His remains were repatriated on March 13, 1974 and positively identified on April 22, 1974. He is buried in Arlington Park Cemetery in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

* * * *

"As a professional set of Armed Forces – and you can't get a more professional set than the United Kingdom..."

First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Jonathon Band. 6 April 2007.

COMMENT THREAD

Armchair generals

According to Reuters, defence secretary Des Browne has "castigated armchair pundits" who criticised how the naval personnel behaved. He is said to have told Sky News, "We ought to be very careful about commenting from the comparative comfort of wherever we are, when we are not out there on operations, about decisions that operational commanders and other people make."

This of course, is the line the military often takes, thus arguing for a license to do whatever they deem fit, whether competently or not, free from the inconvenience of being held responsible for their actions.

The killer phrase is more usually "armchair general", although "pundits" will serve. This is calculated to defuse criticism, especially from "gobshite civilians" whose role in the greater scheme of things is to pay the bills (such as for transporting 15 marines and sailors from Heathrow to Devon in not one but two helicopters ... how much did that cost, I wonder?) and keep their mouths shut.

When it comes to comfort and "armchairs", however, we would have a long way to go to match the splendour of the MoD.

Amongst other gems in their £2.3 billion head office refurbishment, was the purchase of 3,100 luxury Herman Miller Aeron chairs — the kind used by David Dimbleby on the BBC's Question Time — which have been described as "the most comfortable office chairs in the world". The cost is reputed to be more than £1,000 each, and not a few of these will be polished by well-upholstered uniformed rumps.

And dare we wonder what sort of chair Des Browne has in his office?

COMMENT THREAD

This whitewash won't wash

Although one would not hold out The Sun to be the fount of all wisdom, it is certainly the bellwether for a significant sector of public opinion. And, while the "frightened fifteen", clutching their "lucky bags" revel in the warm embrace of their mummies and daddies, and sundry other "loved ones", the redtop has made it clear it sees a link between the bomb in Basra and what it calls the "Tehran tyrant".

Its leader acknowledges that it was "good to see our 15 sailors and marines back on British soil yesterday" but, for all the cheers and champagne, avers that "this was not Britain's finest military hour".

John Humphrys put that very point to First Sea Lord Jonathon Band this morning. He responded: "This incident was a most extraordinary act conducted in those waters and I would not agree at all that this wasn’t our finest hour. I think our people have reacted extremely well in some very difficult circumstances."

Band then went on to justify his force's lack of preparedness by telling us to look at the boarding "in context", defining the threat in terms of protecting the Iraqi oil terminals in the Gulf from "criminals and terrorists and certainly not the Iranians". The Iranians are not the enemy, he averred. In no way are they considered the enemy. The Iranians "are not part of the scene".

Asked whether he considered the possibility that our service people might be captured by the Iranians, Band virtually squawked with indignation. "As a professional set of Armed Forces – and you can't get a more professional set than the United Kingdom – we are always assessing the balance between force protection and the task we are doing… the decision to go ahead with the boarding was entirely proper."

When Humphrys suggested that the "little boat was out of sight of the mother ship" and that "... it was a pretty cavalier approach," Band showed the ranks were truly closing, resorting to the time-honoured defence of the bureaucrat: "The procedure was correct for the situation on the ground as the commander saw it."

If that does not stink of minds already made up, I don't know what does, but the First Sea Lord could have at least waited until his "lessons learned" charade has run its course before being so confident. Now that he has made so public a claim, it will be exceedingly difficult for him to go back on his words and then admit to any major defects - thus does the cover-up progress.

Needless to say, Band dismissed any parallel between the 2004 incident in the Shatt al Arab, when three boats manned by Royal Marines were seized by the Iranians, but he is undoubtedly assuming that we know nothing about the later incident. Let me reproduce the narrative from Hot Air here:

I don't think it was widely reported, but the last time the 'wood was in the NAG' (North Arabian Gulf) (from roughly Oct '04 until Jan '05) the Brits had a standoff with the Iranians. It was early December '04 if I remember correctly when for a reason we could never ascertain, something like 5 or 6 merchant vessels ran aground trying to enter the Shatt al Arab, which is roughly the dividing line between Iranian and Iraqi waters (depending upon who you ask, as you might imagine). A British Boarding Team boarded one of the aground vessels to try to figure out why so many vessels ran aground at the same time. While in the merchant vessel, small boats from the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) surrounded the vessel and the British small boat standing by. The picture I believe is classified, but you can imagine the reaction of the guys in the RHIB when there were two IRGCN RHIBs within 20 feet, pointing AK-47s and an RPG at them. Needless to say the RHIB backed off and returned to the ship. The Boarding Team hunkered down and the diplomacy started. It ended with the Boarding Team getting lifted off the merchant via helicopter, a needlessly dangerous operation, because the Iranians gave them permission to do so by air but only until sunset. After that all bets would be off.

Then there are the more recent incursions reported by CNN, there was the Iranian attempt in September last to abduct US soldiers, the bellicosity of recent statements, the fact that the CIA had warned the British to expect reprisal attacks from Iran after America detained five suspected Iranian intelligence officers in Iraq. And there was also the Iranian action against the Iraqi naval forces in January 2006.

From all this and the activity of Iranians against land forces, taking it in its totality (plus, undoubtedly, much more that we do not know about) and potential threat emerges with the greatest of clarity. If Band is really trying to convey to us that there was no conceivable possibility of an Iranian abduction, then he is either incredibly stupid, or believes us to be. Either way, surely he cannot expect us to swallow the line that the Iranians were "not part of the scene".

However, given even the remotest possibility of Iranian action – and the very serious consequences that might ensure – we did not expect Band (and his subordinate commanders) to pawn the Crown Jewels to protect our servicemen (or even for our servicemen to take unnecessary risks.) Simply - in view of the vulnerability of the British boats - we believe it is entirely reasonable to expect the commanders on the spot to have used the assets they had available – which included other coalition warships.

Thus, we maintain that the central issue is and must remain the question of why the commanders on the spot sent two lightly armed rigid-hulled inflatable boats on their mission on that fateful day, without a warship escort. Everything else is, in our view, peripheral. Until that is resolved, for Band to pretend that, "the decision to go ahead with the boarding was entirely proper" simply won't wash.

COMMENT THREAD

The rot starts at the top

Having listened with growing incredulity to a long interview of Sir Jonathon Band, First Sea Lord, on the BBC Radio 4 Today programme, the suspicion of a cover-up grows apace.

With the supposed inquiry still under way, Band denied any fault, applauding his brave young men (and woman) who did things "exactly right". You came away with the impression that everything had been done for the best, in the best possible way.

Crucially, despite the Army having to suffer their personnel being slaughtered by Iranian-backed militias, using arms supplied by the Iranians, the Band played the tune that "Iran is not an enemy". This justified the (lax) Navy attitude to the operations.

Whatever sympathy one might have for the Royal Navy is fast evaporating. Band may think that toughing it out is the way to go, but there is too much evidence of failure to brush under the carpet. All the First Sea Lord has managed to do with his denials this morning is confirm that, when an organisation starts to decay, the rot starts at the top.

COMMENT THREAD

Start of a cover-up?

We learn from the BBC's Radio 4 World Tonight programme that, contrary to expectations, there is going to be no formal Board of Inquiry into the events surrounding the Iranian hostage incident. This is from Paul Adams, the BBC's defence correspondent, who reports that the Navy is instead to carry out a wide-ranging "lessons learned process".

In the meantime, British boarding operations in the northern Gulf have been suspended and HMS Cornwall has been stood down. The command of Coalition Task Force 158 has been transferred to another (unspecified) vessel – possibly American. This probably means that Nick Lambert, the current force commander has also relinquished his command.

In the same programme, opposition defence spokesman Liam Fox was interviewed, only for him to display his (usual) lamentable lack of detailed briefing. He queried the rules of engagement, the equipment and procedures but gave most emphasis to the absence of helicopter cover, questioning whether we had sufficient helicopters and whether the absence of air cover was an effect of "the cut in the helicopter budget".

After a brief word from Lib-Dim leader Menzies Campbell, who wanted all British forces to pull out, former First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Allan West was interviewed. He complained that dealing with Iranian forces which might capture our boats at any time was "not the basis on which we have been operating over the last three years" and to cope with it would require "a completely new force mix".

It was West, however, who got closest to explaining that the Cornwall was part of a coalition force and that there was also available a "one Iraqi patrol boat and a US coastguard cutter". That, as we know, is a gross understatement - although West did also say that we had two minesweepers - but even that was not picked up by the BBC interviewer, Robin Lustig. He failed to ask the obvious question – why one of these vessels was not tasked to escort the boarding team.

The BBC, however, is by no means the only media source completely to miss the international force dimension and the extent of the assets that were available to Commodore Lambert.

For instance, in a wide-ranging piece reporting that a Navy inquiry was under way, The Times also failed to pick up this dimension.

It listed "a catalogue of errors", from poor intelligence to inadequate training and lack of firepower, and cited "naval sources" which said that clear failings had already been identified. It is also understood that a thorough review of the rules of engagement and standard operating procedures is already under way to prevent another ambush, "the second of British naval forces by Iranian vessels in three years." It has not even got that right for, as we know, this is – at the very least – the third.

The paper also focuses on the absence of the Lynx helicopter, an issue which is developing into something of a red herring as, if there had been a warship escort, top cover would hardly have been necessary.

All The Times could manage in relation to the availability of suitable vessels was to convey "doubts about whether Britain has the right ships to conduct the operations required in the shallow waters of the northern Gulf." HMS Cornwall, it said, "is a Type 22 frigate that was designed to combat Soviet submarines during the Cold War."

She is too large to operate in the confined waters of the northern Gulf coast. As a result she was several miles from the boarding party when they were ambushed and so was powerless to help.

The obligatory "expert" was then wheeled on - Jason Alderwick, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who said that the Navy needed a warship more appropriate for the job, such as a small, fast and heavily armed corvette with a shallow draft that could operate right up to the Gulf coast-line.

That may be true of the Royal Navy but it is not true of the Coalition Task Force as a whole, which was more than adequately equipped – the two Cyclone-class patrol vessels being especially suitable – (USS Whirlwind pictured above – the other pictures show respectively one of the two Mk38 25mm machine guns and one of the twin .50 cal machine gun mounts - plus an Iranian Revolutionary Guard launch ... "make my day, punk!").

Thus, for all the torrent of words and the earnest study, all but The Daily Telegraph has missed the point. There was no shortage of vessels – simply that Commodore Lambert failed to deploy his assets in such a way as to afford protection to the Cornwall's boarding party.

A combination of the idleness of the media and now the absence of a formal Board of Inquiry means that this central issue is closer to being glossed over in what is looking suspiciously like the start of a cover-up.

COMMENT THREAD

Is this the price?

As the "frightened fifteen" were whisked away in military helicopters from Heathrow, after their arrival from Tehran this morning, we heard news that the "Arab street" is rejoicing in Basra after a roadside bomb killed four British service personnel and their interpreter, and seriously injured another soldier.

Two of the dead were women, from the Intelligence Corps and the Royal Army Medical Corps. The two male soldiers were from the Royal Army Medical Corps and 2nd Battalion The Duke of Lancaster's Regiment.

Pictures of the scene (above) show locals cheering and rejoicing, parading with a soldier's helmet and fragments of the Warrior, in Hayaniya, a slum area on the northwestern outskirts of Basra - known as a stronghold of local (Iranian-backed) Shia militias.

According to a more detailed report in The Times the personnel died when a convoy of armoured vehicles was attacked by two devices last night. The patrol then came under attack from small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades.

Witnesses tell of the British patrol having repulsed an earlier ambush by five insurgents in a different district of the city, wounding one of the attackers. During the second ambush, British forces returned fire while trying to evacuate the wounded.

Photographs of the scene showed a large crater in the road that was at least a three feet deep and several yards wide. Iraqi children (and adults) were taking away pieces of burned wreckage.

The Times (and others) also report than, after the attack, a British patrol was seen storming an Iraqi checkpoint close to the scene of and disarming the police there.

This now brings to six the number of British soldiers killed in Basra since Sunday, making it, as the paper observes, one of the deadliest weeks of the Iraq war for UK forces.

No commentators are making any link between the bomb incident and the Royal Navy hostages, but the loss of face embodied in the humiliating capture of the British personnel and their subsequent behaviour can only have emboldened attackers, who could see for themselves the weakness of British forces.

Appeasement brings its own penalties and, in the greater scheme of things, no one can argue that the events of the last 14 days have in any way improved the prestige of British forces, where winning the respect of the local populace is a vital precursor to dealing successfully with an insurgency.

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Flawed choices

The combination of the 25th anniversary of the Falklands War and the current Iranian hostage crisis – all on the top of the festering sore of the Iraqi insurgency – has prompted The Daily Telegraph to commission a YouGov poll on how the public sees the role of Britain in the world.

The results do not make happy reading. A substantial majority of Britons would clearly like to see this country scale down its world role and begin to function internationally "more like Sweden, Canada or even Belgium". The mood, writes Anthony King for the paper is "markedly post-imperial - reluctant to see Britain maintain even its present overseas commitments and totally opposed to seeing them extended further."

"If capabilities are to be matched to commitments," King continues, "most voters would prefer to see Britain's commitments reduced rather than its capabilities expanded. With the Empire now a distant memory, people evidently believe that it is time for Britain to abandon its great-power pretensions."

What immediately strikes one of this survey, of course, is the limited scope. Not least, in what we are constantly told by the political classes is an interdependent world, the options are wider than simply whether to increase or reduce our commitments.

For instance, the Europhiles would have it that we could extend our global reach by working more closely with the European Union, striving for a common foreign policy and a European defence identity, gradually moving to a single European Army in all but name.

It has to say something of how far these options have moved down the political agenda that they are not even considered in the survey, yet – if we are to believe the propaganda – the one sure way of increasing our influence in the world, for no greater expenditure, is to pool our resources with the other EU member states.

Instead, the options offered are firmly cast within a national framework, one being that, if it was accepted that Britain’s armed forces are overstretched, “what do you think this government or any other government should do?”

Depressingly, some 60 percent want Britain's commitment overseas reduced "so that British forces do not become involved in crises overseas", while a mere 30 percent want spending increased so that the forces can continue to be deployed effectively.

What makes this so depressing is that, even within the limited national framework, the options are still hopelessly limited – and based on what could well be a false premise, that our forces are indeed deployed effectively.

Taking the last proposition first, if the arguments on this blog have any merit, no one could begin to argue that the soldiers, for instance, that the marines and sailors despatched to inspect that freighter on 23 Match were in any way "deployed effectively".

Arguably, this is but one small instance. The disastrous retreat from Camp Naji in al Amarah, abandoning an expensive asset to the militias can again hardly be regarded as the effective deployment of troops, and neither can the policy of soaking up punishment for daily mortar and rocket attacks on British bases, without any effective response.

Equally, through lack of suitable vehicles and helicopters, in a deteriorating security situation in Basra, troops venturing out of their barracks have to do so in large numbers, limited the scope of operations and the reach of British forces.

One example might be that, for lack of fast, light utility helicopters to deploy small packets of troops to key locations in the city, commanders have to detach slow-moving and vulnerable convoys comprising at least two Warriors and four Snatch Land Rovers (or other vehicles such as Bulldogs). Thus, where eight or ten troops might be employed, , to great effect, upwards of 40 might be tasked to do the same job, more slowly and less effectively.

Looking at the other proposition – the argument that the options offered are too limited – respondents are asked to link capacity and expenditure so that any increase in capacity is necessarily linked with more spending.

Time and time again on this blog, however, we have sought to show that these two issues are not linked. Most recently, we argued that significantly cheaper fixed-wing aircraft could do a crucial part of the job of a £14 million Lynx helicopter, at a fraction of the operating cost. Inasmuch as they have much great endurance, they could actually do a better job, as they would still be flying when a Lynx had returned for refuelling.

Add up the millions that could be saved from operational efficiencies and from dealing with the billions wasted on misguided and – frankly – insane procurement decisions and a case could be made for improved capacity at less or equal cost.

Now, standing back from the Telegraph survey, one can only speculate what the response would be if, instead of two options, respondent were given the choice of three: reduced capacity at current or less costs, increased capacity but at increased costs, or increased capacity with the same or less expenditure.

Alas – and it says much for the inadequacies of the media and the politicians – the case for better spending has not been made. Even on our own forum we read comments which demonstrate that their authors necessarily regard more spending as a given, to the extent that the debate is lost before it has even run its course.

However, there is one more element to this debate which should be a central part of it. When the hostage crisis broke, we observed that, while we are spending a King's ransom on our subscription to the EU – devoted in part to increasing our global influence – we might be better advised to spend our money where it really matters.

What would have been the response, one wonders, if the Telegraph survey had given respondents the choice of diverting our EU subscription to increasing our defence capacity and effectiveness.

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The mysteries grow

It was a simple enough mistake to make. After all, it was the BBC in one of its first reports after the Iranian hostage-taking which referred to Commodore Nick Lambert as the captain of HMS Cornwall, the frigate on which the abducted boarding team had been based.

We fell in with the BBC – and many others – although we should have known better – the rank of Commodore is far too senior to command a mere frigate. Her captain is in fact Commander Jeremy Woods, who took command on 20th November 2006.

The distinction is, of course, rather important in the drama of the abduction because Commodore Lambert was using the ship as his flag ship, it providing him with a "command platform" from which he controlled the multinational task force in this area, of which he was the commanding officer.

Lambert assumed command on 7 March 2007 of what is known as Coalition Task Force 158 (CTF 158), a coalition force comprising up to 12 units from the US, UK, Australian and Iraqi navies, taking over from US Navy Commodore Jeffrey Harbeson (both pictured above).

Included in this line-up were significant US Navy assets, including USS Howard (DDG 83), USS Chinook (PC 9), USS Whirlwind (PC 11), USCGC Maui (WPB 1307), USCGC Monomoy (WPH 1326), as well as the Australian HMAS Warramunga (FFG 152) – over which Lambert had overall command.

The US patrol craft (PC) are particularly interesting, of which USS Chinook is a typical example (pictured right). It is the ninth of the Cyclone-class patrol coastal boats: length, 170 feet, displacement 331 tons and – all importantly – a draught of 7.5 feet (compared with the Cornwall's 20.7 feet). She has a maximum speed of 35 knots and is armed with two 25mm Mk38 machine guns, two .50 cal machine guns, two Mk19 automatic grenade launchers and six stinger missiles.

She also carries a rigid-hulled inflatable boat, launched and recovered from a stern ramp (pictured left) and a complement of eight special forces personnel to man it.

This, as you may imagine, puts an entirely different light on the additional detail that emerged yesterday, when the Scotsman on Sunday reported that the Cornwall's boarding crew "had even more protection nearby; an American military helicopter and patrol boat were within striking distance, ready - and willing - to help…".

Rather than wait until after the event, Lambert, had he so chosen, could have tasked any one of twelve vessels - including the USS Chinook or one of the other patrol boats – to carry out the freighter inspection, instead of despatching Cornwall's boats, from a distance of eight miles. Equally, he could have asked – no, ordered - any one of those vessels, to provide overwatch – and, clearly, the US Navy knows how to do it, as this illustration of one of its own boarding exercises shows, the gunner keeping a "sharp eye out" for the inflatable (centre frame).

Furthermore, it is not as if Lambert can have been unaware of an Iranian threat. Thanks to one of our sharp-eyed readers, we have picked up this report from CNN, dated 19 February this year, recording multiple incursions by Iranian patrol boats into Iraqi waters.

Crucially, they had been filmed operating near the Iraqi offshore oil terminals, Khor Al Abdullah (Amaya) and Mina Al Bakr, which are close to the position recorded for HMS Cornwall on 23 March when its boarding party was abducted by Iranians in very similar patrol boats. This can be seen from the MoD chart, showing the position of the frigate, and another chart which shows the position of the oil terminals (below). One really does wonder why this has not been publicised more, and why no formal protests were made at the time, especially as the incursions had continued.


However, according to the CNN report, the United States at the time did not see the Iranian moves as "aggressive or provocative". Its assessment was that the probes were "part of an Iranian effort to raise its military presence in the gulf". But officials did say that activity had increased. On at least two days, Iranian patrol boats had crossed into Iraqi waters at the northern end of the Persian Gulf. The boats remained inside Iraqi waters for several minutes before Iraqi security forces (pictured below) told them to leave.

At that time (February) Iraqi security forces had recently taken over the main responsibility for guarding the terminals, although the task force assets remained nearby, as back-up. But, had Lambert so elected, he could have directed Iraqi naval forces to back up his own forces, or even to carry out the freighter inspection.

With so many forces at his disposal, this rather does beg the question as to why Lambert deployed two highly vulnerable Royal Navy craft, sending them on a mission when he knew the Cornwall could not provide back-up. And, one wonders whether other coalition forces in the areas were even told of the despatch of the boarding party.

To be fair to Lambert, though, that morning he had far more important things on his mind. With a BBC television crew on board the Cornwall, he was scheduled to give an interview to the BBC's Ian Pannell for a news backgrounder regarding operations in the North Arabian Gulf. Then, incidentally, Pannell got his job description right, giving him the label "coalition task force commander".

However, with a Royal Navy photographer close at hand to take publicity stills (example right) when his sailors and marines had been despatched to their fateful rendezvous, one wonders whether our Nick had taken his eye off the ball.

Would it be too much to speculate that the presence of LS Turney on the boarding party might have had something to do with the presence of the BBC – even to the point of this being the reason why the team was despatched on what, in hindsight, looks to be such a foolhardy mission?

Could that also explain why, after the event, the BBC downplayed Lambert's role, "demoting" him to captain of HMS Cornwall? After all, we would not want the public to know that, when it came to the Royal Navy boarding party, their journey was not exactly necessary.

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Twenty-five years on

It was pictures such as these that determined that there should be a task force. There was a palpable sense of outrage as we saw the Royal Marines of Naval Party 8901 surrendering outside Government House in Port Stanley. These were Royal Marines and there was no way that mere foreigners were going to treat them in that way. Nothing less than national pride was at stake.

Now, 25 years to the day, when the Argentineans were rash enough to invade the Falkland Islands, our Royal Marines are in peril again. Worse still, they are being humiliated again, paraded in front of television – this time the detachment leader Royal Marine Captain Chris Air.

This video grab taken from the Iranian Arabic-speaking television station Al-Alam shows Captain Air speaking in front of a chart of the Gulf waters, purporting to show that the British boarding party on 23 March was abducted in Iranian waters. Another officer, Lieutenant Felix Carman, was also forced to make an admission that the party strayed into Iranian waters.

Back in 1982, under Thatcher at the height of her powers, there was no question about public support for military action. Today, after four years of haemorrhaging lives in Iraq under a very different prime minister, now serving out the fag-end of his term, there is no appetite for similar action. In fact, the public - to say nothing of the British blogosphere - seems to be struggling even to take an interest in such matters.

We are a sadder, diminished nation as a result.

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Convincing only himself

One thing that has been absent from the media storm over the Iranian hostages is any significant input from the leader of Her Majesty's official opposition, the Boy King himself, David Cameron.

Largely, this is because the Boy has nothing worth saying but, if a further demonstration was needed of how far "project Cameron" has lost the plot on defence issues, one can go out and buy a copy of the low-circulation Sunday Express for an authored piece by the Great Leader. You will search in vain for it on the paper's website for it is not even important enough to place there.

Headed "why I will do more for our Armed Forces", the Boy starts with a "topical sob" about the hostages and then moves sharply into girlie mode, where he stays for the whole piece, barring one solitary paragraph.

There, "derivative" is the new black. The Boy's contribution to defence policy is to tell us that "our troops aren't always sent into battle with the proper equipment", then adding:

Last July I saw for myself the crying need for more helicopters to cope with the harsh conditions of Helmand province in Afghanistan.

In terms of timing, this has to be one of the worst calculated claims in political history – not that anyone will notice – for only last Friday, universally ignored by the media, the secretary of state for defence, Des Browne, announced that fourteen additional helicopters would be made available for use on military operations.

These include six new Merlin helicopters, obtained from the Danish who have agreed to wait for their batch, which will be available within a year. The other eight are the existing Chinook Mark 3 helicopters which, at the moment are languishing unused after botched "improvements" to make them suitable for the special forces. These are now to be retro-fitted with Mk2 equipment to allow them to be deployed on operations.

The saga of these Chinooks was outlined here (on the forum, strangely enough) and, faced with junking the aircraft altogether, this – at a cost in the region of £50m-£60m - was probably the best option.

Anyhow, for a complete package cost of around £230m, the RAF is acquiring a very substantial addition to its tactical transport fleet and, in the process, the Labour government has completely shot Cameron's fox when it comes to complaining about helicopter capabilities. Just to rub it in, the government's press release added:

Operational commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq have consistently and publicly confirmed that they currently have sufficient support helicopters to do the tasks required, although we can always do more with more. For example, Brigadier Jerry Thomas (Commander of British Forces in Afghanistan) has said, "Our success on operations would not have been possible unless our forces were properly equipped and supplied. To be clear, I have not asked for additional helicopters and the supply system is working well."

Cameron might have felt, therefore, that it was just as well he added insurance, also pointing out that the House of Commons Defence Select Committee "has highlighted the need for more heavily armoured vehicles to protect our troops from roadside bombs". But there again, with a substantial number of Bulldogs (pictured) already in service and the Mastiffs coming on stream, there is little force behind such a complaint.

That leaves one other – the Boy highlights the fact that, unlike personal weapons, body armour is not a permanent personal issue (it is allocated according to role). Big deal.

That, however, really is Mr David Cameron's sole contribution to any discussion on the equipment of the Armed Forces. Had he been more cute, he could have taken on the inadequate protection from mortar and rocket attacks on British bases – on which the government is still weak – and he could have taken on the issue of the provision of light assault helicopters.

That is a battle that the government has actually lost, yielding to the lobbying power of the RAF, which is reluctant to see the Army reduce its dependence on the boys in blue-grey, and the reluctance of unimaginative senior Army officers who are incapable of fully understanding the potential of organic air power.

The leader of an opposition party, though, might have been better off taking the high ground, commenting adversely on the government and military obsession with equipping the forces for the mythical European Rapid Reaction Force, instead of devoting energy and wealth to kitting them out to deal with the wars this nation is actually fighting, and needs to win. He could even have asked why the Navy in the Gulf was not equipped with patrol boats that can operate in the shallow waters of the northern continental shelf.

Apart from the fact that the Boy doesn't do "Europe", such a line would have actually required thought and understanding, and he doesn't do those either. Instead, we are back, for the rest of the article, to the retreat from defence.

For sure, what the Boy wants is good stuff, better medical facilities, for instance, better housing and his "Forces Families Manifesto". But it is also secondary. He writes glibly about the "contract" (not a covenant?) between the Armed Forces and the nation, but the most important way of keeping the bargain is to ensure that personnel are properly trained, suitably equipped, well led and operating to realistic rules of engagement, with good tactics and in formations structured to meet operational requirements.

By all means ensure that injured troops are properly looked after but, in the first instance, we need to focus on ensuring that as few as possible get killed or wounded. That is not only good sense, it is good politics.

But then, the Boy doesn't even do that. He finishes off his piece with the peroration, "Quite simply our forces are the best. And they and their families deserve the best". Interestingly, emerging from a discussion on the unofficial Army forum, not even our own Armed Forces thought they were the "best". As for deserving the best, most would be entirely satisfied with good accommodation, good wages and reasonable conditions.

In offering hyperbole instead of practicalities, Cameron convinces no one, except perhaps himself.

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More detail emerges

The Scotsman on Sunday adds an intriguing layer of detail to the incident on 23 March when the Iranian revolutionary guards abducted our marines and sailors.

According to Brian Brady, the political editor, the British boat crews "should have been only minutes from safety. "It now emerges," Brady writes, "they had even more protection nearby; an American military helicopter and patrol boat were within striking distance, ready - and willing - to help as the sailors were taken prisoner by Iranian Revolutionary Guards."

Sources in the US, he adds, have even suggested they were alerted to the drama by the sound of gunfire, though British authorities have refused to say if their forces were fired upon. As it was, it was only after the pair of rigid inflatable boats slipped out of contact with HMS Cornwall that the Americans were summoned - and by then it was too late.

Unfortunately, Brady then repeats the myths, stating that:

Moments after the British boats had been surrounded and captured by an Iranian force superior in numbers and weaponry, their commanders called on their allies, asking them to try to contact their crew. A British Lynx helicopter, charged with protecting the vessels, sighted one of them charging towards the Iranian coastline, with the seized seamen sitting in the front and Iranians at the wheel.

When the Cornwall finally established radio contact with one of its boats, it was confronted with a stranger speaking broken English. The crew were in no harm, he insisted - they were being "taken to a safe place". When the Cornwall's commanders protested, the radio went dead.

But what we have learnt – and it would be so refreshing if paid journalists kept up – is that the initial ambush was carried out by two Iranian vessels, light launches armed with machine guns.

On the face of it, the British actually outnumbered the Iranians in the first phase of the incident, and – in terms of number of weapons – outgunned them. Further, if the Iranians did strike, as we have been informed, as the British were disembarking from the freighter they were inspecting, the tactical advantage rested with the British.

With men on the freighter deck, they had the advantage of height, of a stable platform and, from the steel decks, some cover – and the ability to disperse, presenting multiple targets. From their vantage point, even with SA80s, they could have shredded the light, unarmoured Iranian launches.

Further, had the British craft been tactically deployed, only one of them at any time would have approached the freighter, the other standing off, guarding the embarkation/disembarkation process and keeping watch. Similarly, the embarked crew on the freighter should have been keeping watch, covering both the launches and the personnel carrying out the search.

Iranian vessels approaching the freighter, therefore, should have been confronted with aimed assault rifles from the freighter deck – each capable of automatic fire – and at least one of the Navy boats with armed personnel on board, capable of running interference.

The Navy craft – known as Rigid-hulled Inflatable Boats (RIBs), produced by VT Halmatic - are extremely fast (40 knots) and highly manoeuvrable. They were easily a match for the light Iranian launches and, handled skilfully, would have made extremely difficult targets.

Of course, we will not know exactly what happened until the British crew members are released – and perhaps not even then – so we cannot be too critical of them. On the other hand, though, on the facts as we know them, there are no grounds for suggesting that marines and sailors (or their officers) can be entirely exonerated.

What does come into focus, however, is a point we raised in the forum – that the policing of the Gulf is a coalition task, involving US, British, Australian and Iraqi assets. Since – or so we are told – the Cornwall could not stand off because of the shallowness of the water, did Commodore Lambert consider asking any of his coalition partners to provide cover, bearing in mind, as we are now so helpfully informed, that there were US naval and air assets in the vicinity?

Or was this yet another case of the soooo superior British military not needing help from the uncouth, gung ho Yanks?

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It's taken them long enough

I suppose they were going to get around to it eventually, and at last they have. The Sunday Times devotes its "Focus" piece to the issue of "Fifteen sailors snatched and publicly humiliated without a single shot fired," looking at "a shambles Britain could have avoided".

The newspaper refers to this incident in September where a small group of American and Iraqi soldiers had been patrolling near the Iranian border at Balad Ruz, 75 miles east of Baghdad. They had been "bounced" by Iranian soldiers but, fearing capture, the Americans had fought back and escaped unhurt, averting a potential hostage crisis.

By contrast, says the newspaper, the 14 British servicemen and one woman "proved humiliatingly vulnerable to a low-tech Iranian naval manoeuvre that has provoked mocking headlines around the world."

But, it adds, they should have been alerted months ago by the Balad Ruz clash and could even have read subsequent warnings – reported in The Sunday Times as recently as two weeks ago – that Tehran was threatening to kidnap "a nice bunch of blue-eyed blond-haired officers". The paper continues:

Such is the shambles that senior Royal Navy officers at the fleet's operational headquarters have been directed to review the rules of engagement for naval boarding parties. If necessary they will recommend changes to ensure Britain's forces are never again seized so easily without a shot being fired.

And, while there was no doubting the outrage shared by British ministers, it was equally clear by Thursday's cabinet meeting that Britain's big mistake was to have allowed the sailors to be captured in the first place.

With diplomatic efforts apparently stalling, attention is likely to return this week to how the Royal Navy, pride of Britain for at least 350 years, allowed this disaster to happen in the first place. Have we really sunk so low that we cannot fight off a few Iranian thugs in what amounted to little more than militarised speedboats?

The paper then cites John Pike, "one of America's leading military analysts", who "was similarly baffled that the sailors' home ship, HMS Cornwall, was up to 11 miles away, too far to offer immediate cover as the British inflatables searched an Indian freighter in a routine antismuggling check."

Despite all the evidence that Iran was looking to capture "blue-eyed officers", Pike is cited as saying, "there seems to have been a loss of situational awareness on the part of the folks on Cornwall that their boarding party could be snuck up on like that".

The British lapse was all the more surprising because the same thing happened in June 2004, when eight sailors and marines were seized in the same area and released three days later. The defence ministry compiled a "lessons learnt" paper to ensure that those mistakes were not repeated.


The Sunday Times says it has learnt that the paper highlighted the need for "top cover" for boarding parties, which should always have been covered from the air by the presence of a helicopter. The Cornwall's Lynx – armed with a .50 machinegun that could have caused serious damage to the Iranian fast boats – had apparently been overhead when the sailors boarded the Indian freighter.

Thus the paper asks, "Why did it turn back, leaving the sailors exposed?" The ministry initially said last week that it needed to refuel before retreating behind an insistence that there was no standard procedure for keeping a helicopter in place.

It also remained a mystery how the Cornwall's advanced radar and sonar systems failed to alert its crew to a problem. As a type22 frigate, the Cornwall has the capability to track ships up to 200 miles away. One recently retired naval officer said even basic navigation radar should have picked up motorboats at shorter range, assuming someone was looking out for them.

An official board of inquiry will ultimately be charged with examining the incident and establishing, among many other things, why no immediate effort was made to intercept the Iranians as they departed with their captives.

So much for The Sunday Times, but we also get a reference in The Sunday Telegraph which cites Maj Gen Julian Thompson, a former Falklands War commander, expressing fury at how the sailors surrendered to Iranian gunboats without a fight.

He is calling for a review of the Navy's rules of engagement. "In my view this thing is a complete cock-up," he says. "I want to know why the Marines didn't open fire or put up some sort of fight. My fear is that they didn't have the right rules of engagement, which would allow them to do this."

That plus Booker and the penny is beginning to drop, although the papers are well behind the curve. They have a lot of catching up to do.

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