The mincer of Sangin

Anthony Loyd describes the scene at Camp Bastion's hospital when the dead and wounded are brought in by a Chinook Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT).

After watching the proceedings and then watching young Afghan girl die (from suspected meningitis), "for an awful second," he writes, "I thought I might choke - an unforgivable act of weakness in front of the calm resolve of the young medics."

"Don't think we are immune from all this," says a medic as he walks away, as humbled as he can recall.

The MERT was back in action yesterday morning, with yet another three soldiers reported killed, bringing to the number of British soldiers who have died in Afghanistan since 2001 to 199 – one short of that "sad milestone" – the "magic" number which will trigger the media torrent.

Once again, with dreadful familiarity, these three were killed by an "explosion" while on foot patrol. Another dreadfully familiar word also crops up: "Sangin". With 168 killed in action (KIA), Sangin and its environs have accounted for at least 47 dead, more than a quarter of the total, making this district by far the most dangerous for British troops.

This was the town which from mid-2006 onwards was one of the famous four "platoon houses", occupied by 3 Para who mounted a spirited defence against sustained attacks from the Taleban. Then, in Aril 2007, with the help of the US 82nd Airborne – who carved out their reputation in Normandy and Arnhem (to say nothing of Bastogne and the Rhine crossing) – Operation Achilles was mounted, led by 42 Commando Royal Marines Battlegroup, the Estonian Armoured Infantry Company, and the Danish Recce Squadron.

At the time, Brigadier Jerry Thomas, Commander of the UK Task Force in Helmand, stated the aim of the operation was: "to clear the Taliban from the Sangin area and to re-establish the authority of the Government of Afghanistan in Sangin to create a secure, stable and prosperous environment in which reconstruction and development can take place."

On 30 May, Operation Achilles ended, with Operation Lastay Kulang (pickaxe handle) starting the same day, aimed at clearing out the upper Sangin valley. It was during this operation, which ended on 14 June, that a Chinook was apparently hit by an RPG round and crashed, killing five Americans, a Briton and a Canadian on board.

By early June though, the MoD was in a buoyant mood, claiming that the operation had "succeeded in squeezing the Taliban in the north and south of the Upper Sangin Valley into isolated pockets."

Lt-Col Charlie Mayo, spokesman for Task Force Helmand, declared: "By extending the authority of the Afghan Government and removing Taliban forces this operation will provide the security conditions for the redevelopment of the Upper Sangin Valley and further enhance Government influence across Northern Helmand."

This operation led to Operation Ghartse Gar, which commenced in July 2007, its objective: "to track down Taleban positions, taking the fight to the Taleban and clearing them out of Sangin," building on "the momentum and strategic success of Operation Lastay Kula."

In "pacified" Sangin, however, the Taleban simply moved back in, adopting their now standard techniques of mounting ambushes, using direct fire and IEDs. Fighting remained intense so that, by February 2008, six British soldiers had been killed in and around Sangin in just over a month. Yet another operation was mounted, this one called Ghartse Dagger, aimed at flushing out Taliban from a stronghold in the upper Sangin valley.

Supply convoys were being attacked and in July 2008 heavy fighting was reported with "at least 40 militants" killed in two days.

Nevertheless, the security situation remained tense, with the Army having to apologise in August 2008 for killing four Afghan civilians after troops had rocketed a building in which Taleban had been seen.

Despite this Ministers were citing the "relative stability" of the Sangin area as evidence that British troops were "winning the battle against the Taleban," only to have four Marines killed by a suicide bomb in December when they were approached by a 13-year-old boy pushing a wheelbarrow, which exploded.

This year so far has seen 17 British soldiers killed in the "relative stability" of the Sangin area, with attacks even being mounted close to the district centre (pictured). Then, on 10 July came the horrendous multiple IED attack which killed five soldiers.

So precarious had the situation become that troops holed up in Forward Operating Base Jackson had become entirely reliant on helicopter supply, with the giant Mi-26 helicopter being shot down less than a week later. A dispatch from Michael Yon made it very clear just how tenuous the hold on Sangin has become, in an area The Daily Telegraph reports as "one of the most heavily mined" in Afghanistan.

So it is that yesterday another three soldiers paid the price for "relative stability", the questioning of which defence secretary Ainsworth regards as "defeatist".

No doubt we can rejoice that the government objective remains "to clear the Taleban from the Sangin area and to re-establish the authority of the Government of Afghanistan in Sangin to create a secure, stable and prosperous environment in which reconstruction and development can take place."

But in the mincer that has become Sangin, three more soldiers will never see that happy event arrive.

COMMENT THREAD

A matter of interpretation

A tactical decision to pull some British units out of Sangin, in northern Helmand province, led to a surge in Taleban attacks in and around the town in which 14 British soldiers were killed by IEDs in five weeks.

Thus writes Michael Evans in The Times today, a report that can be interpreted at several levels.

The information comes from a "senior defence source", who says that to make up numbers for Operation Panther's Claw, units in Sangin were "thinned out". The Taleban had then suffered such heavy losses that they had looked elsewhere to see where they could inflict the most damage on British troops and selected Sangin for their attacks.

Ostensibly, this makes complete sense. That is what "guerrillas" do. If their enemy saturates one area with troops, the classic strategy is to move out and cause mayhem elsewhere.

That this was the dynamic at play is "confirmed" by Lt-Gen Simon Mayall. Commanders had used the resources available for the "main effort." "As a corollary, the Taleban moved elsewhere and they turned to Sangin," he says.

However, this may not be an accurate (or complete) explanation for what is happening. In Sangin this year, there have been 20 British fatalities. Six were killed prior to the start of Panther's Claw and 14 afterwards. But raw numbers do not tell the whole story.

Between 1 January and 19 June when the operation started, there were six attacks on British troops, giving rise to six fatalities. Three of the deaths were from shooting. Three were from IEDs.

After the start of Operation Panther's Claw, there were 14 deaths, but also six fatal attacks. The main difference was that all the attacks involved IEDs and three of them gave rise to multiple deaths: five, three and three respectively, accounting for 11 of the 14 deaths.

On the face of it, therefore, we are not seeing substantially increased Taleban activity in response to Panther's Claw, especially as half of the pre-19 June attacks took place in May, with one in early June.

What we are most definitely seeing, however, is a change in tactics. There is a greater reliance on the IED, with the use of multiple devices, and the sophisticated use of secondary devices, increasing the kill rate per attack.

Thus, while displacement of guerrilla activity is one thing, if the Taleban are increasing their kill rate for a roughly constant level of activity, this is a very much more serious development.

Unknown to us though is the number of unsuccessful attacks, those where injury and no deaths occurred, and those involving foreign nationals, which have not been factored into the story in The Times.

We do know from Michael Yon, however, that on 13 August, when three British soldiers were killed in one IED attack, there was another ambush which killed two interpreters. This was not recorded by the British media (or the MoD) – foreigners do not count.

This actually changes the arithmetic slightly, but we do not have enough information overall to draw definitive conclusions. But then, neither does The Times. Lt-Gen Mayall may know more, but he does not bring any facts to the table.

Crucially though, from what we know, we cannot assume that a reduction in troop levels in a particular location (and/or an increase elsewhere) is responsible for increased casualties. For all we know, more troops could have meant more patrols, more "targets" and more deaths. The precise situation, therefore, is not clear – to us, at least. It is a matter of interpretation.

COMMENT THREAD

Fine words ...

"I find it so distressing to hear lavish praise being heaped upon the procurement of vehicles that are potential death-traps and to listen later to expressions of condolence to the families of those who have perished in them."

So said Ann Winterton in a debate in the House of Commons on 4 June this year, but her distress might easily apply to the expressions so freely offered (and repeated) every time troops are killed.

"Fine words butter no parsnips" – a phrase which seems to have its origins in antiquity - seems an appropriate response to these gushing outpourings, so easily trotted out every time a soldier is killed.

Thus we see, yet again, the MoD website tell us that: "It is with great sadness" that it must confirm that one soldier from 3rd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment (Duke of Wellington's) and one soldier from 2nd Battalion The Rifles have been killed in Afghanistan.

The soldiers, we are told, died as a result of an explosion that happened whilst on a routine foot patrol, not connected to election security, near Sangin, northern Helmand province, on the morning of Thursday 20 August 2009.

Yet the "great sadness" phrase is just words, pulled off from a standard MoD template, to be pasted in against the details of whichever incident is then current.

Even now, the media team are rushing around collecting statements from the colleagues and relatives of the deceased, to paste into the increasingly lengthy eulogies that are in the process of being written, but they too will be just words. They butter no parsnips – they do not bring the dead back to life and nor do they prevent troops yet to die from being killed.

Furthermore, built into the brief announcement from the MoD is a "lie" – a circumlocution, if one wants to be charitable. The incident happened while the troops were "on a routine foot patrol" says the MoD.

We saw this "routine patrol" lie in November 2006 when the MoD described the deaths of four military personnel on the Shatt al-Arab waterway in Iraq in terms of them being engaged in "a routine boat patrol".

In fact, they were in a "water taxi", sent to their deaths, wholly unprotected when it was thought that this was the safest way of transporting personnel between bases. It certainly was "routine" – and that is what killed them – but it certainly was not a "patrol". These were lambs led to the slaughter.

Nor indeed was this current incident a "routine patrol" – at least, not wholly. In fact, according to Thomas Harding of The Daily Telegraph, it was not one incident, but three. The first may have arisen from such an event, although the whole idea of a "routine" is an anathema in counter-insurgency. Routines kill, as they did on the Shatt al-Arab.

The first soldier, writes Harding, from the 3rd Bn The Yorkshire Regiment, a unit sent out as emergency reinforcements to Afghanistan last month after the very high casualty rate this summer, was killed instantly after his foot patrol was targeted.

The second soldier, from 2nd Bn The Rifles, died as a force was sent out to retrieve the body of their dead colleague. Then, as the remainder of the force attempted to evacuate both fatalities a third device went off. Two soldiers were wounded in addition to the two killed in the attack, bringing the total number of British fatalities in Afghanistan to 206.

These facts immediately elevate the incident into a different league. We note that the location is what we have called the mincer of Sangin and that these two deaths bring the total in this area to 57, and this year to 22, with nineteen of them arising from IEDs.

With the grand total of 206 fatalities now recorded, an estimated 176 of these are KIA, which has Sangin and its immediate environs accounting for nearly a third of all deaths in action (32.4 percent).

That, in itself, is remarkable, as the area is often cited as one of the government's key targets for its "co-ordinated delivery of military and civil effect". Its aim has been "to provide a secure environment to allow stabilisation activity to take place", an aim in which it seems singularly to have failed, despite numerous intensive operations - although the MoD claims otherwise, one observer "noting" that ISAF is making "small baby steps" that, if continued, will soon pick up greater pace and confidence.

But what has marked out the most recent casualties – and magnified the rate of attrition – is the Taleban tactic of employing multiple IEDs in complex traps, with secondary devices aimed at killing rescue parties when they come to the aid of those caught in the primary blast.

With this current incident, this is the fourth time in the Sangin area since 10 July that troops have been caught out with fatal effect. That is not to say that similar tactics are not being used by the Taleban elsewhere – they are. Earlier this month we saw a soldier killed near Gereshk (although not so very far from Sangin) when he sought to recover an Afghan soldier's body. Then there was the incident in December 2008 when a soldier was killed after a complex ambush on a Viking near Lashkar Gah.

From other reports, though, it would appear that complex IED ambushes are now theatre-wide, these also having been experienced by USMC patrols further south in Garmsir.

Nor indeed is the slaughter confined to British troops. While we have lost 15 so far this month, the total losses for all coalition forces have now reached 50, not so very far short of last month's rate, when the total reached 76.

Public (and therefore political) acceptance of this continued toll of fatalities – which admittedly by contrast with previous campaigns is relatively modest – requires us to trust that the Army knows what it is doing, and the casualties are a necessary and unavoidable consequence of war, all in the context of the military making progress towards achieving its aims.

Sensitised by the saga of the Snatch Land Rover, however, and many other subsequent episodes where it has been demonstrated that the military (with or without the dereliction of the MoD – and it is difficult to assess where the responsibility lies) has been somewhat cavalier in its responsibilities, we are less than convinced that the Army has a grip on the situation.

Looking down from this end of the telescope – lacking the context and broader appreciation of the campaign in Helmand – all we see is a progression of casualties, some of which are evidently caused by the same Taleban tactic, for which the Army seems to have no obvious counter.

The Army response (and that of so many of its fellow travellers) is to retreat behind the wall of OPSEC (operational security) oblivious to the very obvious fact that the enemy clearly knows a great deal about its operations, with so many others directing sneering condescension at those who have the temerity to question or even doubt the wisdom and professionalism of "Our Brave Boys".

So often are our soldiers cast as "heroes" that there is virtually a cultural taboo against offering even the mildest criticism of soldiers, even though there is nothing particularly heroic about being blown apart by a hidden IED, or having limbs ripped apart. In fact, it is a squalid, miserable way to go.

Somehow, though, the military – or perhaps the politicians – are going to have to come to terms with the legitimate, but often overstated demands of OPSEC, and the need to provide enough information to assure its critics that the Army is responding effectively to the different threats in theatre, and is taking them seriously.

Fine words are no longer good enough – if they ever were.

COMMENT THREAD

Part XII: Putting it together

In December last, we were watching events closely in Afghanistan, as strong signals started emerging that the coalition forces were about to retake Musa Qala – vacated the previous year after a deal with the elders which ended up in the Taleban taking possession of the town.

Sure enough, the action did materialise culminating in news on 9 December that British, American and Afghan forces had taken possession of the town centre. By any measure, not least in the very light civilian casualty rate, this was a major success and one which we regarded as a turning point.

Someone else watching these events very closely was Barnett R. Rubin who, with Jake Sherman have written a report - to which we referred earlier. In their view, not only was this action a military success, it was a good example of how [properly] to integrate counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency – a sentiment with which we would agree.

The recovery followed, Rubin and Sherman wrote, "the pattern of putting access and security first, followed by interdiction and alternative livelihoods." They record:

The Afghan government and international forces carried out a joint political-military operation, gaining the support of a major Taleban commander (Mullah Abdul Salaam) and then defeating the remaining insurgents. Once in occupation of the district, government and international forces seized about $25 million worth of narcotics and destroyed over 60 heroin laboratories.

Confiscating products from the upper end of the value chain depended on regaining control of the territory. Had the government and international community engaged in forced eradication in Musa Qala before launching the operation, Mullah Abdul Salaam might not have changed sides, the local people might not have supported the government or remained neutral, and the district might have remained under Taleban control.

If eradication had destroyed locally produced raw opium, the Taleban-supported heroin laboratories could have purchased opium from other sources. Having first undertaken political and military measures to establish security in Musa Qala, however, Afghan and international forces were able to interdict high-value illicit products without harming rural communities. They now can help communities break their dependence on the drug trade.

It was interesting to note that, following the recapture, genuine attempts have been made to carry out reconstruction, led by the repair and upgrading of the road. There was also an undertaking given that the current crop of poppies would not be touched, even after the coalition forces moved in. Security has also been maintained with the positioning of a forward operations base with a permanent presence of British troops and a detachment of the Afghan National Army.

Shortly afterwards, British forces, bolstered by a substantial detachment of US Marines, were able to clear the Taleban from Garmsir. Again reconstruction is in progress, with a permanent troop presence.

Whether these situation can be maintained, however, remains to be seen. But, as Rubin and Sherman note, "Winning consent for counter-narcotics requires providing greater licit economy opportunities, and providing security for people to benefit from those opportunities," underlining the importance of holding the ground until the new economy takes root. However, they also add:

Scarce resources for coercion should be reserved for targeting political opponents at the high end of the value chain, rather than farmers and flowers.

If "take and hold" forms the first part of the strategy, then this offers the direction for the follow-up. Rather than chasing the farmers, the emphasis switches to finding and destroying the processing laboratories, intercepting the smuggling routes and disrupting the trade in opium and the heroin. This has the merit of drying up the flow of money which fuels the insurgency, without damaging the agricultural economy.

That said, the "take and hold" process itself requires "boots on the ground" and, once again in early July, we heard a familiar call, this one from Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, saying, "We have the ability in almost every single case to win from the combat standpoint … But we don't have enough troops there to hold. That is key to the future of being able to succeed in Afghanistan."

On the other hand, in the same week, we got US Gen. John Craddock, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, making his own declaration. The key to success, he said, was not winning by military means but focusing on development and governance.

Therein lies the essential dichotomy in the battle for Afghanistan. The military cannot win without "development and governance" but both require security on the ground before they can take root. On the other hand, the presence of foreign troops and the international aid effort themselves interfere with establishment of governance, if they undermine or replace existing structures. Once again, we seem to be going round in circles, creating the foundations for a no-win situation. We need to go back to basics.

Here, the report of an "Afghan citizen" on the Salem News website is highly instructive. In respect of the 2006 campaign, he (presumably) notes:

Many terrorists can easily get logistical support and places to hide themselves in Helmand, which local government security officials are believed to be linked to. In March 2007 Governor Wafa reported that approximately 700 terrorists from different countries like Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and etc., are in Sangin district. Now where did these terrorists come from and how did they arrive in Sangin?

He then observes:

Sangin district does not have any border with neighbouring countries, so if they have entered Afghanistan from Spin Boldak on the Kandahar border they have certainly crossed through many villages before they have arrived in Sangin, or if they entered from the southern district of Dishu in Helmand they have certainly crossed through Dishu, Khanishin, and Garamseir districts before they could get to Sangin.

These people are entering Afghanistan unknown across a border which the Afghan government claims is not secured, but the local districts and villages are under the control of the Afghan Government, so when these terrorists from different nationalities were crossing so many districts where was Afghan intelligence, the ANP and ANA? It is completely impossible that unknown people should cross so many villages and that the government which has intelligence, national police, and national army, should not be aware of it!

During the fighting in Kandahar during the summer of 2006, the Taleban fired an estimated 400,000 rounds of ammunition, 2,000 rocket-propelled grenades, and 1,000 mortar shells. These had arrived in Panjwai, a district in Kandahar province, from Qetta over the spring months. Ammunition dumps unearthed after the battle showed that the Taleban had stocked over one million rounds in Panjwai. Nato estimated the cost of Taleban ammunition stocks alone at around $5 million. "There is no way the Taleban could have done this on their own…", the Salem News correspondent writes.

Arguably, had the coalition forces known of these movements, they could have acted against them – and not necessarily with ground forces. The capabilities of Reaper and other UAVs armed with Hellfire missiles is well known, these assets providing excellent weapons against small, dispersed groups of men.

But, in the first instance, the coalition forces need to find out this information. The most cost-effective, if sometimes the least reliable source of that is known as HUMINT, human intelligence from local communities. The question is why they should give that information to forces which are seen to be propping up a government which has done nothing for them, and which threatens their economic survival.

Arguably, then, two issues arise. Firstly, in the absence of good intelligence from local communities, the coalition forces must generate their own. Secondly, the coalition forces must direct their activities at measures which create real growth in economic wealth for the populations in the areas in which they operate, in order promote a flow of intelligence.

This is not so much building trust or any sort of relationships between the forces, on the conventional "hearts and minds" basis. Rather, it is the more tangible process of demonstrating to local communities that their economic interests are aligned more closely with the government forces than they are the insurgents. As far as the military is involved, the activities, in the main, amount to road-building, the restoration of power supplies and then assuring the security of the road system – plus ensuring the protection of key economic assets.

As to direct intelligence gathering, the coalition forces have a considerable number of technical aids to assist them – everything from satellites, surveillance aircraft such as the Nimrod R1 and Rivet Joint, plus UAVs. The UAVs, in particular, have been introduced late into theatre and in insufficient numbers. Not for nothing did Craddock recently call for more UAVs, as well as more surveillance aircraft.

However, there is also great merit in the Winterton/Harding thesis (discussed in Part I) – based on the Rhodesian experience. This requires the use of small, long range patrols backed by their own organic air power in the form of light assault helicopters – which gather intelligence on insurgent movements and guide other forces (whether air power, heli-borne or ground forces) to engineer their destruction.

While one must acknowledge that the coalition forces do already carry out a considerable amount of intelligence-gathering, they have been notoriously reluctant to employ light helicopters, or to consider allocating these resources to deep reconnaissance units. Given the success in Rhodesia arising from their use, the case for them is unarguable. The Taleban and their supporters cannot be allowed to feel that there is any territory within Afghanistan that they can consider safe enough to operate openly.

Putting this all together, we can now – at last – begin to think of a coherent force structure, and start thinking of the equipment mix to match.

Taking it, if you like, in the order in which events will unfold (and have been unfolding), the first and most obvious priority is for "conventional" assault forces to retake areas which have been seized by the Taleban. However, with the recapture of both Musa Qala and Garmsir, and with no notable towns currently held by the Taleban, the need for such forces is limited.

Secondly, there is a need for engineers to construct forward operations bases for "garrison" troops, in which to maintain a presence in retaken territories, their purpose primarily to deny their use to the insurgents. Such activities are already well established in the coalition campaign, and therefore need little further exploration – other than to say that the use of Warrior MICVs has proved invaluable and, bearing in mind the Canadian experience on Operation Medusa, we could benefit from having a medium tank on the inventory.

From here, the primary tactic which seems to have been adopted by the British forces is then to extend the radius of the occupied perimeter, launching patrols and armed sweeps into hostile territory, the aim being to bring the Taleban to battle and then, gradually to pacify the area. The idea then – as with Laskar Gah, is that the centre can then be left free of coalition forces - relatively pacified area in which development can then take place.

It is our contention, however, that this strategy is not always the most effective. Extending the "perimeter" is time consuming and dangerous, and manpower intensive. As the area expands, the demand for troops then increases and the coalition forces find they need more and more troops just to keep the ground they hold. This is the problem highlighted by Admiral Michael Mullen. And, in the meantime, the Taleban move in behind to undertake asymmetric warfare, undermining the security of the areas and thus delaying (or preventing) reconstruction.

We would aver, therefore, that this strategy should not be attempted. As we have explored in earlier parts, the military should focus on the "reconstruction" programme. This, however, should be radically curtailed, basically focusing on three things – the building of a cohesive network of roads, developing and improving electrical power, and, in the central areas, building storage and distribution hubs, with an administrative and support base for agricultural officials and technologists – all directed at facilitating the export of high value produce.

The road programme should be published, signalled clearly in advance and either executed by the Army or managed by it and under its direct protection. Crucially, it should then be carried out, irrespective of the security situation. If the Taleban choose to interfere, and have the resources so to do, then that serves the purpose of bringing them to battle and weakening them.

Here, Gen. Petreus, in his counterinsurgency manual is very clear about the principles involved. The first is about managing expectations – the second is one of delivery. The coalition forces should not promise more than they can deliver but, having made promises, they should be kept, come what may.

In this context, the building of schools, community centres, mosques, and even wells and other civil works – not directly and immediately focused on generating wealth - should not be carried out by coalition forces or international agencies. Instead, communities should be encouraged to define their own improvements and to seek financing from their own government, either at local, regional or central level.

On the other hand, at political level, aid funds should be ring-fenced for such projects and perhaps paid after completion, on a reimbursement or match-funding basis. Alternatively, the National Solidarity Programme seems to have promise and could usefully be extended.

As to and when roads are completed and/or upgraded, coalition forces should then seek to assure security of transit along them and over the rest of the network. This may include preventing intervention by local police seeking to extract bribes and informal taxes. If necessary, the coalition forces should provide transport – or manage transport contracts – to ensure that communications are maintained.

Outside the hubs, one then sees a number of independent, free-roaming reconnaissance and interdiction forces – one (of two) of their objectives being to seek out organised Taleban formations and to destroy them. Numbers are not wholly the issue here – it is more a question of equipment and structure. As Craddock observed: "An infantry battalion in Afghanistan without tactical mobility, without intelligence support, surveillance capability, reconnaissance, is very limited".

The second objective needs to be more on police lines of tracing and intercepting the flow of money, opium processing, and the smuggling of drugs and guns. Inasmuch as these activities are carried out – or protected by – armed gangs, often with the support of the Taleban, it is difficult always to separate them from military action.

However, John Sullivan recently wrote an interesting paper on "Expeditionary Law Enforcement", where he advocated a "third force" in between the military and the civilian police, along the lines of European gendarme forces. This has interesting possibilities and could relieve some of the pressure on the military, while making up for some of the inadequacies of the Afghan civil police.

So, putting it all together, we believe, in summary, that the following changes must be implemented (or at least, considered and only rejected if proved unsound).

Firstly, the whole provision of aid should be reprioritised. By far the bulk should be directed towards rural reconstruction, specifically and tightly focused on generating high value agricultural exports. Aid to other activities should be curtailed and given only where necessary for the most basic functions of government to continue – with one exception. A major programme should be developed to set up and administer a taxation system which will allow the various levels of government to fund it activities from its own population.

Secondly, in contested areas – at the very least - where the military are directly engaged with the Taleban or other anti-government elements, the aid programme should be further curtailed, to the provision of vital reconstruction of the economic infrastructure, and then executed or managed directly by the military.

Third, in areas retaken from the Teleban and generally where there is a risk from armed intervention, resources should be directed at securing the communications network, enforcing security and ensuring the safe flow of traffic.

Fourthly, the military surveillance and reconnaissance capability should be greatly enhanced, while the Taleban should be harried and destroyed wherever it operates, by highly mobile independent teams, operating with their own organic air assets.

There is, of course, then the question of the "safe havens" for insurgent in both Iran and Pakistan, and the larger question of intervention by ideologically-driven foreigners who are using Afghanistan as an opportunity to confront and weaken (mainly) American and other coalition forces.

Here, we would argue that, while ideology is a factor in this current insurgency, a drive for economic prosperity amongst the rural communities – with real evidence of delivery – would do much to weaken the insurgency, and isolate the ideologues. The road to victory, as Petraeus would have it, is the battle to convince the population to "accept the legitimacy of the government mounting COIN and stop actively and passively supporting the insurgents."

A former US president put it more succinctly: "It's the economy, stupid". Economic regeneration is not an optional extra in counter insurgency, and nor is it something separate from, or subordinate to military action. It is an integral part of the whole. The military have to learn to deploy economic weapons with the same skill and dedication as they do their martial arts. Otherwise, all their skill and bravery will be for nothing. As Petreus warned, "lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain."

COMMENT THREAD

You can't say it's a victory

The British withdrawal from Sangin was formally announced yesterday by defence secretary Liam Fox to parliament. The date set for their departure is October. In the meantime, the theatre reserve battalion from Cyprus is to be deployed in the district, responsibility for which is to be handed to US forces.

This is the first major contribution by the Cleggeron administration to the conflict in Afghanistan, and one which is being interpreted as a major turning point which Kim Sengupta, writing in The Indpendent thinks makes it now America's war.

In some quarters, this move is being regarded as a defeat. The view of Col Richard Kemp, writing for Channel 4 News is that the Taliban would certainly attempt to present it as a defeat. Parallels are being drawn with our humiliating withdrawal from Basra, although the Americans reject the comparison.

Perhaps it has more in common with the retreat from al Aamarah, where an ill-equipped Army abandoned a city torn by tribal strife, not fully understanding the dynamics in which they had become involved. Certainly, Richard Norton-Taylor, in The Guardian, remarks that British intelligence had been unable to get a grip on the tribal structure in the area, making it hard to cut deals with the key players and therefore protect UK forces.

This is unsurprising as the tribal mix is unusually complex even for Afghanistan, and further complicated by the presence of the Alakozai tribe and the long-standing feud with Ishaqzai, plus the ever-present Kuchi, who remain a poorly recognised but important component of the insurgency.

Predictably, Richard Dannatt, in his new role as all-purpose media renta-mouth, is also on the case. And it says something of the media that they should continue to lionise a retired commander who has probably contributed more to our tactical if not strategic defeat in Afghanistan than any other man.

By his wilful failure to recognise and deal with the IED threat in a timely fashion, by his sloth in ensuring that sufficient of the right type of UAVs and other surveillance assets were made available in theatre - to say nothing of the helicopters - and particularly by his early misreading of the tactical situation and his espousal of FRES as a suitable weapons system, he ensured that our troops were ill-prepared to counter the threats to which they were exposed.

Nevertheless, the former CGS argues in The Daily Telegraph that since the USMC, now in considerable strength, has assumed operational responsibility for northern Helmand, it makes no sense to have a lone British battlegroup in the middle of the US area. Redeployment is an entirely logical move.

Despite this, he says, some will present the change as the Americans bailing out the Brits and some will choose to see it as the start of a wider British withdrawal.

He too sees the Taliban attempting to claim the move as a tactical victory. And, rather forgetting that he is no longer in the Army, where he can order people around, he states: "Those views cannot be suppressed in a liberal democracy such as ours, but they should not be allowed to gain credibility or traction. It is more important that the move be seen for the sensible development of the campaign that it is."

Whatever Dannatt might declare, there is a sense of defeat. With a multi-national force where contingents from different countries are used to operating side-by-side, there is no overwhelming reason why the British Army cannot work within a US zone. But it has clearly reached a limit to how many men it can feed into the mincer of Sangin, which it has long failed to understand and has had no idea how to deal with it.

Of course, there are those in addition to Dannatt who will seek to defend British performance, especially those who have had the dubious benefit of "being there". But – as we have pointed out here, such campaigns are not won or lost on the ground, but in the offices and minds of strategic commanders and their advisors. And it has long been evident that they have lost the plot.

Patrick Cockburn, in The Independent, argues that British troops were never geared up to make a lasting difference. There were never quite enough British troops to gain permanent control of Sangin, and the Taliban obviously sensed the vulnerability of British troops spread too thinly. Roadside bombs, he writes, could inflict a toll which was difficult to justify in terms of bringing an end to the war.

He is not the only one to argue that we never had enough troops, but we disagree. In just one one example (and there were many more), we showed that the lack of imagination and ponderous tactics led to excessive demands for manpower. Much could have been done, more effectively, with far less.

And nor can anyone assert that we are being wise after the event. We have been nothing if not consistent in our criticism of the lacklustre tactics, the inadequate equipment and the limited strategic vision. You cannot defeat an insurgency in a land of a thousand walls.

Nevertheless, this is not a strategic defeat in the mould of Iraq, where British forces scuttled out of the field of fire, leaving unprepared and ill-equipped indigenous security forces to face the insurgency. This time, the US forces have learnt their lesson.

While even now the British are still talking up their expertise in counterinsurgency, based on their Northern Ireland experience, they are regarded as unreliable, their experience irrelevant (not that they are actually implementing the lessons). They have thus insisted on an orderly hand-over rather than allow a moonlight flit and are now - as always - to do the heavy lifting.

Nor is the military getting any support from the population. Ben Farmer in The Daily Telegraph interviews Haji Akhatar Mohammad, from Bostan Zoi village near Sangin.

He says: "The British had been there for a long time. They were not helpful and there was no good result from them. They didn't understand the people and there was too much fighting." Now, adds the 45-year-old elder, "People are happy the British are moving."

Neither does The Guardian offer any comfort. Sangin's residents, it says, have criticised the planned withdrawal, complaining that four years of fighting have failed to bring peace or development. "The British have failed," says Haji Fazlul Haq, a former town governor. "They could not bring security to the town and that is why they are handing it to the Americans."

This " blunt assessment" says the paper, was shared by other residents who expressed greater confidence in US forces due to take control in November. "The Americans fight harder. I think the Taliban will be afraid of this change of command," said Haji Abdul Wahab, acting director of the peace commission of Helmand, a government body that promotes reconciliation.

Despite this, our military have learned something from Iraq: minor embarrassments like failure can easily be dealt with by removing the word "defeat" from the military vocabulary. They simply substitute words like "redeployment", "reorganisation", "force realignment" or "a sensible redistribution of manpower". This latter phrasing was how 13th Century Fox justified it, having learnt well the art of spin from the Labour government that previously he was so quick to deride

The establishment line, being touted by the BBC is that "the changes being unveiled will improve the effectiveness of the overall military effort." They won't, of course – not without a significant change in strategy and tactics. The US tactics are probably marginally better, but still not good enough and their strategic appreciation is probably as lamentable as that of their British counterparts.

The only significant difference, therefore, is that the US forces are better able to weather the running attrition. With more men in theatre, the number of body bags is not (yet) quite so critical.

That aside, however much British politicians and the military care to dress it up, even Con Coughlin admits it still doesn't look good. The mockery has already started and, if they do manage to avoid the taint of defeat, the military sure as hell cannot claim that this has been a victory.

COMMENT THREAD

Another one down

NATO says a helicopter has been shot down in the Sangin district. Four troops have been killed. The Taliban claims responsibility.

The Times is reporting that the aircraft was a US Blackhawk, attempting to pick up a British casualty. It came under fire around midday over Forward Operating Base Jackson, near the British-held town of Sangin.

With others, the BBC is reporting that the aircraft was brought down with an RPG and that it crashed in the Sangin district bazaar.

This seems almost an exact re-run of the Mi-26 downing in Sangin last July. It too was brought down by an RPG as it was approaching FOB Jackson - in apparently much the same area.

The current incident follows the recent downing of a Sea King as it came in to land at a checkpoint in Nad-e Ali, also struck by an RPG. The hit was described at the time as a freak "lucky shot." Five soldiers were injured.

However, since the soldiers in this incident are American and it was a US helicopter that was lost - albeit in a British area of operation, coming to the aid of the British - the notoriously parochial British media is barely reporting it.

It would have been a different matter entirely if a British helicopter had been shot down, and four Brits killed - but there you go. Who are we to question the news values of the British media?

COMMENT THREAD

Sodden and limp

In the aftermath of the British withdrawal from Sangin, we have considerable media comment, and a huge contrast of styles. Up front is the ponderous – some might say pompous - Max Hasting, in The Daily Mail. He says: "Blame the generals and politicians for this mess. But our soldiers can hold their heads up high."

Then we have the gung-ho Sun which blares: "Sangin: Our Boy's blood, their efforts, their victory." And just to make sure we get the message, it has that great strategist Andy McNab, who is now the "Sun Security Adviser". Continuing the joke, he tells us:

I AM fed up with armchair generals who say the handover of Sangin to US Forces is a British retreat. That is 100 per cent crap. We have moved out because at long last the 20,000 US 'boots on the ground' finally arrived.

The Scotsman has Clive Fairweather telling us that the handover is a sensible redeployment of our troops ... not a retreat. He then retreats behind a "premium" paywall, so we never get to see what he really thinks. And we care less.

In The Daily Telegraph we get some sensible pieces from Thomas Harding, but it is more reportage than analysis. And that is what is missing – decent analysis.

You couldn't call Hasting's piece "decent" analysis. His is lightweight extruded verbal material. You unroll it, tear it off by the yard and paste it in to fill the space. I'm getting rather bored with his pontificating.

I was mightily cheered, however, by an extract from Michael Foot's biography of Aneurin Bevan, who commented on the wartime coverage of military affairs – the Second World War, that is. "Immediately on the outbreak of war," he wrote, "England was given over to the mental level of the Boys' Own Paper and the Magnet". He continues:

The Childrens Hour has been extended to cover the whole of British broadcasting, and the editors of the national dailies use treacle instead of ink. If one can speak of a general mind in Britain at all just now, it is sodden and limp with the ceaseless drip of adolescent propaganda.

At least we can take some comfort in having been there before. I devoted a considerable amount of effort into evaluating the situation at Sangin in Defence of the Realm and was particularly proud of this and this.

But with a nation given over to a second childhood, still "sodden and limp with the ceaseless drip of adolescent propaganda," such grown-up analysis is a complete waste of time and energy. How much easier it is to cheer "Our Boys" to the rafters, and celebrate yet another victory.

COMMENT THREAD

Institutional inertia

Things are improving in Sagnin. From the desperate picture painted by Anthony Loyd earlier this month – referring to his experiences in August – we get a completely different "take" from Miles Amoore.

The district, Amoore writes, which has seen the vast majority of British casualties during the bloodiest summer of the eight-year war, is now the focus of operations to counter the IED threat. Helicopters, UAVs and aircraft, which were sucked into Operation Panther’s Claw around the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah during the summer, have been made available to Sangin.

The helicopters, in particular, have allowed commanders to launch Operation Storm: over the past two months troops have air-assaulted into areas that lie beyond the belt of IEDs ringing the army's main bases, moving behind the Taleban's frontline in an onslaught against known IED teams aimed at preventing them from setting their lethal traps.

"We have shifted our operational mentality," said Capt Tom Beasley, who manages operations for the 2 Rifles battle group in Sangin. "Patrolling and looking for a fight meant that we were hitting IEDs. It was not going to be practical unless we changed things. Operation Storm was a response to the IED belt getting so close it was foolish to keep pushing out, finding an IED and then the entire patrol revolving around that incident."

That is how it should be, of course, with different tactics evolving to counter specific threats – and from all accounts they are being relatively successful. Certainly, we have not recently been appraised of any casualties from the area so, mercifully, they seem to have worked.

However, although the new tactics were evidently resource-led, it has long been known that, as Capt Beasley admits: "Patrolling and looking for a fight meant that we were hitting IEDs." Pending the availability of resources, there had been nothing to prevent the Army adopting a more passive stance, to avoid the inevitable casualties.

Nevertheless, even if the Taleban have been thwarted in Sagnin, that does not mean the battle is over – far from it. The focus of attacks has merely shifted to a different location, the previously "safe" main base at Camp Bastion. First of all it was an attack on an RAF Regiment Vector, patrolling the perimeter.

Now, we learn that Guardsman James Hill, of the Coldstream Guards (pictured), who killed last week, had fallen foul of an IED emplaced near the entrance to the base's firing range. The attack, described as "an unprecedented breach of security", also injured ten others.

Hill was in a group of soldiers walking to the range, which is outside the main camp. A soldier is believed to have stepped on the pressure plate of a bomb, detonating it. Amid the confusion, it is claimed, a second bomb planted close by had also gone off, killing Hill.

If the location is different, the tactic of using primary and secondary bombs to maximise casualties, is precisely that which has been used to such devastating effect at Sangin. And if a technique works well in one location – from the enemy point of view – then it will be used elsewhere.

Nor, frankly, should the attacks have come as a surprise. We pointed out earlier the well-worn truism that guerrillas operate to a well-defined pattern, part of which is that they will probe for the weakest spots and exploit them.

The inevitable consequence of this is that, no sooner does the Army manage to suppress activity in one area, the enemy will re-appear elsewhere, its aim as always to kill and injure coalition soldiers with a view to weakening the resolve of the home front.

Here, then, we have a direct conflict between the McChrystal "strategy" of protecting the people – even if it means putting troops at risk to do so – and Taleban strategy of maximising troop casualties. If the coalition intends to pursue the McChrystal strategy, it will become a race against time as to whether it can prevail before the weight of casualties turn public opinion irrevocably against the campaign.

In this, the Taleban's advantages are the Army's slowness of response and its seeming inability to think ahead and pre-empt their next moves. This "institutional inertia" is an almost unavoidable feature of a lumbering, bureaucratic entity – and that is primarily what any modern army really is. A nimble enemy can invariably outwit and outmanoeuvre such a machine which, for all its size and sophistication, is surprisingly vulnerable.

Thus, while the Army sees "boots on the ground" as its greatest asset, the Taleban see not soldiers but targets. Still, though, the British high command is wedded to the idea of sending more troops to theatre and is complaining that the 500 uplift proposed – which is to be formally announced on Wednesday – is not enough.

Some of those troops, it is rumoured, are destined for Sangin, to deal with a threat that was rampant in the earlier months of this year. Others, no doubt, will have to be assigned to base protection at Bastion, to meet the newly emerging threat there. In time the Army will deal with that threat and contain it. But, by that time, the Taleban will have moved on to exploit another vulnerability.

This is a battle the British Army cannot win – as long as there is no tolerance on the home front for continued losses. Gen Sir David Richards, the newly-appointed CGS, recently spoke of the drumbeat of casualties, claiming that that "the Army was ready to bear the sacrifice".

It is interesting how the people who do not have to bear the direct personal brunt of the consequences of that "sacrifice" are so sanguine about bearing it but, that notwithstanding, the evidence is that the population at large is less inclined to allow it.

Unfortunately, "institutional inertia" may well ensure that it has no option in the short-term. But public opinion has an inertia of its own and, once set, it is very difficult to change. Then, the "drumbeat" will have to assume a different tempo.

COMMENT THREAD

The official version

Possibly stung by Michael Yon's trenchant report on the Battle for Pharmacy Road, the MoD has rushed out its own version of the operation, currently on its website.

The Yon version is better and much more detailed, but both bring something to the table. Neither, though, is complete and – it would seem – neither tell the full story of what happened or is going on. From the joint accounts, however, a picture begins to emerge which is more than a little disturbing.

The MoD account, by way of adding missing detail, tells us that the "battle" is codenamed Operation Flint and that 200 soldiers from 2nd Battalion The Rifles are involved, together with "experts from the Joint Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group". We also learn that this was one of two operations, the second being the clearance, a few days later, of a pathway known as "Route Sparta", also in Sangin. In total, 37 IEDs are discovered.

Interestingly, the MoD account relies on some of Michael Yon's photographs (some of which we have reproduced), acknowledging their source – which adds a further dimension to the apparent withdrawal of Yon's embed, after the publication of his despatch. The mystery deepens.

The MoD's account of the early stages of Operation Flint very much follows the narrative set by Yon, the MoD describing Pharmacy Road as "notorious", also telling us that it had "previously" claimed the lives of five soldiers in one day. This presumably is the incident on 10 July, when five were killed in the complex ambush.

Lt Will Hignett from 2 Rifles sets the scene, telling us: "The ground in Wishtan is made up of a maze of high compound walls and narrow alleyways. It is ideal for insurgents placing IEDs in cover and a real challenge for patrols trying not to get channelled or set predictable patterns for patrolling."

As to the operation, we learn that The Rifles surrounded the "one-kilometre stretch of road to provide cover for the specialist search and bomb disposal teams" and, as Yon describes, IED after IED is uncovered.

What then gets very interesting is the way that the MoD then describes (or more accurately does not describe) the blockage caused by two blown-up vehicles, about which Yon gives us some detail and provides photographs.

According to the MoD, the clearance teams, as they moved further down the road, "discovered the wreckage of two vehicles, clearly decimated by an earlier blast." The use of the word "discovered" is, to say the very least, puzzling. They did not know they were there? We are being fed BS.

Moreover, we are led to believe that the vehicles are "decimated by an earlier blast" – i.e., a single blast. Yet, we know from Yon that one vehicle is a "Jingle" – i.e., civilian – truck. The other is, from the look of it, an armoured wheeled loader. We know it is military – Yon tells us so - and, as a JCB (Yon calls it a "scooper") is part of the recovery effort, we are told (by Yon) that "the soldier who is driving the scooper is the same driver who got blown up on Pharmacy Road."

Putting the narratives together and making our own deductions, what appears more plausible is that the civilian truck was blown up and then, subsequently, the armoured loader was despatched in an attempt to clear the wreckage, only to get itself blown up.

Originally, we had assumed that this vehicle was another JCB but, on close inspection of Yon's photograph (above right), it appears similar to the much larger and better-protected Caterpillar loader - the very same type that the MoD are selling off (left). This might explain why the driver survived. But it also tells us the Army has a serious problem. At 37 tons, and a back wheel missing, this is serious heavy metal creating a major obstruction. (It could, however, be a Case 721B Medium Wheeled Tractor with a Penman armoured cab – weighing in at a mere 16 metric tons.)

With the two hulks blocking the road (and then booby-trapped), it must have been these which finally closed off Pharmacy Road, effectively isolating PB Wishtan, forcing it to be re-supplied by helicopter. And, when – as Yon but not the MoD tells us – a supply helicopter was attacked by an RPG, which cannot have been long after the Mi-26 had been shot down, one surmises that helicopter flights were suspended, leaving the base cut-off and under siege.

Thus, it would appear, Operation Flint was not simply a "route clearance" operation. It was an emergency relief force to break the siege of PB Wishtan, before its supplies ran out and it was over-run.

This is, effectively, borne out by the MoD itself, which tells us that, 22 hours after 2 Rifles deployed, the road was declared clear as the soldiers reached Wishtan. The rest of the night, we are then told, a "convoy resupplied Wishtan with everything from fridges to missiles." That detail is not mentioned by Yon.

That is what this convoy must have been all about. Several of the photographs show the convoy driving through Sangin market, which is the route to PB Wishtan from Jackson. We are looking at a relief convoy, breaking the siege – hence the elation of the Wimik driver.

Such is speculation, of course, but it all fits. And it explains the sensitivity of the MoD to Michael Yon's report – and its eagerness now to rush out its own version. The last thing the MoD wants is anyone to realise quite how desperate the situation really is in Sangin, with a Company base not three miles from the main FOB Jackson having been cut off by the Taleban.

That subsequently, the Taleban were effectively able to isolate FOB Jackson on election day also tells you a great deal about the security situation in Sangin, and the strength of the Taleban. Operation Flint – or at least the MoD version of it – seems to be hiding that in plain sight.

Things are perhaps now worse than even the growing casualty rate tells us. Yon got perilously close to revealing this.

COMMENT THREAD

The battle for Pharmacy Road

We have written a great deal of the situation in Sangin, deploring the growing toll of casualties in that town, the brunt of which are being taken by the 2 Rifles Battlegroup under the command of Lt-Col Rob Thomson.

Their headquarters are at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Jackson near the banks of the Helmand River just outside Sangin town, in the so-called "green zone", the lush area of vegetation fed by the river waters.

Embedded with 2 Rifles – until yesterday when his permission to remain was withdrawn by the MoD after he had posted this report – Michael Yon was able to describe in detail one small action, which I have dubbed the "battle for Pharmacy Road", the narrative here culled from Yon's much longer report.

The unpaved Pharmacy Road, flanked by 15ft-high baked mud walls forming the boundaries to sizeable compounds, starts about two miles to the south east of FOB Jackson - a route which passes through Sangin market. It runs east north-east connecting two secondary bases, about a mile apart (see above - note, this is not oriented north/south). At the western end is Patrol Base (PB) Tangiers manned by the Afghan National Army while, at the eastern extremity is PB Wishtan, named after the locality, occupied by C Company 2 Rifles.

Pharmacy Road, however, has effectively been closed by enemy harassment, including a blockage caused by two blown-up vehicles (a "jingle truck" and a British Army armoured JCB). IEDs are planted in broad daylight and the enemy chisels small firing holes through the walls and fires bullets down the tight spaces and alleyways.

Resupply and troop movements, therefore, had to be performed by helicopter, even though a patrol could walk from Jackson to Wishtan in an hour and straight driving would only take fifteen minutes. With the shortage of helicopters (and the fact that an RPG was recently fired at a helicopter as it lifted out of PB Wishtan), closure of the road increased enemy freedom of movement while decreasing that of the British and Afghan forces.

The British soldiers of 2 Rifles were thus given a mission: clear and hold. The task is not easy. With no direct line of sight from one end of the road to the other, and a network of narrow alleys between compounds, giving ambush opportunities to the enemy, the troops will be hemmed in by the high walls.

Snipers are of little use because they can neither see nor shoot through the walls, which are so robust that even 30mm cannon rounds fired from aircraft will not penetrate. A 500lb bomb exploding in the middle of a compound will leave the walls standing. And there is no commanding terrain other than the air.

The mission began under cover of darkness, the troops equipped with night vision goggles and led by a soldier with a sniffer dog.

"We set off down the market road," Yon writes. Then, in an oblique reference to his MoD "minders" – who were subsequently to pull the plug - he adds: "Some folks believe such reports are 'security violations', as if the thousands of people living here do not know exactly where the bases are, or do not know exactly where we came from and went to. Operations take place here every day. Civilians are everywhere."

Despite being observed by so many civilians, the troops, Yon still with them, reach PB Tangiers with no dramas. Some Afghan soldiers were on guard there, while others seemed comatose.

With the troops is Cpl Mark "Axle" Foley, the JTAC who controls air strikes. He is allocated support from A-10s but about 0314, as they approach, still about 40 miles out, they are called away for a TIC (troops in contact) somewhere in South Helmand. The men bed down to sleep.

It is not until nearly half past five in the morning that ordnance clearance (EOD) teams start moving down the road, clearing IEDs with controlled explosions – dealing with six in the space of an hour. They have a soldier with a sniffer dog with them. This is not entirely successful, leading his handler at one stage over an undetected pressure-activated IED.

With one stretch "cleared" - there have been many instances where soldiers heve been blown up by ground that has just been cleared, so cleared is more like "cleared" - Lt-Col Rob Thomson leads some of his men to check the progress in clearing some of the most dangerous ground, where the blown-up vehicles are blocking the road.

The plan to clear the blockage is ingenious. The area surrounding the vehicles is booby-trapped with explosives, and the wrecks themselves also are booby-trapped. So, instead of trying to drag the vehicles the length of the road, the goal is to blow down the wall of the adjoining compound and drag the vehicles off the road and into this compound.

About 200lb of plastic explosive is used to make a breach. This also brings down electrical wires so the breach is widened with an armoured JCB, to allow a heavy truck through into the compound, which is used to winch the wires clear. Then the wrecks are dragged into the compound and the way is now clear for the EOD teams to continue.

That night, however, the troops stay in the compound, the aim being to build a permanently manned observation post halfway down the road. Yon sleeps while soldiers from 2 Rifles and the engineers work all night erecting the sanger (guard post).

As the sun was rising on the second day, Pharmacy Road had been cleared and the sanger had been built. Yon and most of the troops headed back to FOB Jackson. Back at the base, an explosion shook the room. Word came that a local person was pulling parts from one of the vehicles that were dragged off Pharmacy Road. He encountered a Taleban booby-trap and he had been killed.

EOD had not cleared the vehicles of booby-traps; the two vehicles had merely been pulled off the road. Next day another local was killed on a parallel road that he thought the British had cleared. It had not. The Taleban blows up a lot of local people in Sangin, writes Yon.

The mission was an obvious success. It was surprising, Yon adds, that we endured no fatalities or serious injuries. The mission was well-executed and since many of the soldiers have substantial combat experience from Iraq and Afghanistan, major dramas were averted.

Although at least one IED has been placed on the road since, C Company and the ANA are now regularly patrolling and the freedom of movement has resumed. This is a brutal fight. Since that mission, eight more British soldiers and two interpreters have been killed in the area. That's ten KIA plus the wounded. The soldiers keep going.

COMMENT THREAD

On our way out?

With yet another three soldiers reported killed in Sangin, bringing the total up to 204, the Scottish Daily Herald is reporting on a UK opinion poll on our involvement in Afghanistan.

From this we learn that some 57 percent believe British forces should not be in Afghanistan at all, only 13 percent think it is "very clear" why the UK military is there and 82 percent say the UK Government is not doing enough to support our troops. Undoubtedly, sentiment has been heavily influenced by the rush of casualties over the last two months and, as public opinion hardens, the opposition to our continued presence is only likely to increase.

But, if The Daily Telegraph is any guide, the growing public wish for withdrawal might come sooner than expected. Defence secretary Bob Ainsworth, it appears, is telling us that the mission in Afghanistan could largely be concluded as soon as 2010.

That the mission was to undergo fundamental changes was in fact signalled by Gordon Brown in his announcement on the AF/PAK strategy at the end of April, where he intimated that, from the autumn, greater effort would be devoted to training and mentoring Afghan security forces, with a view to an accelerated hand-over of responsibilities to them.

Whether this is realistic in view of the known inadequacies of the Afghan forces is moot, but it provides a political figleaf to cover our progressive disengagement, much as we did in Iraq, enabling us to declare a "victory" and leave with the flags flying.

In fact, according to Mick Smith in The Sunday Times, there are other pressures in theatre which may lead us to disengage even faster. These are coming from the Americans who are expressing their concern about the inability of the British to hold and stabilise Musa Qala district, in addition to their current commitments in the so-called green zone.

Following Operation Panther's Claw, which had British troops "clearing" the Taleban from 150 square miles of the green zone north and northwest of Lashkar Gah, troops have been left exhausted and there are barely enough men to mount "framework patrols" to secure the area.

Thus, the US forces are taking a more and more active part in operations, even to the extent of sidelining the British command structures, centred on the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood, west London. In theory PJHQ controls all British military operations abroad, but is increasingly toothless. With the Americans taking control of most of Helmand, it has lost much of its role.

That much is evident to the west of Musa Qala where, this weekend US Marines and Afghan officials completed yet another operation in Now Zad, this time hoisting the Afghan flag over the deserted town (pictured). Through the week, 400 Marines, with 100 Afghan troops had been taking part in operation Eastern Resolve II and are mow claiming to have regained control of the district.

Until recently, the US Marines have had only a tenuous grip over the district, taking considerable casualties, with a lone company responsible for policing the area.

Now Zad was, of course, one of the four original British "platoon houses", which included Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qala. Now the US has taken total responsibility for Now Zad, if Musa Qala is also taken over, then half of the "outstations" held by the British will have gone.

But, if the casualty rate at Sangin - with over 50 dead - continues, it will only be a matter of time before there are serious questions as to whether holding this district is tenable by British forces. Certainly, it cannot be long before the media focuses on this area and the toll it is extracting, creating a situation where US forces might feel impelled to move in and then, eventually, take over.

By slow progressive moves, therefore, British involvement – at least in terms of the areas occupied – could gradually be scaled down, leaving a situation where one can imagine that the force is concentrated on Lashkar Gah and then Bastion, before retreating entirely to barracks and thence onto the ramps for the final airlift which will take them back home - and military oblivion.

The likelihood is that Gordon Brown's administration is unlikely to see this end game but Brown's successor will almost certainly see it to fruition. There is no longer any appetite for this war, either in the British public or even in the military – and the current casualty rate is politically unsustainable. Despite the analysis from Michael Evans in The Times, given a figleaf by the Americans, we will be gone.

COMMENT THREAD